Multiple memory systems: contributions of human and animal serial reaction time tasks by Christie, Michael Alexander
Multiple Memory Systems: 
Contributions of Human and Animal 
Serial Reaction Time Tasks. 
 
 
 
A thesis 
submitted in partial fulfilment 
of the requirements for the degree 
of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in the 
University of Canterbury 
by 
Michael A Christie 
 
 
 
University of Canterbury 
2001 
   - 2 -  
 
 
 
Contents 
 
List of Figures………………………………………………………..……………IV 
List of Tables……………………………………………..……….………………VII 
Acknowledgements……………………………………………....………………IX 
Abstract……………………………………………………………..…….…………X 
 
Chapter 1 : An Introduction to Multiple Memory Systems…………………1 
1.1 The History of Multiple Memory Systems………………………………….…2 
1.1.1 Multiple Memory Systems Prior To H.M……………………………….2 
1.1.2 Multiple Memory Systems During the 1950’s and 1960’s……………3 
1.1.3 The History of Multiple Memory Systems Post 1970…………………4 
1.2 Neurobiological Evidence for Multiple Memory Systems in Humans..….…5 
1.2.1 Skill Learning.………..………..………………………………………7 
1.2.2 Priming And Evidence Of Multiple Systems……….………………8 
1.2.3 Interim Conclusions of Human Studies……….…………..………10 
1.3 The Evolutionary Likelihood of Multiple Memory Systems.…………….…11 
1.3.1 Sherry and Schacter and the Evolutionary Likelihood of  
Multiple Memory Systems……….………..………………………11 
1.3.2  Reber and the Evolution of the Cognitive Unconscious.………16 
1.3.3 General Conclusion on the Evolutionary Support for Multiple 
Memory Systems……….………..…………………………..….…20 
1.4 Criticisms Of The Multiple Memory Systems Approach; Shanks And St. 
John And The Question Of What Is Learned During Supposed Implicit 
Learning.……….……………………………………………………………20 
1.4.1 Single Dissociations, Awareness and The Information and 
Sensitivity Criteria.……………………………….………..…….…21 
1.4.2 The Dangers of Overly Stringent Application of Criteria.………24 
1.4.3 The Utility of Amnesic Subjects in Memory Studies.………...…26 
1.4.4 Conclusions on Shanks and St. John.………………………...…28 
   - 3 -  
 
1.4.5 General Conclusions On The Evidence For Multiple Memory 
Systems.……….…………………………………………...………29 
1.5 General Aims of the Thesis.………..………..………………..……..………30 
 
Chapter 2 :  The Serial Reaction Time Task: A Non-declarative  
Memory Test……………………………………………….………31 
2.1 Introduction to The Serial Reaction Time Task.………..………..…………32 
 2.1.1 Standard Methodological Features of SRT studies.…………..…33 
2.2 Neuropathology and the SRT.………..………..……………………….……34 
 2.2.1 Limbic System Amnesia and the SRT.………..………..…………34 
2.2.2 Basal Ganglia Syndromes and the SRT.………..…..……………46 
2.2.3 The SRT And Other Forms Of Neural Impairment.…………...…51 
2.2.4 Conclusions on Neuropathology and the SRT.………………..…56 
2.3 Methodological Variations and SRT Performance.…………….………..…56 
 2.3.1 The Role Of Attention In The SRT.……………………………..…57 
 2.3.2 Neuroimaging and the SRT.………………………………….….…62 
2.3.3 The Effect Of Sequence Structure On SRT Performance………66 
2.4 Methodological Concerns; Measuring Explicit Sequence  
Knowledge in the SRT.………..…..………………………………………75 
2.5 Other Methodological Factors.………………………………...…..…………77 
2.6 Shanks and St. John (1994) Revisited.………………..……..…..…………78 
2.7 General Conclusions.………..…..……………………………………………85 
 
Chapter 3 : A Meta-Analysis of the Human SRT Literature.………………88 
Method.………..…..………..…..…………………………………..………94 
Results and Discussions....……………………………………...………100 
Analysis of Part 1....………………………………………………………100 
Discussions of Part 1....………………………………………….………111 
Analysis of Part 2....……….………………………………………..……115 
Discussions of Part 2....………………………………………….………129 
General Discussion....……….………………………………………..…132 
 Recommendations for Future Research.……………..……….………141 
 Appendix to Chapter 3....………………………………….…….………145 
 
Chapter 4 : An Introduction to Multiple Memory Systems in Animals..152 
   - 4 -  
 
 4.1 Evidence of Multiple-Memory in Animals....……….………………153 
4.2 Animal Analogues of Human Memory Tasks....…….….…………161 
4.3 Conclusions....……….……………………………………….………165 
 
Chapter 5 : The Fan-Maze Serial Reaction Time Task....…………………167 
 Methodology....……….……………………………………………..……170 
 Results....………………………………………………………….………173 
 General Discussion....……………………………………..…….………179 
 
Chapter 6 :  The Intracranial Self-Stimulation Serial Reaction Time  
Task: A Control Group Study....……………………...………183 
 Method....……….…………………………………………………………190 
 Results....……….…………………………………………………………199 
  Log Reaction Time.……………………………...……….………199 
  Error Measure....………………………………………….………203 
 General Discussion....……………………………………………………206 
 Appendix to Chapter 6....………………………………………...………208 
 
Chapter 7 :  The Intracranial Self-Stimulation Serial Reaction Time  
Task: A Lesion Group Study..………………..……….………209 
 Experiment 1 The Rat ICSS-SRT Task....………………….….………211 
Method....……….…………………………………………………211 
Results....……….…………………………………………………214 
General Discussion of Experiment One..……..……….………225 
 Experiment 2 The ICSS 16-Hole Board Task....………...…….………227
  Methods....……………………………………….………..………228 
  Results....………………………………………….………………233 
 General Conclusions of the Chapter....………………..……….………238 
 
Chapter 8 : General Discussion and Conclusions.….…..……….………241 
 General Contributions....……….……………….………………….……241 
 Theoretical Contributions....………………………………………..……242 
Contributions of the Meta Analysis....…………………….…….………243 
 Behavioural Contributions of the Current Research....……….………245 
 Neurobiological Contributions of the Current Research..……….……248 
   - 5 -  
 
Unresolved issues and Future Research..……………………….……258 
 Conclusions....……………………………………………………….……250 
 
References..…………………………………………………..………...….……255 
   - 6 -  
 
List of Figures 
 
Fig. 2.1, The Performance of Alzheimer’s Disease and Control Subjects  
in a SRT Task (Data drawn from Knopman and Nissen, 1987) ………36 
Fig. 3.1, Plot of individual effect sizes for all studies included in Part 1 of  
the meta-analysis. All points are g-values (uncorrected for sample  
size) for individual studies and d-values (corrected for sample size)  
for composite effect sizes. Bars are 95% confidence intervals.  
Smaller confidence intervals generally reflect studies with larger  
sample sizes..………………………………………………………………103 
Fig. 3.2, Mean Effect Sizes And 95% Confidence Intervals For The  
Severity Of Dementia Subset And Moderator Analyses……………….109 
Fig. 3.3, Mean Effect Sizes And 95% Confidence Intervals For The  
Degree Of Explicit Sequence Knowledge For Neuropathological 
Subjects Subset And Moderator Analyses……..……………………….110 
Fig. 3.4, Plot of individual effect sizes for all studies included in Part 2 of  
the meta-analysis. All points are g-values (uncorrected for sample  
size) for individual studies and d-values (corrected for sample size)  
for composite effect sizes. Bars are 95% confidence intervals.  
Smaller confidence intervals generally reflect studies with larger  
sample sizes………………………………………………………………..118 
Fig. 3.5. Mean effect sizes and 95% confidence intervals for the severity  
of dementia subset and moderator analyses………………………...…124 
Fig. 3.6. Mean effect sizes and 95% confidence intervals for the degree  
of explicit sequence knowledge of neuropathological subjects  
subset and moderator analyses………………………………………….125 
Fig. 3.7. Mean effect sizes and 95% confidence intervals for the degree  
of explicit sequence knowledge of control subjects subset and  
moderator analyses………………………………………………………..126 
Fig. 3.8, Mean effect sizes and 95% confidence intervals for the age  
subset and moderator analyses…………………………………………..127 
Fig. 3.9, Mean effect sizes and 95% confidence intervals for the Subjects  
On / Not On Medication During SRT Performance subset and  
Moderator analyses…………………………………..……………………128 
Fig. 5.1, A Schematic of the 15-hole Fan-Maze………………………………171 
   - 7 -  
 
Fig. 5.2, Log-RT scores across sessions (error bars ± 1 SEM)……………..175 
Fig. 5.3, Assistance and interference effects for the Log-RT measure  
when switching to / from a block of random sequence sessions  
(error bars ± 1 SEM………………………………………………………..176 
Fig. 5.4, Percentage number of correct trials per session across all  
sessions (error bars ± 1 SEM)…………………………………………....177 
Fig. 5.5, Assistance and interference effects for the percentage number  
of correct trials per session when switching to / from a block of  
random sequence sessions (error bars ± 1 SEM)………………………178 
Fig. 6.1, Photograph of the ICSS-SRT chamber inside the ICSS-Training  
box, all nose-pokes are lit for the purpose of the photo………………..192 
Fig. 6.2, Photograph of 2-hole ICSS-training box. Both nose-pokes are lit..193 
Fig. 6.3, Example of a Rate Response Function (values averaged over  
trials)…………………………………………………………………………195 
Fig. 6.4, Average Stimulation Values (µa) per Group Used in SRT  
Sessions (Error bars ± 1 SEM)…………………………………………..199 
Fig. 6.5, Average Log-Reaction Time per Trial across Non-Interference Blocks 
(Error bars ± 1 SEM). ‘Thirds’ refer to the portion of single sessions only. 
Session numbers are relevant to the triple session conditions only. 
Session 3 only includes three blocks because the  
fourth block is the interference effect block (if appropriate to group 
condition) which is reported separately……………………….…………200 
Fig. 6.6, Data aggregated according to Number of Sessions (Error bars  
± 1 SEM). ). ‘Thirds’ refer to the portion of single sessions only.  
Session numbers are relevant to the triple session conditions only….202 
Fig. 6.7, Change in Average Log Reaction Time per Trial after switching  
to a Random Sequence (if appropriate; Error bars ± 1 SEM)…………203 
Fig. 6.8, Average Number of Errors per Trial across Non-Interference  
Blocks (Error bars ± 1 SEM). ‘Thirds’ refer to the portion of single 
sessions only. Session numbers are relevant to the triple session 
conditions only. Session 3 only includes three blocks because the  
fourth block is the interference effect block which is reported  
separately………………………………………………………………...…204 
Fig. 6.9, Error Rate Data Aggregated According To Number-Of-Sessions 
(Error Bars ± 1 SEM)………………………………………………………205 
   - 8 -  
 
Fig. 6.10, Change in Average Number of Errors When Switched to a  
Random Sequence (if appropriate: Error bars ± 1 SEM)………………206 
Fig. 6A.1, Schematics of representative ICSS electrode tip placements  
in the rat brain. All brain images are 2.6mm posterior to Bregma.  
Brain sections are adapted from Paxinos and Watson (1986)………..208 
Fig. 7.1, SRT4; Average Log Reaction Time per Trail Across Blocks  
(Error bars ± 1 SEM)……………………………………………………….215 
Fig. 7.2, SRT4; Change in Average Reaction Time When Switched to  
a Random Sequence (Error bars ± 1 SEM)……………………………..216 
Fig. 7.3, SRT4; Average Error Rate per Trial Across Blocks (Error bars  
± 1 SEM).……………………………………………………………………217 
Fig. 7.4, SRT4; Change in Average error Rate When Switched to a  
Random Sequence (Error bars ± 1 SEM)..……………………………...218 
Fig. 7.5, SRT8; Average Log Reaction Time per Trial Across Blocks  
(Error bars ± 1 SEM)..……………………………………………………..219 
Fig. 7.6, SRT8; Change in Average Reaction Time When Switched to a 
Random Sequence (Error bars ± 1 SEM)……………………………….219 
Fig. 7.7, Average Log Reaction Times for the Last 14 Blocks of the  
Session………………………………………………………………………220 
Fig. 7.8, SRT8; Average Error Rate per Trial Across Blocks (Error bars  
± 1 SEM)…………………………………………………………………….221 
Fig. 7.9, SRT8; Change in Average Error rate When Switched to a  
Random Sequence (Error bars ± 1 SEM)……………………………….222 
Fig. 7.10, SRT12; Average Log Reaction Time per Trial Across Blocks  
(Error bars ± 1 SEM)………………………………………………….……223 
Fig. 7.11, SRT12; Change in Average Reaction Time When Switched  
to a Random Sequence (Error bars ± 1 SEM)……………………….….224 
Fig. 7.13, SRT12; Change in Average Error rate When Switched to a  
Random Sequence (if appropriate: Error bars ± 1 SEM)………………225 
Fig. 7.12, SRT12; Average Error Rate per Trial Across Blocks (Error  
bars ± 1 SEM)………………………………………………………………229  
 
 
Fig. 7.14, The 16-hole holeboard with behaving rat. Note: the brighter  
nose-pokes are still illuminated whereas the dimmer nose-pokes  
   - 9 -  
 
are unlit having been extinguished after a successful nose-poke…….229 
Fig. 7.15, A schematic of the arrangement of the holeboard room  
(not to scale)………………………………………………………………..230 
Fig. 7.16, Average Number of Working Memory Errors Across blocks  
(Error bars ± 1 SEM)………………………………………………………234 
Fig. 7.17, Average Number of Reference Memory Errors Across blocks  
(Error bars ± 1 SEM)………………………………………………………234 
Fig. 7.18, The Mean Total Number of Errors Made per Session (Error  
bars ± 1 SEM)………………………………………………………………235 
Fig. 7.19, Average Time Taken to Complete a (4-hole) Trial (Error  
bars ± 1 SEM)………………………………………………………………236 
Fig. 8A.1, Schematics of representative ICSS electrode tip placements  
in the rat brain. All brain images are 2.6mm posterior to Bregma.  
Brain sections are adapted from Paxinos and Watson (1986)……….240 
Fig. 8A.2, Schematic of the rat brain detailing the location and extent  
of lesions for; A) the caudate lesion group, and B) the  
hippocampal lesion group. All distances given are anterior /  
posterior from Bregma. Note. Caudate lesion sections are drawn  
from an examination of all caudate lesions included in the analysis, 
whereas Hippocampal lesion sections are drawn from an  
examination of 11 of the 15 hippocampal lesions rats included in  
the analysis. Dark areas indicate maximal lesion extent, light areas 
indicate minimal lesion extent. Brain sections are adapted from  
Paxinos and Watson (1986)………………………………………………241 
 
   - 10 -  
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 2.1, A Table of Transition Probabilities for Knopman and Nissen’s  
10-trial Sequence: DBCACBDCBA………………….…………………….71 
Table 3.1, Stem-and-leaf display of 22 effect sizes for Part 1:  
Interference Effects for Neuropathological Subjects Only……………..101 
Table 3.2. Summary Statistics for the Statistical Power Analysis for  
Part 1 (all power values expressed as a percentage)………………….102 
Table 3.3. Breakdown of the Statistical Power Analysis for Part 1 by  
Meta-Aetiological Category (all power values expressed as a 
percentage)…………………………………………………………………102 
Table 3.4, Overall Meta-Analytic Result……………………………………….104 
Table 3.5, Aetiological Meta-Category Moderator and Subset Analyses…..105 
Table 3.6, Aetiology Moderator and Subset Analyses……………………….106 
Table 3.7, Aetiology Moderator and Subset Analyses for LSN subjects  
only…………………………………………………………………………..106 
Table 3.8, Aetiology Moderator and Subset Analyses for BGN subjects  
only…………………………………………………………………………..107 
Table 3.9, Aetiology Moderator and Subset Analyses for ON subjects  
only…………………………………………………………………………..107
Table 3.10, Moderator and Subset Analyses for the Severity of Dementia..108 
Table 3.11, Moderator and Subset Analyses for degree of Explicit Sequence 
Knowledge…………………………………………………………………..109 
Table 3.12, Stem-and-leaf display of 22 effect sizes for Part 2: The  
difference in Interference Effects Between Neuropathological and 
Control Subjects…………………………..………………………………..115 
Table 3.13. Summary Statistics for the Statistical Power Analysis for  
Part 2 (all power values expressed as a percentage)………………….116 
Table 3.14. Breakdown of the Statistical Power Analysis for Part 2 by  
Meta-Aetiological Category (all power values expressed as a 
percentage) ……………………………………………….………………..117 
Table 3.15, Overall Meta-Analytic Result…………………...…………………119 
Table 3.16, Aetiological Meta-Category Moderator and Subset Analyses…119 
Table 3.17, Aetiology Moderator and Subset Analyses……………………...120 
Table 3.18, Aetiology Moderator and Subset Analyses for LSN subjects  
   - 11 -  
 
only…………………………………………………………………………..121 
Table 3.19, Aetiology Moderator and Subset Analyses for BGN subjects  
only…………………………………………………………………………..122
Table 3.20, Aetiology Moderator and Subset Analyses for ON subjects  
only………………………………………………………………………...122
Table 3.21, Moderator and Subset Analyses for the Severity of Dementia..123 
Table 3.22, Moderator and Subset Analyses for degree of Explicit  
Sequence Knowledge for Neuropathological Subjects………………...124 
Table 3.23, Moderator and Subset Analyses for degree of Explicit  
Sequence Knowledge for Control Subjects…………………….……….125 
Table 3.24, Moderator and Subset Analyses for Age of Subjects………….127 
Table 3.25, Moderator and Subset Analyses for Subjects On / Not On 
Medication During SRT Performance……………………………………128 
Table 3.26. Subject Numbers in Aetiological Sub-Groups Within the  
‘Mixed Amnesic’ Classification by Individual Study…………………….136 
Table 3.25. Subject numbers required for 80% power according to  
effect sizes calculated during the Meta-Analysis……………………….142 
Table 3A.1. Coding of Moderator Variables by Study………………………..145 
Table 3A.2. Detail of Methods Used For Generating Effect Sizes by 
Study…………………………………………………………………………146 
Table 3A.3. Power of Studies Included in the Meta-Analysis Given  
Idealised ESs : Within Neurological Group Effect (Two-Tailed)………148 
Table 3A.4. Power of The Studies Included in the Meta-Analysis Given 
Idealised ESs : Between Neurological & Control Group Effect  
(Two-Tailed)………………………………………………………………...149 
Table 3A.5. Effect Sizes and 95% Confidence Intervals for All Results  
Figures in Part 1……………………………………………………………150 
Table 3A.6. Effect Sizes and 95% Confidence Intervals for All Results  
Figures in Part 2……………………………………………………………151 
Table 6.1, Final Group Sizes……………………………………………………153 
Table 7.1, Summary of Surgery Details………………………………………..212 
Table 7.2, Group Sizes for Experiment 1…………………………………...…213 
Table 7.3. Group Sizes for Experiment 2……………………………………...228 
 
 
   - 12 -  
 
 
   IX   
 
Acknowledgements 
I owe an enormous debt of gratitude to my supervisor Dr. John 
Dalrymple-Alford. Although we have not, and still do not, see eye-to-eye on 
some things, I am constantly aware of the lessons and techniques he has 
taught me and that I am by far the better scientist, writer and academic for 
them. I will always be very grateful for his unswerving dedication to ensuring the 
work I produced was never anything short of the highest quality, and the very 
best I was capable of.  
 
I would also like to thank the many people I have worked with over the 
years. Trish in particular for her continual help, inexhaustible good humour, 
Fiona, Nigel and Marian for their valuable technical and animal husbandry skills, 
Glen for his amazing apparatus building and maintenance skills, and Gerard for 
always going the extra mile for me. John and Graeme for their advice and 
company in the early years, and finally Annie and James for not only their 
company and assistance over the last few years, but especially for their 
indispensable help over these last frantic days. 
 
The debt I owe my friends and family for their patient and loving support 
through these many years can never be repaid. In particular I would like thank 
my parents, Peter and Patsy Christie, for their love, their unwavering belief in 
me, and their constant desire to see me achieve what they knew me to be 
capable of. I would also like to thank my ‘older’ brother David and his family, my 
sister Philippa, and my Auntie Lyn and Uncle Arnold (and family) for their 
constant encouragement, generosity and timely advice.  
 
Finally I would like to salute my friends; Nathan, Seth, Elissa, Colin, Tim, 
Gary, Jill and Sally. Not only for being some of the finest people I have been 
privileged to know, but also for making the journey so much more enjoyable and 
infinitely more worthwhile that it would otherwise have been. Arohanui. 
 
This work has been supported by a Neurological Foundation small 
projects grant, and a University of Canterbury Psychology Departmetn 
equipment grant
Abstract 
 
Human memory systems have been divided into two broad domains, one 
responsible for ‘declarative memory’ and the other for ‘non-declarative memory’. The 
evidence for multiple memory systems is reviewed with respect to the human SRT, a 
sensitive measure of non-declarative memory. A qualitative review of the human SRT 
literature concludes that damage to extrapyramidal brain systems disrupts SRT 
performance whereas limbic system neuropathology (LSN) leaves performance intact. 
However, a meta-analysis of the SRT literature with neuropathological patients 
revealed unexpectedly that patients with explicit memory disorders are impaired on 
the SRT task, although less severely than patients with extrapyramidal damage. Other 
evidence suggested that the apparent SRT impairment in humans with LSN might be 
due to the additional pathology (eg frontal) often evident in these patients.  A brief 
review of the animal evidence for multiple memory systems concluded that, like 
humans, animals too have multiple memory systems but none of the animal tasks 
used to model non-declarative memory make good conceptual or behavioural contact 
with the corresponding human tasks.  Thus a novel animal-analogue of the human-
SRT task, the ‘fan-maze’, was developed.  Although rats displayed a reasonable 
ability to perform the fan-maze SRT task it was abandoned due to technical and 
conceptual problems in favour of a better design. The second new SRT task used 
intra-cranial self-stimulation to promote prolonged, rapid and continuous responding.  
A control study determined that the optimal conditions for sequence learning was a 
single large (2820 trial) session.  Intact rats that experienced a switch from the 
repeating to a random sequence under these conditions demonstrated a clear 
interference effect, the primary measure of SRT performance.  A lesion study used 
these optimal conditions and showed that small caudate lesions impaired, whereas 
small hippocampal lesions facilitated, rat-SRT performance. Hence, this second task 
has proven to be a valid animal-analogue of the human SRT task, as rats performed it 
in a manner similar to that shown by humans and relied on the same neural substrate 
to perform the task as humans. In addition, this second task resolved the discrepancy 
of the LSN meta-analysis.  Quantitative findings are reviewed in light of theories and 
studies presented earlier in the thesis. Limitations of the thesis are identified and 
suggestions are made as to future SRT research in animals or humans. 
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Chapter 1 
 
An Introduction to Multiple Memory 
Systems 
 
Note to the reader. Originally there was no single copy of the total thesis, instead 
individual chapters were stored in separate files and I simply printed them off as 
needed. This electronic version of the thesis has been assembled from those separate 
copies and may well have suffered for it in both the formatting and absence of several 
figures (that were always printed separately). For this reason the page numbers 
almost certainly do not match up with the numbers in the ‘Contents’.  My apologies if 
this makes it difficult to read. M Christie, 30-May-2007 
 
General Introduction 
Within the last 20-30 years considerable interest has been generated in the 
possibility that memory is not a unitary construct but rather is a collection of 
independent and (anatomically and functionally) dissociable systems. The concept of 
multiple-memory systems has in large part emerged due to two, now commonly 
documented, observations: that amnesic patients previously considered to suffer a 
global memory impairment, demonstrate some spared memory functions, and 
secondly that it is possible for neurologically normal subjects to demonstrate an 
experimentally induced dissociation between quantifiably distinct types of memory. 
 
This thesis will examine both the likelihood and neurological basis of multiple 
memory systems, primarily focusing on a systems based approach predicated on the 
availability of critical information to conscious awareness (‘declarative’ and ‘non-
declarative’ memory). This will initially involve a discussion of the general evidence for 
and against the likelihood of multiple memory systems before moving on to a 
consideration of the theory in light of the evidence provided by one specific human 
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non-declarative memory task, the Serial Reaction Time task (SRT). Both these 
sections will also address a number of serious concerns as regards some of the 
common conceptual and methodological assumptions made in the non-declarative 
memory literature and it will be shown that while such concerns are well-founded 
studies published in light of these concerns continue to provide good evidence for both 
the likelihood of multiple memory systems and the validity of the SRT as a measure of 
non-declarative memory. As part of both the general discussion and of that concerning 
the limitations inherent in the non-declarative memory literature a meta-analysis will be 
presented that addresses a number of questions / concerns introduced during the 
discussion. Thereafter the thesis will present experimental work that demonstrates an 
animal analogue of the Serial Reaction Time task developed in order to examine the 
neurological basis of non-declarative memory in rodent subjects.  
 
This chapter briefly introduces the history of thinking about multiple memory 
systems. It also examines several theories concerning the likelihood, and possible 
nature, of multiple memory systems before discussing a recent critique of the 
paradigm. The chapter concludes with a summary of the aims and objectives of the 
thesis. 
 
1.1 The History of Multiple Memory Systems 
1.1.1 Multiple Memory Systems Prior To H.M. 
Were you to ask the man-on-the-street when the possibility of multiple, 
independent, memory systems was first posited they would, I suspect, pick a point 
within the last 100 years, largely due to the influence of modern theorising about 
human cognition and recent advances in neuro-medical techniques (e.g. 
neuroimaging). It would, therefore, come as something of a surprise to our man-on-
the-street to learn that the possibility of multiple memory systems has a long and 
distinguished (albeit somewhat sporadic) history stretching back to classical antiquity. 
The history of the study of memory contains a number of instances of philosopher-
scientists who advanced and discussed the possibility of multiple memory systems, 
even as far back as Socrates and Aristotle who, while never specifically discussing the 
possibility, posited systems which either allowed, or suggested, multiple memory 
systems.  
 
   - 4 - 
   
  
 
The first wave of systematic thinking on multiple forms of memory began in the 
mid 17th century. While no-one explicitly addressed the multiplicity or unitary nature of 
memory, the distinctions made within these discussions often suggest an unspecified 
assumption of multiple memory systems. For example, Descartes (1649) discussed a 
non-conscious form of memory in his The Passions of the Soul. Gottfried Leibniz 
(1704) described a similar (non-conscious) type of memory. Darwin (1794) 
distinguished between voluntary and involuntary recollections, again suggestive of 
multiple systems. Maine de Biran, in his 1804 monograph The Influence of Habit on 
the Faculty of Thinking, specifically postulated the existence of 3 independent forms of 
memory. In keeping with the popular theory of the time, phrenology, Franz Gall 
(c.1835) argued the need for a separate memory system for each ‘specialised faculty’ 
(eg. music, mathematics etc). However the idea of multiple memory systems fell into 
disuse shortly after Gall’s efforts and didn’t surface again until the second half of the 
19th century. In 1861, Paul Broca not only reintroduced the concept but was the first 
person to advance a non-unitary memory hypothesis based on neuropsychological 
evidence. His seminal observations on selective loss of expressive linguistic abilities 
can be conceptualised in terms of damage to a particular kind of memory, and the 
sparing of other linguistic abilities as the ongoing function of different forms of 
memory: “this special memory [the memory “necessary” for the articulating of words] is 
in no way related to other memories” (emphasis added, see Rosenfield 1988). 
 
In the subsequent decades a small flurry of work on the topic emerged. Carl 
Wernicke interpreted the symptoms of his eponymous aphasia specifically in terms of 
damage to a special memory centre distinct from that memory centre damaged in 
Broca’s aphasia. The German physician Ludwig Lichtheim developed this idea at 
length. In a surprisingly modern assertion the French psychologist Theodule Ribot 
argued for multiple memory systems in his Diseases of Memory (1882) contending 
that “if, in the normal condition of the organism, the different forms of memory are 
relatively independent, it is natural that, if in a morbid sate one disappears, the others 
should remain intact”. It is somewhat surprising therefore that it is difficult to find any 
further discussion of the subject until the 2nd half of this century. One reason for this 
neglect is undoubtedly the influential position enjoyed by the British associationists at 
this time who, while discussing memory at length, did so only in the context of a 
unitary system. However, all such discussions / hypothesise about the possibility of 
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multiple memory systems should always be seen as temporary and 
phenomenologically isolated events in a long period of an overwhelming focus on a 
unitary memory system. 
 
1.1.2 Multiple Memory Systems During the 1950’s and 1960’s. 
As with so much in the modern history of the study of memory the issue of 
unitary versus multiple memory systems owes a great deal to the impetus gained from 
the study of the patient H. M., who underwent a complete bilateral resection of the 
medial temporal lobes. Key among the findings by Scoville and Milner (1957) was the 
realisation that while H. M. exhibited profound amnesia for recent events his 
intelligence remained above average and other perceptual and cognitive functions 
were unimpaired. The well known conclusion from studies of H. M., and consequent 
animal models of his syndrome, was that the hippocampal formation and adjacent 
structures supported the acquisition of ‘normal’ memory. Moreover there appeared to 
be memory systems that do not depend on the hippocampus and related structures; 
the first convincing neuroanatomical evidence of multiple memory systems.  
 
Although considerable work during the 1960’s had been undertaken examining 
the distinction between short- and long-term memory this was largely within a unitary 
memory paradigm which regarded the different forms of memory as located at 
different positions on a continuum and therefore not independent systems. However, 
at the same time that the short / long-term distinction was being debated a number of 
distinctions within long term memory were also mooted that were suggestive of truly 
independent systems (See Reiff and Scheerer, 1959, and Bruner, 1969). However, 
much as 100 years earlier, none of this work produced a meaningful impact on the 
course of memory research and theorising and it wasn’t until the early 70’s / late 80’s 
that the possibility of multiple memory systems was seriously considered.  
 
1.1.3 The History of Multiple Memory Systems Post 1970 
Schacter and Tulving (1994) identify 3 fundamental developments whose 
confluence gave rise to multiple memory as a major research topic post 1970. The first 
development was the surprising discovery that severely amnesic patients retained 
some learning and memory abilities. H. M was again at the forefront of this research, 
with Milner, Corkin and Teuber (1968) showing that H.M. demonstrated near, or near-
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normal, motor skill learning, necessitating the dependence of motor learning on a 
system different to that for which he suffered such a clear and profound impairment. 
Similarly, Warrington and Weiskrantz (1968) showed that amnesics retained some 
ability to perform on fragmented-cue tests of previously encountered material despite 
being unable to recognise that very same material. This finding, and others like it, 
demonstrated differing susceptibility of memory tasks to the hippocampal system 
lesions usually found in amnesic subjects. 
 
The second development was the conceptualisation of the distinction between 
remembrances and memoria as “two parallel and partially overlapping information 
processing systems” via the constructs of episodic and semantic memory (Tulving, 
1972). Although the distinction would be seriously challenged in later years and 
undergo considerable revision it served to stimulate discussion and debate about the 
notion of separate memory systems. 
 
Thirdly, and largely a consequence of the previous developments, was the 
revelations of remarkable dissociations between what are now referred to as 
declarative  and non-declarative memory performances in neurologically normal 
subjects. These studies, motivated in large part by the observations of spared learning 
in amnesic patients, revealed that priming effects on non-declarative memory tests 
could be dissociated experimentally from performance on standard tests of recall and 
recognition. These results generated strong support for the contention that brain 
lesions in amnesic subjects, and experimental manipulations in neurologically normal 
subjects, demonstrate the existence of different and independent memory systems. 
 
Consequently the field experience a boom such that an enormous amounts of 
effort is now devoted to answering questions concerned with the nature and 
substance of different memory systems. However, while the fact that there are 
different systems is these days almost taken for granted, due to the extensive body of 
work demonstrating dissociations between memory systems, it is actually far from a 
proven fact and the remainder of the chapter will explore some of the recent 
controversy concerning multiple memory systems. 
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1.2 Neurobiological Evidence for Multiple Memory Systems in Humans. 
 
Despite substantial variation in terminology and detail, there is general agreement 
within the literature that memory is divisible into two broad domains. The first is 
responsible for the repetitive learning of common features which are typically 
unavailable to conscious awareness and deliberate recollection and instead influences 
behaviour via non-conscious predisposition. The second system is responsible for 
rapid (often 1-trial) learning of critical features which are available to conscious 
awareness at the time and may later be deliberately recollected. 
 
  A ‘terminological maelstrom’ (Reber, 1992) has developed to try and  
characterise this distinction: spatial learning vs. contextual (Nadal, 1994; Jarrard, 
1993) and, earlier, general cognitive vs. noncognitive distinction (Hirsh, 1974; Nadal 
and O’Keefe, 1974; O’Keefe and Nadal, 1978; Mishkin, Malamut and Bachevalier, 
1984) are but two of the characteristics. Some theorists have focused on a simple vs. 
configural / relational learning distinction (Sutherland and Rudy, 1989; Cohen and 
Eichenbaum, 1991; Shapiro and Olton, 1994, Eichenbaum, Otto and Cohen, 1994). 
Other theorists have focused on the involvement of conscious awareness with the 
memory trace, i.e. non-declarative and declarative  memory (Graf and Schacter, 1985; 
Schacter, 1987, Schacter and Graf, 1986) or the declarative vs. non-declarative 
distinction (Squire and Zola-Morgan, 1988, Eichenbaum, Stewart and Morris, 1990).  
 
Because this thesis focuses on contributions from the SRT task, which is 
characterised as a test of non-conscious / non-declarative memory, the thesis will 
have to employ terms associated with conscious awareness. However, this thesis will 
also focus on animal memory systems, and in particular how animal and human 
memory systems relate to each other. Thus there is a need for a set of terms that 
encapsulates both the aware / unaware status of the remembered information and are 
generalisable to animals. Therefore, the terms ‘declarative’ and ‘non-declarative’ 
memory will be used. Although these terms are not without their own problems when 
used to describe animal memory systems they are perhaps the least problematic of 
the various memory dichotomies in this regard. In particular, the use of the terms 
‘declarative’ or ‘non-declarative’ in relation to animals automatically raises some very 
difficult conceptual and theoretical issues as regards conscious awareness in animals. 
Although the terms ‘declarative’ and ‘non-declarative’ do assume the presence / 
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absence of conscious awareness they do not focus on it to anything like the same 
degree as the ‘explicit and ‘implicit terms do. Furthermore, while the deliberate 
declaration of remembered information is usually associated with verbal delivery this 
need not be the case. It is perfectly possible for both humans and animals to ‘declare’ 
remembered information via behaviour. Thus this thesis will use the terms ‘declarative’ 
and ‘non-declarative’ to both avoid the major theoretical difficulty associated with any 
necessity to posit conscious awareness in animals, and to enable the relatively 
unconfounded generalisation between animal and human memory systems. 
 
Regardless of terminology, assuming there are multiple memory systems, is 
their good evidence for any particular form of memory demarcation? The finding that 
H.M was severely amnesic yet able to demonstrate learning for which he had no 
memory produced a profound shift in thinking about amnesia, from global impairment 
to a more modular system within which different forms of memory operated 
independently of each other and in which damage to one module (system) did not 
necessarily impair a different one. Once it was understood that H.M.’s impairment 
(and other patients with ‘organic amnesia’) was a result of damage to the hippocampal 
system and related pathways considerable work was devoted to ascertaining what 
specific role the hippocampus plays in memory. However the concern of this thesis is 
not with the hippocampus per se, but rather with the opportunity that hippocampally 
based memory impairments offer for the demonstration of impaired and spared 
memory functions. While not neglecting the hippocampus based impairments, the 
following discussion focuses on those memories that are spared after hippocampal 
damage and in doing so demonstrates evidence of a functional dissociation between 
neural substrates responsible for different forms of memory. 
 
1.2.1 Skill Learning 
Many studies have demonstrated that amnesic patients can acquire a variety of 
skills at an apparently normal rate. Examples include motor skills (Brooks and 
Baddeley, 1976), perceptual-motor skills (mirror-tracing, Milner, 1962; rotary pursuit, 
Corkin, 1968; bimanual tracking, Brooks and Baddeley, 1976, Cermak et. al. 1973; 
Cohen, 1981; serial reaction time task, Nissen and Bullemer, 1987), perceptual skills 
(Cohen and Squire, 1980; Martone et. al,. 1984; Moscovitch et. al. 1986) and cognitive 
skills (Tower of Hanoi, Squire and Frambach, 1990; Saint-Cryer et. al. 1998; arithmetic 
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algorithms, Charness et. al. 1988; Kinsbourne and Wood, 1975; Milberg et. al 1988). 
Moreover the skills acquired can be based on novel material (Musen and Squire, 
1991) which counters a common criticism of early studies of this type, namely that 
amnesics only showed spared learning for familiar (premorbid) stimuli. Similarly, skill 
learning is intact in monkeys with large lesion of the temporal lobe that fail tasks of 
object recognition (Zola-Morgan and Squire, 1984).  
 
Recently, there has been interest in the possibility that more complex versions 
of skill learning, such as probability learning or artificial-grammar learning, might also 
depend on nondeclarative / procedural memory. In artificial-grammar learning (Reber, 
1967) subjects first inspect a group of letter strings that adhere to a finite-state rule 
system. Subjects are then able to classify new letter strings as either grammatical or 
nongrammatical at well above chance levels. In a recent experiment amnesic patients 
were able to classify grammatical and nongrammatical letter strings as well as control 
subjects despite impaired recognition memory for the items they had encountered in 
the test (Nowlton, Ramus, and Squire, 1992). While the amnesic subjects in this study 
did score a little below normal subjects in artificial grammar learning (although not 
significantly so) amnesics in a more recent study displayed essentially identical 
performance to normal subjects (59.1% vs. 58.3%, respectively; Knowlton and Squire, 
1994). Thus it appears that one kind of memory stores declarative information about 
the specific items that were presented, which is impaired in amnesics. However, the 
second kind of memory stores information non-declaratively either by abstracting 
information from the items in the form of rules or by assembling information from items 
as a collection of associations between item features and their grammatical category. 
If this division is valid, then it obviously provides good evidence of multiple memory 
systems. 
 
1.2.2 Priming And Evidence Of Multiple Systems 
Given its long history in the memory literature, no discussion of multiple-
memory systems would be complete without some mention of priming. Priming refers 
to the improved facility for detecting or processing stimuli on the basis of recent 
experience with that stimuli (Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993) and can occur in the 
absence of any conscious / declarative  awareness of the stimulus (and thus is 
considered a form of non-declarative memory). Amnesic subjects can show robust 
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priming effects over a variety of stimulus modalities: word stems (Cermak et. al, 1987; 
Graf et. al. 1984; Squire et. al 1987, word fragments (Squire et. al. 1987), [stochastic] 
presentation (Cermak et. al. 1985, 1988) and visually degraded stimuli (Keane et. al. 
1988). For example, H.M demonstrated priming for dot-patterns as a result of previous 
exposure to them, in the absence of any awareness of the episode during which he 
fist saw them (Gabrieli et. al. 1990). While there has been some uncertainty about 
whether amnesic subjects display normal or less-than-normal priming effects, there is 
now considerable evidence that, under some conditions, amnesic subjects can display 
normal priming effects (for a review see Tulving and Schacter, 1990). Under other 
conditions, however, amnesic subjects produce less-than-normal effects (Cermak et. 
al. 1985; Diamond and Rozin, 1984; McAndrews, Glisky and Schacter, 1987; Milner 
et. al. 1968; Warrington and Weiskrantz, 1968). A commonly accepted explanation for 
the variation in the degree of sparing of priming is that different priming tasks 
encourage the use of varying degrees of declarative  memory (i.e. are not process 
pure), and in those tests that encourage the use of declarative  memory (in 
conjunction with non-declarative priming) it is reasonable to expect that amnesic 
subjects would be impaired relative to controls (Cohen and Schacter, 1993).  
 
Furthermore, unlike declarative memory tests (recall and recognition) priming 
effects are independent of levels of processing and are generally not influenced by 
secondary / distracter tasks (Parkin et al 1990; Parkin and Russo 1990). Also unlike 
declarative  memory tests, priming is greatly affected by presentation modality 
(Tulving and Schacter‘s “hyperspecificity of access”, 1990) such that prior experience 
of a source picture primes a picture fragment but not a (relevant) word fragment and 
experience of a word primes a word fragment but not a (relevant) picture fragment. As 
a result Roediger and Srinivas (in Graf and Masson, 1993) characterise declarative  
memory tasks as being sensitive to secondary task interference, levels of processing 
and retention interval, whereas non-declarative memory tasks, (including priming) are 
deemed to be more sensitive to perceptual or surface features. 
 
There has also been considerable argument as to whether or not spared 
priming in amnesics is limited to familiar stimuli only. The activation / integration 
approach contends that priming is due to the activation of pre-existing representations 
and therefore predicts that amnesics would not be capable of non-declaratively 
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learning novel stimuli / associations. The memory systems view however suggests 
that only those memories which are dependent on episodic / declarative memory are 
subject to consolidation failures (a failure to encode a memory trace in long-term / 
reference memory) and therefore amnesics would be capable of learning any novel 
stimuli / associations that did not require these systems. Overall, the evidence 
supports the memory systems view, especially for novel nonverbal priming 
capabilities. Studies attempting to demonstrate priming of novel verbal associations 
are far less conclusive (Cermak, 1988; Shinamura and Squire, 1989). However, 
learning verbal associations likely also requires semantic processing, which may 
require episodic memory (Tulving and Schacter, 1990). A compelling demonstration of 
the variable nature of priming in amnesic subjects is the finding that a pairing-specific 
reduction in a Stroop task was normal in amnesic patients when the conflicting 
information was conjoined in the same way (i.e. when each individual stimulus item 
was both a colour name and had a display colour), but when the conflicting 
information was not conjoined the amnesic subjects failed to demonstrate a priming 
effect (Musen and Squire, 1991).  
 
In light of these, and similar, results Tulving and Schacter (1990) offer 5 points 
of evidence to demonstrate the independence of priming and declarative  memory: 
1) Amnesic subjects: while having no recollection of the priming episode or 
the primed material they nevertheless show priming of it. 
2) Developmental: while recognition memory improves with age priming is as 
strong in young (3-year olds) subjects as in older (university student) subjects 
(but see Rovee-Collier, Hayne and Colombo, in press). 
3) Drug dissociation: drugs that impair declarative  memory have little or no 
effect on priming. 
4) Functional independence:  the two systems appear to operate by different, 
sometimes opposing, rules, e.g. semantic elaboration has little effect of 
priming but improves declarative  recall, and declarative  memory is not 
modality specific whereas priming is. 
5) Stochastic independence: Priming effects are as large for words that 
subjects declaratively recognise as for words they do not. 
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1.2.3 Interim Conclusions of Human Studies 
Although not all of these arguments discussed above are conclusive in isolation 
they all indicate the same empirical conclusion. Taken together they provide strong 
circumstantial evidence for the presence of multiple memory systems. Furthermore, 
although most accounts of multiple memory systems posit two distinct forms there is 
some evidence that priming is not only dissociable from declarative  memory but also 
other forms of non-declarative memory, especially motor-skill learning. Studies with 
Alzheimer’s patients show they suffer impaired lexical and pictorial priming but 
perform a motor skill-learning task (rotor-pursuit) at control levels, whereas 
Huntington’s patients are impaired on motor-skill learning but perform like controls on 
lexical and pictorial priming (see Butters, Heindel and Salmon, 1990). Similarly, 
Tulving and Schacter (1990) report the case of a subject with complete global 
amnesia (unable to remember anything from his previous life, either before the injury 
or after it) who nonetheless displays evidence for both perceptual and conceptual 
priming but whose performance on these tasks is stochastically independent. Further 
compelling demonstrations of the dissociation of memory systems is found in the SRT 
literature but due to the particular importance of this material to this thesis it will be 
discussed separately, and in some detail, in the following chapter, and Chapter 4 will 
discuss the evidence for multiple-memory systems from animal research. 
 
1.3 The Evolutionary Likelihood of Multiple Memory 
Systems  
 
While the focus of efforts to answer the question of multiple memory systems is 
largely confined to the neurocognitive and neurophysiological domains there have 
been contributions from other fields, including work from the field of evolutionary 
psychology. The following section will briefly review and discuss two such 
contributions and raise some criticisms of the first contribution in particular, especially 
that the authors failed to fully extend their promising discussion of the animal evidence 
into the human domain. However, the ultimate conclusion that multiple memory 
systems are evolutionarily likely is not seriously threatened by these criticisms and 
thus serves to strengthen the argument that multiple memory systems are possible, 
even likely, and in doing so provides a priori theoretical grounds to justify an attempt to 
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investigate the possible existence of multiple memory systems in rodent subjects. 
 
1.3.1 Sherry and Schacter and the Evolutionary Likelihood of Multiple Memory 
Systems. 
 
Sherry and Schacter (1987) contended that rather than the notion of general 
laws and a unitary memory system (in humans) being incorrect they are instead 
incomplete. In that an evolutionary analysis predicts that both generality and specificity 
are expected characteristics of memory. Sherry and Schacter were concerned with the 
key question of “whether the evolution of qualitatively distinct memory systems would 
be expected to occur or whether a single memory system that is characterised by 
increasing complexity and flexibility is the expected evolutionary outcome”. Obviously, 
evolutionary adaptations need not necessarily lead to multiple memory systems. 
Selective adaptation could occur within a unitary memory system as long as the 
system is sufficiently flexible to accommodate any demand placed on it. The primary 
impetus therefore for the evolution of a multiple memory system is that the 
environment can impose demands that, by their nature, are not amenable to resolution 
by a single memory system, regardless of how flexible it is.  
 
Sherry and Schacter‘s argument is that memory systems necessarily develop 
with a degree of specialisation, primarily because they arise in response to specific 
problems, and this intrinsically produces limitations on what the system can do. 
Therefore an environmental problem that is solvable by one memory system inevitably 
results in a system that, by virtue of its prior specialisation, is incapable of solving 
other problems. Consequently new environmental challenges may necessitate the 
development of a novel and separate memory system. Schacter and Sherry coined 
the term ‘functional incompatibility’ to describe the situation where a pre-existing 
memory system is unable, by virtue of its specialised nature, to accommodate a novel 
environmental challenge. Thus the memory demands of a novel situation are 
functionally incompatible with the behavioural range of the pre-existing system. Their 
conceptualisation of functional incompatibility is a modified version of the idea 
advanced by Rozin and colleagues (Rozin, 1976, Rozin and Kalat, 1971) who argued 
that memory (and learning) is an adaptive specialisation shaped by natural selection 
to solve problems posed by the environment.  
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Not all novel environments result in new, and independent, memory systems. 
Some, in fact most, memory problems may be sufficiently similar that they can be 
effectively solved in similar ways and therefore by the same system. In keeping with 
this point Sherry and Schacter note that most memory systems are extremely 
generalisable and deal perfectly well with many different problems either as a result of 
adaptation or fortuitously (perhaps via the mechanism of exaptation developed by 
Gould, 1991, but see Buss, et. al., 1998 for a recent critique of exaptation). The 
consequences, according to Sherry and Schacter, is that while there will be multiple 
memory systems there will not be altogether that many of them, and those that do 
exist will deal with a variety of environmental demands. It is only when the pre-existing 
systems are incapable of being modified to handle a novel situation that a totally new 
memory system will arise. 
 
Functional Incompatibility and Processing Variant and Invariant Features of an 
Episode. 
In support of their thesis of the evolutionary likelihood of multiple memory 
systems in humans (and other primates) Sherry and Schacter develop a dichotomous 
memory system which they label memory systems I and II. Essentially, the systems 
are a somewhat standard non-declarative vs. declarative memory dichotomy as 
System I supports the gradual acquisition of skill / habit learning, and System II 
supports the rapid (one-trial) learning of specific situations and events. Sherry and 
Schacter focus on the type of variance extracted by the two different memory systems 
from the features of the stimuli event to delineate the dichotomy. In this manner they 
distinguish between System I (non-declarative) memory which detects and preserves 
invariances across episodes and System II (declarative) that detects and preserves 
variances across episodes. 
 
In terms of the functional incompatibility of the systems it will be readily 
apparent that the preservation of variant and invariant features are contradictory 
processes and therefore likely to be best handled by functionally independent 
systems. It is therefore Sherry and Schacter’s contention that the data demonstrating 
dissociations between habit / skill learning and episodic / representational memory 
indicate the existence of separate memory systems due to one system’s inability to 
handle the critical information of the other system. In order to support this argument, it 
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is necessary to show that the habit / skill learning system is incapable of handling 
variant features of successive episodes (not just unlikely to, or inefficient at it), and 
that the episodic / representational system is likewise incapable of handling invariant 
features of successive episodes (again not just unlikely to, or inefficient at it). 
 
Functional Incompatibility in Animals 
Sherry and Schacter offer song-learning and food-caching in birds as an 
example of functionally incompatible environmental demands requiring the evolution of 
multiple memory systems. There are few grounds for argument against the contention 
that these two systems are functionally incompatible and the use of one system to 
drive the behaviour of the other system would result in a serious impairment of 
reproductive fitness. However, as Schacter and Tulving discuss in the introductory 
chapter of their book ‘Memory Systems’ (1994), each species has environmental 
pressures unique to it (in conjunction with pressures common to all species) and thus 
species (by definition) evolve differently and this makes it difficult to draw behavioural 
and cognitive comparisons between species due to the influence of even subtle 
differences in neural architecture. That brain / behaviour relations in animals are often 
different (in varying degrees) to human brain / behaviour relations and thus is 
problematic for the purpose of modelling human behaviour in animals, and especially 
so for uniquely human behaviours. Although memory is demonstrably not unique to 
humans there may well be aspects of it that are. It may be that, for example, humans 
create complex interrelated memory traces which other species cannot and thus while 
song learning and food-caching are strong evidence for multiple-memory systems in 
birds, it is only useful as a demonstration of the possibility that multiple-memory 
systems can evolve and acts only as circumstantial evidence for the likelihood of this 
in other species, and especially in the ‘higher’ organisms. 
 
Conclusions on Sherry and Schacter 
This thesis is fundamentally predicated on the theory that dissociable / 
independent memory systems exist, and is willing to accommodate the likelihood that 
different memory systems evolved due to the inability of one system to handle a novel 
environmental challenge, necessitating the evolution of an new and independent 
system. However, while offering evidence of behavioural dissociations in memory (see 
original article for list of studies), Schacter and Sherry offer no direct evidence that 
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human declarative  / representational memory systems functions by extracting variant 
features from successive events, nor that human non-declarative / skill-learning 
system operates by extracting invariant features from successive events. They may 
well actually do this, but none of the evidence they present addresses those issues, 
instead the evidence is concerned with demonstrating the dissociation and only 
provides indirect support for why the separate memory mechanisms evolved. 
 
Sherry and Schacter suggest, as a result of the examples they present, that 
there is “compelling psychological evidence that gradual learning of certain habits and 
skills can proceed independently of the ability to remember specific episodes” and that 
skill-learning and episodic remembering are mediated by different brain structures. 
While both points have been convincingly demonstrated in the literature this does not, 
as they themselves noted, necessarily demand the postulation of separate memory 
systems. The fact that they depend on different brain structures and that they function 
independently of one another certainly suggests different systems, but does not 
conclusively prove it. In fact it is entirely possible to postulate that this could be 
achieved (to quote the authors themselves) by a “single memory system that is 
characterised by increasing complexity and flexibility”.  
 
Furthermore, Sherry and Schacter’s model is almost exclusively ‘top-down’ in 
that it is driven by environmental changes and ignores both the ‘bottom-up’ 
contribution provided by continual mutations in the phenotype and the incessant 
interaction between these two processes. One of the primary advantages of sexual 
reproduction is the constant mixing of genotypes it produces. The particular advantage 
of this is that it produces slight changes in the reproductive fitness of the offspring 
which allows evolution via natural selection. In contrast Sherry and Schacter’s top-
down approach regards natural selection in terms of more abrupt events with relatively 
dramatic consequences. However, instead of multiple-memory systems appearing 
relatively quickly as a result of the sudden imposition of environmental demands that a 
single-memory systems was ill equipped to handle it is possible that very gradual 
increases in flexibility and function occurred simply due to random genetic mutation 
over generations. The point that declarative memory is largely cortically based, and 
non-declarative memory is largely sub-cortically based, supports this hypothesis. Non-
declarative memory is a phylogenetically older system and thus depends on 
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commensurately older brain structures. In contrast declarative memory is 
evolutionarily more recent and thus depends of more recently evolved brain 
structures, as well as being more frequently expressed, and of a higher ‘quality’, in the 
‘higher organisms’ i.e. those with neo-cortices.  
 
Thus while Sherry and Schacter’s approach is not wrong it is incomplete. 
Undoubtedly relatively sudden changes in the environment influenced the 
development of multiple memory systems, be it by directly encouraging it’s 
development and / or by encouraging the utilisation of ‘spare’ potential inherent in the 
system but hitherto unused. However, the majority of the changes are likely to have 
occurred at a more gradual pace in a ‘brick-on-brick’ manner. Nevertheless, both 
these approaches assume an identical reason for why multiple-memory systems 
developed, because the two forms of memory provide a reproductive advantage over 
that of a single system. And thus the top-down and bottom-up processes are not 
competing approaches but are rather complimentary. Therefore, the argument here is 
not so much with Sherry and Schacter’s contention as to the likelihood of the evolution 
of multiple memory systems but rather with their almost exclusive focus on a top-down 
approach at the expense of a more balanced account. 
 
  In conclusion, systems that seek to winnow either the variant or invariant 
features of an episode are obviously incompatible in that they process information in a 
diametrically opposed fashion. It is Sherry and Schacter’s failure to clearly show that 
this is how human memory actually functions that substantially weakens their 
argument. If, however, it can be shown that skill-learning and episodic memory do 
function in this manner then it will be a perfectly reasonable consequence to assert 
that they are functionally incompatible and therefore provide convincing evidence of 
the need for evolutionary independent memory systems in humans. Thus the current 
state of their theory of the evolutionary likelihood of multiple memory systems is “not 
so much incorrect as incomplete”! 
 
1.3.2 Reber and the Evolution of the Cognitive Unconscious.  
 Although more concerned with an evolutionary perspective of the “cognitive 
unconscious” (Rozin, 1976) than multiple memory systems per se’ Reber’s (1992) 
article necessarily rests on the premise that there are independent and dissociable 
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systems. In particular Reber claims that conscious cognitive processes are 
phylogenetically far more recent than unconscious processes and thus non-
declarative memory functions are not only dissociable from declarative cognitive 
functions but likely to enjoy a number of advantages over them. 
 
 Working from general principle of evolutionary development, Reber distils the 
work of the 19th century scientist Hughlings Jackson, the pre-Darwinain embryologist 
Karl Ernst von Baer and the more recent work by Schank and Wimsatt (Schank and 
Wimsatt 1987; Wimsatt 1986) into four principles from which he develops a general 
axiom about consciousness and five properties of a non-declarative memory system. 
 
 The principles, the axiom and the subsequent properties are worth discussing 
briefly as they provide additional support for the evolutionary likelihood of a 
dissociation between memory functions, and thus strengthen the argument presented 
in the preceding section. Furthermore, several of the points Reber makes will have a 
direct bearing on arguments made later in the thesis and are introduced here for that 
reason. 
 
 The ’operating’ principles, or heuristics, Reber develops are, firstly, the principle 
of success: successful1 forms become the basis for later forms. Secondly the principle 
of Conservation: developmental processes are conservative and once successful 
forms are established they tend to become relatively fixed and function as the basis 
for developing forms. Thirdly, the principle of Stability: successful forms will tend 
towards stability, showing fewer successful variations than more recent forms. And 
finally the principle of Commonality: evolutionarily earlier forms and functions will be 
displayed across species. 
 
 In order to apply these principle to the cognitive unconscious Reber posits a 
simple axiom about consciousness, that it “is a late arrival on the evolutionary scene”. 
As Reber notes this axiom is sufficiently well supported and accepted to constitute a 
virtual truism. Irrespective of how you characterise consciousness (to borrow Reber’s 
example) humans have it and protozoa do not. Therefore somewhere along the 
evolutionary progress that led from the latter to the former, the capacity for reflection 
and the ability to modify cognitive functions developed. Regardless of when 
                                                 
1 Successful in the sense of the establishment of either a viable species or an individual organism.  
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consciousness actually evolved it was undoubtedly preceded by “cognitively 
sophisticated, adaptive functions and forms” which are now clustered under the 
general rubric of the ‘cognitive unconscious’. 
 
 As consciousness is presumed to be a relatively recent evolutionary event and 
because of generalisations about the properties of forms that develop evolutionarily 
early Reber is able to propose some rather specific properties that non-declarative 
cognitive system can be expected display. And in particular these properties can be 
contrasted with those of a declarative cognitive (i.e. evolutionarily recent) system can 
be expected to have and in doing so provide further argument for the likelihood of the 
two systems being independent and dissociable. 
 
The first property Reber proposes for a non-declarative cognitive system is that 
of robustness. Because non-declarative processes are reliant on phylogenetically 
older forms then they should be more stable and more resilient. Specifically non-
declarative cognitive systems should be less vulnerable to disruption from insults, 
injuries and diseases than declarative cognitive systems. In support of this property 
Reber notes that Alzheimer’s patients have extensive cortical (and some subcortical) 
dysfunction and consequently substantial declarative cognitive impairment, and that 
those relatively few cognitive functions that are spared by the disorder are those that 
rely on evolutionarily older sensorimotor tasks (e.g. motor skills). Another reason for 
the resilience of non-declarative cognition is that the course of cognitive disorders is 
inversely related to the phylogenetic age of the function. The more evolutionarily 
recent a function the earlier it is disrupted in the course of cognitive deterioration. For 
these reasons declarative cognitive functions will tend to be disrupted sooner and 
more severely than non-declarative cognitive functions, and this is borne out in the 
amnesia literature (see Chapter 2). 
 
The second principle is that of independence from age. Because they are 
phylogenetically older non-declarative cognitive functions should be relatively 
independent of age. For the same reason they should also develop earlier in the life-
cycle than declarative  functions, and Reber offers evidence that human infants 
develop non-declarative cognition functions substantially earlier (at around three 
months after birth) than they develop declarative  cognitive functions. Similarly non-
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declarative functions should show less decline with age (albeit while not being immune 
to ageing effects), and there is considerable evidence that non-declarative cognitive 
functions do not decline as quickly, as soon or as far as general (declarative) cognitive 
functions do due to normal aging (but see Rovee-Collier, Hayne and Colombo, 2001). 
 
Thirdly non-declarative functions should demonstrate lower population 
variance, in that they should show less individual-to-individual variation compared to 
declarative functions (by virtue of the principles of stability and conservation). 
 
Fourthly non-declarative cognitive functions should be relatively independent of 
intelligence. Standard intelligence tests focus almost entirely on measuring overt, 
conscious and declarative cognitive functions and thus are only peripherally influenced 
by non-declarative cognition. 
 
Finally, the principle of commonality holds that the “underlying processes of 
non-declarative acquisition and memorial representation [should] show across-species 
commonality”. Thus there should be very real and very similar principles in manner in 
which information is acquired and stored across species, to the extent that such 
functions are all but independent of the phyla. To support this point Reber employs a 
modified Rescora-Wagner (Rescora, 1998; Rescora and Wagner, 1972) thesis that 
organisms acquire associative knowledge based on their ability to detect ‘true’ 
covariations between events. Reber goes on to note that “simple co-occurrence is not 
sufficient to produce stable learning, organisms ultimately key on a kind of Humean 
causality”. In particular Reber claims that such an associative learning system forms 
the epistemic basis for the “induction of tacit knowledge” by capturing patterns of 
stimulation inherent in the environment (which harkens back to Sherry and Schacter’s 
thesis that the organism parses (in)variant features of events). Reber’s argument is 
that such an associative learning system can be observed across the “full panoply of 
species” and as such is likely to function in an extremely similar manner across 
species. This point in particular is critical to this thesis as it will be argued later that 
humans and rats share similar neuroanatomical and functional characteristics of a 
‘non-declarative’ memory system (see Chapter 4) and thus we can model human non-
declarative learning in rats. According to Reber this is a perfectly reasonable position 
to take, in particular because the forms and functions that the phylogenetically older 
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non-declarative cognitive systems rely on are, by virtue of their phylogenetic antiquity, 
common across most species. 
 
Thus not only does Reber’s theory provide support for the central behavioural 
tenant of this thesis but it also serves to strengthen the likelihood that there are 
independent, and dissociable memory systems. The cognitive unconscious developed 
far earlier than, and separately from, the cognitive consciousness and is thus largely 
independent of it and for this reason enjoys a number of functional advantages to 
cognitive consciousness, and the cognitive unconsciousness is therefore far more 
similar across species than ‘cognitive consciousness’. 
 
1.3.3 General Conclusion on the Evolutionary Support for Multiple Memory 
Systems 
 The conclusions from the work discussed above is clearly that multiple memory 
systems are evolutionarily more likely than a unitary memory system. Firstly it is 
unreasonable to expect a unitary system to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate the 
large variety of demands placed on memory by the environment, particularly the 
demands of a dynamic and ever-changing environment. Secondly, there are good 
conceptual grounds for positing that the different memory systems evolved at a 
different point in time and for this reason are very likely to be largely independent 
dissociable (although capable of complementary / convergent activity). Thus these 
accounts provide another strong avenue of evidence for the multiple memory systems 
theory. 
 
1.4 Criticisms Of The Multiple Memory Systems Approach; Shanks And St. 
John And The Question Of What Is Learned During Supposed Implicit 
Learning. 
 
Among the many theories of multiple memory systems there is often an almost 
non-declarative assumption that that any evidence supporting a dissociation between 
memory systems or demonstrating the stochastic independence of such systems is 
good evidence. However, the fact is that some of this evidence, especially those 
studies undertaken in the early part of the current period of research often rest on 
weak methodological and conceptual grounds. This criticism is especially relevant to 
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studies employing the non-declarative and declarative dichotomy by virtue of the 
complex and often ill-defined nature of its key distinguishing feature: conscious 
awareness. As this thesis is both expressly concerned with this dichotomy and heavily 
based on the literature in this field it is appropriate to consider criticisms of the 
paradigm and the following section will explore some these issues in detail. One of the 
more comprehensive assaults on the assumption of multiple memory systems has 
come in the form of a detailed refutation of the evidence for non-conscious learning by 
Shanks and St. John’s (1995) “Characteristics of dissociable human learning 
systems”. It will be shown that while many of the criticisms raised by Shanks and St. 
John are valid and appropriate their ultimate conclusion, that there is no good 
evidence on non-conscious learning, is both incorrect and premature. The reasons for 
disagreement with Shanks and St. John’s position are: 1) their unreasonably stringent 
application of criterion, 2) their unjustified dismissal of the entire corpus of amnesia 
studies, and (in Chapter 2) 3) the presentation of more recent studies, designed 
specifically with their criticisms / criterion in mind, that demonstrated non-declarative 
learning in the absence of declarative knowledge of the information critical to task 
performance. 
 
1.4.1 Single Dissociations, Awareness and The Information and Sensitivity 
Criteria 
 
Shanks and St. John developed a dual-criterion system for assessing the 
validity of non-declarative -learning studies and consequentially come to conclusion 
that there is little unequivocal empirical evidence that learning can proceed in the 
absence of conscious knowledge. Instead they propose a distinction between 
instance- and rule-learning to account for the apparent dissociation in human learning 
processes. Although their ultimate conclusion is at odds with this author’s there is 
much to be commended in Shanks and St. John’s thoughtful and comprehensive 
examination of the material which justifies an equally careful consideration herein. 
 
There can be no question that learning and memory are inherently interrelated 
(i.e. very seldom process-pure) and while it is redundant to note that memory requires 
learning the reverse, that learning requires (conscious) memory, is at the heart of the 
declarative  / non-declarative memory debate. Thus while Shanks and St. John 
specifically address their attention to learning without awareness (and rightly chide 
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those critics who premise their criticisms of their article on points strictly relevant only 
to memory) there remains much of what they say which is directly applicable to 
memory research. This is reinforced by the point that in order to memorise something 
(especially skills) it is necessary to first learn it. Therefore learning is a prerequisite for 
memory and thus a consideration of the former greatly informs our understanding of 
the latter. 
 
To test the validity of various tests of non-declarative learning Shanks and St. 
John first note that most experiments of this type typically rely on the logic of 
dissociation to demonstrate non-declarative learning can take place in the absence of 
awareness. However they cite two main problems with this approach as used in most 
such studies. Firstly such studies commonly use single dissociations which offer 
relatively weak proof of independence and secondly they note most non-declarative -
learning studies employ a “constrained version of the logic of dissociation” within 
which separate indices of learning and awareness are used (see below). At first 
glance using separate indices of learning and awareness makes good logical sense 
but in practice it quickly runs foul of serious difficulties with quantifying awareness and 
devising tests that are sufficiently sensitive to both contamination by unconscious 
information and exhaustive detection of all relevant conscious knowledge. 
 
Having identified the problem Shanks and St. John then go on to detail an 
experimental template that conceptually underlies almost all studies of this sort. While 
discussing this template they note that “subjects may be unaware of the relationships 
between stimuli even though they are aware of the stimuli themselves”. This 
description neatly encapsulates what non-declarative learning / memory is. It is not so 
much a lack of conscious knowledge of the stimuli themselves but rather of the 
relationships between them that, once learnt, provide the subject with a behavioural 
advantage. However, the quote above brings us to the first concern with their article 
(and of others that do similar) which is that their use of the term ‘awareness’ is rife with 
possibility for confusion. While somewhat pedantic it is nonetheless worth noting that 
even in order to learn something non-declaratively the learner must, in some fashion, 
be aware of the stimuli. Thus to describe somebody as aware or unaware risks 
conflation with the, relatively, less ambiguous terms ‘conscious’ and ‘unconscious’ 
(see Catania, 1994 and below, and Terrace and McGonigle, 1994). Obviously Shanks 
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and St. John and others often use the term ‘(un)aware’ as shorthand for ‘consciously 
(un)aware’ but given that they also talk of ‘awareness’ in the sense of subjects having 
differing degrees of awareness of stimuli, relationships etc. it would seem useful to 
constrain the use of these conceptually similar terms to deliberate, specific, and 
singular meanings. To this end this thesis will describe subjects as being either 
‘conscious’ or ‘unconscious’ of something or as having (varying degrees of) 
‘declarative’ or ‘non-declarative’ knowledge or information. [Like many authors I will 
not offer a definitive quantification of conscious or unconscious and will simply employ 
these terms in their common-use sense, except to note that, in humans a necessary 
property of conscious knowledge is that it is available to deliberate / intentional and 
(not necessarily verbal) declaration whereas unconscious knowledge is not]. 
 
Shanks and St. John state that non-declarative retrieval is defined as occurring 
when information from some prior episode can be retrieved and influence processing 
in the absence of conscious recollection of the prior episode, and state that “non-
declarative retrieval requires the absence of conscious re-experience of the study 
episode”. Thus Shanks and St. John are not only concerned with a subjects ability to 
consciously recollect the learning episode during test but also the subjects state of 
conscious awareness during the learning episode itself and insist that the subject must 
be unaware of the relevant relationship in addition to being unaware of the episode 
itself. Here perhaps is the first and most obvious disparity between concerns of 
learning and of memory, that no recourse to the subject’s state vis-à-vis recollection of 
the learning episode is required for a demonstration of non-declarative memory, 
simply that the subject be unconscious of the specific information that influences their 
behaviour whilst they are expressing it. While it is not impossible for a neurologically 
normal subject who is overtly conscious of the critical information whilst learning to be 
unconscious of it during testing it is however unlikely and thus when testing non-
declarative memory it is methodologically preferable that such subjects also be 
unconscious of the specific information during learning.  
 
This thesis agrees with those authors who criticise Shanks and St. John for 
making their necessary conditions for non-declarative learning so strict that it is 
essentially unprovable (e.g. Cleeremans, 1994). It seems almost redundant to note 
that it is not recollection of the learning episode per se’ but rather of the particular 
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information learnt during that episode that facilitates subsequent performance which is 
germane to an examination of (un)conscious learning and memory. Thus to insist that 
a subject be unconscious of not just the critical information learnt during the episode 
but that of the learning episode itself strikes this author as unnecessary. What does it 
matter if a subject can consciously recollect the learning episode and even the 
process by which they learnt the information as long as they are unconscious of the 
relationships between the stimuli that go to make up the information that facilitates 
subsequent performance? Conscious recollection of the episode and it’s details (type 
of stimuli, procedures etc.) confers no advantage during test (assuming good 
methodological rigour). In fact an argument could even be made that conscious 
recollection of the episode in the absence of conscious knowledge of the critical 
information might interfere with subsequent performance, but this is clearly not Shanks 
and St. John’s reason for insisting on its absence. As Stadler and Frensch (1994) note 
in their peer-review of Shanks and St. John’s article, there are circumstances when 
learning is declarative and memory non-declarative, such as the development of 
automaticity for example, but which Shanks and St. John would deny as being non-
declarative by virtue of the subject being conscious of the original learning episode(s). 
Given no clear methodological or conceptual requirement for subjects to be 
unconscious of the actual learning episode Shanks and St. John run the risk, with 
such over-zealous criteria, of creating a ‘stone-man’ (proposed in opposition to the 
concept of a ‘straw-man’) hypothesis that is practically unprovable and thus their 
examination of non-declarative learning runs the risk of degenerating into a case of 
reduction ad absurdum.  
 
1.4.2 The Dangers of Overly Stringent Application of Criteria. 
While their emphasis on a subjects’ conscious state during learning is 
unnecessarily strict the criterion Shanks and St. John develop from this are 
extremely useful. The first of these, the ’information criterion’, addresses the 
concern that there may be a disparity between the information that is responsible 
for performance and that which is revealed by tests of conscious awareness of the 
information, essentially an issue of test validity. Shanks and St. John note that in 
order to conclude that a subject has non-declarative knowledge of the critical 
information any test of conscious knowledge must actually test for conscious 
knowledge of the precise information that produces the performance advantage, 
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and they go on to conclude that many tests of conscious knowledge actually test for 
something other than this and therefore fail to demonstrate the necessary absence 
of conscious knowledge of the critical information.  
 
Their 2nd criterion, the ’sensitivity criterion’, is predicated on the point that in 
order to demonstrate the independence of an declarative and an non-declarative 
system any test of conscious knowledge must be sensitive to all relevant conscious 
knowledge (and is thus reminiscent of Schacter, Bowers and Booker’s (1989) 
retrieval intentionality criterion; and Jacoby, Ste-Marie, and Toth’s (1993) process-
dissociation procedure), and as such is primarily an issue of test sensitivity. Shanks 
and St. John note that unless this criterion is met the fact that a subject displays 
improved task performance may simply be due to the fact that the behavioural task 
is more sensitive to the conscious information the subject has than the test of 
conscious is. Shanks and St. John conclude from this that there must be either 
some independent reason to believe that the test of conscious knowledge is 
exhaustive or that there is some reason to believe the test of conscious knowledge 
is equally as sensitive as the performance test. Given the practical unlikelihood of 
demonstrating exhaustive knowledge Shanks and St. John chose the 2nd approach, 
although some of their critics, Jeminez et al (1994) and Cleeremans (1994), for 
example, condemn them based on the former definition, instead noting “if the 
retrieval contexts… are approximately matched , then the Sensitivity Criterion may 
be met”. When applying this criterion Shanks and St. John come to the conclusion 
that none of the variety of tests for conscious knowledge in non-declarative learning 
/ memory tests extant in the literature satisfies this criteria and they therefore 
conclude that there is no good evidence for unconscious learning. While this 
criterion is now widely accepted in one form or another, Shanks and St. John have 
been heavily criticised for what is seen as an extremely stringent application of what 
they accept as ‘approximately matched’ and in doing so erroneously failing to reject 
the null hypothesis (of no independence between systems) due to excessively strict 
criteria. (Berry, 1994; Lindsay and Gorayska’s, 1994; Merikle, 1994; Overskied, 
1994; Reber and Winter, 1994; and Willingham, 1994). 
 
In response to critiques of this nature Shanks and St. John note that relaxing 
the criteria increases the danger of false-positives due to “differential sensitivity or a 
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mismatch in the type of information examined by the two tests”. Whilst true this is also 
somewhat disingenuous, in that the criticism of Sherry and Schacter’s criteria 
acknowledges the necessity of the sensitivity criterion and attacks it on the grounds of 
it’s application rather than it’s utility. Moreover it is worth noting that given the very 
stringent criteria a single demonstration of dissociable learning that satisfies Sherry 
and Schacter’s criterion is sufficient to invalidate their hypothesis of no difference, as 
the studies that fail to satisfy the criteria and thus fail to demonstrate dissociable 
learning systems simply produce an absence of evidence, and are not evidence of 
absence.  
 
1.4.3 The Utility of Amnesic Subjects in Memory Studies  
The second prime criticism levelled at Shanks and St. John is their abrupt and 
total dismissal of the evidence for multiple-memory systems demonstrated by subjects 
with a variety of amnesic etiologies. In the original article they state that “We know of 
no convincing data that would suggest that amnesics are capable of unconscious 
learning”. Specifically because although such subjects may be unable to recall the 
learning episode Shanks and St. John contend there is no good evidence to suggest 
that they were unconscious of the relationship between stimuli during the learning 
episode. However, they appear to directly contradict themselves in their response to 
the peer-reviews when they state “if.. information is unconscious at the time of 
retrieval, then it is plausible to assume that it was registered unconsciously”! 
 
It will come as no surprise to the reader to learn that Shanks and St. John have 
been roundly criticised for so casual a dismissal of the amnesic related evidence for 
multiple learning / memory systems. In their defence Shanks and St. John contend 
that data from amnesics subjects is unlikely to be useful because the fact that amnesic 
subjects are incapable of verbalising information does not necessarily mean they do 
not have that information available to consciousness during testing (Shanks and St. 
John are also highly critical of the validity of verbal reports as a measure of conscious 
knowledge). If amnesics are selectively (their emphasis) impaired on declarative tests 
such as recognition then the deficit displayed by amnesic subjects on declarative  
memory tasks doesn’t necessarily denote the absence of declarative  knowledge, 
merely an inability to express it. Shanks and St. John have a good point, care must be 
taken to ensure that impaired performance on declarative  tests actually tells us 
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something about a subject’s ability to use declarative  memory during learning and 
isn’t simply an indication of a subjects inability to perform the test irrespective of their 
ability to employ declarative  memory during learning (i.e. studies with amnesic 
subjects fail the information criterion). During their response to the peer-review of their 
article Shanks and St. John defend their decision to discard the evidence from 
amnesic subjects in some depth and make a number of good points about typical 
studies supposedly demonstrating non-declarative learning in amnesic subjects and a 
brief summary is warranted.  
 
Shanks and St. John point out that the commonly-held theory that amnesia is a 
deficit in conscious declarative memory is but one of many theories and not without it’s 
criticisms. Thus if amnesia turns out to be something other than this (for example: a 
selective deficit of contextual processing, Mayes, 1998) then its relevance to the 
unconscious learning is very limited. 
 
Like a number of other authors (e.g. Curran ,1997) Shanks and St. John are 
concerned with the fact that amnesic subjects always show impaired baseline 
performance in comparison with normal subjects. Although this difference is typically 
slight (and not statistically significant) it does raise a number of issues (e.g. baseline 
differences can help to obscure / emphasise group differences; Curran, 1997) Shanks 
and St. John are specifically concerned with the point that if amnesic and normal non-
declarative learning performance is not truly equivalent “it is possible that the extra 
conscious knowledge the normal subjects have (as indexed by superior performance 
on the declarative  test) is what explains their superior performance on the non-
declarative test”. While this is undoubtedly true they then conclude as a direct result of 
this point that there are no grounds “for concluding that unconscious knowledge is 
playing any role at all” (emphasis added). Thus they suggest any difference in 
behaviour is due solely to the relative difference in conscious knowledge. This 
however is an unwarranted conclusion in that while different degrees of conscious 
knowledge could produce superior non-declarative test performance (and see the next 
chapter for some empirical evidence for this) this point in no way excludes the other 
possibility, that improved performance on an non-declarative memory test may be due 
to non-declarative memory.  Before leaving this topic the reader’s attention is drawn to 
Sherry and Schacter’s point that one way to employ amnesic subjects to demonstrate 
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multiple learning systems would be to show that amnesics can perform better than 
normal subjects on an non-declarative task while performing worse on an declarative  
task, but that there “appear to be no published cases of this sort”. They go on to 
conclude that studies with shorter retention intervals for amnesic subjects which might 
provide related sorts evidence (e.g. Schacter et al. 1984) are very difficult to interpret, 
but that “A crossover interaction would be much more persuasive”. (Emphasis added, 
the relevance of which will become apparent in Chapter 2). 
 
Finally they also note that a single source (system) model of conscious 
information which is used for both declarative  and non-declarative learning-and-
memory would predict amnesics would be impaired on both declarative and non-
declarative tasks, and indeed they sometimes are (see Chapter 2), but to vastly 
different degrees. Once again Shanks and St. John are being somewhat disingenuous 
as any non-declarative impairment demonstrated by amnesic subjects is substantially 
less than their declarative  impairment, and any recourse to arguments about degrees 
of impairment (as Shanks and St. John would be forced to undertake in order to 
continue arguing their point) intrinsically allows the possibility that amnesics do 
provide good evidence of multiple systems by virtue of having a relative impairment of 
one system compared to the other. While there is some evidence that both memory 
systems are impaired in amnesic subjects there is also good evidence that some 
amnesic subjects display completely normal non-declarative memory in the presence 
of a serious declarative  memory deficit (i.e. the priming studies cited above). 
 
Given their emphasis on learning as opposed to memory and that amnesia is 
typically thought of as a memory (as opposed to learning) deficit their insistence that 
amnesic subjects be held to the same strict criterion as normal subjects for the 
availability of the critical information to conscious awareness during learning is 
reasonable. In fact, in light of what is discussed above the use of amnesic subjects 
may actually make demonstration of non-declarative learning more difficult. As using 
of the presence of an declarative  memory deficit during testing to reason back to one 
during learning is logically vulnerable (although logic of this form is commonplace). 
 
Another issue raised in the peer-review is that Shanks and St. John argue their 
case from the assumption that conscious processing is the default condition. As Berry 
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(1994) points out not everybody would accept this position, and in fact some (e.g. 
Reber, 1990) argue precisely the opposite. Several commentators (Holyoak and 
Gattis, Reber and Winter, and Terrace; 1994) note that this is as much an assumption 
as the reverse which Shanks and St. John themselves criticise.  
 
1.4.4 Conclusions on Shanks and St. John 
It is not the intention of this thesis to provide a comprehensive discussion of all 
the points raised in the original article and subsequent commentary. Furthermore 
Shanks and St. John’s alternative to conscious / unconscious learning, instance and 
rule learning (which is due a chapter in it’s own right) has deliberately not been 
discussed in order to focus on those issues directly related to the validity of multiple 
memory systems (Shanks and St. John consider their alternatives to be 
complementary operations of a unitary system). Therefore, the examination of their 
article will conclude with a few final points, while acknowledging the wealth of material 
left untreated and with the promise to visit a subtopic (hitherto unmentioned) of this 
area in detail in the next chapter. 
 
While this thesis does not concur with Sherry and Schacter’s conclusion that 
there is no good evidence of dissociable learning / memory systems in adult humans it 
acknowledges the debt the field owes them for drawing attention to considerable 
methodological and conceptual complexities hitherto often confused / ignored. What is 
taken issue with, however, is how these criteria are applied. Specifically that Sherry 
and Schacter employ the information criterion too stringently to the point of making it 
all but impossible to satisfy, and their cavalier and dismissive treatment of the amnesia 
literature and their reasoning for which is weak and unconvincing. Other concerns 
such as their non-declarative assumption of conscious processing as the norm, and 
the somewhat artificial separation of learning and memory in light of the point that 
declarative  / non-declarative dichotomy rests on several strands of evidence and 
“does not stand or fall according to the status of aware versus unaware learning” 
alone (Squire, Hamann and Knowlton, 1994; also see Willingham, 1994) strengthen 
this conclusion. 
 
General Conclusions On The Evidence For Multiple Memory Systems 
Totally conclusive evidence for or against multiple memory systems is missing. 
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However the evidence presented in this chapter strongly favours the multiple-system 
hypothesis (see also Kinsbourne, 1987; Weiskrantz, 1987; and Gershburg and 
Shimamura, 1998). The demonstration of functional independence of memory tasks in 
subjects, amnesic or neurologically normal, cannot easily be explained by a unitary 
memory system. What is more, the results from the animal literature discussed in 
Chapter 4 provides convergent evidence that there are similar neurologically 
independent and functionally dissociable forms of memory in both animals and 
humans. That said Shanks and St. John’s conclusion is based on a thoughtful analysis 
of the literature and cannot be simply ignored. In response to this the next chapter will 
examine the evidence for multiple memory systems as provided by a specific 
behavioural paradigm, the serial reaction time (SRT) task, both in general and with 
specific consideration for Shanks and St. John’s critique of the task, and arrive at firm 
conclusions as a result of the evidence discussed therein. 
 
1.5 General Aims of the Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis will be concerned firstly with a qualitative review of 
a specific human non-declarative memory task, the serial reaction time (SRT) task. 
This review (Chapter 2) will focus on how the SRT is used to provide evidence for 
non-declarative memory and its utility a source of evidence for multiple memory 
systems. This review will discuss the SRT, the contrasting abilities of subjects with 
different amnesic etiologies to perform the SRT task, and the capacity for 
experimental dissociation between this task and declarative memory tasks. Shanks 
and St. John will also be revisited in light of the SRT literature and some recent 
studies introduced which address the concerns of their critique while still 
demonstrating good evidence of non-conscious learning / memory. 
 
Chapter 3 will present a meta-analysis of studies from the SRT literature to 
address two important questions: 1) Do those neuropathological subjects with limbic 
system damage (i.e. organic amnesia, Korsakoff’s syndrome, mildly dementing 
Alzheimer’s patients, etc.) actually display SRT performance that is not different to 
control subjects in contrast to what SRT studies usually claim, and 2) do various 
neuropathological groups show reliable SRT performance. 
 
Chapter 4 will present a review of the limited animal literature on non-
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declarative learning and in doing so demonstrate that there is, as yet, no good animal 
analogue of a human non-declarative memory task. It will also be shown that what few 
tasks there are that supposedly demonstrate human-style non-declarative learning in 
animals involve substantial methodological and conceptual differences to the human 
tasks they attempt to mimic. A possible animal analogue of the human-SRT will be 
introduced and its utility and validity discussed. 
  
In response to the argument in the Chapter 4, Chapter 5 will introduce a novel 
rat-SRT task which has a reasonable degree of similarity to the human-SRT task, and 
will show that rats performing this task display behaviour very similar to that of human 
behaviour in the SRT task. A novel apparatus, the 16-arm Fan-Maze, will be 
introduced the development an animal-SRT task reported. However, a number of 
serious limitations that became apparent with this approach will be presented and an 
alternative, the Intra-Cranial Self-Stimulation SRT (ICSS-SRT) task, will be suggested. 
 
The following chapter (6) will report a control study designed to demonstrate 
the ideal conditions for SRT learning in rats. Manipulations of the type of sequence 
(repeating or random) and the number of sessions / days (one or three) are examined 
and conclusions presented as to the best combination of these variables for SRT 
learning. This study will also provide firm empirical support for the ability of animal 
subjects to demonstrate SRT behaviour of a very similar type to human behaviour, 
and thus the likelihood of having some form of non-declarative memory. 
 
Thereafter the next chapter (7) presents an experiment designed to 
demonstrate a dissociation between lesion site (dorso-lateral caudate nucleus and 
dorsal hippocampus) in the SRT memory task. These results will demonstrate that the 
rat-SRT relies on the same neural substrate as human SRT performance does and, 
furthermore, that the rat-SRT is not impaired by hippocampal dysfunction.  
 
The final chapter (8) will present a discussion of the experimental results in light of 
the theoretical arguments presented in the thesis and as the empirical results relate to 
the meta-analysis. This chapter will also discuss the validity and utility of the rat-SRT 
and several limitations of the current research will be discussed. Possible avenues for 
future research will also be suggested before presenting general conclusions. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Serial Reaction Time Task: A Non-
declarative Memory Test 
 
General Introduction 
 
This chapter will initially present a brief overview of a common test of 
non-declarative memory, the Serial Reaction Time task (SRT), before 
progressing to a discussion of the pattern of impairment and spared-
performance found in different neuropathological populations. It will be shown 
that those subjects with a limbic-system amnesia appear to display normal, or 
near normal, SRT behaviour, even though suffering a substantial explicit 
memory deficit. In contrast subjects with non-limbic-system disorders 
(specifically those suffering basal ganglia based syndromes) are impaired in the 
SRT whereas their explicit memory performance is unimpaired. Thereafter a 
number of critical methodological issues are discussed. A large part of 
methodology discussion will be devoted to a consideration of the arguments 
made by Shanks and St. John (1994) that pertain to the SRT. Thereafter 
several studies will be presented that address these concerns while still 
demonstrating good evidence of non-declarative learning in the SRT task. As a 
result of this discussion conclusions will be presented as regards those 
questions surrounding multiple-memory systems first raised in Chapter 1, 
including the concerns raised by Shanks and St. John, and thus the relevance 
and validity of the SRT task as a measure of non-declarative memory. 
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2.1 Introduction to The Serial Reaction Time Task 
First introduced by Knopman and Nissen in 1987 the SRT has enjoyed 
considerable use since and is often employed in attempts to demonstrate a 
dissociation between explicit and non-declarative memory. In the prototypical SRT 
study subjects perform a visual serial reaction time task with an embedded (and 
uncued) repeating sequence. The task is considered to be non-declarative by virtue of 
the fact that subjects are, supposedly, not consciously aware of the repeating 
sequence. Implicit sequence learning in this task is demonstrated in two ways. The 
first, the ‘learning effect’ is the reduction in reaction times (over and above that which 
is attributable to sheer motor improvement alone) across the session demonstrated by 
subjects who experience a repeating sequence. The second, and more substantive, 
measure of learning is the ‘interference effect’ which is a rebound increase in reaction 
time that occurs when subjects are (unknowingly) switched from a repeating to a 
random sequence.  
 
2.1.1 Standard Methodological Features of SRT studies. 
In a typical SRT study subjects are seated in front of a computer monitor 
immediately below which is a response board with four buttons. An asterisk appears in 
one of four positions spaced horizontally across the bottom of the screen and aligned 
with the positions of the response buttons. The reaction time to each stimulus is 
determined and (typically) the median for a block of trials calculated. The stimulus 
remains onscreen until the correct button is pushed and, following a short delay, the 
next stimulus appears. Stimuli appear in either repeating or random sequences. The 
most common repeating sequence is a 10-trial repeating sequence of light positions 
which repeats ten times during a 100-trial block and most studies employ 5 or 6 
blocks. So called ‘random’ sequences are in fact quasi-random in that they are at least 
constrained by the rule that a stimuli cannot immediately reappear in the same 
stimulus location on the next trial. Blocks of random (sic) sequences usually contain 
as many trials as the relevant repeating sequence blocks (i.e. 100 trials). The 
beginning and end of any sequence (random or repeating) is not marked and the 
subjects are not told that learning or memory is being assessed or that a repeating 
sequences is present, but rather are instructed to simply respond to the stimulus as 
fast as possible.  
 
The prototypical procedure is for a subject to perform the SRT for five blocks. 
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The first four blocks contain the repeating sequence and the fifth block the random 
sequence(s). The expectation is that the subject will show a marked decrease in 
reaction times (RTs) over the course of the first four (repeating) blocks (the learning 
effect) and a sudden increase in reaction times in block five when switched from the 
repeating to the random sequence (the interference effect). In contrast subjects who 
only ever experience the random sequence throughout all five blocks are expected to 
demonstrate a smaller decrease in reaction times (due simply to an improved ability to 
perform the motor requirements of the task) and, critically, no increase in reaction 
times between block four and five. 
 
Although both the learning and the interference effects are measured during a 
typical SRT experiment the literature has tended to focus on the interference effect 
due to its ease of quantification allowing simple and prompt comparison between 
groups and because it is not confounded by sheer motor-skill improvement. As a 
result the following discussion (and indeed the thesis as a whole) will concentrate on 
this measure of non-declarative learning and typically only discuss the learning effect 
in terms of offering support for, or contradicting, conclusions based on interference 
effect. 
 
2.2  Neuropathology and the SRT 
 
One of the great promises of the SRT is that as a test of non-declarative 
memory it will differentiate between types of neuropathology. Specifically it will reveal 
spared / preserved non-declarative memory in subjects with impaired explicit memory 
while revealing impaired non-declarative memory in other aetiologies. Thus those 
subjects that are typically thought of as ‘amnesic’ should be able to perform this test in 
very similar manner to that of non-amnesic subjects. 
 
2.2.1 Limbic System Amnesia and the SRT 
This section will present evidence that those subjects with limbic system 
amnesias are not (or only mildly) impaired on the SRT while suffering varying degrees 
of explicit memory impairment. This suggests that the SRT is both a valid measure of 
non-declarative memory and that the two forms of memory are dissociable and 
independent of each other. Knopman and Nissen’s  (1987) article which originally 
introduced the SRT will be presented first. This is a fortuitous coincidence for three 
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reasons: this article was the first to introduce the SRT in its current form and is thus 
the foundation article for this field and the main impetus for the subsequent 
development of SRT-based non-declarative memory research. Secondly, while some 
of the methodological detail has changed the broad approach to SRT work remains 
very similar to that first reported in this article and thus this article is a good primer for 
discussing later SRT work. And lastly because it demonstrates preserved SRT ability 
in limbic system amnesiacs (Alzheimer’s disease subjects).  
 
Alzheimer’s Disease 
In their 1987 study Knopman and Nissen compared elderly control subjects 
with mildly dementing Alzheimer’s disease (AD) subjects. Both groups experienced 
five 100-trial blocks, the first four blocks employed a 10-trial repeating sequence (ten 
repetitions over a block) while the fifth block contained random-sequence stimuli. Both 
the Alzheimer subjects and the control subjects displayed a decrease in reaction times 
over repeating-sequence blocks (the learning effect) and an increase in reaction time 
when switching from a repeating- to a random-sequence (the interference effect), 
suggesting the AD subjects had some preserved (implicit) memory ability.  
 
Nonetheless it is readily apparent (see Fig. 2.1) that the reaction time for the 
AD subjects was markedly slower than controls, in fact by more than twice (see 
original text). However, what is also clear is that the Alzheimer patients display a near 
identical pattern of behaviour as the control subjects. Thus irrespective of their 
generally slower reaction times AD subjects displayed both a learning and an 
interference effect of a very similar nature / strength as that shown by control subjects. 
Knopman and Nissen emphasise the point that acquisition of knowledge about the 
repeating sequence occurred despite the patients markedly slower reaction times 
compared with the control subjects and in contrast to the AD subject’s significantly 
impaired explicit memory. 
 
Somewhat surprisingly however Knopman and Nissen found that the sequence 
learning ability of the Alzheimer patients’ was not related to severity of their dementia 
as indexed by the mini-mental state exam. This is at odds with what was expected and 
what is reported in other studies (especially Ferraro, Balota & Connor, 1993, see 
below). 
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Fig. 2.1, The Performance of Alzheimer’s Disease and Control Subjects in a SRT Task 
(Data drawn from Knopman and Nissen, 1987). 
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As will be seen in the following section this study is typical of most SRT studies 
employing subjects with limbic system damage in that these subjects show a degree 
of spared sequence-learning ability in the presence of an explicit memory impairment. 
However, subsequent studies often differ from this one in that while Knopman and 
Nissen only tested for general explicit memory ability later studies often deliberately 
test their subject’s explicit knowledge of the actual repeating sequence in order to 
demonstrate amnesic subjects can perform the SRT without explicit knowledge of the 
actual information that bestows a behavioural advantage.  
 
Nevertheless, virtually all SRT studies with limbic systems amnesiac subjects 
conclude that their neurologic subjects perform the SRT in a control-like manner, 
irrespective of any generally slower reaction times demonstrated by the neurologic 
subjects. However, given that all subsequent SRT studies with limbic system 
amnesiac subjects show a non-significant difference in the same direction (limbic 
system amnesia subjects always have slower reaction times than controls) it is 
possible that individual studies do not have sufficient statistical power (by virtue of 
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small sample and effect sizes) to demonstrate the difference between neurologic and 
control groups, rendering the conclusion of equivalency unreliable. For this reason 
Chapter 3 will present a meta-analysis designed to test the assumption in the literature 
that limbic system amnesiacs are not different to controls. 
 
In a study designed to test both the ability of Alzheimer’s disease subjects (AD) 
to perform the SRT and to examine how well they retained sequence information over 
long delays Knopman (1991a) tested AD subjects on the standard SRT task and then 
repeated the test 1 or 2 weeks later. In contrast with the result from the earlier study 
(above) he found that AD subjects’ degree of ‘sequence-specific learning’ 
(interference effect) was significantly weaker than controls (80ms vs. 128ms 
respectively; first session). However, Knopman then went on to divide the AD group 
into ‘learners’ and ‘non-learners’ post hoc (to be classified as a ‘learner’ subjects had 
to have an interference effect of greater than 50ms). Once ‘non-learners’ were 
removed from the analysis there was no difference in sequence-specific learning 
between groups (AD: 119ms, Controls: 146ms), but as with the original 1987 study the 
AD subjects responded significantly slower than the control group. 
 
In the second session, delayed by 1 or 2 weeks, both the AD and control 
subjects demonstrated considerable sequence retention in that both groups had much 
lower reaction times in the first block of the second session than in the first block of 
the first session when they were naïve to the task. As in the first session once ‘non-
learners’ were removed from the analysis there was no difference in the strength of 
the interference effect displayed by either group, although AD subjects were again 
significantly slower than the control. 
 
While additional general psychometric testing showed that the AD subjects 
were overall “markedly impaired to the elderly control group” the results of a generate 
task (a test of explicit sequence knowledge) showed that the somewhat less-accurate 
AD subjects were not significantly different from the control group (36.2% and 48.1% 
accurate respectively). Furthermore, the chance-level of behaviour on the generate 
task is 33% and thus the AD subjects appear to have been performing this task 
virtually at chance, suggesting they had very little explicit awareness of the repeating-
sequence. Similarly a generate score of 48% for the control group is lower than seen 
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in most studies employing similar conditions (typically ~70-80%, see below) and 
suggests these subjects had only partial awareness of the sequence. 
The results of this study suggest, that with use of judicious selection criterion, 
AD subjects are capable of demonstrating non-declarative sequence-learning and 
retaining that learning over a delay, in the absence of any explicit awareness for the 
sequence, and in the presence of a significant explicit memory impairment. This study 
is also interesting in that it provides evidence that control subjects are able to 
demonstrate sequence-learning with a much weaker degree of explicit awareness of 
the sequence than is common. 
 
There is further corroboration that AD subjects can perform the SRT, providing 
evidence for both multiple memory systems and the validity of the explicit / non-
declarative memory distinction. In a study of mixed amnesic etiologies Ferraro, Balota 
and Conner (1993), tested: non dementing healthy aged subjects, non dementing 
Parkinson’s disease (PD) subjects, very mildly demented AD subjects, and mildly 
demented AD subjects. The task characteristics were typical in that they used 4 blocks 
of a repeating sequence before switching to one block of random sequences. The 
result that stands out is that the mildly dementing AD patients are significantly 
impaired to all other groups as they display both much slower reaction times and a 
much weaker interference effect.  
 
In contrast the very mildly dementing AD subjects are extremely similar to 
controls in terms of both their actual reaction times and the strength of their 
interference effect. The pattern of results for Parkinson’s disease subjects is different 
again in that while they showed similar reaction times to both the controls and the very 
mildly dementing AD subjects they had a significantly weaker interference effect than 
both these groups. A comparison between the mildly dementing AD group and the PD 
group revealed the mildly dementing AD group was significantly slower than the PD 
group and had a significantly weaker interference effect, indicating it was more 
impaired than the PD group. Although no test of explicit sequence knowledge was 
employed subjects did undergo a battery of psychometric tests which produced results 
consistent with group classification (i.e. as regards dementia and explicit memory 
impairment). What is more interesting is that when the scores on the psychometric 
tests were correlated with a degree of non-declarative learning (interference effect) 
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only the very mildly dementing AD group revealed any reliable correlations. On closer 
examination it is evident that the tests that do produce significant correlations rely 
more on perceptualmotor aptitude. Interestingly those tests that do not correlate with a 
degree of non-declarative memory are considered tests of explicit memory. Therefore 
the lack of a reliable correlation between tests of explicit memory and a measure of 
non-declarative memory is important as it provides divergent validity for the separate 
constructs. 
 
It is apparent from these studies that while AD sufferers can demonstrate good 
SRT performance in the presence of an explicit memory impairment this is only true in 
the early stages of the disease (most likely while the neuropathology is still relatively 
limited). However, given the pervasive and progressive nature of this disorder, it is all 
but impossible to determine if the impairment evident in more dementing subjects is 
due to a mildly impaired non-declarative memory or a consequence of more general 
neuropathology.  
 
Mixed Amnesics 
Given that organic amnesia is, by definition, produced by damage in the limbic 
system the first experiment in Reber and Squire (1994) was designed solely to 
demonstrate the ability of amnesic subjects to perform the SRT in the absence of any 
explicit memory for the repeating sequence. During the first of two session (sessions 
were separated on average by 73 days) the amnesics and first control group subjects 
experienced a 10-trial, 40-block (for a total of 400 trials) repeating-sequence before 
moving onto a verbal report phase and then a prediction phase (both are tests of 
explicit knowledge of the repeating sequence). In contrast the ‘random’ control group 
experienced a quasi-random sequence for the full 400 trials before going onto the 
verbal report and prediction phases. As expected the amnesic subjects demonstrated 
an improvement in reaction time (RT) over blocks consistent with that shown by the 
(‘first’) control group that experienced the repeating sequence. Furthermore the 
random-control group did not display any improvement in reaction times over blocks 
and both the amnesic and control groups were significantly different from this group. 
 
The second session revealed a similar pattern of results and included an 
interference test. All subjects experienced four blocks of the repeating sequence (for a 
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total of 400 trials) before completing explicit sequence knowledge tests. After these 
tests subjects returned to the SRT and performed a further repeating sequence block 
before being switched to a random sequence block in the sixth and final block. All 
subjects, control and amnesic, demonstrated; a significant reduction in reaction times 
over blocks, similar reaction times in the blocks immediately prior to, and after, the 
explicit memory tests, and (most importantly) a similarly strong increase in reaction 
times when switched from a repeating to a random sequence. While the amnesic 
subjects demonstrated good SRT performance their sequence recognition test scores 
were indistinguishable from the random control subjects, and both groups were not 
different from chance and significantly impaired in comparison to the first control 
group. Thus amnesic subjects demonstrated sequence learning in a similar fashion to 
control subjects while having no measurable explicit memory for the repeating 
sequence. 
 
In their second experiment Reber and Squire attempted to address the 
concerns of Shanks and St. John (1994) with respect to a number issues to do with 
stimulus presentation (see below for a detailed discussion of these concerns). To this 
end they substituted the original 10-trial sequence for a 12-trial sequence that allowed 
both equal frequency of stimulus presentation and transition frequency (i.e. the 
frequency with which one particular stimuli preceded another particular stimuli) 
between the different sequence types. Otherwise the study was identical to that in the 
second session described above. Once again both groups demonstrated good 
reduction in reaction times over repeating-sequence blocks and a strong increase in 
reaction times when switched from a repeating to a random sequence. Thus there 
remains good evidence that amnesic subjects can perform the SRT in a manner near 
identical to controls when nothing but actual sequence information is allowed to vary 
between the repeating and random sequences (see below for a discussion on this 
issue). Furthermore the validity of the SRT as a test of non-declarative memory is 
strengthened by the finding that both the amnesic and control groups performed at 
chance-levels in the recognition memory test and thus both groups demonstrated 
good SRT performance in the absence of any explicit memory of the 12-trial 
sequence. 
 
In a similarly comprehensive study Reber and Squire (1998) attempted to 
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demonstrate a crossover in SRT performance between amnesic subjects and a wide 
variety of control conditions. The rational behind the attempt is that if the multiple 
memory system view is correct it should be possible to generate circumstances 
whereby one group (amnesiacs) exhibits significantly more non-declarative memory, 
and significantly less explicit memory, than another group (controls).  
However, analysis of the ‘pretraining’ data revealed an identical, and significant, 
decrease in reaction times across the first portion of the ‘pretraining’ session for all 
groups including those subjects who only ever experienced random sequences. 
Fortunately the ‘random only’ subjects failed to demonstrate any interference effect at 
all, unlike the various groups that experienced repeating sequences during this phase 
who all demonstrated strong interference effects. Thus the practise of preferring the 
interference-effect over the learning-effect that is common in the literature has some 
experimental support. 
 
Both the amnesiac and the “CON” groups (the primary control group for 
amnesiac subjects) display a significant increase in reaction times when switched to 
random stimuli in this study. However the Reber & Squire report that the CON group 
displayed a (non-significantly) greater interference effect than the amnesiac group, 
and the author’s suggestion that the CON group’s greater score “probably reflects a 
contribution of explicit sequence knowledge” seems reasonable. Nevertheless, the 
amnesiac subjects demonstrate a robust interference effect that is different from zero 
and from all the ‘memorisation’ control groups (who explicitly memorised the repeating 
sequence but only practised it for a short period), but is not different to the CON 
group. The purpose of the deliberate memorisation of the repeating sequence in the 
‘memorisation’ groups was to examine the ability of subjects to employ explicit 
knowledge of the sequence during SRT performance. The obvious conclusion from 
these results is that explicitly memorising the sequence alone (i.e. in the absence of 
reasonable period of SRT performance with the repeating sequence) does not 
produce a behavioural advantage. 
 
Irrespective of the sequence memorisation issue it is clear that amnesiac 
subjects can perform the SRT in a manner very similar to that of control subjects who 
experience identical experimental conditions. However in order to demonstrate a 
crossover effect Reber and Squire must also demonstrate the opposite dissociation 
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between explicit sequence knowledge for the amnesiac and CON groups. 
However, Reber & Squire report that in the first test of explicit sequence 
knowledge, a verbal report procedure, the amnesiac subjects demonstrated 
reasonably good knowledge of the repeating sequence. This is surprising as it is 
typically expected that amnesic subjects will have poor explicit knowledge of the 
repeating sequence (indeed this is the point of using amnesic subjects). However, 
given that verbal report is  supposedly a measure of explicit sequence knowledge the 
author’s assertion that the ability of the amnesiac subjects to report a “fair portion” of 
the sequence is due to the influence of non-declarative knowledge is somewhat 
surprising. This becomes clearer when Reber and Squire acknowledge that during the 
verbal report amnesiac subjects received “repeated encouragement to guess” and it 
was at this point that they generated reasonably long sequence strings (up to 8 of 12 
positions). It is readily apparent that such encouragement fundamentally changes the 
task requirements and shifts the focus of the verbal report procedure from an explicit 
to a more non-declarative test of sequence awareness but forcing the amnesiac 
subjects to rely on (necessarily implicitly informed) guesses. This point is supported by 
the finding that an amnesiac subject who scored moderately well on the (supposedly 
explicit) verbal report score “had no detectable declarative memory capacity” and as 
such his performance must reflect non-declarative knowledge. Therefore, as the 
verbal report test was initially intended to ascertain the amnesiac subject’s level of 
explicit sequence knowledge, this raises the question of what possible utility the 
authors saw in deliberately forcing subjects to continue the task beyond the ability of 
their, impaired, explicit memory.  
However, in a second test of explicit knowledge of the repeating sequence 
subjects performed a recognition test and while all control groups scored at above 
chance the amnesiac group who also recognised the sequence significantly more 
poorly than any of the other groups exposed to it. This test therefore produces results 
consistent with expectations and provides evidence that any capacity of amnesiac 
subjects to learn serial-order information can be exercised in the absence of explicit 
knowledge of the sequence. 
Thus, because the amnesiac subjects demonstrated good SRT performance in 
the absence of any explicit memory for the repeating sequence it is reasonable to 
conclude that this study has succeeded in demonstrating a performance crossover 
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between explicit and non-declarative memory. Both the amnesiac and CON groups 
show a dissociation between explicit and non-declarative knowledge unlike the various 
control conditions who do. 
Reber and Squire go on to note that their CON group received extensive SRT 
practise and also acquired some explicit knowledge of the sequence displayed a 
(nonsignificant) numerically larger reaction time slowdown than the amnesiac 
subjects, suggesting the CON group was able to apply some explicit knowledge two 
the non-declarative test. This is consistent with findings of the studies mentioned 
above that found an advantage of explicit sequence knowledge and suggests that it is 
the conjunction of both explicit and non-declarative sequence knowledge that enables 
non-neurologically impaired subjects to produce very short reaction time’s during the 
SRT. 
Analysis of a second SRT session by Reber & Squire (performed by amnesiacs 
and the primary control group only) some three to 12 months after the first session 
revealed no difference in reaction times between the amnesic and the CON group (the 
interference effect is not reported for the second session), and both groups exhibited a 
significant reduction in reaction times across blocks. Interestingly, while no mention is 
made of it there is a strong suggestion in the graph that neither group exhibited the 
reaction time saving between sessions that both the AD and control subjects 
displayed in Nissen, Willingham and Hartman, 1989 (below), and in Knopman 1991a 
(above). However in these cases the delay was only 1 or 2 weeks, whereas in Reber 
and Squire the delay between sessions was 3 to 12 months, suggesting sequence 
knowledge decays over extended periods. 
 
Reber and Squire’s conclude that they have demonstrated a crossover 
interaction between non-declarative and explicit knowledge, and that this result, in 
conjunction with findings of selective impairment in amnesiacs subjects, provides 
strong evidence “that non-declarative and explicit sequence learning must depend on 
separate brain systems supporting separate representations of sequence knowledge”. 
This finding is of especial interest in light of Shanks and St. John’s comments reported 
in Chapter 1, and these results would seem to be precisely those that Shanks and St. 
John describe as being “much more persuasive”. 
 
   - 46 - 
   
  
 
Korsakoff’s Syndrome 
In the final experiment in their 1987 paper Nissen and Bullemer examined the 
ability of Korsakoff’s syndrome (KS) subjects to display sequence learning (having 
previously shown that attention was necessary for sequence-learning in normal 
subjects) in order to determine wether-or-not KS induced amnesia disrupts attention. 
The ability of KS sufferers to perform the SRT was also of interest as the SRT is a 
novel non-verbal association learning task and the authors were interested in light of 
the (then) recent evidence that some amnesiac patients were capable of learning 
novel associations (Graf and Schacter, 1985). Similar to the results found with AD 
subjects above the KS subjects responded significantly slower than age-matched 
controls but they also displayed a very similar pattern of behaviour to that of the 
controls. There was no difference between the slopes of the Korsakoff or control 
subjects indicating the two groups learnt the sequence at similar rates. Unfortunately 
no analysis of the increase in reaction time when switched from the repeating to the 
random sequence was reported. However, it is clear from the data Nissen and 
Bullemer presented in the study that while the KS subjects displayed an interference 
effect it was smaller than that shown by control subjects, but it is not known if the 
difference was significant. What is especially interesting in this study is that, when 
asked, all of the control subjects reported becoming aware of a repeating sequence 
(verbal report only) whereas none of the Korsakoff subjects became aware of it. So it 
is apparent therefore that the amnesia produced by Korsakoff’s syndrome does not 
interfere with non-declarative memory as sufferers demonstrate a spared memory 
ability for sequence learning in the absence of conscious awareness of the sequence. 
Thus Nissen and Bullemer conclude that patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome could 
learn the SRT despite severe impairments in consciously recalling verbal and non-
verbal information related to it, but this conclusion must be viewed with some caution 
as no attempt to quantify the difference between interference effects for control and 
Korsakoff’s subjects was made. 
 
In another study with Korsakoff subjects Nissen, Willingham and Hartman 
(1989) compared them to age-matched controls and an alcoholic control group. All 
groups received two sessions of a typical SRT task separated by one week. Although 
significantly slower than both the age-matched and alcoholic control groups (who were 
not different from each other) the Korsakoff’s group once again displayed the same 
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pattern of behaviour as the two control groups (in both sessions): reduction in reaction 
time over repeated sequence blocks and an increase in reaction time when switched 
to the random-sequence block. Furthermore all subjects displayed retention of the 
sequence between sessions as their reaction times in the first block of the 2nd session  
were very similar, or slightly faster, than that of the last repeating-sequence block in 
session one. However, when questioned about the presence of a repeating sequence 
at the end of the 2nd session five of seven age-matched controls, and six of eight 
alcoholic controls reported noticing it, whereas none of the KS subjects did. 
Suggesting once again that KS subjects could perform the SRT in the absence of any 
explicit knowledge of the repeating sequence, or that there even was a repeating 
sequence. 
 
Other Limbic System Neuropathology  
In a very recent study Stefanova et al (2000) compared their PD subjects to 
both healthy controls and subjects with anterior communicating artery aneurysms 
(ACoA). The ACoA group, who suffer a declarative memory impairment, were included 
to provide a neuropathological control for the PD group. Although the ACoA subjects 
displayed both a learning and an interference effect they were significantly slower 
overall compared to controls which is consistent with most limbic systems amnesiacs. 
However, while they demonstrated a significant interference effect it was significantly 
weaker than that of the healthy controls (while being significantly stronger than that of 
the PD subjects) and thus they do not perform the SRT in a control-like manner. 
Nevertheless, while capable of demonstrating a degree of spared sequence learning 
they also demonstrated a significant explicit memory impairment for the repeating 
sequence. Thus providing further evidence for the independence of explicit and non-
declarative memory, and the utility of the SRT for demonstrating such a dissociation.  
 
Conclusions on Limbic System neuropathology and the SRT 
In conclusion there is considerable evidence that subjects with limbic systems 
amnesia (LSA) can perform the SRT in a manner similar (but not identical to) to non-
neurologically impaired subjects. While the fact that LSA subjects are often slower 
than control subjects and / or have a somewhat weaker interference effect is of 
concern the fact that LSA subjects display both a learning and interference effect 
irrespective of their overall slower reaction times is telling. However, the fact that most 
   - 48 - 
   
  
 
SRT studies may not have sufficient statistical power (due to small sample sizes) to 
detect a small difference between LSA and control groups is worrying (see Chapter 3). 
However, the (in)equivalence with controls subjects is not the definitive measure of 
LSA subjects’ ability to perform the SRT. It is enough currently to demonstrate that 
LSA subjects enjoy some spared non-declarative memory function in contrast to their 
often seriously impaired explicit memory. Given that such subjects often suffer a 
relatively broad neurological impairment (i.e. not simply an explicit memory 
impairment, e.g. dementia) it should perhaps come as no surprise that such subjects 
don’t perform identically to controls and what perhaps is more interesting is 
ascertaining any discernable differences in the ability of the different LSA etiologies 
(AD, KS, non-specific amnesia) to perform the SRT. This is not to dismiss 
comparisons with controls groups completely but rather to acknowledge that such 
comparisons are only one part of the overall picture of any neurologically impaired 
groups’ ability to perform the SRT. 
 
2.2.2 Basal Ganglia Syndromes and the SRT 
Given that limbic systems amnesiacs demonstrate a reasonably good ability to 
perform the SRT the next question is how subjects with basal ganglion (BG) disorders, 
(traditionally the neural substrate for non-declarative / procedural memory), perform. 
Caudate nucleus involvement in non-declarative learning and memory has been 
proposed by a number of authors (see Squire, 1992; and Cohen and Eichenbaum, 
1993, for reviews) and is known to be responsible for a habit system in primates, 
which may be analogous to procedural learning in humans (but see Wise, 1996, for a 
critique of this view). The expectation is that such subjects will, in diametric contrast to 
LSA subjects, demonstrate an impairment on the SRT in the absence of any explicit 
memory deficit. Such a pattern of results would further strengthen the case for multiple 
memory systems in general and the explicit / non-declarative distinction in particular. 
 
Parkinson’s Disease 
As discussed above Ferraro, Balota and Connor (1993) compared PD suffers 
with AD sufferers and controls and found that although the PD subjects demonstrated 
a good learning effect their interference effect was significantly weaker than either the 
control or very mildly dementing AD groups. Unfortunately the authors did not test the 
PD subject’s explicit memory for the repeating sequence, however, the PD subjects 
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did perform a battery of psychometric tests which suggest they did not have an explicit 
memory deficit. Thus supporting the hypothesis that BG dependent neuropathologies 
produce the opposite pattern of results (spared explicit memory, impaired non-
declarative memory) to that of LSN subjects. 
 
In another study with Parkinson’s disease subjects Pascual-Leone et al, (1993) 
compared normal-controls, subjects with cerebellar damage and Parkinsonian 
subjects while on and off their medication. Unlike previous studies Pascual-Leone et al 
defined ‘response time’ as the interval between the onset of the stimulus and the 
depression of any response key, regardless of if it was the correct one or not. They 
also did not discard the reaction time’s from error trials (initially pressing an incorrect 
button) as is typically done in other studies. Nevertheless, although the Parkinsonian 
subjects did display a decrease in reaction time across repeating sequence blocks it 
was significantly shallower than that shown by the controls (the number of errors 
made per block showed a similar pattern). The authors cite this as evidence of a 
lesser degree of procedural learning in the PD subjects. While the authors do not 
report the results of any analysis on the interference effect the graphs provided in the 
article suggest a very similar degree of interference in both reaction times and error-
rates for control and PD subjects. What will also be evident from the figures is that the 
cerebellar group display neither a learning-effect (reduction reaction time over 
repeating sequence blocks) nor any interference-effect for either measure. 
 
In the 2nd experiment in their study Pascual-Leone et al varied the length of the 
repeating-sequence from 8, to 10, to 12 trials and found that the degree of procedural 
learning for both the control and PD subjects was inversely related to the length of the 
sequence. However, at longer sequence lengths PD subjects showed significantly less 
learning over blocks than did the control subjects, and this was especially evident in 
the PD subjects while in their unmedicated state. While the authors again fail to 
mention any analysis of an interference effect it is clear that the control subjects 
display a robust interference effect at all sequence lengths, whereas the on-
medication PD subjects show an inverse relationship between sequence-length and 
strength of the interference effect. Furthermore, it is clear that the on-medication PD 
subjects have only a very modest interference effect while performing with the 12-trial 
sequence, especially in comparison with the very robust effect seen from the control 
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subjects. Although the unmediated-PD subjects show a similar interference effect for 
both the 8- and 10-trial sequences it entirely absent for the 12-trial sequence 
suggesting a much reduced ability to learn the 12-trial sequence. Furthermore, 
although general explicit memory ability did not differ between PD and control groups 
significantly fewer of the PD subjects developed explicit knowledge of the repeating 
sequence. This pattern of results clearly suggests a substantial non-declarative 
learning impairment for PD subjects at the longer sequence-length but this conclusion 
must be viewed with some caution in the absence of any actual analysis of the data.  
 
In the second experiment of their study Jackson et al (1995) examined the 
ability of Parkinson’s subjects to perform an 11-trial SRT task (the first experiment is 
discussed separately below). Although statistically equivalent after two ‘practise’ 
blocks (pseudo-random sequences) once the repeating-sequence blocks began the 
PD subject’s reaction times only improved for the first two blocks (of six) and 
thereafter showed no further reduction. Furthermore, while the control subjects show a 
marked slowing of reaction time when switched to the random-sequences the PD 
subjects show only a very slight slowing, which is most likely simply inherent 
behavioural variation rather than a meaningful response to the alteration in sequence 
information, and statistical analysis supports this conclusion. Furthermore, the PD 
subjects demonstrated no explicit knowledge of the repeating sequence. 
 
Jackson et al, in light of the (then) recent speculation that “the integrity of the 
frontal lobes may be a key in accounting for many of the cognitive deficits associated 
with PD”, went on to sort their PD subjects post-hoc into having either a ‘frontal’ or 
‘non-frontal’ impairment (via scores on the Wisconsin card-sort test). Evaluation of 
performance on the SRT task between PD conditions produces a marked difference. 
Due to the small sample sizes resulting from splitting the PD group no statistical 
analysis was undertaken but it is clear that the frontal-PD group display neither a 
learning, nor an interference effect. While the non-frontal-PD group initially respond 
faster than the controls it should be noted that the marked improvement only occurs 
within the first two practise (random sequence) blocks and once the non-frontal PD 
subjects begin the repeating-sequence portion of the study their reaction time showed 
only a minor decrease across blocks, suggesting they failed to learn the repeating 
sequence. This conclusion is borne out by the lack of a meaningful slowing in reaction 
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time when the non-frontal PD subjects are switched the random-sequence condition. 
The authors go on to note that the Parkinson’s subjects in a previous study by Ferraro, 
Balota & Connor (discussed above) have psychometric test scores that suggests they 
(the PD subjects) would be categorised into the non-frontal group, which would 
explain why the PD subjects in that study appear to learn at near control levels of 
performance.  
Westwater et al (1998) demonstrated that PD subjects who were not different to 
controls on several psychometric tests (e.g. the National Adult Reading Test) 
demonstrated a significantly weaker interference effect when switched from a 
repeating to a random sequence (control reaction time increase = 109ms, PD reaction 
time increase = 47ms). Although no test of subject’s explicit sequence knowledge is 
reported it is enough currently to show that PD subjects demonstrate a SRT 
impairment without any explicit memory deficit. 
 
Sommer et al (1999) show a stronger interference effect for control subjects 
than PD subjects (104 & 78ms respectively). Furthermore, PD subjects performed 
only “marginally worse” than control subjects on a declarative learning task (the 
California Verbal learning Task). Thus these PD subjects also demonstrate a SRT 
impairment in the absence of an explicit memory impairment (or very weak 
impairment). 
 
Finally Stefanova et al (2000) report that PD subjects are substantially impaired 
on the SRT task in comparison to healthy controls and ACoA subjects. Somewhat 
atypically PD subjects in this study demonstrate no learning effect of any kind and 
virtually no interference effect (see Fig. 2.X). Such a comprehensive SRT impairment 
is unusual and there is nothing in the particular methodology of this study or subject 
characteristics to suggest why the PD subjects were so completely impaired on the 
SRT. What is also unusual about the results of this study is that all subjects developed 
good explicit knowledge of the repeating sequence, even PD subjects, over the course 
of the test. But yet the PD subjects were not able to employ this explicit knowledge to 
their advantage. Furthermore the PD subjects did not suffer an explicit memory 
impairment (Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised) relative to healthy controls, unlike the 
ACoA subjects who were impaired relative to both PD and control groups. Thus this 
pattern off results perfectly matches that predicted by the double-dissociation 
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hypothesis. PD subjects are grossly impaired on the SRT but have normal explicit 
memory abilities, whereas ACoA subjects demonstrate good SRT performance (albeit 
not quite as good as controls) while suffering an explicit memory deficit.  
 
Huntington’s Disease 
Having shown that SRT performance was not impaired in a number of limbic 
system dependent amnesic syndromes Knopman and Nissen (1991) then turned their 
attention to the basal-ganglion dependent syndrome Huntington’s disease (HD) in the 
expectation that this would impair SRT performance. In this paper Knopman and 
Nissen report that HD subjects were impaired on “sequence-specific learning” (i.e. 
they had a weaker interference effect) and performed at chance level on a test of 
explicit sequence knowledge. There is something of a confound here in that the HD 
subjects also demonstrate impaired general explicit memory. It is possible therefore 
that this explicit memory deficit contributed to their impaired SRT performance. 
However, the point that PD subjects (with similar BG damage) have an impaired ability 
to perform the SRT but no explicit memory impairment and no dementia (all PD 
subjects discussed in this chapter are non-dementing) suggests that the HD subject’s 
explicit memory impairment is more a consequence of their dementia rather than a 
causative agent of SRT impairment.  
 
It is interesting to note that although the authors cite that HD subjects were 
substantially slower than the control subjects as evidence of a procedural learning 
impairment this is an identical pattern of behaviour to the Alzheimer’s subjects in their 
own 1987 study in which they concluded the overall slower reaction times were not 
evidence of an non-declarative memory impairment in the AD subjects. It would 
appear, therefore, that they consider the interference effect a more sensitive measure 
of sequence learning than the learning effect. 
 
Willingham and Korroshetz (1993) tested Knopman and Nissen’s 1991 finding 
that HD subjects were impaired on the SRT and included a methodological variant in 
that makes the study of particular interest. Rather than simply comparing raw pre- and 
post-interference reaction times Willingham and Korroshetz calculated a ‘predicted 
reaction time’ score for each subject for the random sequence block based on a 
regression line calculated from the first nine (repeating sequence) blocks, and 
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compared this figure with the observed post-interference reaction time, and used the 
difference scores as a measure of Knopman and Nissen’s sequence-specific learning 
(interference effect). Otherwise the methodology was identical to the standard SRT. 
 
Analysis revealed that the slope of the curve for the HD subjects was 
significantly shallower than that of the controls suggesting the controls learned faster 
than the HD subjects. Furthermore the predicted vs. observed difference scores for 
the HD subjects were significantly smaller than for the control subjects suggesting the 
former had substantially less sequence-specific knowledge. Nevertheless a post SRT 
interview revealed that only one of the control subjects claimed knowledge of a 
sequence, and the subject could not accurately describe any portion of it, and none of 
the HD subjects claimed any awareness of a sequence. Furthermore, although all HD 
subjects were dementing their explicit memory ability was only mildly impaired relative 
to control subjects and therefore an unlikely cause of any SRT impairment. 
 
Having demonstrated that HD subjects were impaired on the SRT Willingham 
and Korroshetz then went on to test their ability to learn a motor skill that did not 
contain a repeating sequence. In a modified SRT they label the ‘Incompatible SRT 
task’ subjects are required to press the button to the right of the stimulus position and 
only ever saw random sequences. The prime measure of behaviour in this task 
therefore is the reduction in reaction time over blocks. Although HD subjects had 
slower reaction times there rate of improvement over blocks was not different to that of 
control subjects, nor was their accuracy (suggesting HD subjects were not trading 
accuracy for faster reaction times). The conclusions that can be drawn from this study 
is that HD subjects display a sequence-learning impairment that is not attributable to a 
simple motor-skill deficit. 
  
In conclusion subjects with BG disorders demonstrate an impaired ability on the 
SRT while retaining (near) normal explicit memory function. This diametrically 
contrasts with the behaviour of amnesic subjects and provides strong evidence that 
the two neural substrates are responsible for different and dissociable memory 
systems.  
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2.2.3 The SRT And Other Forms Of Neural Impairment. 
Although the SRT literature is primarily concerned with standard memory 
disorders a number of studies have examined the ability of subjects to perform the 
SRT after various other neurological events (e.g. traumatic head injury, drug 
administration etc.). These studies provide parallel strands of evidence for the 
possibility of multiple memory systems while also adding to our understanding of the 
processes involved in SRT performance. 
 
Neuropharmacological Studies 
In an experimental manipulation of neurologically normal subjects Nissen, 
Knopman and Schacter (1987) administered the anticholinergic drug scopolamine and 
then had subjects complete several tests of memory and cognition (e.g. the Boston 
Naming Test) before performing the SRT task. Although the scopolamine group was 
impaired on several of the declarative memory tests in comparison to the saline-
control group they were not impaired on the SRT as measured by the reduction in 
reaction time over repeating-sequence blocks and the increase in reaction time when 
switched to a random-sequence. All subjects went on to complete a generate task (for 
explicit knowledge of the repeating sequence) and although the scopolamine subjects 
responded significantly less-accurately than the control group both groups displayed 
worryingly high levels of accuracy (greater than 70%). In a later article one of the 
authors (Knopman, 1991a) noted that chance level of generate-task accuracy is 33% 
and as a result described generate scores of ~60% as reflecting “partial awareness of 
the repeating sequence” and scores ≥70% as “a marker for the presence of complete 
explicit knowledge of the repeating sequence”. 
 
In his 1991 study Knopman (1991b) examined neuropharmacological 
manipulations of the cholinergic and GABAnergic systems with administration of 
lorazepam (all experiments) and scopolamine (3rd experiment only) respectively. In the 
first experiment lorazepam was found to disrupt free-recall of word lists (considered an 
explicit memory task) but did not significantly disrupt SRT performance (although 
scopolamine subjects had generally slower reaction times and a slightly weaker 
interference effect). All subjects completed a generate task and both the lorazepam 
and control groups showed very similar degrees of explicit awareness of the repeating 
sequence (62.6% for the lorazepam group, and 64.2% for the control group). As noted 
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above Knopman considers this to reflect partial awareness of the sequence. 
 
In the second experiment in the study Knopman (1991b) replaced the (typical) 
motor-SRT task with a verbal-SRT task. Identical to the motor-SRT except that 
subjects responded verbally to the location of the stimuli (presented in one of the four 
cardinal compass points), Knopman reports verbal-SRT learning is associated with a 
smaller proportion of subjects gaining awareness of the repeating sequence than in 
the motor-SRT task. Once again lorazepam subjects were impaired on delayed free-
recall compared to the control group but none of the other explicit-memory 
psychometric test. However in contrast to findings from the first experiment lorazepam 
subjects displayed a significant impairment on the verbal-SRT task, displaying a 
minimal reduction in reaction time over the repeating-sequence blocks and no 
increase in reaction time when switched to a random-sequence. Furthermore the 
generate task showed than only half of the control subjects had acquired explicit 
knowledge of the sequence while none of the lorazepam subjects did. The verbal-SRT 
therefore enjoyed several advantages compared to the usual motor-SRT in that it 
produced a lesser degree of explicit awareness for the sequence and demonstrated a 
clear impairment of sequence learning in subjects with GABAnergic blockades. 
 
In the final study of the same paper, which again used the verbal-SRT, 
Knopman compared scopolamine with a lower dose of lorazepam than in the previous 
study (1.5mg compared to 2.5mg). Subjects in this study only every performed 
repeating-sequences and thus no cannot display an interference effect. Unlike the 
previous experiment the low-dose lorazepam subjects displayed reduced reaction 
times over the course of repeated-sequence blocks, and their reaction times were not 
different from the placebo group. In contrast the scopolamine group did not display 
reduced reaction times over blocks and had significantly slower reaction times than 
the placebo group. Furthermore, the low-dose lorazepam and control groups were not 
impaired on free recall, but the scopolamine group was. Although stem-completion 
was reduced in the lorazepam group this phenomena is clearly dose dependent as the 
difference was not statistically significant at this, lower, dose. Similarly there was no 
difference between the placebo and scopolamine group on the stem-completion test, 
whereas scopolamine did result in impaired free-recall. Interestingly the generate task 
revealed that all three groups had very similar generate accuracies (~50%) and, more 
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importantly, when the those subjects with a high degree of awareness of the sequence 
(≥70%) were removed from the analysis the results did not change, providing some of 
the strongest evidence that explicit awareness is not necessary for sequence learning. 
 
Traumatic Brain Injury 
In a study examining the ability of subjects with traumatic brain injury to perform 
the SRT Mutter, Howard and Howard (1994) found that subjects with mild (Glasgow 
Coma Scale (GCS) scores from 13-15) traumatic brain injury (TBi) had no SRT 
impairment in comparison with either case-matched controls or college student 
controls, even though the TBi subjects did have lower verbal memory test scores than 
both control groups. However all groups showed very similar evidence of a high 
degree of explicit awareness for the, 10-trial, sequence (~80%).   
 
In the second experiment of the study the same authors examined subjects 
with moderate-to-severe TBi (GCS <13) and found that this group had significantly 
slower reaction times than the uninjured control group but not when compared to a 
moderately-injured (GCS>13) group. The more severely injured group also displayed 
less reduction in reaction times over repeating-sequence blocks and a weaker 
interference effect, although neither of these results were significant. Thus moderate, 
or greater, head injury results in impaired SRT behaviour concurrent with reduced 
explicit memory abilities, however, given the variation in injury locus, little can be 
concluded as to why. 
 
Beldarrain et al, (1999) tested the ability of subjects with unilateral prefrontal 
cortex lesions (pFC) to perform two SRT tests, one with a 10-trial repeating sequence 
and one with a 4-trial repeating sequence. Psychometric testing revealed that the pFC 
subjects were mildly impaired on tests of explicit memory relative to controls. 
Furthermore, pFC subjects demonstrated both weaker learning and interference 
effects than control subjects on the 10-trial sequence.  Although pFC subjects had a 
similar learning effect to controls for the 4-trial repeating sequence their interference 
effect at this trial length was substantially weaker. All subjects, including controls, had 
poor explicit knowledge of the 10-trial repeating sequence and this was also true of 
pFC subjects for the 4-trial repeating sequence whereas controls demonstrated 
reasonable explicit sequence knowledge for this trial length. Thus, although pFC 
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subjects had only a very mild explicit memory deficit their non-declarative memory 
performance was substantially impaired. 
 
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation 
Given the rich afferents from the basal ganglia to the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (dl-PfC) Pascual-Leone et al, (1996) hypothesised that the dl-PfC might be an 
essential component of the neural system responsible for procedural learning. To test 
this they disrupted dl-PfC activity during SRT performance with transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS). TMS had no effect on SRT performance during stimulation of either 
the supplementary motor cortex or the ipsilateral dl-PfC, but produced a marked 
impairment with stimulation of the contralateral (to the hand used to perform the SRT) 
dl-PfC. In this condition subjects displayed neither a reduction in reaction time across 
repeating-sequence blocks, nor an increase in reaction time when switched to a 
random-sequence block and as such there SRT performance was considered 
severely impaired. Unfortunately no measure of explicit awareness of the sequence is 
reported. 
 
Cerebellar Injury 
 As discussed above Pascual-Leone’s 1993 study compared subjects with 
cerebellar lesions to control and PD subjects. Cerebellar subjects were completely 
incapable of demonstrating either a learning or interference effect, irrespective of 
sequence length (4, 8 or 10-trial repeating sequences). Furthermore they were 
demonstrated very poor explicit sequence knowledge although no mention is made of 
their general explicit memory ability. 
 
Down Syndrome 
 Vicari, Belluccia and Carlesimo (2000) examine the ability of subjects with 
Down syndrome (DS) to perform the SRT. They note that while subjects with mental 
retardation usually have a declarative memory impairment there is some evidence that 
subjects with mental retardation show a relative preservation of on-declarative 
memory (see article for review). For this reason they posit that subjects with DS would 
not be impaired in a variety of non-declarative memory test including the SRT. 
Although subjects with DS were impaired relative to controls on explicit memory tests 
(immediate recall, word recognition, picture recognition and visuo-spatial sequence 
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learning) both groups demonstrated very similar interaction effects when switched 
from a repeating to a random sequence in the SRT. However, much as in AD 
subjects, DS subjects always reacted more slowly than control subjects. Furthermore 
the interference effect demonstrated by DS subjects was numerically weaker than 
control subjects. These points suggest DS subjects do not perform the SRT to exactly 
the same degree as that shown by neurologically intact subjects and that DS subjects 
may also suffer a mild SRT impairment that was not discovered in the study due to the 
test between groups having insufficient power (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of 
power and effect-size issues with SRT studies). Note: Evidence of this study appeared 
only very shortly before completion of this Ph.D. thesis. This DS study was not 
included in the meta-analysis presented in Chapter 3 for this reason, but the nature of 
DS is problematic and its inclusion in the meta-analysis would probably be 
inappropriate. 
 
2.2.4 Conclusions on Neuropathology and the SRT 
A clear pattern emerges when considering various amnesic etiologies and SRT 
performance. Those subjects with some form of limbic system insult demonstrate a 
reasonable sparing of SRT performance, albeit not strictly identical to controls, even 
with a substantial comorbid explicit memory impairment. In contrast those subjects 
with basal ganglia injury show an opposing pattern of behaviour; little, if any, explicit 
memory impairment, but some form of SRT impairment (typically a weaker 
interference effect). Whereas subjects with neither limbic system or basal ganglion 
injury are often substantially impaired in both the SRT and explicit memory tests. This 
is precisely the pattern of results predicted by the multiple-memory systems model. 
Furthermore, all the studies produce consistent results and thus provide a good 
degree of convergent validity, and the fact that Reber and Squire (1998) successfully 
managed to demonstrate a crossover interaction in a study with good methodological 
rigour lends substantial credence to both the validity of the SRT as a test of non-
declarative memory and the likelihood of multiple memory systems.  
 
2.3 Methodological Variations and SRT Performance 
If forced to rely on the evidence from neuropathological studies alone it could 
reasonably be concluded that the two memory systems were stochastically 
independence. Fortunately there is also a similarly compelling set of evidence 
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provided by studies that attempt to dissociate memory performance experimentally in 
neurologically normal subjects. The following section will discuss a number of 
experimental manipulations that demonstrate the potential for dissociating between 
the different memory types via the SRT and in doing so present evidence that the SRT 
is primarily a non-declarative memory task, and explicit and non-declarative memory 
are independent and dissociable systems. 
 
2.3.1 The Role Of Attention In The SRT.  
Nissen and Bullemer (1987) tested subjects in the SRT under dual-task (tone 
counting) conditions in order to examine the contribution of attention to sequence 
learning. They found that subjects who experienced dual-task conditions during SRT 
performance responded more slowly than those subjects who performed the SRT 
alone. Furthermore, subjects in a dual-task condition who experienced a repeating-
sequence in the SRT did not differ statistically from those dual-task subjects that only 
ever saw a random-sequence, suggesting that the reaction time decrease shown by 
the dual-task repeating-sequence subjects was simply due to motor learning and did 
not reflect acquisition (implicit or otherwise) of the repeating sequence In a subjective 
report measure nine subjects (of 12) in the single- task repeating-sequence condition 
reported becoming aware of a sequence, whereas only one subject (of 12) in the dual-
task repeating-sequence condition became aware of the sequence, and then only in 
the last block. Therefore while a distracter task severely inhibits developing awareness 
of a sequence it also inhibits learning sequence specific information (but see Stadler, 
and Reed and Johnson below), suggesting that some form of conscious awareness is 
necessary for sequence learning.  
 
In an extension of this study Nissen and Bullemer went on to employ two 
groups which underwent a series of dual-task repeating-sequence SRT blocks before 
being switched to either single-task repeating-sequence or single-task random-
sequence conditions. The expectation was that if something was learnt about the 
sequence during the dual-task portion of the experiment the single-task repeating-
sequence group should display some advantage over the single-task random-
sequence group. While analysis revealed no difference between the groups during the 
dual-task portion of the experiment (as expected) once switched to the single-task 
condition the repeating sequence group soon showed a decrease in reaction time 
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compared to the random-sequence group (as would be expected from the previous 
experiment above). What is of prime interest in this study is the block of trials 
immediately after the switch from dual to single task, if any learning of the sequence 
had taken place during dual-task performance it should produce an immediate 
advantage for those who continued to experience the repeating sequence in the 
single-task condition in comparison to those who, at this point, switch to a random-
sequence. However there was no difference between the two sequence condition 
groups in this block, suggesting that the subjects in the single-task repeating-
sequence condition had not learnt the sequence during dual-task performance. These 
results clearly demonstrate that prior-practise in the dual-task condition does not 
produce savings in sequence learning. 
 
In response to Nissen and Bullemer’s finding that dual-task performance 
disrupted serial-order learning Curran and Keele (1993) set out to examine whether 
variation in attentional availability qualitatively altered SRT results (in order to test their 
hypothesis that serial-order information can be learnt by two independent 
mechanisms). The first mechanism they propose requires attention to the relation 
between successive events while the second operates independently of such 
attention. Consequentially they predict that dual-task performance will disrupt serial-
order learning by degrading attention to the relation between successive events.  
 
This hypothesis was tested by varying the presence of a dual-task and 
comparing subjects in an ‘incidental’ learning condition who were either “more aware” 
of the sequences to those in the same condition who were “less aware” (group 
assignment via post hoc analysis of questionnaire reports) and subjects in an 
‘intentional’ learning condition who had been provided with the actual sequence prior 
to SRT performance. In the first, single-task, phase of the experiment subjects in 
either the ‘intentional’ or ‘more-aware’ conditions displayed similar amounts of serial-
learning (both learning- and interference-effects) consistent with previous studies. 
Although the ‘less-aware’ group also showed learning- and interference effects both 
were significantly weaker than either the other two groups. However, once the dual-
task was imposed all groups demonstrated a far weaker interference effect (although 
still significant) but unlike in the single-task conditions there was now no between 
group differences. Thus Curran and Keele conclude that “variations in single-task 
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learning, caused by awareness differences, was not transferred to dual-task 
conditions”. 
 
In their second experiment Curran and Keele covaried the presence of dual-
task and awareness of the sequence such that one group was informed of the 
sequence prior to the task and practised the SRT task for eight blocks under single-
task conditions, before switching to a dual-task condition for the test of sequence 
learning. In contrast the comparison group was not informed of the presence of a 
sequence and practised the SRT, and was tested for sequence learning, under dual-
task conditions. Although, as expected, the ‘dual-task-unaware’ group responded far 
more slowly than the ‘single-task-aware’ group during SRT practise there was no 
difference in the strength of the interference effect during the, latter, phase of the 
study when both groups were performing under dual-task conditions. Thus any explicit 
knowledge gained under single-task intentional conditions is not expressed in the 
dual-task condition. 
 
Curran and Keele argue that the asymmetry in abilities of differing levels of 
either awareness (experiment one) or attention (experiment two) to effect initial 
sequence learning when expressed during dual-task performance is due to “the 
parallel acquisition of two forms of sequential knowledge – attention and 
nonattentional – under single-task conditions”. Thus, because dual-task performance 
disrupts attentional learning (by whatever mechanism), only non-attentional learning is 
expressed during dual-task performance. To further demonstrate this point Curran and 
Keele had a single group of subjects perform the SRT under (incidental learning) dual-
task conditions before switching them to single-task SRT performance in the 
expectation that only nonattentional learning can occur during dual-task SRT 
performance. Subjects should display equivalent levels of sequence-learning during 
single-task performance as during dual-task performance in the absence of sufficient 
practise to allow attentional learning in the single-task condition. If however they do 
not display equivalent levels of sequence-learning in the dual-task and single-task 
conditions this would suggest something other than either attentional or nonattentional 
learning is influencing reaction time differences. Fortunately the level of sequence-
learning was very similar in both test conditions, consistent with the view that only 
nonattentional learning was exhibited in both conditions.  
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In light of these findings Stadler (1995) examined the roles of attention in non-
declarative learning in order to reconcile Nissen and Bullemer’s findings with those of 
later authors (Cohen, Ivry and Keele, 1990, and Curran and Keele, 1993) whose 
subjects demonstrated some ability to learn serial order information while performing 
dual tasks. Stadler noted that the typical task used to interfere with attention while 
performing the SRT, a tone-counting task, may disrupt learning either by requiring 
subjects to withhold needed attention from the SRT task (as assumed by most 
experimenters employing it) or because it disrupts a subjects ability to meaningfully 
parse the sequence. A number of studies have shown that sequence learning is 
sensitive to organisational variables (Frensch, Buchner and Lin 1994; Jacoby et al, 
1989; and Stadler, 1993). Previously Stadler (1993) had demonstrated that “consistent 
organisation produced greater learning than…. no organisation, and inconsistent 
organisation produced less learning than….. no organisation”. As Stadler notes tone-
counting typically requires subjects to maintain a running count of a particular type of 
tone (typically high tones), thus subjects must assess the tone heard in all trials but on 
some trials (usually 50%) subjects must then go on and update their count. Stadler 
suggests that this additional requirement may be sufficient to disrupt sequence 
organisation instead of attention.  
 
Stadler manipulated dual-task conditions during SRT performance such that 
one condition imposed additional attentional demand but did not affect sequential 
organisation and another condition disrupted sequence organisation but did not 
impose additional attention demands. Although all dual-task conditions (‘additional-
attentional demands’, ‘disrupted-sequence’, and ‘normal’ dual-task tone-counting) 
disrupted SRT performance (in comparison to an identical SRT task in which subjects 
were instructed to ignore the tones and concentrate on the their reaction time’s) there 
was still good evidence of sequence learning in all dual-task conditions. However, 
while the disrupted-sequence-organisation condition produced very similar levels of 
sequence-learning (interference effect) to the standard tone-counting task the 
additional-attentional-demands condition produced a larger effect (stronger 
interference-effect) than either the tone-counting or pause conditions, which is 
consistent with the contention that dual-task tone-counting affects learning because it 
disrupts sequence organisation. 
   - 63 - 
   
  
 
 
Stadler repeated the experiment with longer sequence lengths (10-trial instead 
of 6-trial) in order to control for sequence structure in light of several findings that 
sequence structure interacts with secondary task such that learning is impoverished 
under dual-task conditions for some sequences and not others (Cohen et al, 1990; 
and Curran and Keele, 1993). Although Stadler notes that “in Cohen et al’s terms, the 
sequence had no unique associations” any 10-trial sequence has an inherent 
sequence structure independent of its serial order information which can produce 
SRT-like learning in the absence of learning any serial-order information (see below), 
and this must kept in mind when considering Stadler’s findings. Of course this critique 
is even more troubling when applied to his earlier use of 6-trial sequences which not 
only contain very high levels of sequence structure (unique associations etc.) but also, 
being so short, raises the strong possibility of subjects becoming explicitly aware of it. 
However, these concerns notwithstanding, Stadler’s second experiment produced the 
same pattern of results as the first providing further support for the hypothesis that the 
tone-counting task disrupts sequence organisation rather than attention. What is 
especially interesting is that in this longer sequence condition both tone-counting and 
sequence-disruption virtually eliminate any evidence of serial-order learning and 
manipulating attention demands resulted in only modest evidence of learning. 
However, those subjects who essentially performed the task under single-task 
conditions still showed reasonable amounts of non-declarative learning. This suggests 
that non-declarative learning is capacity limited especially when employed in 
conjunction with a dual-task, but not as a function of attentional load, 
 
Almost irrespective of how he arrives at his conclusions Stadler (1989, 1992, 
1995) is right to point out that one thing attention does is to produce organisation, as 
attention shifts it parses experience into meaningful chunks. An interruption in a 
sequence of events creates two sequences, one just ending and one just beginning. 
Thus attention inevitably produces organisation by determining which parts of the 
stimulus environment are associated together. For this reason pauses due to dual-
task requirements disrupt the organisation of repeating sequence as a complete unit 
forcing the subject to learn the sequence in a series of variable subunits (due to the 
variable occurrence of dual-task producing pauses), which is a less efficient method 
for learning the sequences than whole-sequence parsing. Stadler also concludes that 
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attention depends on organisation especially when “previously acquired 
associations…. influence processing”. 
 
Stadler’s conclusions are extended by Rah, Reber and Hsaio (2000) who found 
that instead of being an invasive additional task subjects treated the tone-counting as 
if it were “an integral component of a complex stimulus environment”. Subjects treated 
the tone-counting and SRT as two parts of a single task, and in doing so scan the 
environment for potential patterns of covariance which is necessarily more cognitively 
demanding than performing either task alone. Thus rather than being a distracter in 
the sense of competing for cognitive resources the dual-task SRT compromises 
performance in a manner more akin to a highly complex single task. Specifically, the 
non-contingent nature of the two tasks acts as an interferer, subjects attempt to 
establish covariant relationships which do not actually exist and therefore ‘waste’ the 
cognitive resources employed in the effort. Secondly, by treating the dural-task SRT 
as a more complex task than either of the two tasks alone performance is impaired by 
the fact that the task now becomes ‘too’ complex to perform properly. 
 
Thus while earlier studies of attention and the SRT seem to implicate attention 
as a necessary component of sequence learning it is now apparent that in fact the role 
of attention in the SRT is somewhat more subtle. Specifically that attention allows the 
efficient organisation of stimuli into meaningful units, and thus anything that disrupts 
attention disrupts this organisation which is what results in weaker sequence learning 
rather than attentional disruption per se’. Furthermore, that subjects treat the dual-task 
SRT as a highly complex multivariant task rather than two separate and competing 
tasks. Therefore, performance, and acquisition of explicit sequence learning in 
particular, is degraded by providing examples of spurious covariance between the two 
tasks. Thus the tone-counting dual-task SRT would appear to be an effective and 
conceptually sound method for limiting explicit sequence knowledge and inhibiting 
SRT performance in neurologically intact subjects. 
 
2.3.2 Neuroimaging and the SRT 
Neuroimaging studies provide evidence of the basal ganglia hypothesis for non-
declarative sequence learning and are consistent with the multiple-memory 
hypothesis. Specifically, that discrete and independent neural substrates are 
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responsible for non-declarative and explicit sequence learning. While the critical 
regions responsible for different forms of learning are difficult to enumerate there is a 
clear dissociation in terms of explicit learning involving more cortical structures 
whereas non-declarative learning involves more sub-cortical structures, including the 
motor areas of basal ganglia (putamen). This cortical / sub-cortical dissociation is 
consistent with the assumptions of the limbic system / basal ganglia dissociation. 
 
 Grafton, Hazeltine and Ivry (1995) used PET scanning in conjunction with a 
dual-task SRT procedure (SRT and tone-counting) and found learning related 
increases in regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) in left hemisphere motor effector 
areas (all subjects were right-hand dominant). In particular the motor cortex, the 
supplementary motor area and the putamen. What is especially compelling about this 
result is that dual-task performance prevented the acquisition of any explicit sequence 
knowledge and thus the activation of these neural regions is specific to non-
declarative sequence learning. Furthermore, subjects in this study immediately went 
on to do a single-task SRT study with PET scanning during which most subjects 
acquired good explicit sequence knowledge. However, during single-task performance 
different neural regions were activated (the right-hand: dorsolateral pre-frontal cortex, 
pre-motor cortex, and ventral putamen, and the biparieto-occipital cortex). 
Furthermore, there was no difference in the pattern of neural activation between 
subjects in the single-task SRT that did or did not acquire explicit sequence 
knowledge. Therefore, non-declarative learning involves activation of motor effector 
areas and the motor region of the basal ganglia in the left hemisphere, undoubtedly 
because these areas control the hand subjects respond with. However, once learning 
becomes explicit activation shifts to the right hemisphere. Most likely because task 
focus then shifts to requiring subjects to learn about the sequential nature of spatial 
events.  
 
 In a follow-up study Hazeltine, Grafton and Ivry (1997) performed a similar 
experiment in which they substituted a ‘perceptual’ SRT task for the usual spatial SRT 
task. The perceptual SRT task was identical to the spatial task except for all the stimuli 
appearing a central location and varied by colour rather than position. The results of 
the perceptual SRT PET study supported that of the earlier spatial SRT PET study. 
During dual-task performance no subjects developed explicit sequence knowledge 
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and rCBF increased in the contralateral frontal and parietal areas. In particular the 
supplementary motor area, the motor cortex and the (subcortical) putamen / thalamus. 
In contrast rCBF decreased in the bilateral middle temporal cortex, the inferior 
occipital areas and the cerebellum. Once again neural activation changed when 
subjects were switched to the single-task perceptual SRT in which some subjects 
developed explicit sequence knowledge. Specifically rCBF increased in the right-hand 
inferior temporal and frontal areas and bilaterally in the anterior cingulate. Similar to 
the previous study there was no difference in neural activation for subjects with or 
without explicit sequence knowledge during single-task SRT performance. 
 
 Two particular patterns of results are evident in these studies. Firstly, 
perceptual SRT performance produces more ventral activation than spatial SRT 
performance, and spatial SRT performance produces activation in the dorso-lateral 
pFC while perceptual SRT performance does not. Furthermore, the pattern of neural 
activation between the two tasks is exclusive as there is no foci of activation common 
to both tasks. Secondly, although not all subjects acquired explicit sequence 
knowledge during the single-task condition in either study there was absolutely no 
difference in the pattern of rCBF activation between ‘aware’ and ‘unaware’ subjects. It 
is also worth noting that these results support Curran and Keele’s (1993) finding that 
different neural systems are responsible for sequence learning under distracted and 
non-distracted conditions.   
 
 Hazeltine, Grafton and Ivry note that while the spatial SRT removes the spatial 
component of the stimuli the spatial component of the response remains the same as 
in the spatial-SRT (subjects physically respond in the same way). However, removing 
the spatial component of the stimuli helps to determine whether sequence learning is 
more dependent on perceptual or motor events (Willingham, Nissen and Bullemer, 
1989; Keele et al, 1995). Hazeltine et al  note that if sequence learning is more 
perceptual than motor orientated then ‘we would expect to find the change in stimulus 
properties to lie outside areas associated with motor control’. In contrast if sequence 
learning is more motor orientated then blood flow changes should be relatively 
restricted to motor areas. As blood flow changes do occur outside motor areas 
Hazeltine et al conclude sequence learning does not simply depend on learning a 
series of stimulus locations but rather “occurs at a more abstract or response-related 
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level”. 
 
 In the latest study in the series Grafton, Hazeltine and Ivry (1998) examined the 
question of why behavioural evidence shows near perfect transfer of knowledge to 
novel sets of effectors when non-declarative sequence learning is predominantly (but 
not exclusively) supported by motor regions. The authors note that SRT learning can 
consist of any combination of three functional attributes: motor knowledge, perceptual 
knowledge, and abstract (goal) knowledge. Assuming that SRT performance relies 
primarily on abstract sequence representations (per their findings above) rather than 
motor knowledge helps explain the flexible nature of the knowledge. In order to test 
this assumption the authors employed the perceptual SRT from their previous study 
(including the distracter task) and varied the presence or absence of a repeating 
sequence and the form of motor responses to stimuli (either the traditional SRT 4-
finger response panel or a much larger keyboard requiring complete arm movements). 
Unlike the previous two studies sequence awareness was not varied in that subjects 
always performed under dual-task conditions and never acquired explicit sequence 
knowledge. They found that, irrespective of response style, during repeating 
sequences rCBF increased in the contralateral (left-hand) sensorimotor cortex, 
supplementary motor area and rostral inferior parietal cortex.  Furthermore, rCBF 
activity peaked in the cingulate motor area during transfer between response styles, 
suggesting a role linking abstract sequence information and effector systems. After 
transfer activity in the inferior parietal cortex remained high whereas sensorimotor 
cortex activity shifted to more dorsal loci. From these results they concluded that 
abstract sequence information resides in the inferior parietal cortex and is channelled 
through the cingulate motor area (Brodman’s area 24) to particular effector systems. 
 
 Pascual-Leone et al (1999; see also Pascual-Leone, Grafman, and Hallet, 
1994) report conceptually similar results from a transcranial magnetic stimulation SRT 
study. During early single-task SRT performance, during which the authors assume all 
learning is implicit, the contralateral (to the hand in use) motor cortex output map 
significantly increases in size. This increase plateaus during the subsequent phase of 
performance, which the authors assume consists of a mixture of non-declarative and 
explicit learning, before rapidly decreasing in the final phase which is assumed to 
consist entirely of explicit learning. While the assumptions as to when the shifts in 
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learning style occur during the various phases of SRT performance are open to 
question the clear fact is that there are two very distinct patterns of motor cortex 
output which, at the very least, suggest two distinct forms of learning are taking place. 
 
 Finally, Rauch et al (1995) report a PET scan study of subjects performing the 
SRT and found that the right ventral premotor area, the right ventral caudate / nucleus 
acumbens, and the right thalamus were activated during the implicit condition (uncued 
repeating sequence information). Whereas activation in the explicit condition (after 
explicit training with the repeating sequence) occurred in the primary visual cortex, 
pre-sylvian cortex and cerebellar vermis. As a result the authors concluded that 
“implicit sequence learning is mediated by cortico-striatal pathways”. 
 
In summary neuroimaging SRT studies produce good, but not totally 
unequivocal, evidence that non-declarative sequence learning generally involves 
subcortical / basal ganglia structures. The biggest limitation with these studies is that 
they can (currently) only generate relatively low resolution indexes of neural activation. 
Although the general pattern of neural activation in these studies is consistent with the 
multiple memory systems theory (i.e. non-declarative memory relies on the basal 
ganglia whereas declarative memory relies on the limbic system) the scanning 
techniques employed so far cannot reveal the degree of neural specificity necessary 
to conclusively demonstrate the neuroanatomical independence of the memory 
systems that declarative and non-declarative memory are dissociable and 
independent. However, when the neuroimaging evidence is combined with clinical 
studies with neuropathological patients the weight of evidence in favour of the multiple 
memory systems theory is compelling. 
 
2.3.3 The Effect Of Sequence Structure On SRT Performance 
It well known that the longer sequence is the more difficult it is to deliberately 
remember, which can only be a good thing in any test of non-declarative memory. 
However, the more important point is that sequence length, in conjunction with the 
number of stimulus locations, imposes constraints on what is commonly termed the 
‘sequence structure’ or the ‘statistical structure’ of the sequence. An example drawn 
from the SRT literature will readily illustrate the concept. When Knopman and Nissen 
(1987) first introduced the SRT they employed the following 10-trial sequence (where 
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‘A’ is the left most stimuli position and ‘D’ the right most) DBCACBDCBA. However, 
given that there are only four stimulus positions in the SRT task there must 
necessarily be an inequality in the number of locations presented to a subject within a 
single repetition of the sequence. Thus the two ‘outer’ stimulus positions (‘A’ and ‘D’) 
are presented twice during one repetition whereas the two ‘inner’ positions (‘B’ and 
‘C’) are presented three times. Therefore, there is unequal stimulus-frequency within 
the sequence and a subject could facilitate their performance simply by learning 
(explicitly or implicitly) that two of the locations have a higher probability of appearing 
next and thus predisposing themselves to respond to those positions, which would 
‘pay off’ half of the time. However, the random-sequence used by Knopman and 
Nissen was not similarly biased, all stimulus locations other than the current location 
had an equal probability of appearing next, therefore a subject could not facilitate 
performance via simple stimulus-frequency information. The critical point is that a 
subject could respond faster in the repeating sequence condition without actually 
learning the repeating sequence, but instead by learning simple frequency information. 
However, when compared to reaction times in the random-sequence condition, a 
subject would fulfil all the criterion of having learnt the sequence (faster reaction times 
during the repeating-sequence blocks and a slowing in reaction times when switched 
to the random-sequence block), when this was not necessarily the case. Thus it is 
necessary to ensure two things: that a repeating sequence be consistent within itself 
(e.g. have equal stimulus frequency etc.) and that it be consistent with a random 
sequence such that only the actual sequence information varies between the two 
types of sequence. As will be seen in the following discussion subjects will readily 
seize on variations in simple frequency information in order to facilitate their 
performance if such information is available to them, rendering conclusions about 
sequence learning in such situations problematic. However, it will also been shown 
that when sequence structure is strictly controlled such that subjects can only improve 
their performance by learning the repeating sequence learning they do learn it, and 
thus, under such rigorous methodological conditions, the SRT is a valid and reliable 
test of sequence-learning. 
 
In a study designed to elucidate exactly what is learned during sequence 
learning Reed and Johnson (1994) first discuss a number of different types of simple 
frequency information contained within a sequence that may provide subjects with an 
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advantage when performing the task, and hence give the appearance of actually 
learning the sequence. They identify 5 types of simple frequency information inherent 
in sequences: 
 
1) Location Frequency: The frequency with which each target location is 
presented within a sequence. 
2) Transition Frequency: The frequency with which each possible transition 
(from one stimulus to another, e.g. A→C, or B→C or D→A etc.) occurs 
within a sequence. 
3) Reversal Frequency: The frequency with which back-and-forth 
movements occur, e.g. A→B→A 
4) Rate of Full Coverage: The average number of stimuli encountered so 
that each possible location has been presented at least once. 
5) Rate of Complete Transition Usage: The average number of stimuli 
encountered so that each possible transition has been presented at least 
once. 
 
Reed and Johnson cite a study by Cohen, Ivry and Keele (1990) in which 
subjects were first trained with Second Order Conditional sequences (SOC: A SOC 
exists when a stimulus location is entirely predicted by the previous two locations, 
whereas knowledge of the immediately prior position provides no information 
regarding the next) and then switched to random sequences, displaying an increased 
reaction time after the switch. When comparing the structures of the repeating 
sequences and random sequences Cohen et al used it was found that, while the 
location and transition frequencies were very similar, other frequency information 
associated with the repeating sequence was very different to that of the random 
sequences. In comparison with the SOC sequence the random sequences contained 
higher reversal frequencies, rates of full coverage and rates of full transition usage. 
Therefore it is possible the increased reaction time’s demonstrated by these subjects 
reflects the learning of any-or-all of the frequency information that changes during 
transfer trials rather than sequence learning as originally assumed. 
 
Reed and Johnson went on to conduct several experiments designed to 
determine if this sort of variation in simple frequency information could produce SRT-
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like learning. In the first they trained subjects on a series on non-repeating trials that 
were characterised by “nearly identical” event frequency properties as a SOC 
sequence. After training subjects were transferred to either a truly random sequence 
or a SOC sequence, in the expectation that if subjects had learned the structural 
frequencies during training their performance would no deteriorate when switched to 
the SOC sequence, but would when switched to truly random sequences. (Note: All 
subjects completed this experiment under dual-task, tone-counting, conditions ). 
Although there was no actual sequence information to be learnt during the training 
trials those subjects that were switched to random sequences with different structural 
frequency information than the training trials displayed a significant interference effect. 
Whereas those subjects that were switched to a SOC sequence with similar event 
frequency information to the training trials did not. Thus those subjects that were 
transferred to one random sequence condition from another demonstrated an SRT-
like interference effect which can only be attributed to the variation in the structural 
information contained in the different conditions. This raises the possibility that what is 
considered evidence of sequence learning in most SRT studies may in fact actually be 
due to variations in structural information rather than sequence information. As a result 
Reed and Johnson conclude “transfer sequences should match training sequences on 
all properties other than the specific structural characteristic being investigates”. 
 
In their second experiment Reed and Johnson examined the ability of subjects 
to learn a SOC sequence when tested with a random sequence that was identical with 
regard to simple frequency information but varied completely in regard to SOC 
(sequence) information. The experimental group underwent blocks of one particular 
SOC sequence before being switched to a single block of a novel SOC sequence that 
was structurally identical to the first SOC sequence.. Analysis showed that all groups 
became significantly faster over blocks but that there was no difference between 
groups, thus learning an actual sequence gave no advantage over learning simple 
frequency information. However, the analysis of the experimental group’s transfer 
block revealed a significant slowing in reaction times which can only be attributed to 
the variation in sequence information, and further analysis showed that subjects had 
not simply learned a subset of the SOC sequence, strongly suggesting that subjects 
are capable of learning complex sequence information. The performance of repeating-
only control subjects (who performed the repeating-sequence portion of the SRT but 
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were not switched to a random sequence of any kind) in a subjective (verbal-report) 
test revealed between 15-20% of subjects became consciously aware of a sequence 
during training, but none were able to actually specify it. Furthermore, a correlation 
between the slope of subjects learning curves and their performance on the tests for 
explicit sequence knowledge was not significant suggesting the independence of non-
declarative and explicit sequence knowledge. Thus while subjects will use simple 
frequency information to facilitate performance if they can they will also learn complex 
sequential information if that is the only way they can facilitate their performance. This 
conclusion is further supported by studies that find simpler sequences (those that 
include both SOCs and First Order Conditionals (FOCs)) are learnt more readily than 
more complex (SOC only) sequences (Cohen at al, 1990, and Keele and Jennings, 
1992). Therefore attribution of learning to acquisition of complex sequence information 
is problematic when simpler information is also allowed to vary between training and 
test conditions. 
 
Jackson and Jackson (1995) argue that SRT performance could be due to 
learning simple probabilities present within the repeating sequence, rather than a 
more complex representation of serial-order information. Similar to Johnson and 
Reed’s argument Jackson and Jackson also note that the structure of a sequence 
(less than 12-trials long) when performed on a 4-reponse apparatus (as per the 
normal SRT procedure) necessarily produces a sequence ‘grammar’ in that some 
transitions (the relationship between two sequentially adjacent sequence elements as 
measured by the probability that one stimulus location will be followed by another) 
occur less often than others (or even not at all). An examination of the 10-trial 
sequence first introduced by Knopman and Nissen in 1987 (see above), and widely 
used thereafter, reveals a very uneven transition grammar (see Table 1). Jackson and 
Jackson argue that simply learning unequal transition probabilities within a sequence 
could produce SRT-like performance in the absence of any serial-order learning, and 
note that it is possible to have knowledge of transition probabilities in the absence of 
knowledge of serial-order information. Furthermore they claim that common methods 
of explicit-awareness analysis do not asses the former kind of knowledge, therefore 
common methods of testing for explicit sequence awareness fail to meet the 
conditions for Shanks and St. John’s information criterion because they do not test for 
the information that actually produces the behaviour (assuming simple probabilistic 
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learning is sufficient to produce a behavioural advantage during SRT performance). 
 
When Jackson and Jackson reanalysed generate-task data from their own 
studies they found a positive relationship between generate accuracy and the 
correlation of subject’s responses and the transition table for each of the different 
sequences examined. Further examination of these results revealed a small number 
of subjects whose responses correlated highly with the transition structure of the 
relevant sequence while their accuracy performance was at chance levels. Strongly 
suggesting these subjects had learned the transition structure of the sequence rather 
than the repeating sequence. 
 
Table 2.1, A Table of Transition Probabilities  
for Knopman and Nissen’s 10-trial Sequence:  
DBCACBDCBA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In a study also concerned with sequence structure Stadler and Neely (1997) 
explore a possible confound between sequence length and sequence structure. A 
number of studies (Howard and Howard, 1992, and Pascual-Leone et al, 1993) 
concluded non-declarative memory is capacity limited as non-declarative learning 
diminishes when sequence length increases and Stadler and Neely’s experiments 
also reveal some very interesting consequences of various sequence-structure 
variations. As they note sequence structure can be coded in many ways and they 
choose to employ an information metric approach (per Attneave, 1959), and 
specifically focus on per-cent redundancy within a sequence. As a sequence departs 
from complete randomness, it increases in redundancy. A completely random 
sequence has 0% redundancy; a completely predictable sequence has 100% 
redundancy (see the article for a discussion of how redundancy is calculated). Stadler 
and Neely go on to note that the sequences used by both Howard and Howard, and 
Pascual-Leone not only varied by length but also by redundancy, such their longer 
sequences had less redundancy than the shorter sequences. Therefore, rather than 
2nd Element 
 
A B C D 
A - 0.00 0.5 0.5 
B 0.33 - 0.33 0.33 
C 0.33 0.66 - 0.00 
 
1ST 
Eleme
nt D 0.00 0.5 0.5 - 
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the variation in sequence lengths, it may have been the variation in sequence 
structure / redundancy that produced learning differences in these studies.  
 
To address this concern Stadler and Neely compared sequences of different 
lengths with sequences of varied structures. Specifically they compared the two 10-
trial and two 16-trial sequences used by Howard and Howard (1989) with two 
additional 16-trial sequences of their own devising which “matched the 10-trial 
sequences in statistical structure”. Therefore, if sequence length is an important factor 
in serial-order learning the difference between 10- and 16-trial sequences found in the 
Howard and Howard study should be replicated here, regardless of statistical 
structure. On the other hand if sequence structure is important there should be no 
difference between Howard and Howard’s 10-trial and Stadler and Neely’s 16-trial 
sequences. Analysis of the slowdown in reaction time after switching to random 
sequences showed that the 16-trial sequences generated by Stadler and Neely 
produced as much interference as Howard and Howard’s 10-trial sequences allowing 
Stadler and Neely to conclude “Thus, when sequence structure is equated, length has 
little effect on learning” with the obvious consequence that sequence structure does. 
Furthermore, although the difference was not significant the mean interference score 
for the 10-trial sequences was actually less than that for the 16-trial sequences, which 
is in the opposite direction to that predicted by the sequence length hypothesis. 
 
Stadler and Neely next manipulated both sequence length (with 8-, 12- and 16-
trial sequences) and sequence structure (high and low) and again found that structure 
was the main determinant of learning (highly structured sequences resulting in greater 
learning than less structured sequences), and if anything learning actually increased 
with trial-length. 
 
Finally Stadler and Neely manipulated sequence length (8- and 12-trial 
sequences), by co-varying it with number of stimulus locations, (four and six 
respectively) and sequence structure (high and low). Their results were consistent with 
their previous experiments, finding a significant effect of structure (higher structure 
producing more learning) regardless of sequence length. Examination of a sequence 
recognition test showed that approximately half the subjects recognised the sequence, 
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however2, as a general rule, these subjects actually showed less learning (a lower 
reaction time slowdown) than those subjects who did not correctly recognise it 
allowing Stadler and Neely to conclude that “subject’s awareness…. appears not to 
affect the pattern of results”. However, it is worth noting that Stadler and Neely’s 
recognition test explicitly informed subjects that a repeating sequence had been 
present before forcing them to choose between one of four sequences, where perhaps 
a more graduated procedure (e.g. foils) might have been more appropriate. 
Furthermore, the actual proportion of correct judgements is not reported which is 
unfortunate, especially as they also asked subjects to rate how confident of their 
judgement they were which, when combined with raw accuracy, is likely to be a 
sensitive test of conscious awareness. 
 
Finally, Curran (1997) manipulated the presence of FOCs and SOCs in 
sequences in order to re-evaluate higher-order association learning in light of Reber 
and Squire’s (1994) finding that amnesic and control subjects showed similar levels of 
non-declarative sequence learning when the repeating and random sequences 
contained different serial-order information but identical stimulus (simple-) frequency 
information.3 Curran used two repeating sequences with different degrees of pairwise-
association predictiveness, the first sequence contained elements that were 
probabilistically predictive (i.e. FOCs) whereas the second repeating sequence 
contained SOCs which were not probabilistically predictive, so simply learning 
pairwise information is an inadequate technique for learning the SOC sequence.  
 
In a very interesting departure from normal SRT methodology Curran, instead 
of having subjects perform several blocks of a repeating sequence and then switch to 
a block of random sequences, intermixed the repeating and random sequences in the 
same block. Thus (using ‘R’ to denote 12 random trials and ‘S’ to denote one cycle of 
the 12-trial repeating sequence, either the FOC or the SOC sequence) each block of 
120 trials was arranged as: R-S-S-R-S-S-R-S-S-R. Curran notes two main advantages 
of this methodology; it helps obscure the presence of a repeating sequence thus 
                                                 
2 On a methodologically similar note Pascual-Leone et al (1993) reported that while 80% of their control 
subjects developed declarative knowledge of the 8-trial sequence (‘declarative knowledge’ was defined 
being able to consciously reproduce 50% of the sequence) only 10% developed it for the 12-trial 
sequence. 
3 Curran uses the terms first-, and second-, order predictive, i.e. FOP and SOP, rather than first-,and 
second-, order conditional as used by Reber and Squire, but the terms are synonymous and this thesis 
will continue to use FOC and SOC to maintain consistency with the discussions above. 
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reducing explicit awareness of it, and allows a within-subject measure of learning to be 
obtained in each block rather than at a single point towards the end of the experiment. 
 
Analysis revealed that although subjects learned more while performing the 
SOC rather than the FOC sequence there was no difference for either sequence 
between groups, thus amnesiac subjects displayed similar levels of learning compared 
to control subjects for both sequence types. The only difference between the 
amnesiac and control groups was that while the amnesiacs showed significant 
learning of both sequences when analysed separately from the control group they did 
not show a greater learning effect for the SOC sequence as compared to the FOC 
sequence while, when analysed separately, the control group did. 
 
As mentioned the intermixed design allows an analysis of pairwise learning, 
such that it was possible to compare reaction times for identical stimulus transitions, 
e.g. 1-2, in both the random and repeating conditions. Not only was there no effect of 
group when analysing the FOC sequence in this way but the analysis also suggested 
that, when learning the FOC sequence, there was little higher-order information learnt 
by either group. This is consistent with the studies presented above that suggest 
subjects will use simple frequency (FOC) information to perform the task if they can. In 
contrast a pairwise-analysis of the SOC sequence learning revealed a significant 
difference in the amount of higher-order learning between the random and repeating 
sequences. Thus, on average, there was significant learning of higher-order (SOC) 
information. While there was no main effect of group in this analysis, examination of 
group results independently of each other revealed that while the control group 
showed a significant effect of sequence type this only approached significance 
(p=0.07) in the amnesiac subjects, suggesting that control subjects learnt more than 
mere pairwise information in most sequence positions whereas amnesiac subjects 
also learnt this but in fewer positions (but see Chapter 3). 
 
When explicit sequence knowledge was assessed (using recognition tests) it 
was found that neither group displayed above-chance levels of recognition on any 
test. Curran notes that the particular recognition tests employed had previously 
(Curran, 1997) been confirmed as valid and sensitive and suggest that the low levels 
of explicit sequence knowledge are likely due to the intermixing of random and 
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sequence trials. 
 
Thus Curran concludes that while amnesiac subjects demonstrated some 
higher-order learning they displayed less than control subjects and are therefore 
somewhat impaired in comparison, and this may explain why many SRT studies find 
amnesiac subjects typically react more slowly than control groups, even though the 
difference is typically not significant. However, it is also worth bearing in mind that the 
presence of intermixed sequence types may have instead produced a disproportionate 
degree of disruption in amnesic subjects as it has been suggested amnesic subjects 
show greater susceptibility to such interference (Shapiro and Olton, 1994). 
Regardless, this study also produces good evidence of: the ability of both amnesic 
and neurologically-normal subjects to demonstrate sequence-learning in the absence 
of any conscious knowledge of the critical (SOC) information contained in the 
sequence and the importance of ensuring that only intended sequential information is 
allowed to vary between different sequence types. 
 
It will be apparent from the forgoing discussion that considerable 
methodological rigour is required in order to ensure that what appears to be 
sequence-learning is in fact just that. Nonetheless, it is also clear that with careful 
consideration of these issues it is still possible to demonstrate an SRT phenomena in 
both intact control and neurologically impaired subjects. 
 
2.4 Methodological Concerns; Measuring Explicit Sequence Knowledge in the 
SRT 
As has become apparent in the forgoing discussion there are a number of 
methodological and conceptual / theoretical concerns with the SRT. Although the 
previous section dealt with concerns relating to sequence structure there remains the 
problem associated with accurate and valid tests of a subjects explicit knowledge of 
the sequence. This is one of Shanks and St. John’s primary concerns (and led to the 
development of their sensitivity criterion) and the following section will discuss a 
number of different procedures used to this end, and the problems and advantages 
associated with each. 
 
The contamination of SRT performance by explicit awareness of the repeating-
sequence (either in part or in its entirety) is, given the SRT is a test of non-declarative 
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memory, of concern. The least empirically rigorous technique for assessing explicit 
sequence knowledge is a simple verbal report. Subjects are simply asked, at the 
completion of the SRT, if they became aware of a repeating sequence. A number of 
concerns have been mooted with this approach, ranging from issues of how confident 
of their opinion the subjects are to concerns with the poor fit between free-recall and 
SRT task characteristics (Shanks and St. John, 1994). Prefacing the definition of their 
criterion for non-declarative learning Shanks and St. John comment that many studies 
have reported subjects can acquire information without being able to verbalise it later 
on, and note that these findings are often used to support the claim of unconscious 
learning. They then go on to propose that “if the aim is to establish what the subjects’ 
state of awareness was at t1 [time 1], examining the content of their verbal reports at t2 
is certainly not the only way to do this and may not be the best one”. 
 
In an extension of the free-report technique some authors instead adopt a structured-
interview approach. Rather than simply being asked if they noticed a sequence, subjects are 
asked a series of progressively more focused questions, ranging from “Did you notice 
anything about the task” to asking them to reproduce the actual sequence. Although 
Willingham et al (1989) found a reliable SRT learning effect even after removing subjects 
who appeared to have explicit knowledge of the sequence after such an interview this 
approach is also open to many of the concerns with free-recall. 
 
In conjunction with the introduction of the SRT task itself Nissen and Bullemer 
introduced the generate-task (AKA prediction task) whereby subjects are typically 
required to identify the stimulus position coming next (a cued-recall task). While this  
test is undoubtedly a more sensitive / rigorous test of conscious knowledge (see 
Shanks and St. John, 1994). However, Jackson and Jackson (1995), in their critique 
of methods for assessing explicit awareness, note their own demonstration (Jackson 
and Jackson, 1992) that estimates of explicit knowledge identify only partially 
overlapping sub-populations of subjects. Furthermore they also note that Shanks 
(1993) “showed that subjects classified as unaware… were significantly above chance 
on a cued recall task”. 
 
Reber and Squire (1998, above) and Perruchet and Amorim (1992) employed a 
recognition test to examine subject’s explicit knowledge of a repeating sequence. 
Typically this requires subjects to rate various sequence elements (e.g. 4-trial subsets 
of a 10-trial sequence) as having been present (or not) in the previously performed 
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SRT task. Elements of the actual sequence are juxtaposed with foils and recognition 
accuracy is correlated with reaction time performance. In the Perruchet and Amorim 
study this produced a correlation of 0.8, which the authors decided was evidence that 
SRT performance was a consequence of explicit knowledge of sequence fragments. 
Shanks and St. John also conclude that a recognition test is a valid measure of explicit 
knowledge. They come to this conclusion because this task (as well as the generate 
task) reproduce the stimulus context, and can be performed at above-chance levels 
regardless of whether the subjects knowledge is of fragments or of the entire 
sequence, hence fulfilling both their sensitivity and information criteria. 
 
Therefore recognition tests would appear to be valid and appropriate method 
for testing subject’s explicit sequence knowledge. As a result more recent studies 
often employ this procedure (typically in conjunction with other tests of explicit 
sequence knowledge, e.g. generate tests) and report evidence of non-declarative 
sequence learning in the absence of explicit sequence knowledge (Perruchet and 
Amorim, 1992; Reber and Squire, 1998).  
 
2.5 Other Methodological Factors. 
In one of the first explorations of precisely what is learned during a SRT task 
Willingham, Nissen and Bullemer (1989), in the first part of their study, demonstrated 
that some subjects were capable of significant serial-order learning in the absence of 
any explicit knowledge for the sequence (as assessed by a standard generate task). 
As later authors would also do they removed those subjects from the analysis who 
they classified as making anticipatory responses (those subjects that initiated a motor-
response prior to, or extremely quickly (<100ms) after, stimulus onset). Willingham et. 
al. quantified anticipation as any response quicker than 100ms in light of Wood’s 
(1997) finding that the response portion of a simple reaction time is approximately 
100ms, and go on to note that while this type of response was initially rare by the end 
of the experiment those subjects with a high degree of declarative knowledge of the 
sequence were making anticipatory responses 50% of the time. The overall pattern of 
results was similar with-or-without the anticipatory responses removed except and, as 
would be expected, the ‘full explicit knowledge’ group did not reach the same 
extremely fast reaction times by the end of the experiment, when anticipatory 
responses were removed, as they had with them included. What is especially 
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interesting is that with anticipatory responses removed none of the groups (‘no explicit 
knowledge’, ‘some explicit knowledge’ and ‘full explicit knowledge’) differed from each 
other, all showed a similar degree of reaction time reduction over blocks and similar 
levels of absolute reaction time, again suggesting that it is possible to perform the 
SRT without any declarative knowledge of the sequence, and that any degree of 
(anticipatory independent) declarative knowledge for the sequence confers no 
behavioural advantage on the SRT task. 
 
Willingham et. al’s second experiment was designed to “investigate the 
temporal relation between the emergence of procedural and declarative knowledge of 
the sequence”. To this end they compared groups with varying lengths of exposure to 
the sequence (number of SRT blocks completed) and found that both non-declarative 
and explicit knowledge increased with performance. However, they went on to assess 
individual subjects degree of non-declarative and explicit knowledge and found that 
there were comparable proportions of subjects who developed; both non-declarative 
and explicit sequence knowledge, just non-declarative knowledge, and just explicit 
knowledge. Allowing the author’s to conclude that “It is apparent that declarative 
learning can take place in the absence of procedural learning, just as procedural 
learning can take place in the absence of declarative learning”. 
 
2.6 Shanks and St. John (1994) Revisited 
As promised in Chapter 1 the discussion will now return to a consideration of 
Shanks and St. John’s conclusion (that non-declarative learning has not been 
adequately demonstrated) within the specific context of the SRT task. This section will 
first examine Shanks and St. John’s treatment of SRT studies in their article before 
moving on to later studies that have a bearing on their conclusions. It will be shown 
that several studies unequivocally fulfil both their criteria and are hence compelling 
evidence for both the explicit / non-declarative dichotomy and multiple memory 
systems in general. 
 
Like many authors at the time Shanks and St. John criticise the use of 
repeating sequences that contain probabilistic structures (e.g. stimulus frequency) 
other than mere serial order and also the use of supposed random sequences which 
vary in simple frequency information from that found in the repeating sequence. They 
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support these criticisms with the results of a study, Shanks, Green and Kolodny, 
(1994) based on Willingham, Nissen and Bullemer’s, (1989) study in which both 
studies compared a ‘normal [repeating] sequence’4 group, with a ‘pseudorandom’ 
sequence group (who received a “series constrained to have the same number of 
each stimuli… per 10 trials as appear in the sequence proper”) and a “truly random” 
group who’s stimuli were only constrained by the injunction that they not immediately 
repeat (i.e. a ‘classical’ control group typical of early SRT studies). After classifying 
subjects in the normal sequence group via structured interview as having: no 
knowledge, some knowledge, or full knowledge of the repeating sequence they 
discovered that while reaction time did diminish significantly for all but the truly random 
group (indicating the other groups had learnt something) there was no significant 
difference between the normal-sequence / no-knowledge group and the 
pseudorandom group (but note they are solely concerned with the ‘learning effect’ 
here and make no comment about their subject’s ‘interference effect’). As a result they 
conclude this experiment, and therefore Willingham et al’s also, fails the information 
criterion. Given the discussion above the results will come as no surprise and is 
perfectly compatible with the contention that subjects will employ simple probabilistic 
information to improve performance where possible.  
 
However, while Shanks and St. John’s conclusion isn’t disputed there are two 
points worth making. Firstly that, as discussed above, their own normal-sequence and 
pseudorandom conditions are vulnerable to criticism based on the variation of simple 
frequency information (other than simple stimulus frequency for which they did control) 
and one can’t help but wonder what the result might have been if they used a 
repeating sequence and appropriate random sequences that varied no frequency 
information other than the actual repeating sequence (i.e. a 12-trial repeating 
sequence). Secondly, Shanks and St. John are open to the criticism that they have 
adopted a straw-man hypothesis in terms of what they decide constitutes non-
declarative learning. In much the same way that Cleereman’s (1994) criticises them 
for attacking a position that “I doubt anyone researching non-declarative learning 
would be willing to defend” their decision to confine their attention to reaction time 
reduction (the learning effect) as opposed to reaction time increase when switching 
from a repeating to random sequence (the interference effect) is indefensible. Even 
the early SRT studies recognised the interference effect is a more reliable measure of 
                                                 
4 It is assumed, in light of other comments, that this is the usual 10-trial sequence introduced by 
Knopman and Nissen, 1987 
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non-declarative learning than the learning effect and this approach was well 
established in the literature by the time Shanks and St. John undertook their study. 
Furthermore, they expressly sought to replicate Willingham et al who most definitely 
included, and analysed, an interference condition and thus Shanks and St. John’s 
omission is even more inexplicable. Although Shanks and St. John’s findings are in 
line with others concerned with the effect of sequence structure the fact that they 
chose to test their hypothesis against the weaker of the two articles of proof for non-
declarative learning, while not defeating it, reduces the value of their study. 
A quick examination of Reed and Johnson’s 1994 study (discussed above) 
reveals that it fulfils both Shanks and St. John’s criterion. Reed and Johnson’s random 
sequence was structural identical to the repeating sequence and thus fulfil the 
information criterion. Furthermore, in order to demonstrate an absence of conscious 
knowledge of the repeating sequence Reed and Johnson employed both a prediction 
and a recognition test, the latter of which Shanks and St. John conclude is “a genuine 
measure of awareness of the sequence”. As discussed above Reed and Johnson’s 
subjects performed the recognition task at chance levels while showing significant 
reaction time slowing when switched to interference trials in the SRT and, as Reed 
and Johnson’s study meets both criterion, it is undisputable evidence for unconscious 
sequence learning during SRT performance. Reed and Johnson note three points to 
explain the difference in results between their study and Shanks and St. John. Firstly, 
as just noted, Shanks and St. John compared learning slopes between groups 
whereas Reed and Johnson compared disruption in reaction time (interference), Reed 
and Johnson note that the latter measure is more sensitive, especially in light of the 
fact that they found no correlation between slope and magnitude of reaction time 
disruption. Secondly Reed and Johnson’s subjects performed under dual-task 
conditions and they suggest that the lack of any distraction in the Shanks and St. John 
study (both only employed neurologically intact subjects) may well account for the high 
degree of conscious sequence knowledge. Thirdly that the subjects in Shanks and St. 
John saw 40 repetitions of their 10-trial sequence whereas those in Reed and 
Johnson saw 136 repetitions of their 12-trial sequence, thus the Shanks and St. John 
subjects may not have had sufficient exposure to the sequence.  
Nevertheless, Shanks and St. John criticise Reed and Johnson’s conclusion on 
three grounds. Firstly they note that the subjects performed a “relatively small number 
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of (prediction and recognition) trials” and thus there may have been insufficient 
opportunity to “detect small savings from the training phase”. This criticism is 
somewhat churlish given that Shanks and St. John have expressed concern on a 
number of occasions that a prediction test (with feedback) might well induce sequence 
learning within the prediction phase which could therefore erroneously inflate a 
subject’s apparent conscious knowledge of the sequence. Thus it is obviously 
desirable to keep the prediction phase as short as possible and yet they criticise Reed 
and Johnson for doing so. Furthermore, irrespective of Shanks and St. John 
insistence that it is necessary for there to be absolutely no conscious knowledge of the 
sequence in order to definitively demonstrate non-declarative learning, the fact that 
they themselves describe any conscious knowledge that the subjects may still have 
had as “small” is telling. Shanks and St. John are troubled that Perruchet and 
Amorim’s subjects in a similar task were able to perform at above chance in the 
prediction task whereas Reed and Johnson’s were not. It seems likely that Perruchet 
and Amorim used a single-task rather than dual-task design and if so the same point 
Reed and Johnson made about the Shanks and St. John study above holds here also. 
On the face of it the most telling criticism Shanks and St. John make is that when they 
replicated Reed and Johnson’s study their (Shanks and St. John’s) subjects 
performed the prediction test at above chance, from which Shanks and St. John 
concluded their subjects “appear to have [conscious] access… to second-order 
sequence knowledge”. Once again however Shanks and St. John are being somewhat 
disingenuous as although they have endorsed the recognition test as appropriate and 
valid and although Reed and Johnson use this as their primary measure of conscious 
knowledge Shanks and St. John either fail to use it in their ‘replication’ or at least fail 
to report it. In this sense Shanks and St. John are guilty of violating their own 
(information) criteria. Furthermore they note that their own subjects display significant 
evidence of conscious sequence knowledge within the first 12 trials of the 96 trial 
prediction task, yet they have just finished criticising Reed and Johnson for running 
too few prediction trials to demonstrate conscious knowledge, having themselves just 
reported that the very same task is sufficiently sensitive to show just that with only a 
1/3 as many trials as Reed and Johnson use. 
Shanks and St. John however are kinder to Stadler and Frensch who refute 
Shanks and St. John’s contention that the failure of the prediction test to demonstrate 
conscious sequence knowledge in their (Stadler and Frensch’s) 1989 study may be 
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due to interference and hence rapid forgetting during the prediction test (as it did not 
include feedback). Shanks and St. John acknowledge that Stadler and Frensch have 
satisfactorily addressed this point (by virtue of the fact that subject’s performance was 
consistent throughout the prediction task) and go on to admit that “this study goes a 
long way to meeting the Sensitivity and Information Criteria…… [and thus these] 
results appear to provide good evidence of unconscious learning”. This conclusion is 
rather surprising in light of Shanks and St. John’s ultimate contention that there is no 
good evidence of non-declarative learning. However Shanks and St. John qualify their 
support for Stadler and Frensch by noting that the assessment of awareness in 
Stadler and Frensch was based on a fraction of the number of observations used to 
demonstrate reaction time reduction, and this may introduce problems with statistical 
power. It is strange that Shanks and St. John go on to comment that they are still 
concerned that withholding feedback during prediction testing “works against the 
possibility of finding significant savings” again having just condemned the practise of 
feedback in prediction tasks!. However, they do conclude that Stadler and Frensch’s 
study merits replication and further exploration. Given that it has apparently fulfilled 
both their criterion this would seem to be a somewhat overly-conservative response, 
but their point is well taken, even though it does apparently provide good evidence of 
non-declarative learning it is (as far as Shanks and St. John are concerned) at odds 
with a number of quite similar studies and the reasons for this difference need to be 
determined before any firm conclusion can be reached. This notwithstanding, if it 
could be shown that other studies that were similarly rigorous produced evidence of 
non-declarative learning / memory then Shanks and St. John’s conclusion would be 
seriously challenged, if not entirely invalidated. 
As mentioned above this author feels that both Reed and Johnson and Stadler 
and Frensch have provided good evidence of non-declarative learning even though 
Shanks and St. John do not share this conclusion and a brief (re)visit to other studies 
that have been published since 1994 in light of Shanks and St. John’s criterion 
illustrates the point. 
In Jackson et al’s (1995) first experiment subjects completed a prediction test to 
measure explicit sequence knowledge and the authors found no difference between 
control and PD subjects. Furthermore Jackson et al used the same type of test in their 
second experiment but also went on and removed all subjects (control and PD) that 
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performed the prediction test at, or greater than, one standard deviation above chance 
performance, and found that doing so did not alter the results (PD subjects were still 
impaired on SRT performance in comparison with control subjects). Unfortunately 
Jackson et al are vulnerable to criticism on statistical-structure grounds (the statistical 
structure, e.g. frequency information, of their random sequences  varied from that of 
their repeating sequence) and thus it cannot be concluded the study demonstrated 
non-declarative serial-order learning. This notwithstanding it can be concluded that 
something (probably simple frequency information) was learnt implicitly which is 
sufficient to support the global notion of non-declarative learning and thus multiple 
learning / memory systems. 
As noted in the discussion above Reber and Squire’s (1998) amnesic group 
produced recognition tests that were not significantly different from chance but yet 
also demonstrated a strong interference effect when switched from a repeating to 
random sequence, on the face of it unequivocal evidence for non-declarative 
sequence learning (and of the utility of using amnesic subjects). Examination of the 
repeating and random sequences used shows Reber and Squire accounted for the 
possibility of simple probabilistic learning by employing sequences which were 
structurally identical except for the actual serial-order information (i.e. ‘totally 
ambiguous’ per Curran and Keele, 1993), thus any learning is highly likely to have 
been actual sequence-learning, satisfying Shanks and St. John’s sensitivity criterion. 
Furthermore, the non-amnesic subjects who experienced the repeating sequence (the 
primary control group) displayed a greater degree of conscious knowledge of the 
repeating sequence than the amnesic subjects (although still far less than those who 
had explicitly memorised it) but also showed good evidence of non-declarative 
learning. The disparity in the degree of conscious knowledge of the sequence strongly 
suggests that while conscious knowledge is not necessary for sequence learning 
subjects take advantage of it to aid performance when available. This point highlights 
the value of using amnesic subjects and experimental conditions that inhibit the 
development of conscious sequence knowledge (e.g. dual-task conditions or mixed 
designs per Curran 1997, etc.). It also allows the re-examination of those amnesia 
studies that while failing the information criterion for sequence-learning may well 
demonstrate good evidence of non-declarative learning for something (again most 
likely simple frequency information) and thus provide evidence of independent 
learning and memory systems. Secondly, as mentioned in the earlier discussion of this 
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study, Reber and Squire produce good evidence of precisely the sort of crossover 
effect Shanks and St. John called for in their article to demonstrate non-declarative 
learning and the independence of the different learning / memory systems. As a result 
of demonstrating the crossover effect Reber and Squire conclude “that differential 
performance on non-declarative and explicit tests does not simply arise from 
sensitivity differences…. [but rather] indicates that non-declarative and explicit 
sequence learning must depend on separate brains systems”.  
 A similar, although not quite so unequivocal, result is evident when examining 
Curran, 1997. It will be recalled from the discussion above that Curran found that 
amnesic subjects learnt the SOC sequence as well as they learnt the FOC sequence, 
however while they could rely on simple frequency information to learn the latter they 
had to learn second-order probabilities in order to learn the former. Although amnesic 
subjects were mildly impaired in comparison with control subjects the main point 
currently is that they demonstrated learning in the absence of conscious knowledge of 
the information learnt (both amnesic and control subjects performed a recognition test 
at chance levels). The fact that amnesic subjects are mildly impaired compared to 
control subjects on an non-declarative memory test is an exciting result as it suggests 
the black-and-white distinction often made between spared and impaired abilities in 
amnesics is somewhat simplistic, and in doing so further refines our understanding of 
what amnesia is and suggests interesting avenues for future research. It does not 
however invalidate the conclusion that there are independent and dissociable forms of 
memory, but rather suggests the pattern of impairment suffered by amnesic subjects 
is more subtle and complex than hitherto thought. 
 The conclusions to be drawn from this section will be obvious and while Shanks 
and St. John have been criticised for their over stringent application of their criterion 
by providing such a strong test of the evidence they have ultimately done the field a 
great service as, once met, such robust standards-of-proof offer correspondingly 
strong evidence for the multiple-memory hypothesis.  
 
 Furthermore it is not expected that Shanks and St. John’s criterion will 
constitute the final-word in this matter but that refinements and criticisms of it (see 
Jackson and Jackson, 1995, for example) will continue to test the validity of the 
assumption of multiple-memory systems. However, in light of the evidence presented 
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and the criterion adopted this thesis is content to accept, pro tem, the hypothesis of 
multiple-memory systems as it currently stands and explore the contributions of 
different neural substrates within the framework of the SRT task.  
 
2.7  General Conclusions  
It is clear that the more recent SRT studies, which have addressed these 
serious methodological and conceptual issues, have managed to clearly demonstrate 
a capacity for non-declarative sequence learning in the absence of any (or severely 
reduced) explicit knowledge of the sequence. Moreover the fact that such a 
demonstration is possible when the only sequence information varied between the 
repeating- and random-sequences is the actual repeating sequence is especially 
encouraging as there seems little doubt that, in such situations, nothing other than 
sequence learning could produce the faster reaction times during learning, and the 
slowed reaction times after switching to a random sequence, that are seen in the SRT. 
 
 This notwithstanding is will be obviously from the preceding discussion that 
there are a number of contradictions and uncertainties within the SRT literature as 
regards the abilities of different neuropathological populations to perform the SRT. Of 
particular concern is the reliance on non-significant statistical test to conclude there is 
no difference between the various limbic systems amnesias and their control groups 
(see Chapter 3). Relying on a failure to reject the null hypothesis in order to 
demonstrate no difference between groups is a conceptually weak test of theory and 
particularly vulnerable to issues of insufficient statistical power. Specifically, if such a 
test has weak statistical power it will be insufficiently sensitive to small group 
differences and is therefore likely to make a type-II error (which, in this case, is 
incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis of there being a group difference).  
 
 There is also some uncertainty about precisely which neurological aetiologies 
produce spared or impaired SRT and the degree to which they spare, or impair, SRT 
performance. For these reasons, and those given above, the SRT literature would 
greatly benefit from an analytical review (i.e. a meta-analysis) that will combine related 
studies to provide greater test accuracy / sensitivity.  
 
 As well as concerns with the precise aetiological consequence for SRT 
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performance there is a reasonable amount of uncertainty as to precisely which neural 
substrate are responsible for non-declarative sequence learning. The neuroimaging 
studies discussed above lend only secondary support to the notion that non-
declarative sequence learning is dependent on basal ganglia structures. However, the 
general trend towards more ventral / sub-cortical structures in non-declarative 
sequence learning is consistent with the general thrust of the non-declarative / explicit 
memory hypothesis as regards the different substrates responsible for the two types of 
memory. Identification of the neural substrates responsible for non-declarative 
sequence learning, therefore, would benefit greatly for the an examination of the 
consequences for SRT performance of accurately sited and neuroanatomically 
restricted lesions.  
 
 The consequences of the concerns and criticisms discussed above suggest a 
very clear line of action. Firstly, a detailed examination of the human SRT literature in 
order to answer a number of questions raised by inconsistent results of various SRT 
studies. In particular the combination of SRT studies in order to allow the 
quantification of the literature, and in doing so increasing the sensitivity to group 
differences in SRT studies. This would allow the re-examination of various issues 
within the SRT literature as regards to the differing abilities of various aetiologies to 
perform the SRT, both in comparison with other neuropathological aetiologies and in 
comparison with healthy control subjects. The last point will allow a more sensitive test 
of the commonly held assumption that some limbic-system dependent amnesias spare 
SRT performance to the extent that subjects with these disorders perform the SRT in 
a control-like manner. As discussed above this assumption may be due more to the 
insensitivity of the methods used to test for a difference between limbic system 
amnesiacs and control subjects than anything else and a more sensitive test of the 
matter should help resolve the issue one way or the other. Furthermore, a 
quantification and the consequent re-analysis of the SRT literature should provide 
empirical support for the re-interpretation of existing SRT studies and for both the 
particular methodological approaches and theoretical directions of future research.  
Secondly, having gained a more accurate and detailed understanding of the 
nature and utility of the SRT task an obvious next step is to improve our understanding 
of the neural substrates responsible for non-declarative sequence learning. As 
discussed above determining the precise nature and extent of neural injury in human 
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subjects is difficult and leads to much of the uncertainty that surrounds the precise 
location and function of the various neural substrates that are responsible for SRT 
performance. In order to provide the degree of certainty about neural injury necessary 
to be able to discover the sites and mechanisms responsible for non-declarative 
sequence learning we must be able to specify both the precise location and extent of 
that injury, and lesion studies with animal subjects are the only practical option for 
doing that. Therefore, after the empirical quantification of the human SRT literature we 
will turn to a brief discussion of the animal literature relevant to the multiple-memory 
hypothesis in general, and non-declarative sequence learning in particular. Thereafter 
a series of experiments will be presented that, initially, were designed to develop an 
animal analogue of the human SRT and thereafter tested the behavioural 
consequences of various targeted neural lesions on animal SRT performance.  
 
 Therefore, the next chapter will present a power and meta-analytic review of 
the SRT literature. It is hoped that this review will allow us to draw definitive 
conclusions about what aetiologies are, and are not, impaired in the SRT. In order to 
answer this question we will firstly examine the relative abilities of neuropathological 
subjects to demonstrate an interference effect when switching from a repeating to a 
random sequence. Having done that we will then examine the performance of those 
same subjects relative to their controls in order to determined if some aetiologies (the 
limbic systems amnesias in particular) are capable of demonstrating control-like SRT 
performance as is sometimes claimed. 
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Chapter 3 
 
A Meta-Analysis of the Human SRT 
Literature 
 
General Introduction 
 
The previous chapter discussed the development of the SRT task and its utility 
as a measure of non-declarative memory, especially with respect to empirical attempts 
to dissociate different types of learning in neuropathological populations. A 
demonstration of the ability of the SRT to dissociate between patients with different 
neuropathologies in terms of spared / impaired memory is especially pertinent in light 
of the criticisms raised by Shanks and St. John about the use of amnesic subjects in 
memory research. While most of the criticisms raised by Shanks and St. John specific 
to the SRT task have since been addressed (e.g. Reber & Squire, 1998) these 
criticisms, and others, (see Curran, 1995; Jackson and Jackson, 1995,) illustrate the 
point that there are as yet unexplained variations and contradictions within the findings 
from the SRT literature. Not only do studies report different results between 
neuropathological aetiologies, as might be expected, but also within a given condition 
(e.g. Alzheimer’s Disease: Knopman & Nissen, 1987; Knopman, 1991; and Ferraro, 
Balota & Connor, 1993). 
 
Cursory examination of the detail of some of the human findings suggests that 
small to medium differences between patients and control groups may exist even 
when ‘non-significant’ differences are reported. Indeed there appears to be general 
concerns with respect to the statistical validity of many human SRT studies. For these 
reasons the current chapter provides a quantitative examination of the SRT literature. 
As detailed below, SRT studies often rely on failing to reject the null-hypothesis to 
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demonstrate the lack of a difference between groups under conditions of low statistical 
power. Incorrect use of the null-hypothesis, especially, in conditions of low power 
substantially increases the probability of making a type-II error. Thus individual studies 
in this field often provide a weak empirical basis for testing the abilities of 
neuropathological subjects to demonstrate an interference effect relative to their 
preceding repeating sequence behaviour and especially in comparison with control 
subjects. Given these concerns, a meta-analytic evaluation of the SRT literature is 
clearly warranted to complement the qualitative review provided in Chapter Two. 
 
Although the SRT task generates two measures of non-declarative sequence 
learning, the ‘learning’ and ‘interference’ effects, only the latter measure was used in 
the meta-analysis presented here. The reason for selecting the interference effect is 
that there is a clear consensus within the literature is that interference is the more 
valid and reliable measure of non-declarative learning (see Knopman & Nissen, 1987; 
Nissen & Bullemer, 1987; Reed & Johnson, 1994; Jackson & Jackson, 1995; and 
Reber & Squire 1998). Due to the amount of motor repetition necessary to perform a 
repetitive reaction time task the learning effect is unreliable as a test of non-
declarative sequence learning. During sequence learning it is usually impossible to 
separate mere motor skill improvement in reaction times due to practice effects from 
improvements in reaction times due to non-declarative sequence learning. The 
interference effect does not suffer from this problem. If a subject’s learning effect is 
solely due to motor skill improvement then the switch to a random sequence should 
have no effect on reaction times. On the other hand if the decrease in reaction times 
across repeating-sequence blocks is at least partially due to non-declarative sequence 
learning then switching to a random sequence should disrupt a subject’s ability to 
continue reacting at the same speed or accuracy as previously, the interference effect 
is hence a clear behavioural test of non-declarative sequence learning. 
 
Statistical power and the SRT 
There are two main concerns with SRT studies as regards statistical power. 
Firstly most SRT studies employ small sample sizes and therefore tend to have low 
power as a result. Secondly, many SRT studies rely on failing to reject the null 
hypothesis in order to demonstrate that the neuropathological patients are not 
impaired relative to control subjects. This is conceptually and empirically problematic 
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at the best of times, but in conditions of low power almost guarantees the commission 
of a type-II error (erroneously failing to reject the null-hypothesis). 
 
Statistical power is the probability that a test will report a significant difference if 
there is a real difference between groups. Thus a study has ‘high’ power when it is 
likely to (correctly) report a difference, and ‘low’ power when it is unlikely to do so. The 
commonly accepted level for adequate power is 80% (Cohen, 1988). Statistical power 
(often shortened to just ‘power’) is reliant on three factors: effect size, alpha level and 
sample size. The concept of effect size (ES) was initially developed by Glass (1976) 
and, while the specific denominator may vary, is usually conceptualised as an average 
difference between groups expressed in terms of their common variance. Effect sizes 
are thus independent of the specifics of a dependent variable (i.e. it expresses group 
differences on a standardised metric). 
 
The main use of estimating statistical power is firstly to help interpret non-
significant results and secondly to provide the researcher with reliable estimates of 
minimally acceptable parameters (i.e. sample sizes) in order to maximise the 
likelihood of reaching the correct conclusion. As most researchers are aware, a non-
significant result is more properly described as ‘inconclusive’ rather than ‘non-
significant’ and this distinction is particularly pertinent when a study has low power. A 
study with low power and a lack of significance is ambiguous as it could be due to 
either no difference between groups or due to the test being insufficiently sensitive to  
detect any difference between groups. Obviously, it is desirable to have high power in 
order to allow the researcher to differentiate between these possibilities. 
 
Given these concerns the meta-analysis includes a complementary power analysis. 
 
Effect Size, Power Analysis and Meta-Analysis 
Although Glass (1976) first developed the concept of an effect size the de facto 
standard for effect sizes are Cohen’s (1962) ‘small’, ‘medium’ and ‘large’ conventions, 
which provide the context for a power analysis. It is widely accepted that the norm for 
effect sizes in the behavioural sciences is in the small to medium range (Rossi, 1990; 
Sedlemeier & Gigerenzer, 1989). As a consequence, researchers will often fail to 
identify conceptually and theoretically significant differences due to their statistical 
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tests being insufficiently sensitive to small-to-moderate differences between groups. 
Furthermore, researchers may readily accept that there is no difference between 
groups (the null hypothesis) when this fits a particular theoretical point of view, instead 
of rigorously testing the research hypothesis with designs that achieve low Type-II 
error rates (perhaps 95% power; Cohen, 1988). 
 
The main advantage of a meta-analysis is the increase in statistical power as a 
result of the larger sample sizes gained by aggregating studies (Hedges and Olkin, 
1984). It also provides greater precision for the effect sizes of the studies included by 
calculating confidence intervals for their effect sizes. Now widely accepted in the 
behavioural sciences a meta-analysis has the advantage of reducing the likelihood of 
making a type-II error, increasing the probability of detecting small but theoretically 
important group differences, and enabling the researcher to distinguish between 
genuine non-significance and an inconclusive test result. 
 
A meta-analysis also enjoys other advantages, in particular it allows the 
researcher to explore the differences between effect sizes for meaningful causative 
factors. A researcher can test the validity of different moderators as reliable predictors 
of behaviour and estimate how much variance in the set of effect sizes can be 
attributed to sampling error. While small amounts of variance can safely be ignored 
(Hunter & Schmidt, 1990) larger amounts cannot, but instead allow for the possibility 
of identifying the causes of this variance. Identifying causes of variation within a set of 
effect sizes has two benefits: it removes the need for additional exploratory studies to 
test moderators identified as important (although confirmatory studies may well be 
warranted) and it provides strong empirical support for possible directions in future 
research. 
 
This chapter will test the ability of subjects with a variety of neuropathologies to 
perform the SRT by using statistical power and meta-analyses. Two main questions 
addressed by these SRT studies will be analysed separately. Part 1 evaluates the 
degree to which patients with a given neuropathological condition demonstrate SRT 
learning in terms of the strength of their interference effect when switched from a 
repeating to a random sequence. Part 2 is perhaps more critical as it will examine the 
behaviour of neuropathological subjects relative to control subjects and address the 
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issue of the size of any difference in the interference effect between neuropathological 
and control groups. Both sections will initially present a statistical power analyses 
designed to determine the typical power associated with current SRT studies. 
Thereafter a meta-analysis of each set of data will be presented in order to provide a 
quantitative estimate of the magnitude of the interference effects. Each meta-analysis 
will also include moderator analyses designed to identify possible sources of variation 
between the studies. 
 
In summary, neuropathological populations in general have larger effect sizes 
(i.e. greater deficits) than normal subjects, but researchers often use very small 
sample sizes (for perfectly understandable reasons, i.e. the relative lack of availability 
of aetiologically ‘pure’ subjects). Therefore neuropathological studies tend to have low 
statistical power. As a result clinically and / or theoretically significant differences may 
go unreported due to insufficiently sensitive tests. Furthermore, relying a failure to 
reject the null hypothesis is always of concern and this approach is particular troubling 
in the context of SRT studies for these reasons (i.e. because SRT studies typically 
employ small sample sizes, see Tables 3A.3, and 3A. 4 in the appendix to this 
chapter). Increasing the power the between-group tests of by combining SRT studies 
in a meta-analysis addresses these issues by increasing the sensitivity and reliability 
of the tests and therefore increasing the likelihood of reaching correct conclusions. 
 
Aggregating SRT Studies 
As well as studies being grouped by individual aetiology in the meta-analysis 
(i.e. all AD studies are grouped together) they were also grouped according meta-
aetiological category. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 damage to the limbic system 
(i.e. the extended hippocampal formation and the temporal lobes) results in an 
impairment on tasks that primarily measure declarative memory, but not on tasks that 
primarily measure non-declarative memory (i.e. subjects with limbic system amnesia 
should not be impaired on the SRT). Conversely damage to the basal ganglia (in 
particular the caudate nucleus) produces an impairment on some non-declarative 
memory tasks (i.e. the SRT task), but not an declarative memory tasks. For this 
reason studies were grouped into meta-aetiological categories according to their 
limbic system neuropathological or basal ganglia neuropathological (LSN or BGN, 
respectively) status. Furthermore, while the main interest was the BGN / LSN 
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distinction a third meta-aetiological category ‘other neuropathologies’ (ON) was 
included for comparison with the BGN and LSN meta-categories. The ON group 
consisted of SRT studies with any neuropathological populations other than those with 
LSN or BGN dependent disorders, and included subjects with generalised closed-
head traumatic brain injury (TBI), pre-Frontal Cortex (pFC) injury due to diffuse 
phenomena (ischemic episodes, tumours etc.) and cerebellar lesions (Cb). 
 
As the multiple-memory literature typically focuses on LSN and / or BGN injury 
in order to demonstrate a double dissociation between neural substrate and memory 
task it therefore makes few predictions about the abilities of ON subjects to perform 
the SRT. However, given that some authors have suggested a role for the cerebellar 
in (non-declarative memory dependent) motor skill learning (Layforce and Doyon, 
2001; Doyon et al, 1998; Wickelgren, 1998; Salmon and Butter, 1995) and that SRT 
performance may require other cognitive abilities than just non-declarative memory 
(e.g. attention, see Jackson & Jackson, 1995; and Pascual-Leone et al 1995, in 
Grafman, Holyoak, and Boller, 1995) which are often disturbed by head injury, one 
might expect that ON subjects will display at least a mild SRT impairment. 
 
While the meta-aetiological analysis will provide the opportunity to test the more 
general neurological hypothesis that LSN, BGN and ON subjects will demonstrate 
differing abilities to perform the SRT, it is also possible to perform an analysis of 
individual aetiologies. This will enable us to examine the possibilities that individual 
aetiologies (e.g. Alzheimer’s disease) may not produce consistent results within a 
meta-aetiological category, and individual aetiologies may produce different results 
between meta-aetiological categories even if the meta-aetiological categories 
themselves do not differ (i.e. while the LSN and BGN meta-aetiological groups, for 
example, may not differ, patients with AD and PD may yet differ). Fortunately the SRT 
literature falls fairly easily into five primary individual aetiologies and (less easily) into 
three secondary / composite aetiologies. The five primary aetiologies are: Alzheimer’s 
disease (AD), Mixed Amnesia (MA), Korsakoff’s Syndrome (KS), Parkinson’s disease 
(PD) and Huntington’s disease (HD). The first three of these neurological disorders 
make up the LSN meta-aetiological category, and the last two the BGN meta-
aetiological category. The three additional aetiologies (which make up the ‘ON’ meta-
aetiological category) are: pre-Frontal cortex injury, cerebellar lesions and generalised 
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traumatic brain injury. Although there is only one cerebellar and one pFC SRT study 
currently published it was felt that these aetiologies are sufficiently different to warrant 
their inclusion as separate entities within the ON meta-category. 
 
Method 
Selection of Studies 
A literature search was conducted using two on-line databases: PubMed 
(previously MEDLINE) and PsycINFO (previously PsycLIT; unpublished studies were 
not included in the meta-analysis). The keywords and key-phrases used in the search 
were: serial, reaction, SRT and serial reaction time. All articles written in English and 
published from 1987 were considered, excluding any animal studies (largely 
comprising the rat 5-choice SRT in use during this period). Reference lists of obtained 
articles were also examined for relevant studies. Importantly, selected studies all had 
to include the use of a repeating sequence which was replaced by a random 
sequence at some point. In total 25 articles were located. Two studies were removed 
for failing to include a switch from a repeating to a random sequence (Doyon, et al, 
1997; and Doyon, et al, 1998). Three studies were removed as they were purely 
methodological manipulations (e.g. sequence length variations, dual-task conditions 
etc.) and did not include any neuropathological group (Hoffman and Koch, 1997; 
Stadler and Neely, 1997; Zhuang, Warzeri, Gerloff and Hallett, 1998). Finally three 
studies were removed due to the neurological condition being a temporary product of 
experimental manipulation (Knopman, 1991b; Nissen, Knopman and Schacter, 1987; 
Pascual-Leone et al, 1996). Thus 17 articles were retained for analysis, from which 22 
effect sizes were generated. 
 
Calculation of Effect Sizes 
Effect sizes were calculated using Johnson’s ‘D-STAT’ program (version 1.11, 
1995; see manual for formulae). Where the relevant means and standard deviations 
were not supplied in a target article, effect sizes were estimated from other information 
provided such as means, p, t, r or F values, or figures showing means. In the case of 
means and mean values estimated from figures the D-STAT enables one to work back 
from related test statistics to generate an estimate of the appropriate variation of the 
means (i.e. standard deviation of the difference scores). Unless otherwise stated 
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individual effect sizes generated from the studies are presented as raw-d (g) values 
whereas the mean effect sizes used in the meta-analysis are presented as d-values 
(i.e. corrected for sample size). We were also fortunate enough to be given original 
data from two authors (Beldarrain, 1999; and Curran, 1997) to assist in calculating 
effect sizes. 
 
In Part 1 of the analysis an effect size had a positive sign when the neurological 
group displayed a reaction time increase after switching to a random sequence from a 
repeating sequence. Thus a non-significant or negative effect size in this analysis 
indicates a lack of an interference effect and thus an inability to demonstrate SRT-
learning. 
 
In Part 2 an effect size had a positive sign when the control group had a greater 
/ stronger interference effect than the neurological group and a significant positive 
effect size indicates that the neuropathological group cannot be said to perform the 
SRT in a manner similar to its control group. 
 
Where a study yielded more than one effect size from the same subjects the 
effect sizes were aggregated to obtain a representative effect size. If a study yielded 
more than one effect size obtained from separate sets of subjects these effects were 
include in the meta-analysis as individual effect sizes (per Hedges and Olkin, 1984). 
 
Coding of Study Characteristics 
The moderator variables coded were5: 
A) Aetiological Meta-Category: Subjects were grouped into either Limbic System 
Neuropathology (LSN), i.e. early AD, Mixed Amnesia, & KS; or Basal ganglia 
Neuropathology (BGN), i.e. PD & HD; or Other Neuropathology (ON), i.e. 
frontal damage, non-specific traumatic brain injury and cerebellar lesion. 
B) Individual Etiology, coded as: 
Alzheimer’s Disease 
Non-Specific Amnesia 
Korsakoff’s Syndrome 
Parkinson’s Disease 
Huntington’s Disease 
                                                 
5 A number of other moderator variables were coded, e.g. repeating-sequence length (8, 10 or 12-trials) 
but their analyses were not relevant to the main concerns of the meta-analysis and are not reported. 
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Cerebellar Injury 
Pre-Frontal Cortex Injury 
Traumatic brain injury 
C) Severity of Dementia: non-dementing, very mildly dementing, mildly dementing. 
D) Degree of Explicit knowledge: the degree of explicit knowledge of the repeating 
sequence shown by the neurological and control subjects. Subjects were 
classified as have ‘no’, ‘some’ or ‘good’ explicit sequence knowledge6. 
E) Age: subjects were classified as being 65-and-under versus over 65. 
F) Raw or Log reaction times: whether or not the reaction time data was log-
transformed. 
G) Random Sequence Style: Per the discussion in Chapter 2 some studies 
employed random sequences that simply disallowed immediate stimulus 
repetition and / or an equal frequency of stimulus representations throughout a 
random block. Studies employing either (or both of) these techniques were 
classified as ‘unconstrained’ by virtue of their failure to address any variation in 
other statistical features between the repeating and random sequences.  
Whereas those studies that controlled for all statistical information except actual 
sequence information between repeating and random sequences were 
characterised as ‘constrained’. 
 
Coding and method of effect size calculation were first determined independently 
by the author and supervisor and any disagreements were discussed and consensus 
agreement reached. See Table 3A.1 in the appendix to this chapter for coding values 
for each study used in the meta-analysis. 
 
Power Analyses 
Statistical power for each study was calculated for small, medium and large 
effect sizes as defined by Cohen’s (1988) conventions and mean, median, SD and  
minimum / maximum power calculated. In light of Pascual-Leone et al’s (1993) 
cerebellar subjects and Stefanova et al’s (2000) PD subjects who were incapable of 
demonstrating any interference effect it seems likely that some subjects will have very 
large effect sizes (i.e. be seriously, or even totally, impaired). Furthermore, preliminary 
data from the rat-SRT (see Chapters 6 and 7) revealed that non-lesioned rats typically 
produced very large effect sizes when switching from a repeating to a random 
                                                 
6 Those studies which did not report this were coded with a missing value score. 
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sequence (i.e. d>1.0). As a result a ‘very-large’ effect size category was included in 
the power analysis (set at d=1.2) in order to examine what sort of power the human 
studies would have enjoyed if they too are testing for effect sizes in this range. 
 
Statistical power was calculated using the Power & Precision (National Institute 
of Mental Health) software package. For Part 1 appropriate values for alpha (5%), 
effect size and the neurological group N were entered for a two-tailed paired t-test 
assuming zero difference (SD of the difference was set to 1) and power calculated. 
For Part 2 appropriate values for alpha (5%), effect size and neurological and control 
group Ns for a two-tailed t-test of means (difference scores) were entered and power 
calculated. 
 
File-Drawer Analysis 
 
It is generally acknowledged that those studies with a significant result are 
more likely to be published and therefore there is a bias towards such studies in the 
literature. This potential confound is known as the ‘file-drawer problem’. Hedges and 
Olkin (1984) describe a method for calculating the number of unpublished studies 
needed to invalidate any finding of significance (i.e. reduce the combined effect size to 
a level of non-significance): 
 
ko=k(d-dc)/dc 
 
Where ko is the number of unpublished studies required to invalidate the finding, k=the 
number of studies included in the meta-analysis, d=the mean effect size, and dc=an 
estimate of a trivial or non-significant effect size (set at 0.2 per Cohen, 1969). Note: 
This analysis is relevant to significant findings only and is not reported for non-
significant results. 
 
Meta-Analysis 
Each meta-analysis is presented in three parts: overall analysis, moderator 
analyses and individual subset analyses. 
 
The overall analysis simply analyses all effect sizes as a single group of 
studies, having no regard for individual study characteristics (aetiology, subject’s age 
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etc.). Thus the mean effect size of this analysis provides a measure of performance 
for the entire population of effect sizes. Of particular interest in this analysis is the test 
of the model (QB) statistic which indicates whether or not the effect sizes differ. 
Obviously if the effect sizes do differ then this allows the possibility that one or more 
categorisations / moderators will be able to account for much of the variance and in 
doing so identify possible causative factors of variable SRT performance. 
 
A moderator analysis is concerned with the ‘Test of the Model’ (‘QB’) statistic 
and attempts to explain the variation present between groups of effect sizes by virtue 
of a particular factor (e.g. age). Thus a significant moderator statistic (‘QB’) indicates 
that the various groups that go up to make the analysis (e.g. 65 years and under 
versus over 65 years) are significantly different from one-another. A moderator 
analysis is therefore the functional equivalent of a independent measures t-test or a 1-
way ANOVA. The homogeneity statistic (‘Qw’) for a moderator analysis tests whether 
or not the individual effect sizes, when collapsed together, are homogenous and it is 
expected that effect sizes will typically be heterogeneous within a group. This is 
because if a group is homogenous then there is no variance between effect sizes 
which can be explained by a moderator variable and therefore there is nothing to 
analyse. The Qw test for moderator analyses is significant (i.e. the hypothesis of 
homogeneity is rejected) unless otherwise stated and will not be reported except in 
rare occasions where it is theoretically / conceptually appropriate to do so. 
 
In contrast individual subset analyses are solely concerned with one group of a 
moderator analysis (e.g. subjects under 65 years) and whether or not the mean effect 
size for that group is significantly different from zero. The values of interest in such an 
analysis are: the mean effect size (ES), r & p-values. In Part 1 of the analysis 
significant subset effect sizes and r-values indicates that the group of 
neuropathological patients has an interference effect that is significantly greater than 
zero, whereas in Part 2 they indicate that the group has a significantly weaker 
interference effect than controls. The QB & p values of a subset analysis are 
concerned with whether or not the group is homogenous. A non-significant QB effect 
can be taken as confirming the group categorisation as valid and appropriate (i.e. 
irreducible), whereas a significant QB value indicates there is considerable variation in 
the effect sizes that make up the group and therefore further testing and / or 
subdivision of that group is warranted. However QB tests of homogeneity for subset 
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analyses will only be reported if appropriate. 
 
All parts of the analysis will report file-drawer analyses (k0) where appropriate 
(i.e. where a test is significant) but these will only be discussed when it is theoretically 
/ conceptually relevant to do so. 
 
Thus the results of the analyses for both parts will be reported in the following format: 
1) Analysis of the Distribution of Effect Sizes 
2) Power Analysis 
3) Overall Meta-analysis result 
4) Analysis of the first moderator variable 
a. Subset analysis of the first group of the first moderator variable 
b. Subset analysis of the second group of the first moderator 
variable….. 
N. Subset analysis of the Nth group of the first moderator variable 
5) Analysis of the second moderator variable 
a. Subset analysis of the first group of the second moderator variable 
b. Subset analysis of the second group of the second moderator 
variable….. 
N. Subset analysis of the Nth group of the second moderator variable… 
N) Analysis of the Nth moderator variable 
a. Subset analysis of the first group of the Nth moderator variable 
b. Subset analysis of the second group of the Nth moderator variable 
….. 
N. Subset analysis of the Nth group of the Nth moderator variable 
 
Note: while it is possible to perform post-hoc comparisons between individual groups 
using χ2 analyses such testing relies upon the premises of standard probability tests 
and thus reintroduces the very risks meta-analysis is designed to avoid. In the 
introduction to their 1984 book on meta-analysis Hedges and Olkin conclude “the use 
of conventional statistical procedures for the analysis of effect sizes….. cannot be 
justified on either statistical or conceptual grounds”. Therefore post hoc analysis of 
meta-analytic results will be restricted to descriptive concerns. However, confidence 
intervals will be reported for all effect sizes which does allow an examination of 
whether they (confidence intervals) overlap or not. Effect sizes with non-overlapping 
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confidence intervals are likely to be significantly different from each other. 
 
Results and Discussions 
Analysis of Part 1 
This analysis addresses the question of whether or not the various neurological 
groups are capable of demonstrating a reliable (within-subject) interference effect 
when switching from a repeating to a random sequence. 
 
Analysis of the Distribution of Effect Sizes 
A total of 22 effect sizes were calculated from 17 studies and are presented in 
Table. 3.1 using Tukey’s stem-and-leaf display. Across ‘all aetiologies’ this display 
reveals a moderately normal distribution with a fairly long upper tail, and outliers at 
both ends of the range. Analysis of the distribution of effect sizes in Statistica (StatSoft 
Inc. Tulsa, USA) reveals that the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality is not 
significant (p > 0.2) and therefore the effect sizes are normally distributed. 
 
Examination of the distribution of effect sizes for the three 
meta-aetiological categories reveals that the limbic system 
neuropathology group is reasonably evenly distributed 
throughout the small to very-large range with an extreme, upper-
range, outlier. The basal ganglia neuropathology group also has 
an upper range outlier but otherwise have a more restricted 
distribution of effect sizes with peaks in both the small and 
medium ranges (i.e. is bimodal). In contrast the other 
neuropathology group includes effect sizes that spread from a 
small negative effect size through to a large positive effect size. 
The conclusions we can draw from this is firstly that while 54% 
of aetiologies generate effect sizes in the small to large range 
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36% produce larger effect sizes and 10%  produce negative 
effect sizes. Secondly, that both the LSN and ON groups are 
variable within themselves, whereas the BGN group has more 
uniform effect sizes (bar one outlier). Both the pattern of effect 
sizes within the ‘all aetiologies’ section, and the differences 
between the distributions of the different meta-aetiological 
categories suggest there is considerable variation of effect sizes 
between studies and we can therefore expect this variability may 
be explained by one or more moderator variables. 
 
Table 3.1, Stem-and-leaf display of 22 effect sizes for Part 1: Interference Effects 
for Neuropathological Subjects Only 
ES Range All aetiologies 
Limbic system 
neuropathology 
Basal Ganglia 
neuropathology 
‘Other’ 
neuropathology 
-0.2 to –0.1 -0. 12   -0. 12 
-0 to 0.1 -    
0.2 to 0.3 0. 2333 0. 3 0. 233  
0.4 to 0.5 0. 54  0. 4 0. 5 
0.6 to 0.7 0. 667777 0. 677 0. 677  
0.8 to 0.9 0. 99 0. 9  0. 9 
1.0 to 1.1 1. 00 1. 00   
1.2 to 1.3 1. 33 1. 33   
1.4 to 1.5 1. 4  1. 4  
1.6 to 1.7 -    
1.8 to 1.9 -    
2.0 to 2.1 2. 1 2. 1   
Total # of effect 
sizes 
22 10 8 4 
Average 
effect size 0.56 0.78 0.51 0.17 
 
Power Analysis for Part 1 
Table 3.2 summarises the results of the statistical power analysis for Part 1 based on 22 power calculations. For a small effect size none 
of the studies reached the minimal power threshold (80%), and only 2 of 22, and 11 of 22, studies reached this threshold for the medium 
and large effect sizes, respectively. In contrast 20 of 22 studies had sufficient power when assuming a ‘very large’ effect size. Thus 
although most studies had sufficient power to detect very large effect sizes, Table 3.1 suggests that only a medium to large effect size is 
to be expected in most cases and therefore most studies typically have insufficient power to demonstrate any effect. 
 
Table 3.3 breaks the power analysis down by meta-aetiological category. What is immediately clear is that limbic system neuropathology 
tends to have less power than the other groups at each effect size. Although both basal ganglia, and ‘other’, neuropathologies studies 
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attain (near) adequate power with a ‘large’ effect size the limbic system neuropathology studies do not attain this power until we assume 
a ‘very-large’ effect size. Furthermore, although the basal ganglia neuropathology has slightly weaker power than the group labelled 
“other neuropathology” this difference is less pronounced. 
 
Table 3.2. Summary Statistics for the Statistical Power Analysis for Part 1 (all power 
values expressed as a percentage). 
  ←       Theoretical Significance       → 
   ←Clinical Significance→ 
Effect Size Small 
(d=0.2) 
Medium 
(d=0.5) 
Large 
(d=0.8) 
Very Large 
(d=1.2) 
Mean Power 11.7 43.8 74.3 92.7 
Median Power 10 38 75 98 
Standard Deviation 4.4 20.3 21.1 12.4 
Minimum Power 6 14 28 53 
Maximum Power 23 86 100 100 
# of studies (of 22) with greater than 80% Power 0 2 11 20 
N required for 80% Power : paired t-test (2-tail) 199 34 15 8 
 
Table 3.3. Breakdown of the Statistical Power Analysis for Part 1 by Meta-Aetiological 
Category (all power values expressed as a percentage) 
  
 ←       Theoretical Significance       → 
   ←Clinical Significance→ 
Effect Size 
Average (SD) # of 
Neuropathological 
subjects in Meta-
Analysis Small 
(d=0.2) 
Medium 
(d=0.5) 
Large 
(d=0.8) 
Very Large 
(d=1.2) 
Mean (and SD) Power for Limbic system 
neuropathology 15 (10) 11 (5) 39 (24) 69 (27) 86 (16) 
Mean (and SD) Power for Basal Ganglia 
neuropathology 17 (9) 12 (5) 46 (18) 79 (12) 98 (2) 
Mean (and SD) Power for ‘Other’ 
neuropathology 18 (6) 13 (3) 51 (14) 86 (12) 99 (2) 
Mean (and SD) Power for the Overall Meta-
Analysis 16 (9) 11.7 (5) 43.8 (20) 74.4 (20) 92.3 (13) 
 
 
The finding that most SRT studies have effect sizes in the medium to large 
range and yet have less than adequate power at anything but a very-large effect size 
(Table 3.3) is important. This finding clearly indicates that the SRT literature will 
benefit from the increased power of a meta-analysis. What is also interesting is that 
the group that contains subjects which are sometimes described as not different to 
controls (the LSN group) has the lowest average power at all the different effect sizes. 
This is probably because LSN studies have smaller sample sizes (LSN average N = 
14.6 (SD=9.9)) than the other meta-aetiological groups (BGN average N = 17(9.4), 
and ON average N = 18.3(5.7)) and have higher within-group variability than the other 
meta-aetiological groups at all effect sizes (see Table 3.3). 
 
Meta-Analysis for Part 1 
A point-and-whisker plot of the overall meta-analytic result, all 22 effects sizes 
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that go up to make the meta-analysis, and mean effect sizes for the three meta-
aetiological groupings, is presented in Fig. 3.1. A list of all effect sizes and 95%CIs for 
each figure in this section is provided in Table 3A.5 in the appendix to this chapter. 
 
1) Overall Meta-Analysis Result 
As can be seen from Table 3.4 the overall meta-analysis for Part 1 generates a 
highly significant mean effect size of d=0.56, with a 95% confidence interval that is 
well above zero (0.41 to 0.72). Thus, as a whole, the neurological subjects included in 
the analysis show a robust interference effect. However, the test of the model result 
(QB(21)=30.4) is marginally non-significant (p=0.084). While strictly speaking the 22 
effect sizes are homogenous, the marginality of the result raises the possibility that 
there is some variation within the overall set of effect sizes which might be explained 
by moderator analyses. Some  moderator analyses are appropriate in any case given 
the clinical and theoretical considerations under scrutiny. 
 
Table 3.4, Overall Meta-Analytic Result 
 k d,  95% CI & r p QB; Test of the Model k0 
Overall Meta-Analysis: 
Part 1 22 0.56, 0.41 to 0.72, 0.27 p<0.0001 Q(21)=30.4, p=0.084 40 
 
2) Aetiological Meta-Category Moderator and Subset Analyses. 
The moderator analysis of meta-aetiology concludes there is a significant 
difference between the three groups (Q(2)=8.1, p<0.025). An examination of the mean 
effect sizes for the each of the three groups clearly shows that the mean effect size for 
the ON group is substantially lower than both the LSN and BGN groups (ON d=0.17; 
LSN d=0.78; and BGN d=0.51). Furthermore, the confidence intervals for the LSN and 
ON groups do not overlap, so it seems very likely that ON subjects have a significantly 
weaker effect size than LSN subjects. However, as the confidence interval of the BGN 
group overlaps both the LSN and the ON confidence intervals the distinction between 
these groups is less clear. The file-drawer analysis for the LSN and BGN groups 
reveals that the LSN group in particular requires a large number of unpublished 
studies to invalidate the significant finding (k0=29) and that a reasonably large number 
of unpublished studies is required to invalidate the significant finding for the BGN 
group (k0=12). 
 
Table 3.5, Aetiological Meta-Category Moderator and Subset Analyses. 
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Moderator Analyses # 
Subjects 
# 
effe
ct 
size 
d, 95% CI & r QB; Test of the Model k0 
Aetiological Meta-Category 345 20 0.56, 0.41 to 0.72, 0.27 QB(2)=8.1, p<0.025 40 
Subset Analysis # 
Subjects 
# 
Studies 
# effect 
sizes 
Mean effect size, 95% 
CI & r p k0 
Limbic System 
Neuropathology (LSN) 148 9 10 0.78, 0.54 to 1.02, 0.36 p<0.001 29 
Basal Ganglia 
Neuropathology (BGN) 136 8 8 0.51, 0.27 to 0.75, 0.25 p<0.001 12 
Other Neuropathology (ON) 61 3 4 0.17, -0.19 to 0.53, 0.08 p=0.36 n/a 
 
The subset analyses for this moderator variable tests if each independent 
group is different to zero. Subjects with limbic system dependent neuropathology 
demonstrate a large and significant interference effect (d=0.78, 95% CI = 0.54 to 1.02; 
p<0.001; see table 3.5). Similarly, subjects in the BGN meta-category generated a 
significant mean effect size (d=0.51, 95% CI = 0.27 to 0.75; p<0.001). However, in 
contrast, the ON group demonstrate no interference effect as their effect size, while 
positive, is not different to zero (d=0.17,  95% CI = -0.19 to 0.53; p=0.36) and thus 
display impaired SRT performance. 
 
3) Individual Aetiological Moderator and Subset Analyses 
The moderator analysis for individual aetiology (see Table 3.6) reveals there are also 
significant differences between specific neuropathological groups (QB(7)=17.7, 
p<0.025). The confidence intervals generated by pre-Frontal cortex injury subjects do 
not overlap with those of mixed amnesic and KS subjects and thus the pFC group is 
likely impaired relative to these two groups. (The effect sizes for individual aetiologies 
are discussed below). 
 
Furthermore, while the MA, KS and PD file-drawer analyses reveal these 
results are robust (k0=16, 12 & 10, respectively) the analyses for AD and TBI subjects 
demonstrated that these results need relatively few unpublished non-significant 
studies (k0=7 & 5, respectively) to invalidate them. 
 
In order to gain a better understanding of the differences between individual 
aetiologies moderator analyses were computed within each meta-aetiological 
category. The moderator analysis for the LSN meta-category (see Table 3.7) was 
marginally non-significant (QB(2)=1.8, p=0.09) and therefore there is no clear 
difference between the three constituent groups of the LSN meta-category. This is 
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supported by the fact that while the KS subjects have a numerically much higher effect 
size than AD subjects (AD d=0.57, KS d=1.36) confidence intervals for all three 
groups overlapped and thus there is no basis to assume they are different. 
 
Table 3.6, Aetiology Moderator and Subset Analyses. 
Moderator Analyses # 
Subjects 
# 
effe
ct 
size
s 
d, 95% CI & r QB; Test of the Model k0 
Individual Aetiology 345 22 0.56, 0.41 to 0.72,  0.27 QB(7)=17.7, p<0.025 40 
Aetiological Subset 
Analyses 
# 
Subjects 
# 
Studies 
# 
effect 
sizes 
Mean effect size, 95% 
CI & r p k0 
Alzheimer’s Disease 81 3 4 0.57, 0.25 to 0.88, 0.27 p<0.001 7 
Mixed Amnesia 54 4 4 1.01, 0.61 to 1.41, 0.45 p<0.001 16 
Korsakoff’s Syndrome 13 2 2 1.36, 0.51 to 2.22, 0.56 p<0.005 12 
Parkinson’s Disease 111 6 6 0.54, 0.27 to 0.81, 0.26 p<0.001 10 
Huntington’s Disease 25 2 2 0.39, -0.19 to 0.95, 0.19 p=0.18 n/a 
Cerebellar Injury 15 1 1 -0.07, -0.79 to 0.64, 0.08 p=0.85 n/a 
Traumatic Brain Injury 24 1 2 0.66, 0.08 to 1.25, 0.31 p<0.05 5 
Pre-Frontal Cortex Injury 22 1 1 -0.18, -0.77 to 0.41, -0.09 p=0.56 n/a 
 
Table 3.7, Aetiology Moderator and Subset Analyses for LSN subjects only. 
Moderator Analyses # 
Subjects 
# effect 
sizes d, 95% CI & r 
QB; Test of the 
Model k0 
LSN Aetiological Moderator 
Analysis 148 10 0.78, 0.25 to 0.88, 0.27 QB(2)=4.8, p=0.09 29 
Aetiological Subset 
Analyses 
# 
Subjects 
# 
Studies 
# effect 
sizes 
Mean effect size, 95% 
CI & r p k0 
Alzheimer’s Disease 81 3 4 0.57, 0.25 to 0.88, 0.27 p<0.001 7 
Mixed Amnesia 54 4 4 1.01, 0.61 to 1.41, 0.45 p<0.001 16 
Korsakoff’s Syndrome 13 2 2 1.36, 0.51 to 2.22, 0.56 p<0.005 12 
 
Although it is not possible to discuss any differences between groups when the test of 
the model statistic (QB) is not significant it is possible to analyse the individual 
aetiological groups based on the fact that they are clinically distinct groups. The 
subset analysis for the three aetiologies that go to make up the LSN meta-category 
(Alzheimer’s disease (AD), Mixed Amnesia (MA), and Korsakoff’s Syndrome (KS) 
revealed all mean effect sizes were significantly different from zero and therefore 
subjects with these aetiologies demonstrate a reliable interference effect when 
switching from a repeating to a random sequence (AD d=0.57, 95% CI = 0.25 to 0.88, 
p<0.001; mixed amnesia d=1.01, 95% CI = 0.61 to 1.41, p<0.001; and KS d=1.36, 
95% confidence interval0.51 to 2.22, p<0.005). 
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The moderator analyses for the BGN and ON meta-categories (Tables 3.8 & 3.9, 
respectively) were not significant (BGN QB(1)=0.22, p=0.64; ON QB(2)=5.38, p=0.1), 
with the confidence intervals for the constituent groups showing considerable overlap. 
 
Table 3.8, Aetiology Moderator and Subset Analyses for BGN subjects only. 
Moderator Analyses # 
Subjects 
# effect 
sizes d, 95% CI & r 
QB; Test of the 
Model k0 
BGN Aetiological Moderator 
Analysis 136 8 0.51, 0.27 to 0.75, 0.25 QB(1)=0.2, p=0.64 n/a 
Aetiological Subset 
Analyses 
# 
Subjects 
# 
Studies 
# effect 
sizes 
Mean effect size, 95% 
CI & r p k0 
Parkinson’s Disease 111 6 6 0.54, 0.27 to 0.81, 0.26 p<0.001 10 
Huntington’s Disease 25 2 2 0.39, -0.19 to 0.95, 0.19 p=0.18 n/a 
 
While it is not possible therefore to talk in terms of group differences it is 
possible to analyse the constituent aetiological groups separately from each other 
because they too are clinically distinct groups. The PD subjects mean effect size is 
significantly different to zero (d=0.54, 95% CI = 0.27 to 0.81, p<0.001) whereas the 
mean effect size for HD subjects is not (d=0.39, 95% CI = -0.19 to 0.64, p=0.18). Thus 
while PD subjects demonstrate a reliable interference effect there is an indication that 
HD subjects demonstrate impaired SRT behaviour. 
 
Table 3.9, Aetiology Moderator and Subset Analyses for ON subjects only. 
Moderator Analyses # 
Subjects 
# effect 
sizes d, 95% CI & r 
QB; Test of the 
Model k0 
ON Aetiological Moderator 
Analysis 8 4 0.17, -0.19 to 0.53, 0.09 QB(2)=5.38, p=0.1 n/a 
Aetiological Subset 
Analyses 
# 
Subjects 
# 
Studies 
# 
effect 
sizes 
Mean effect size, 95% 
CI & r p k0 
Cerebellar Injury 15 1 1 -0.07, -0.79 to 0.64, 0.08 p=0.85 n/a 
Traumatic Brain Injury 24 1 2 0.66, 0.08 to 1.25, 0.31 p<0.05 5 
Pre-Frontal Cortex Injury 22 1 1 -0.18, -0.77 to 0.41, -0.09 p=0.56 n/a 
 
As the test of the model for the ON meta-aetiology was no significant we can 
only consider these results in terms of individual groups and not in terms of between-
group differences. The subset analysis of the constituent ON groups (Table 3.9) 
reveals that both the cerebellar injury (Cb) and the pre-Frontal cortex (pFC) injury 
patients were not different from zero (Cb d=-0.07, 95% confidence interval = -0.79 to 
0.64, p=0.85; and pFC d=-0.18, 95% confidence interval = -0.77 to 0.41, p=0.56) and 
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were thus impaired on the SRT. In contrast the traumatic brain injury (TBI) patients 
were significantly different to zero (d=0.66, 0.08 to 1.25, p<0.05) and thus 
demonstrated a robust interference effect. 
 
4) Severity of Dementia Subset and Moderator Analyses 
This moderator analysis compared three groups of effect sizes (‘not 
dementing’, ‘very mildly dementing’, and ‘mildly dementing’) which were based on the 
neuropathological subject’s dementia status (see Fig. 3.2). Although the effect size for 
mildly dementing subjects was somewhat weaker than that for both non-dementing 
and very-mildly dementing subjects (d=0.45 vs. d=0.58 & d=0.6 respectively), the 
moderator analysis was not significant (QB(2)=0.4, p=0.82, see Table 3.10 and Fig. 
3.2). 
 
We also conducted a moderator analysis for the dementing groups only across 
studies (see Table 3.10) which was also not significant (QB(1)=0.3, p=0.59). Therefore 
severity of dementia, up to mildly dementing status, is not a reliable predictor of a 
subjects’ ability to demonstrate a (within-subject) interference effect. 
 
Table 3.10, Moderator and Subset Analyses for the Severity of Dementia. 
Moderator Analyses # 
Subjects 
# effect 
sizes d, 95% CI & r 
QB; Test of the 
Model k0 
Severity of Dementia 
Moderator Analysis 345 22 0.56, 0.41 to 0.72, 0.27 QB(2)=0.4, p=0.82 35 
Dementia Subset Analyses # 
Subjects 
# 
Studies 
# effect 
sizes 
Mean effect size, 
95% CI & r 
p k0 
Non-Dementing Subjects 239 14 16 0.58, 0.39 to 0.76, 0.28 p<0.001 30 
Very Mildly Dementing 
Subjects 51 3 3 0.6, 0.21 to 1.0, 0.29 p<0.005 6 
Mildly Dementing Subjects 55 3 3 0.45, 0.07 to 0.83, 0.22 p<0.025 4 
Moderator Analyses # 
Subjects 
# effect 
sizes d, 95% CI & r 
QB; Test of the 
Model 
k0 
Severity of Dementia 
Moderator Analysis for 
Dementing Subjects only 
106 6 0.52, 0.25 to 0.8, 0.25 QB(1)=0.3, p=0.59 10 
 
Subset analysis of the individual dementing groups revealed that the effect 
sizes for all three groups were significantly different from zero (non-dementing d=0.58, 
95% CI = 0.39 to 0.76, p<0.001; very-mildly dementing d=0.6, 95% CI = 0.21 to 1.0, 
p<0.005; mildly dementing d=0.45, 95% confidence interval = 0.007 to 0.83, p<0.025). 
However, the results for both dementing groups are somewhat weakened by the fact 
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that relatively few non-significant studies are required to invalidate these findings (k0=6 
& 4, respectively). 
 
Fig. 3.2, Mean Effect Sizes And 95% Confidence Intervals For 
The Severity Of Dementia Subset And Moderator Analyses 
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5) Explicit Knowledge Subset and Moderator Analyses 
Studies were categorised according to the degree of explicit sequence 
knowledge enjoyed by the neuropathological subjects: ‘no’, ‘some’, or ‘good’ (see 
Table 3.11 and Fig. 3.3). Those studies that did not test their neuropathological 
subjects for explicit sequence knowledge are excluded from this analysis. The 
moderator analysis was significant (QB(2)=8.5, p<0.025) and thus the effect sizes of 
the three groups differ. 
 
Table 3.11, Moderator and Subset Analyses for degree of Explicit Sequence 
Knowledge. 
Moderator Analyses # 
Subjects 
# 
effect 
sizes 
d, 95% CI & r QB; Test of the Model k0 
Degree of Explicit Sequence 
Knowledge 241 17 0.6, 0.42 to 0.78, 0.29 QB(2)=8.5, p<0.025 32 
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Explicit Sequence 
Knowledge  Subset 
Analyses 
# 
Subjects 
# 
Studies 
# effect 
sizes 
Mean effect size, 
95% CI & r 
p k0 
Subjects with ‘No’ explicit 
sequence knowledge 117 11 11 0.49, 0.24 to 0.74, 0.24 p<0.001 15 
Subjects with ‘Some’ explicit 
sequence knowledge 61 3 3 1.1, 0.74 to 1.48, 0.48 p<0.001 14 
Subjects with ‘Good’ explicit 
sequence knowledge 63 2 3 0.39, 0.04 to 0.74, 0.19 p<0.05 3 
 
Examination of the effect sizes reveals that while the effect sizes for the ‘no’ 
explicit knowledge and ‘good’ explicit knowledge groups are very similar (d=0.49 & 
0.39, respectively) the effect size for the ‘some’’ explicit knowledge group is 
substantially higher (d=1.1). Furthermore, both the ‘no’ and ‘good’ group’s confidence 
intervals overlap only to a minor degree with the ‘some’ group. Thus we can conclude 
that the subjects with ‘some’ explicit sequence knowledge demonstrate a significantly 
stronger interference effect than those with ‘no’ or ‘good’ explicit sequence knowledge. 
 
Subset analyses for degree of explicit sequence knowledge revealed that 
neurological subjects with ‘no’ explicit sequence knowledge nevertheless had a 
significantly greater than zero effect size and therefore a reliable interference effect 
(d=0.59, 95% CI = 0.24 to 0.74, p<0.001). The same was true of subjects with ‘some’ 
explicit sequence knowledge (d=1.1, 95% CI = 0.71 to 1.48, p<0.001) and those 
subjects with ‘good’ explicit sequence knowledge (d=0.39, 95% CI = 0.04 to 0.74, 
p<0.05). However, the file-drawer analysis revealed that only three non-significant 
studies would be required to invalidate the significant finding for those subjects with 
‘good’ explicit sequence knowledge which renders the significant finding for ‘good’ 
subjects empirically weak. 
 
Fig. 3.3, Mean Effect Sizes And 95% Confidence Intervals For 
The Degree Of Explicit Sequence Knowledge For 
Neuropathological Subjects Subset And Moderator Analyses. 
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Other Moderator Variables. 
All other moderator analyses (on or off medication, SRT repeating sequence 
length, SRT style, neurological subject age, raw / log reaction times, and random 
sequence style) were not significant and are not reported any further. 
 
Discussion of Part 1 
The significant overall meta-analysis result provides strong empirical 
confirmation for the contention that neurological subjects in general are capable of 
performing the SRT. As a group neuropathological subjects demonstrate a significant 
(within-subject) interference effect when switched from a repeating to a random 
sequence. The fact that a large number of neurological subjects had absolutely no 
explicit sequence knowledge but yet had significant interference effects is strong 
empirical support for the multiplicity of memory and the validity of non-declarative 
memory in particular. 
 
Although it was hypothesised that the BGN group would be impaired relative to 
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the LSN group there is no evidence to support this hypothesis. In contrast the LSN 
and BGN groups display relatively similar degrees of sequence learning (d=0.78 and 
d=0.51, respectively) as measured by the interference effect. Therefore, this analysis 
offers no support for the limbic system / basal ganglia model of multiple memory 
systems. However, the ON group has a substantially weaker interference effect than 
the LSN group and thus demonstrates impaired SRT performance relative to the LSN 
group, which does support the possibility of multiple memory systems. 
 
The multiple-memory literature, and the SRT literature in particular, predicts 
subjects with LSN aetiologies will not be impaired on tests of non-declarative memory 
and the finding that all LSN subjects are capable of demonstrating a robust 
interference effect confirms this prediction. The lack of difference between the LSN 
aetiologies suggests that the various LSN groups included in the meta-analysis, 
irrespective of individual aetiology, are capable of demonstrating sequence learning 
when switching from a repeating to a random sequence (Part 2 will deal with their 
ability to perform the SRT relative to control subjects). 
 
However, it must be noted that the AD studies included in the meta-analysis all 
used early-stage AD subjects and this may account for their ability to perform the SRT 
because entorhinal connections to the hippocampus represent the most significant 
neuropathology in these early stage patients (Braak and Braak, 1996; Braak et 
al,1996). AD subjects with more advanced pathology (i.e. more than ‘mildly’ 
dementing) may demonstrate a SRT impairment (see Ferraro, Balota and Connor, 
1993). 
 
The hippocampus-dependent multiple-memory theory specifically predicts that 
BGN based disorders will produce opposing results to LSN based disorders. As a 
consequence BGN subjects would be expected to display an SRT impairment in 
contrast to LSN subjects. However, as noted above, BGN subjects do not differ from 
LSN subjects in their ability to produce a robust within-subject interference effect. It is 
worth noting in response to the unexpected lack of any difference between BGN and 
LSN subjects that SRT studies with BGN subjects make it clear that BGN subjects 
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suffer partial rather than total impairments on the SRT task. Therefore, the ability of 
BGN subjects to demonstrate a within-subject interference effect is not entirely 
surprising. What is surprising however is that they demonstrate an interference effect 
that is not different to LSN subjects. However, this result is only concerned with the 
ability of subjects to demonstrate an interference effect relative to their own pre-
interference behaviour and says nothing about the ability of subjects to demonstrate 
sequence learning relative to control subjects which is the more critical measure of 
sequence learning. 
 
As PD and HD are both primarily disorders of the basal ganglia it is interesting 
therefore to find that PD subjects display interference effects that are significantly 
different from zero whereas HD patients do not. The obvious hypothesis is that the 
very restricted basal ganglia damage suffered by HD subjects produces a substantial 
SRT impairment, whereas the (relatively) diffuse basal ganglia dysfunction in PD 
subjects does not. Given that PD is a progressive disorder in which larger amounts of 
damage to the basal ganglia occur towards the latter stages of the disease (with 
increasing involvement of the dorsal caudate and frontal dopamine afferents) it would 
be interesting to compare early- and late-sage PD subjects. The fact that all PD 
subjects in this meta-analysis were in the relatively early stages of the disorder may 
therefore explain why they showed a relatively robust within-subject SRT behaviour. It 
is also worth noting that although one study within the PD group has a noticeably 
higher effect size than the other PD studies (Pascual-Leone, et al, 1993; d=1.37) that 
the PD group is homogenous ((Q(5)=8.42, p=0.13) and thus the unexpected 
differences between the PD and HD groups is not likely to be due to any inflationary 
effect on the PD mean effect size because of this study. 
 
ON subjects demonstrate a SRT impairment effect when switching from a 
repeating to a random sequence. This suggests that the neural substrates damaged in 
ON subjects bears some responsibility for non-declarative sequence learning 
behaviour. This is not particularly surprising for the cerebellum as several authors 
have suggested this structure plays a role in motor-skill learning (Layforce and Doyon, 
2001; Doyon et al, 1998; Wickelgren, 1998; Salmon and Butter, 1995) which is a 
substantial component of SRT behaviour. Furthermore, the finding that non-specific 
traumatic head injury produces an SRT impairment is not unexpected given that such 
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injuries often damage the frontal areas of the brain. As discussed in Chapter 2 the 
SRT performance requires contributions from both non-declarative memory and non-
memory cognitive functions (e.g. attention). Given that frontal areas of the brain are 
largely responsible for attention in particular, and other more general cognitive 
functions, it is therefore reasonable to conclude that damage to these areas with 
disrupt SRT performance, without necessarily positing their involvement in non-
declarative memory ‘per se’. 
 
As increased severity of dementia is (by definition) associated with greater and 
more pervasive cognitive deficits, it is expected that more severely dementing subjects 
would suffer a greater impairment on the SRT than subjects which are less  severely 
dementing. Contrary to this expectation severity of dementia in the mild range was not 
a reliable predictor of SRT behaviour. This is especially strange in light of Ferraro, 
Balota and Connor’s (1993) finding that mildly dementing AD subjects had significantly 
impaired SRT performances relative to very-mildly dementing subjects. However, 
mildly dementing subjects do have a smaller effect size than very-mildly dementing 
subjects and it may be that even this meta-analysis is insufficiently sensitive to detect 
this small difference (i.e. has insufficient power). This seems particularly possible in 
light of the equally small numbers of effect sizes that go up to make both dementing 
groups (k=3), and the relatively small sample sizes from which those effect sizes are 
generated (‘very-mildly dementing’ N=51, ‘mildly dementing’ N=55). Clearly more 
evidence is required before one can unequivocally state that mild dementia produces 
a weaker SRT interference effect than very-mild dementia. 
 
The meta-analysis found that ‘some’ explicit sequence knowledge produced a 
far stronger interference effect than either ‘good’ or ‘no’ explicit sequence knowledge. 
SRT studies tend to conclude that explicit sequence knowledge either benefits SRT 
performance (Mutter, Howard & Howard, 1994; Segar, 1997) or does not influence it 
at all (Stadler & Neely, 1997; Jackson & Jackson, 1995; Willingham & Korroshetz, 
1993; Reber & Squire, 1884 & 1998). Therefore evidence for an ‘inverted-U’ 
relationship between SRT performance and degree of explicit sequence knowledge 
was unexpected. A possible explanation for this ‘inverted-U’ relationship is that 
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neuropathological subjects are unable to take advantage of greater amounts of explicit 
knowledge (by virtue of both their specific cognitive impairment and general cognitive 
impairment common to all neuropathologies examined in this analysis) and instead it 
becomes an interferer / distracter which degrades behaviour rather than improving it 
as it would in a neurologically intact subject. 
 
In conclusion the meta-analysis for Part 1 has demonstrated that although 
neuropathological subjects as a whole generate a significant interference effect when 
switching from a repeating to a random sequence there is considerable variation 
between individual aetiologies. Cerebellar, pFC and HD subjects were found to suffer 
a SRT impairment although more studies with these patient groups are required. AD, 
KS, mixed amnesic, PD  and TBI subjects however do demonstrate a reliable 
interference effect and thus show evidence of SRT learning. Furthermore, in contrast 
to expectations severity of dementia in neuropathological subjects is not a reliable 
predictor of SRT performance. While the degree of explicit sequence knowledge a 
neuropathological subject enjoys does reliably predict their SRT performance the 
relationship between explicit sequence knowledge and SRT performance is not a 
linear one as might be expected. Rather, a moderate degree of explicit sequence 
knowledge produces a stronger interference effect than either no, or good, knowledge. 
However, this finding only applies to neuropathological subjects and may not be true 
of neurologically intact subjects. 
 
Analysis of Part 2 
This analysis addressed the critical question of whether or not those subjects 
with a variety of neuropathological disorders perform the SRT in a manner comparable 
to their respective control subjects and whether the SRT performance of 
neuropathological patients varies as a function of neuropathology. 
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A total of 22 effect sizes were calculated from 17 studies and are presented in 
table 3.12 using Tukey’s stem-and-leaf display. The overall aetiological distribution 
shows a moderately normal distribution of effect sizes with a long upper-range tail and 
several outliers. Analysis of the distribution of effect sizes in Statistica reveals that the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality is not significant (p > 0.2) and therefore the 
effect sizes are normally distributed. The groups of effect sizes within the distribution 
suggests the possibility that these peaks may be explained by moderator variables. 
 
Table 3.12, Stem-and-leaf display of 22 effect sizes for Part 2: The difference in 
Interference Effects Between Neuropathological and Control Subjects. 
ES Range All aetiologies 
Limbic system 
neuropathology 
Basal Ganglia 
neuropathology 
‘Other’ 
neuropathology 
-0.2 to –0.1 -    
-0 to 0.1 0. 1   0. 1 
0.2 to 0.3 0. 222 0. 22 0. 2  
0.4 to 0.5 -    
0.6 to 0.7 0. 66777 0. 667 0. 7 0. 7 
0.8 to 0.9 0. 899 0. 89 0. 9  
1.0 to 1.1 1. 0011 1. 00 1. 1  
1.2 to 1.3 1. 33 1. 3 1. 3  
1.4 to 1.5 1. 4   1. 4 
1.6 to 1.7 1. 7  1. 7  
1.8 to 1.9 1. 8  1. 8  
2.0 to 2.1 2. 11  2. 1 2. 1 
Total # of 
effect sizes 22 10 8 4 
Average 
effect size 0.94 0.68 1.14 1.43 
 
Even this relatively simple level of analysis suggests that control subjects as a whole display a stronger interference effect than 
neurological subjects. Both the relative scarcity of zero and small effect sizes (which would indicate no difference or a very weak 
difference respectively) support the likelihood of a difference between neuropathological and control groups. Indeed the majority of 
studies produce a medium, or greater, effect size. 
 
Breaking the distribution of effect sizes down by meta-aetiology reveals that 
effect sizes generate by LSN subjects tend to fall within the medium to large to very-
large range but also with outliers at both ends of the scale. In contrast effect sizes 
within the BGN and ON meta-categories are far more widely spread and show a 
square distribution, making it more difficult for a moderator analysis to explain the 
variation. 
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Power Analysis for Part 2 
As in Part 1 none of the studies achieve adequate power assuming a small 
effect size (see Table 3.13). However, unlike Part 1 none of the studies achieve 
adequate power for a medium effect size in Part 2 either. This is most likely to be a 
function of between-group effects requiring larger sample sizes to achieve the same 
power for a given effect size than within-group effects (per the greater ‘N required for 
80% power’ values for this table compared to the same table in Part 1; Table 3.2). It is 
not until we assume a ‘large’ effect size that any of the studies have sufficient power, 
and even then only 23% of effect sizes reach this goal. Even when assuming a very-
large effect only slightly more than half (63%) of the studies would have adequate 
power. These power analyses are therefore important considerations when evaluating 
the many null findings reported in the literature, and especially those (LSN) studies 
that rely on failing to reject the null hypothesis. 
 
Table 3.13. Summary Statistics for the Statistical Power Analysis for Part 2 (all 
power values expressed as a percentage). 
  ←       Theoretical Significance       → 
   ←Clinical Significance→ 
Effect Size Small 
(d=0.2) 
Medium 
(d=0.5) 
Large 
(d=0.8) 
Very Large 
(d=1.2) 
Mean Power 8.5 28.1 56.1 82.8 
Median Power 8 22.5 48.5 82.5 
Standard Deviation 2.1 12.1 20.3 15.4 
Minimum Power 6 14 27 53 
Maximum Power 13 54 91 100 
# of studies (of 22) with greater than 80% Power 0 0 5 14 
N required for 80% Power : independent t-test (2-
tail) 394 64 26 12 
 
 
Breaking the power analysis down by meta-aetiological category (Table 3.14) 
we find a similar pattern to Part 1. LSN studies have less power than either the BGN 
and ON studies. However, none of the meta-aetiological categories have adequate 
power even at a ‘large’ effect size (bearing in mind most behavioural studies generate 
small to medium effect; Rossi, 1990; Sedlemeier & Gigerenzer, 1989).  Perhaps the 
most interesting finding of the power analysis is that while SRT studies as a whole 
achieve adequate power when assuming a very-large effect size this is not true of 
LSN studies. Even at a very-large effect size LSN studies still have less than 80% 
power. Given that the question addressed by this part of the meta-analysis concerns 
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the sensitivity of null hypothesis testing to decide if the LSN subject’s behaviour is 
comparable to control subjects this lack of adequate power at anything but the very-
large effect sizes is of great concern, and provides a clear justification for combining 
these studies into a meta-analysis. 
 
Meta-Analysis for Part 2 
A point-and-whisker plot of overall meta-analysis result, all 22 effects sizes 
(ESs) that go up to make the meta-analysis, and mean effect sizes for the three meta-
aetiological groupings, is provided in Fig 3.4. A list of all effect sizes and 95%CIs for 
each figure in this section is provided in Table 3A.6 in the appendix to this chapter. 
 
Note: All sample sizes reported in tables included in this section are in the following 
format: numbers of neuropathological subjects  / numbers of controls subjects. 
 
Table 3.14. Breakdown of the Statistical Power Analysis for Part 2 by Meta-
Aetiological Category (all power values expressed as a percentage) 
  
 ←       Theoretical Significance       → 
   ←Clinical Significance→ 
Effect Size 
Average (SD) # of 
Neuropathological / 
Control subjects in 
Meta-Analysis Small 
(d=0.2) 
Medium 
(d=0.5) 
Large 
(d=0.8) 
Very Large 
(d=1.2) 
Mean (and SD) Power for Limbic system 
neuropathology 15 (10) / 16 (13) 8 (2) 25 (12) 51 (23) 77 (19) 
Mean (and SD) Power for Basal Ganglia 
neuropathology 17 (10) / 18 (14) 9 (2) 30 (13) 58 (19) 86 (11) 
Mean (and SD) Power for ‘Other’ 
neuropathology 18 (6) / 26 (21) 9 (2) 33 (12) 65 (18) 91 (9) 
Mean (and SD) Power for the Overall 
Meta-Analysis 16 (9) / 19 (11) 8.5 (2) 28.2 (12) 56 (20) 83 (15.5) 
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1) Overall Meta-Analysis Result 
 
Table 3.15, Overall Meta-Analytic Result 
 k d,  95% CI & r* p QB; Test of the Model k0 
Overall Meta-
Analysis: Part 2 22 0.94, 0.781 to 1.1, 0.43 p<0.0001 Q(21)=54.2, p<0.0001 81 
 
The overall meta-analysis (see Table 3.15) for Part 2 generated a significant large-to-
very-large effect size (ES = 0.94, r=0.43, p<0.001) with a constrained 95% confidence 
interval (0.78 to 1.1) that is well above zero (zero being equivalent to controls in Part 
2). Thus we can conclude that neurological subject as a whole do not perform the SRT 
in a control like manner, but are rather considerably impaired in their ability to 
demonstrate an interference effect when switching from a repeating to a random 
sequence. Furthermore, the significant test of the model (QB(21)=54.24, p<0.0001) 
clearly reveals that the individual effect sizes vary and therefore we can expect 
analysis premised on various characterisations of the studies (moderators) to reveal 
reliable predictors of SRT behaviour. 
 
2) Aetiological Meta-Category Moderator and Subset Analyses 
This moderator analysis (see Table 3.16; QB(2)=21, p<0.01) confirms a 
significant difference between the three meta-aetiological groups. Not only do they 
have substantially different effect sizes (LSN d=0.68, BGN d=1.14, and ON d=1.43) 
but the 95% confidence interval for the LSN group does not overlap with either that of 
the BGN or ON groups. Thus the LSN group has a significantly smaller effect size 
than either of the other two groups and are thus less impaired relative to these groups 
when compared to the appropriate controls. 
 
Table 3.16, Aetiological Meta-Category Moderator and Subset Analyses. 
Moderator Analysis # 
Subjects 
# 
effe
ct 
size 
d,  95% CI & r QB; Test of the Model k0 
Aetiological Meta-Category 345 / 383 22 0.92, 0.77 to 1.08, 0.42 QB(2)=21, p<0.01 81 
Subset Analysis # 
Subjects 
# 
Studies 
# effect 
sizes 
Mean effect size, 95% 
CI & r p k0 
Limbic System 
Neuropathology (LSN) 148 / 159 9 10 0.68, 0.45 to 92, 0.32 p<0.001 24 
Basal Ganglia 
Neuropathology (BGN) 136 / 145 8 8 1.14, 0.93 to 1.35, 0.5 p<0.001 38 
Other Neuropathology 
(ON) 61 / 79 3 4 1.43, 1.16 to 1.71, 0.58 p<0.001 25 
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However, the subset analysis revealed that all three meta-categories are 
significantly different from controls  (LSN d=0.68, 95% CI = 0.45 to 0.92, p<0.001; 
BGN d=1.14, 95% CI = 0.93 to 1.35, p<0.001; ON d=1.43, 95% CI = 1.16 to 1.71, 
p<0.001). Therefore, the neuropathological subjects in all three groups have 
significantly weaker interference effects than controls. Thus although LSN subjects 
have a smaller effect size than BGN and ON subjects, and are less impaired than 
these groups, they nevertheless are still impaired relative to their own control group. It 
is especially pertinent here to note that a file-drawer analysis reveals that the results of 
all three meta-categories is reliable and not susceptible to invalidation by a few non-
significant studies. 
 
3) Individual Aetiological Moderator and Subset Analyses 
The overall aetiological moderator analysis for all aetiologies (see Table 3.17) 
reveals there is a significant difference between individual aetiologies (QB(7)=20.9, 
p<0.005). As the 95% confidence interval for the Alzheimer’s studies (0.27 to 0.93) 
does not overlap with that of the cerebellar study (1.4 to 2.9), these effect sizes are 
likely to be significantly different. 
 
Table 3.17, Aetiology Moderator and Subset Analyses. 
Moderator Analyses # 
Subjects 
# 
effe
ct 
size
s 
d, 95% CI & r QB; Test of the Model k0 
Individual Aetiology 345 / 428 22 0.92, 0.77 to 1.08,  0.42 QB(7)=20.9, p<0.005 81 
Aetiological Subset 
Analyses 
# 
Subjects 
# 
Studies 
# 
effect 
sizes 
Mean effect size, 95% 
CI & r p k0 
Alzheimer’s Disease 79 / 81 3 4 0.60, 0.27 to 0.93, 0.29 p<0.001 8 
Mixed Amnesia 67 / 83 4 4 0.77, 0.39 to 1.15, 0.36 p<0.001 11 
Korsakoff’s Syndrome 13 / 15 2 2 0.79, 0.2 to 1.56, 0.37 p<0.05 6 
Parkinson’s Disease1 98 / 121 5 5 0.85, 0.52 to 1.18, 0.39 p<0.001 16 
Huntington’s Disease 25 / 24 2 2 1.47, 0.84 to 2.09, 0.59 p<0.001 13 
Cerebellar Injury 15 / 30 1 1 2.12, 1.4 to 2.9, 0.73 p<0.001 10 
Traumatic Brain Injury2 26 / 22 1 2 0.67, 0.07 to 1.26, 0.32 p<0.05 5 
Pre-Frontal Cortex Injury 22 / 52 1 1 0.64, 0.1 to 1.18, 0.31 p<0.25 n/a 
1 One study (Stefanova et al ,2000) was removed from this analysis (only) to render the analysis homogenous. 
2 Although this analysis was heterogeneous (Q(1)=1.73, p<0.05) there were insufficient effect sizes included in it 
(i.e. two) to be able to remove any to achieve homogeneity. 
 
As in Part 1 separate moderator analyses were performed for each of the meta-
aetiological categories in order to identify any differences within these groups. See 
Fig. 3.4 for individual study effect sizes and effect sizes for each meta-aetiology. 
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The aetiological moderator analysis for the LSN aetiologies (see Table 3.18) 
was not significant (QB(2)=0.52, p=0.8), reflecting the high degree of similarity of the 
effect sizes between the three aetiologies. Furthermore, the three aetiologies that 
make up the LSN meta-category all have mean effect sizes significantly different to 
controls (AD d=0.60, 95% CI = 0.27 to 0.93, p<0.001; mixed amnesia d=0.77, 95% CI 
= 0.39 to 1.15, p<0.001; and KS d=0.79, 95% CI = 0.2 to 1.56, p<0.05) and therefore 
all three LSN subgroups demonstrate significantly weaker interference effects than 
their control groups. However, while all three aetiologies require relatively few non-
significant findings to render them not different to controls, studies employing KS 
subjects are especially threatened by the file-drawer analysis (k0=6). Yet this is 
unlikely to be a problem because it is precisely this group (KS) which would not be 
subject to the ‘file drawer’ problem because current wisdom is for there to be no 
difference between KS subjects and their controls in the SRT task (but see the general 
discussion on LSN amnesia and SRT performance). 
 
Table 3.18, Aetiology Moderator and Subset Analyses for LSN subjects only. 
Moderator Analyses # 
Subjects 
# 
effe
ct 
size
s 
d, 95% CI & r QB; Test of the Model k0 
LSN Aetiological Moderator 
Analysis 168 / 179 10 0.68, 0.45 to 0.92,  0.32 QB(2)=0.52, p=0.8 24 
Aetiological Subset 
Analyses 
# 
Subjects 
# 
Studies 
# 
effect 
sizes 
Mean effect size, 
95% CI & r 
p k0 
Alzheimer’s Disease 79 / 81 3 4 0.60, 0.27 to 0.93, 0.29 p<0.001 8 
Mixed Amnesia 67 / 83 4 4 0.77, 0.39 to 1.15, 0.36 p<0.001 11 
Korsakoff’s Syndrome 13 / 15 2 2 0.79, 0.2 to 1.56, 0.37 p<0.05 6 
 
The moderator analysis of the two BGN groups (see Table 3.19) was 
marginally non-significant (QB(1)=3.09, p=0.08) which suggests that the mean effect 
size for HD subjects (d=1.47) may be higher than that for PD subjects (d=0.85). Note 
however, that Stefanova et al’s (2000) PD study had to be excluded to achieve 
homogeneity for the PD group. Stefanova et al had a large N (39 PD subjects and 31 
controls) and produced an effect size of 2.09, which was even higher than that shown 
for the HD group. If Stefanova et al’s effect size is actually representative of the SRT 
performance of PD subjects relative to controls (as it may well be given the excellent 
sample sizes and consequent high power) this marginal PD / HD difference may be 
   - 123 - 
   
  
 
more apparent than real. If Stefanova et al’s effect size is actually representative of 
PD subjects then the exclusion of the Stefanova et al study to render the PD group 
homogenous would produce a PD effect size that is under-representative of the true 
effect size for PD subjects. Thus the PD effect size may actually be higher than 
reported for the homogenous PD group, and therefore more similar to the HD effect 
size. 
 
Irrespective of any differences between PD and HD subjects both aetiologies 
had significantly weaker interference effects than controls (PD d=0.85, 95% CI = 0.52 
to 1.18, p<0.001; and HD d=1.47, 95% CI = 0.84 to 2.09, p<0.01). 
 
Table 3.19, Aetiology Moderator and Subset Analyses for BGN subjects only. 
Moderator Analyses # 
Subjects 
# effect 
sizes d, 95% CI & r 
QB; Test of the 
Model k0 
BGN Aetiological Moderator 
Analysis1 123 / 145 7 0.97, 0.68 to 1.26, 0.44 QB(1)=3.1, p=0.08 38 
Aetiological Subset 
Analyses 
# 
Subjects 
# 
Studies 
# effect 
sizes 
Mean effect size, 95% 
CI & r p k0 
Parkinson’s Disease1 98 / 121 5 5 0.85, 0.52 to 1.18, 0.39 p<0.001 16 
Huntington’s Disease 25 / 24 2 2 1.47, 0.84 to 2.09, 0.59 p<0.001 13 
1 One study (Stefanova et al, 2000) was removed from this analysis to render the analysis homogenous. 
 
The moderator analysis for the ON aetiologies was highly significant (see Table 
3.20; QB(1)=11.4, p<0.0005). Therefore, because the confidence interval for 
cerebellar subjects does not overlap with that of TBI and pFC subjects, cerebellar 
subjects are significantly more impaired relative to controls than TBI and pFC 
subjects. However, TBI and pFC subjects do not differ between themselves. 
Furthermore, all three ON aetiologies are significantly different from zero (Cerebellar 
d=2.16, 95% CI = 1.39 to 2.29, p<0.001; and TBI d=0.99, 95% CI = 0.26 to 1.06, 
p<0.001; and pFC d=0.64, 95% CI = 0.1 to 1.18, p<0.025), and thus have significantly 
weaker interference effects than their controls. 
 
Table 3.20, Aetiology Moderator and Subset Analyses for ON subjects only. 
Moderator Analyses # 
Subjects 
# 
effect 
sizes 
d, 95% CI & r QB; Test of the Model k0 
ON Aetiological Moderator 
Analysis 63 / 104 4 0.97, 0.62 to 1.32, 0.44 QB(2)=11.4, p<0.005 15 
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Aetiological Subset 
Analyses 
# 
Subjects 
# 
Studies 
# 
effect 
sizes 
Mean effect size, 95% 
CI & r p k0 
Cerebellar Injury 15 / 30 1 1 2.12, 1.4 to 2.9, 0.73 p<0.001 10 
Traumatic Brain Injury 26 / 22 1 2 0.67, 0.07 to 1.26, 0.32 p<0.05 5 
Pre-Frontal Cortex Injury 22 / 52 1 1 0.64, 0.1 to 1.18, 0.31 p<0.25 n/a 
 
While all groups are generated from a very small number of effect sizes (i.e. 1 
or 2) the cerebellar group requires a reasonably large number of non-significant 
studies (k0=10) to invalidate it even though it only includes one effect size which is 
undoubtedly due to its extremely large effect size. In contrast the TBI group requires 
relatively few non-significant studies (k0=5) to invalidate the result of its subset 
analyses. Thus the subset analyses for the TBI and pFC groups must be viewed with 
some caution. Furthermore, the two TBI effects sizes actually come from the same 
paper (Mutter et al, 1994) and subjects in the two studies vary in terms of the severity 
of their head injury which produced quite different patterns of SRT behaviour.  
 
4) Severity of Dementia Moderator and Subset Analyses 
In spite of the reasonably low effect size for very-mildly dementing subjects 
relative to non-dementing and mildly dementing subjects (d’s=0.55, 1.15, & 1.1, 
respectively) the moderator analysis of severity of dementia (see Table 3.21 and Fig. 
3.5) was not significant (QB(2)=4.6, p=0.1). Furthermore, all three dementing groups 
were significantly different from zero and thus demonstrate a weaker interference 
effect than controls (Non-dementing, d=1.15, 95% CI = 1.0 to 1.31, p<0.001; very-
mildly dementing, d=0.55, 95% CI = 0.1 to 0.94, p<0.01; and mildly dementing, d=1.1, 
95% CI = 0.68 to 1.53, p<0.001, see Fig.3.22). 
 
Table 3.21, Moderator and Subset Analyses for the Severity of Dementia. 
Moderator Analyses # 
Subjects 
# effect 
sizes d, 95% CI & r 
QB; Test of the 
Model k0 
Severity of Dementia 
Moderator Analysis 345 / 383 22 0.92, 0.77 to 1.08, 0.42 QB(2)=4.6, p=0.1 81 
Dementia Subset Analyses # 
Subjects 
# 
Studies 
# effect 
sizes 
Mean effect size, 
95% CI & r 
p k0 
Non-Dementing Subjects 239 / 290 13 16 1.15, 1.0 to 1.31, .05 p<0.001 76 
Very Mildly Dementing 
Subjects 51 / 55 3 3 0.55, 0.1 to 0.94, 0.26 p<0.01 5 
Mildly Dementing Subjects 55 / 51 3 3 1.1, 0.68 to 1.53, 0.48 p<0.001 14 
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Moderator Analyses # 
Subjects 
# effect 
sizes d, 95% CI & r 
QB; Test of the 
Model 
k0 
Severity of Dementia 
Moderator Analysis for 
Dementing Subjects only 
106 / 106 6 0.79, 0.5 to 1.07, 0.37 QB(1)=3.4, p=0.07 95 
 
A moderator analysis restricted to dementing subjects only was marginally non-
significant (QB(1)=3.38, p=0.07) but does suggest that across dementing groups the 
more dementing subjects were more impaired relative to controls as would be 
expected (see the general discussion for an examination of this finding). 
 
Fig 3.5. Mean effect sizes and 95% confidence intervals for the 
severity of dementia subset and moderator analyses 
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6) Moderator and Subset Analyses of the Degree of Declarative Sequence 
Knowledge Enjoyed by Neuropathological Subjects 
 
The moderator analysis of explicit sequence knowledge enjoyed by 
neuropathological subjects was not significant (Table 3.22; QB(2)=4.1, p=0.13, see 
Fig. 3.6) and therefore the groups do not differ. This result is supported by the overlap 
of the 95% confidence intervals for all three groups. 
 
Table 3.22, Moderator and Subset Analyses for degree of Explicit Sequence 
Knowledge for Neuropathological Subjects. 
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Moderator Analyses # 
Subjects 
# 
effect 
sizes 
d, 95% CI & r QB; Test of the Model k0 
Degree of Explicit Sequence 
Knowledge 266 / 302 17 1.0, 0.82 to 1.18, 0.45 QB(2)=4.1, p=0.13 68 
Explicit Sequence 
Knowledge  Subset 
Analyses 
# 
Subjects 
# 
Studies 
# effect 
sizes 
Mean effect size, 
95% CI & r 
p k0 
Subjects with ‘No’ explicit 
sequence knowledge 142 / 171 11 11 0.96, 0.72 to 1.2, 0.43 p<0.001 42 
Subjects with ‘Some’ explicit 
sequence knowledge 61 / 76 3 3 0.82, 0.47 to 1.18, 0.39 p<0.001 9 
Subjects with ‘Good’ explicit 
sequence knowledge 63 / 55 2 3 1.37, 0.95 to 1.8, 0.57 p<0.001 18 
 
All three groups (neuropathological subjects with ‘no’, ‘some’ and ‘good’ explicit 
sequence knowledge) had effect sizes that were significantly higher than zero and 
therefore weaker interference effects than control subjects (‘no’ explicit knowledge, 
d=1.27, 95% CI = 1.05 to 1.48, p<0.001; ‘some’ d=0.93, 95% CI = 0.66 to 1.2, p<0.01; 
and ‘good’ d=1.39, 95% CI = 1.97 to 1.81). 
Fig 3.6. Mean effect sizes and 95% confidence intervals for the 
degree of explicit sequence knowledge of neuropathological 
subjects subset and moderator analyses 
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6) Moderator and Subset Analyses of the Degree of Explicit Sequence 
Knowledge Enjoyed by Control Subjects 
 
The moderator analysis for the SRT performance of neuropathological subjects 
as a function of the explicit sequence knowledge enjoyed by the control subjects was 
significant (QB(2)=9.64, p<0.01, see Fig. 3.7). As can be seen in Table 3.23 the 95% 
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confidence intervals for subjects with ‘some’ and ‘good’ explicit sequence knowledge 
do not overlap and therefore these two groups are different from each other. Those 
studies with control subjects with ‘some’ explicit sequence knowledge have 
neuropathological subjects that are less impaired than those studies with control 
subjects with no or ‘good’ explicit sequence knowledge. 
 
Table 3.23, Moderator and Subset Analyses for degree of Explicit Sequence 
Knowledge for Control  Subjects 
Moderator Analyses # 
Subjects 
# 
effect 
sizes 
d, 95% CI & r QB; Test of the Model k0 
Degree of Explicit Sequence 
Knowledge 266 / 301 17 1.0, 0.82 to 1.18, 0.45 QB(2)=9.64, p<0.01 68 
Explicit Sequence 
Knowledge  Subset 
Analyses 
# 
Subjects 
# 
Studies 
# effect 
sizes 
Mean effect size, 
95% CI & r 
p k0 
Subjects with ‘No’ explicit 
sequence knowledge 33 / 32 11 3 1.1, 0.56 to 1.6, 0.48 p<0.001 14 
Subjects with ‘Some’ explicit 
sequence knowledge 99 / 116 3 7 0.66, 0.37 to 0.95, 0.31 p<0.001 16 
Subjects with ‘Good’ explicit 
sequence knowledge 134 / 153 2 7 1.26, 1.0 to 1.53, 0.54 p<0.001 37 
 
As would be expected the subset analyses revealed that neuropathological 
subjects in each of the groups were significantly different from controls irrespective of 
the degree of explicit sequence knowledge enjoyed by controls (Subjects with ‘No’ 
explicit sequence knowledge d=1.1, p<0.001; Subjects with ‘Some’ explicit sequence 
knowledge d=0.66, p<0.001; Subjects with ‘Good’ explicit sequence knowledge, 
d=1.26, p<0.001). 
 
Fig 3.7. Mean effect sizes and 95% confidence intervals for the 
degree of explicit sequence knowledge of control subjects subset 
and moderator analyses 
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7) Age Moderator and Subset Analyses 
The moderator effect for age is significant (QB(1)=3.9, p<0.05; see Table 3.24 
and Fig. 3.8). The mean effect size for subjects over 65 was significantly lower than 
the effect size for subjects ≤65 (d=1.06 & 0.72, respectively), as reflected by the 
minimal overlap in 95% confidence intervals. Thus subjects over 65 are relatively less 
impaired relative to controls compared to subjects ≤65. This is unexpected as age is 
generally positively related to cognitive impairment and thus we would expect the 
older cohort to be more impaired than the younger cohort. However, the younger 
cohort includes the effect sizes for the HD, cerebellar and pFC subjects which inflate 
the mean effect size for this group. This argument is supported by a clear lack of 
homogeneity in the younger group (Qw=39.76, p<0.001). A moderator analysis with a 
homogenous under-65 group (the cerebellar study [Pascual-Leone et al, 1993] and 
the outlier PD study [Stefanova et al, 2000], were removed) is not significant 
(QB(1)=0.41, p=0.52). Thus the homogenous ‘under-65 group’ is not impaired relative 
to the ‘over 65 group’ which is what would typically be expected of a younger cohort 
(the younger cohort are usually expected to be equal to, or less impaired, than the 
older cohort). Therefore it is the inclusion of those studies in the younger cohort that 
have large effect sizes (Pascual-Leone et al, cerebellar d=2.16; Stefanova et al, PD 
d=2.09) which are due to the neurologic condition of the patients that renders the non-
homogenous ‘65-and under’ group impaired relative to the ‘over-65’ group, rather than 
the age of the subjects ‘per se’. 
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Table 3.24, Moderator and Subset Analyses for Age of Subjects. 
Moderator Analyses # 
Subjects 
# effect 
sizes d, 95% CI & r 
QB; Test of the 
Model k0 
Age  Moderator Analysis 345 / 395 22 0.92, 0.77 to 1.08, 0.42 QB(1)=3.9, p<0.05 81 
Dementia Subset Analyses # 
Subjects 
# 
Studies 
# effect 
sizes 
Mean effect size, 
95% CI & r 
p k0 
Subjects ≤ 65 years 231 / 268 12 15 1.06, 0.86 to 1.25, 0.47 p<0.001 65 
Subjects > 65 years 114 / 127 5 7 0.72, 0.45 to 0.99, 0.34 p<0.001 18 
 
Fig 3.8. Mean effect sizes and 95% confidence intervals for the 
age subset and moderator analyses 
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The (homogonous) ‘over 65’ age group has an effect size that is significantly 
different from zero and these subjects therefore have weaker interference effects than 
their control subjects (‘> 65’ d=0.72, p<0.001). Both the heterogeneous ’65 and under 
‘age group and the homogenous ’65 and under’ group do have effect sizes 
significantly different to controls (heterogeneous ‘≤ 65’ d=1.06, p<0.001; 
homogeneous ‘≤ 65’ d=0.83, <0.0001) and are impaired relative to controls. 
 
8) Moderator and Subset Analyses for Presence or Absence of Medication in 
Neuropathological Subjects during SRT performance 
 
This moderator analysis revealed that studies in which neuropathological 
subjects were on medication during SRT performance produced larger effect sizes 
than studies in which neuropathological subjects were not on medication during SRT 
performance (QB(1)=6.4, p<0.025). 
 
Table 3.25, Moderator and Subset Analyses for Subjects On / Not On Medication 
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During SRT Performance. 
Moderator Analyses # 
Subjects 
# 
effect 
sizes 
d, 95% CI & r QB; Test of the Model k0 
Presence/Absence of 
Medication  Moderator 
Analysis 
335 / 396 22 0.92, 0.77 to 1.08, 0.42 QB(1)=6.4, p<0.025 81 
Dementia Subset Analyses # 
Subjects 
# 
Studies 
# effect 
sizes 
Mean effect size, 
95% CI & r 
p k0 
Subjects on Medication 136 / 146 12 8 1.19, 0.93 to 1.45, .051 p<0.001 40 
Subjects not on medication 199 / 250 5 14 0.77, 0.57 to 0.97, 0.36 p<0.001 40 
 
Fig 3.9. Mean effect sizes and 95% confidence intervals for the 
Subjects On / Not On Medication During SRT Performance 
subset and moderator analyses 
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Subjects on medication were significantly more impaired relative to controls 
than those subjects not on medication. Thus it would appear that medication worsens 
SRT performance. However, the difference between the medicated and unmedicated 
groups is confounded by the fact that all medicated subjects suffered BGN dysfunction 
(all medicated subjects were either PD or HD sufferers, and all PD and HD subjects 
were medicated during SRT performance). Thus, given that this test is essentially 
between BGN studies and all other studies  (i.e. the ‘non-medicated’ group is simply 
the LSN and ON groups collapsed together) the possibility exists that the difference 
between the two medication groups is due more to meta-aetiological status rather than 
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purely as a function of medication, and consequentially this result must be interpreted 
with some caution.  
 
Other Moderator Analyses 
All other moderator analyses (different repeating sequence lengths, raw or log-
transformed reaction times, and ‘constrained’ or ‘unconstrained’ random sequences) 
were not significant (all p’s>0.1) and are not reported further. 
 
Discussion of Part 2 
The primary conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis of Part 2 is that 
neurological subjects as a whole differ from control subjects in that they have a 
significantly weaker interference effect. In contrast to the SRT literature this also holds 
true for LSN subjects which comprise the group typically described as not different to 
controls in the literature. The most parsimonious explanation for this discrepancy is 
that those studies which conclude LSN subjects perform the SRT in a control-like 
manner did so because they lacked the statistical power to find even the medium-to-
large differences between LSN and control subjects, as a consequence of using small 
sample sizes. 
 
Subjects in all three aetiological meta-categories are impaired relative to 
controls and they also differ between themselves. While LSN subjects are impaired 
relative to controls, in contrast to what is usually reported in the SRT literature, LSN 
subjects are also less impaired relative to controls than both BGN and ON subjects. 
Hence there is clear support for the hypothesis that BGN subjects are impaired in the 
SRT relative to LSN subjects and for the hippocampal / basal ganglia memory 
systems dissociation. However, the dissociation is only partial because the LSN deficit 
is not consistent with the more specific hypothesis of a complete dissociation of 
multiple-memory systems. 
 
While the individual LSN aetiologies (AD, MA, & KS) were not different from 
one-another there was some indication that there were differences between the 
individual BGN aetiologies. However, the complete PD group in this analysis was 
markedly heterogeneous (Q(5)=19.33, p<0.0025) and only attained homogeneity once 
the extremely large effect size from the Stefanova et al (2000; d=2.09) study was 
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removed. Including the Stefanova et al study in the analysis (ignoring issues of 
heterogeneity) would substantially weaken any differences between the PD and HD 
groups and this which must be taken into account when considering any possible 
differences between PD and HD subjects. 
 
All constituent ON aetiologies (cerebellar lesions, non-specific TBI and pFC 
injury) are impaired relative to controls which is not surprising in light of their inability 
to demonstrate a robust interference effect in Part 1. However, while the individual ON 
aetiologies did not differ between themselves in Part 1 they did so in Part 2. 
Specifically, cerebellar subjects demonstrated a profound impairment relative to 
controls (d=2.16) whereas TBI and pFC subjects demonstrated an impairment more in 
line with LSN subjects (TBI d=0.66, pFC d=0.64, & LSN d=0.68). Furthermore, 
although the effect size for cerebellar subjects is only generated from a single study it 
is sufficiently large that it requires a reasonable number of non-significant results to 
invalidate it (k0=10). 
 
It was expected that severity of dementia would be a reliable predictor of SRT 
performance, the analysis for severity of dementia repeats the findings for the same 
analysis in Part 1. While all ‘non-dementing’, ‘very-mildly dementing’ and ‘mildly 
dementing’ groups were significantly impaired relative to controls they did not differ 
between themselves and thus once again severity of dementia, at least in this range, 
is not a useful predictor of SRT performance. However, the analysis restricted to 
dementing subjects only was marginally non-significant which suggest the test may 
have been insufficiently sensitive to the relatively large numerical differences in effect 
sizes between these two groups (‘very-mildly dementing’ d=0.55, ‘mildly dementing; 
d=1.1). More evidence is needed, particularly from more severe dementia, before one 
can conclude that dementia status ‘per se’ is not an important variable in SRT effects. 
 
Studies differ as to whether there is any advantage of explicit sequence 
knowledge for SRT performance (Segar, 1997; Stadler & Neely, 1997; Jackson & 
Jackson, 1995; Mutter, Howard & Howard, 1994; Willingham & Korroshetz, 1993; 
Reber & Squire, 1884 & 1998). A high degree of explicit sequence knowledge 
undoubtedly aids SRT performance by allowing subjects to confidently and 
deliberately predict the locus of the next stimulus. Although the moderator effect for 
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explicit sequence knowledge enjoyed by neuropathological subjects was not reliable, 
the moderator of neuropathological subjects performance as predicted by control 
subject’s explicit sequence knowledge was. Thus the degree of explicit sequence 
knowledge enjoyed by a control subject accurately predicts the SRT performance of a 
neuropathological subject. Specifically, when control subjects have ‘some’ explicit 
sequence knowledge neuropathological subjects are less impaired relative to control 
subjects than when control subjects have ‘no’ or ’good’ sequence knowledge. This 
may be because control subjects perform the SRT more poorly when they have ‘some’ 
explicit sequence knowledge (because this limited amount of explicit sequence 
knowledge acts as a relative interferer) than when they have ‘no’ or ‘good’ explicit 
sequence knowledge. However, this explanation would require additional evidence 
and replication before it could be considered as anything other than a theoretical 
possibility. 
 
In summary Part 2 has reported four important findings. First, although most 
SRT studies have medium-to-strong effect sizes they have low power and are thus 
insensitive to group differences, which is especially problematic for those studies that 
rely on failing to reject the null hypothesis in order to be able to conclude their groups 
do not differ (which is typical of LSN SRT studies in particular). Second, LSN subjects 
generally are impaired relative to controls, irrespective of which aetiology causes the 
LSN damage, in contrast to what is usually reported in the SRT literature. Third, BGN 
subjects are impaired relative to LSN subjects which is evidence for both the 
hippocampus / basal ganglia memory-systems dissociation and multiple-memory 
systems in general, although the strength of the evidence is weakened because of the 
incorrect assumption that  LSN subjects are completely unimpaired in the SRT. And 
finally, contrary to expectations severity of dementia is not a reliable predictor of SRT 
performance although this finding may be due to the meta-analysis being insensitive 
to differences between the (non-)dementing groups. 
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General Discussion 
 
Overview of the Goals and Results of the Power and Meta 
Analyses. 
The purpose of the analysis was firstly to test the hypothesis that those SRT 
studies which reported no difference between neuropathological group and controls 
did so because such studies lacked adequate statistical power. Even though most 
studies produced medium to large effect sizes the results of the power analysis 
conclusively demonstrated that the majority of studies lacked adequate power even at 
these effect sizes (which were unusually high for behavioural studies) and as a result 
were insensitive to group differences. Thereafter the meta-analysis compared 
between aetiologies and meta-aetiological categories to ascertain if individual 
neuropathologies and / or groups of neuropathologies had particular consequences for 
SRT performance.  
 
One goal of these analyses was to test the widespread assumption in the SRT 
literature that subjects with limbic system dependent amnesia were not impaired on 
the SRT.  In contrast to the literature the meta-analysis found that subjects with limbic 
system amnesias do have impaired SRT performance, but not as impaired as the 
other neuropathologies (BGN and ON) tested. Another goal of the SRT was to 
determine the degree of the deficit produced by basal ganglia disorders and whether 
different basal ganglia disorders resulted in different degrees of SRT impairment. 
While both PD and HD subjects suffer markedly impaired SRT performance relative to 
controls and LSN subjects there is little clear evidence as yet of any difference 
between the abilities of PD and HD patients to perform the SRT. A surprise finding 
was that subjects grouped into the ‘other’ meta-aetiological category were 
substantially impaired in the SRT, although perhaps this should not be so surprising 
given that cerebellar subjects in particular demonstrated absolutely no sequence 
learning of any type while performing the SRT task. Finally, a number of moderator 
analyses were performed but only the degree of explicit sequence knowledge enjoyed 
by both neuropathological and control subjects was found to be a reliable predictor of 
SRT performance. All other moderator variables were not reliable predictors of SRT 
performance. 
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Limbic System Amnesia and the SRT. 
One of the primary reasons for performing this meta-analysis was to discover if 
subjects with disorders of the limbic system are unimpaired in the SRT relative to 
control subjects, as is often claimed in the SRT literature. The meta-analysis clearly 
demonstrated that LSN subjects are reported as being unimpaired relative to controls 
because such studies have low power and are thus insensitive to even the medium-to-
strong differences between LSN and control subjects. The meta-analysis shows that 
the reason LSN studies have low power is because they typically have sample sizes 
that are too small. Once LSN subjects were aggregated into a single group by the 
meta-analysis LSN patients were shown to actually have significantly weaker 
interference effect than controls and therefore can not be said to be unimpaired in the 
SRT relative to controls. 
 
The finding that LSN subjects are impaired relative to controls is at odds with 
virtually all of the studies that contributed effect sizes to the LSN group. While 
Knopman and Nissen (1987) found no difference between the interference effects for 
the AD and control groups in the first SRT study, but examination of the respective 
means indicated that there might be one. While the average difference score for the 
AD subjects was 110msec, it was 181msec for the control subjects. Similarly the 
standard deviations of each group are substantially different, the control subjects SD 
was 84msec whereas the AD subjects SD was twice as large at 162msec. As a result 
the effect size when using a pooled SD (i.e. not just the SD of the controls) for the 
group differences is reasonably large (d=0.62) and is indicative of a possible real 
difference between the two groups. Thus the reason for Knopman and Nissen and the 
meta-analysis reaching opposite conclusions is that Knopman and Nissen’s test of the 
null hypothesis was insensitive to any actual group differences because of low power 
(due in particular to the small sample size of the control group: N=13). 
 
In fact of the nine studies included in the meta-analysis that used LSN subjects 
only two (Ferraro, Balota and Connor, 1993; and Curran, 1997) concluded that their 
LSN subjects were different to control subjects. However, careful examination of all 
LSN studies suggests that it is actually Ferraro, Balota and Connor who reached the 
correct conclusion and not the other studies (including Curran who appears to have 
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reached the correct conclusion by error). 
Curran (1997) concluded his mixed-amnesic patients were impaired relative to 
controls but there is actually evidence that there was no difference between groups in 
his study. His conclusion that the mixed-amnesics were impaired in the SRT relative to 
controls rests on the finding that amnesic patients demonstrated less ‘higher-order’ 
learning than controls. This conclusion was based on a marginally non-significant test 
result (p=0.07) of the difference in reaction times for random and repeating-sequence 
sets performed by amnesic subjects. Furthermore, this marginal test result directly 
contradicts the more reliable, and non-significant, test of any difference between the 
strength of interference effects of the amnesic and controls groups. We were fortunate 
enough to obtain the actual data used in Curran’s study and used these data to 
directly test any difference in interference effects between mixed-amnesics and 
controls. The t-test of difference scores between groups was not significant (t(9)=0.35) 
and produced a small effect size of d=0.16. Therefore there is currently no firm 
evidence that Curran’s groups differed, and thus at this stage amnesics do not seem 
to be are impaired on his version of the SRT task. 
 
In contrast to the majority of LSN studies Ferraro, Balota and Connor (1993) 
report that their very-mildly dementing AD subjects were not different to controls 
whereas a deficit was present in their mildly dementing AD subjects. They concluded 
the reason for the different SRT performance between their AD groups was simply 
because the mildly dementing AD subjects had a SRT impairment by virtue of their 
more severe dementia. Their finding that very-mildly dementing subjects are not 
impaired relative to controls contrasts with most other SRT studies using LSN 
subjects. Their assumption that SRT differences vary with severity of dementia also 
contrasts with the meta-analysis which concluded that severity of dementia was not a 
reliable predictor of SRT behaviour. While the issue of dementing severity and SRT 
performance will be discussed below, their finding that very-mildly dementing subjects 
were not impaired in the SRT task seems valid for the following reasons. Not only did 
the very-mildly dementing AD subjects have a very similar interference effect to 
control subjects (including a small effect size for the difference between the two 
groups, d=0.22) but the very-mildly dementing AD subjects did not have slower overall 
reaction times than control subjects. This contrasts with all other LSN subjects 
(including Ferraro, Balota and Connor’s mildly dementing AD subjects) who did have 
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slower overall reaction times. Irrespective of the meta-analyses finding that severity of 
dementia does not predict SRT performance it appears obvious that the very-mildly 
dementing AD subjects demonstrated no SRT impairment because they had such a 
mild cognitive disorder. 
 
Overall LSN subjects are reliably impaired in the SRT relative to controls, but 
they are also less impaired relative to other forms of neuropathology. Subjects with 
LSN-dependent amnesia produce a far stronger interference effect than subjects with 
generalised traumatic brain injury or cerebellar lesion (Part 1). Furthermore LSN 
subjects are less impaired relative to controls than subjects with any other form of 
major neural disorder (Part 2), and BGN and ON subjects are more impaired relative 
to controls than LSN subjects (in Part 2). By demonstrating that LSN subjects are 
substantially less impaired in the SRT than BGN subjects (irrespective of the LSN 
subject’s impairment relative to controls) the meta-analysis provides some support of 
a (partial) dissociation between non-declarative memory and limbic system 
neuropathology. 
 
An obvious criticism of aggregating AD, KS and mixed-amnesia studies into a 
single group is that these are clinically and functionally different aetiologies, and in 
particular have reasonably different neuropathological profiles. By definition of being a 
dementia AD produces other neuropathology outside the limbic system and KS often 
produces relatively diffuse neural damage in addition to its primary neuropathology. It 
is possible therefore that the individual aetiologies produce quite different patterns of 
impairment / sparing in the SRT and hence the relatively mild deficit in the LSN group 
may be due to the averaging effect on effect sizes produced when combining the 
groups. However, it is readily apparent from Fig. 3.4 that this is not the case, the 
individual aetiologies, and even individual studies, that go to make up the LSN group 
are remarkably consistent between themselves. Even thought here are only two KS 
studies they are particularly consistent with each other. Similarly the mixed amnesics 
study are consistent within themselves as are the AD studies (the exception in each of 
the AD and amnesic groups, Curran, 1997, and Ferraro, Balota and Connor, 1993, are 
discussed above). Not only are the effect sizes of individual studies consistent within 
aetiologies but the mean effect sizes for each aetiology are very similar to each other. 
Finally, the test of homogeneity for each LSN aetiology and for the LSN group as a 
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whole are all non-significant, demonstrating that both the individual groups and the 
LSN meta-aetiology are valid characterisations of their constituent effect sizes. Hence 
the three LSN aetiologies all produce a very similar degree of impairment in the SRT 
and therefore can be treated as a single group where useful to do so. 
 
Another possible confound within the LSN meta-aetiology is that ‘mixed 
amnesic’ groups include subjects with clinically dissociated aetiologies, in particular 
Korsakoff’s Syndrome. A closer inspection of the three studies that go to make up the 
‘mixed amnesia’ aetiological grouping in the meta-analysis reveals that the ‘amnesiac’ 
groups in each study included a number of different (albeit related) aetiologies. Table 
3.26 shows the amnesic group breakdown for each study and as can be seen ‘mixed 
amnesia’ groups are made up of a variety of neuropsychological disorders which 
seriously questions the feasibility of treating them as a homogenous group. As KS 
subjects (on average) make up a large minority sub-group (about a 3rd) of the mixed 
amnesic designs overall, the distinction between the mixed amnesic and Korsakoff’s 
aetiologies may not be valid. A greater problem is that KS subjects may not always be 
representative of pure (‘organic’) amnesia, even if they do not show clear signs of 
other (i.e. frontal) pathology. 
 
 
Table 3.26. Subject Numbers in Aetiological Sub-Groups Within the ‘Mixed Amnesic’ 
Classification by Individual Study. 
Study KS Encephalitis Diencephalic Lesion 
Hippocampal 
Lesion 
Anoxia Infarct Unknown Total 
Curran, 1997 4 2 - - 3 1 - 10 
Reber & 
Squire, 1994 1 - 6 2 - - - 9 
Reber & 
Squire, 1998 2 1 - - - 1 1 5 
Total 7 3 6 2 3 2 1 24 
 
 Finally,  Aggleton and Brown (1999) comment on a study by Hanley et al (1994) 
who reported that one subjects with an anterior communicating artery aneurysm 
evidenced damage to the left hemisphere, including damage to the anterior thalamus 
and the caudate. This subject showed a verbal recall deficit but not a recognition 
memory deficit. Although this pattern of injury is presumed uncommon in ACoA 
patients it provides additional evidence that human amnesics often fail to have 
restricted neural damage which serves to reinforce the case for experimental lesion 
work in animals. 
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Basal Ganglia Neuropathology and the SRT 
An examination of the studies with subjects suffering basal ganglia dependent 
neuropathology reveals that the literature and the meta-analysis agree that BGN 
patients are impaired in the SRT. In particular the meta-analysis extended the 
literature by specifying the size of the effect and providing quantitative evidence that 
subjects with BGN disorders are impaired on the SRT relative to both controls and 
LSN-dependent amnesics. 
 
No SRT study to date has directly compared the performance of PD and HD 
subjects and in doing so in the meta-analysis provides a unique and important 
comparison of these disorders. There is an initial suggestion that PD and HD may 
produce differing amounts of impairment in the SRT task. However, this suggestion is 
dependent on the removal of an outlier effect size generated by one PD study 
(Stefanova et al, 2000). While the inclusion of this study in the PD group renders the 
PD group heterogeneous Stefanova et al is more empirically reliable than most PD-
SRT studies by virtue of having much larger-than-normal sample sizes and thus 
possibly more indicative of the real ability of PD subjects in the SRT (Note, there was 
no obvious reason why the PD subjects in Stefanova et al produced such a larger 
effect size than other PD subjects). Thus the effect size of the homogenous PD group 
is likely to underestimate the true effect size for PD subjects and therefore likely to 
overestimate the difference between the effects of PD and HD on SRT performance. 
Hence, while there is a clear and obvious SRT deficit for BGN subjects as a whole 
there is little evidence to suggest the constituent aetiologies within the BGN meta-
category vary between themselves. 
 
However, the finding that LSN subjects are less impaired relative to BGN 
subjects rather than LSN subjects simply being unimpaired relative to BGN subjects 
conflicts with the multiple memory literature which claims that a clean dissociation 
exists between LSN and BGN subjects in non-declarative memory tasks. This lack of 
a clear dissociation between the SRT performance of LSN and BGN subjects, and the 
mild LSN-SRT impairment it stems from, is a serious challenge for the multiple 
memory systems theory. 
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Other Neuropathology and the SRT 
In contrast to both LSN and BGN groups the ‘other’ neuropathologies are 
relatively underrepresented in the SRT literature. Of the three studies included in the 
meta-analysis one used subjects with cerebellar lesions, one used subjects with pFC 
lesions and one used subjects with (closed head) traumatic brain injury (from which 
two effect sizes were generated). While the test of homogeneity was not significant 
when combining the two TBI studies together the extent and severity of brain injury 
differed markedly between subjects in the two TBI conditions which made combining 
them into a single group conceptually problematic. Because there are so few studies 
in  each of the individual aetiologies they (the separate aetiological groups) suffer the 
greatest problems with test sensitivity and interpretation and their results are also 
especially vulnerable to invalidation via unpublished studies. For these reasons it was 
especially useful to combine these effect sizes into a meta-aetiological group even if 
the neuropathological and clinical profile of the individual aetiologies isn’t particularly 
consistent within the meta-category. 
As there are so few studies in the SRT literature employing subjects with these 
aetiologies there is no general consensus about the effects of these aetiologies on 
SRT performance beyond that non-specific brain injury (i.e. anything that does not 
include LSN or BGN dysfunction) will probably result in some degree of impairment of 
SRT performance, but a weaker impairment than basal ganglia dysfunction. 
Consequently the results of the meta-analysis provides good empirical evidence that 
non-specific brain injury does indeed impair SRT performance. Two findings in 
particular are of interest as regards ON-SRT studies. Firstly, that as a group the ON 
subjects are impaired relative to all other subjects (ON subjects are impaired relative 
to control and LSN subjects in Part 1, and relative to control, LSN and BGN subjects in 
Part 2). Surprisingly, this indicates that there are other aetiologies that produce a more 
severe SRT impairment than even basal ganglia dysfunction. Secondly, that there are 
considerable differences between the individual aetiologies that make up the ON 
meta-category. Not only are the individual aetiologies different in terms of the strength 
of their effect sizes but also in terms of the pattern of effect sizes. 
The least impaired of the three individual ON aetiologies are the non-specific 
TBI subjects (Mutter et al, 1994) who produce evidence of a moderately-strong within-
subject interference effect (Part 1, d=0.66; and thus moderately-strong evidence of 
non-declarative sequence learning) and a moderately-strong impairment relative to 
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controls (Part 2, d=0.67). The finding that subjects with mild head injury are not 
particularly impaired is not surprising as such injury is likely to produce little brain 
damage and therefore little consequence for cognitive function. In contrast subjects 
with explicit, confirmed brain insult (such as the moderately head injured subjects) can 
be expected to suffer a marked degree of brain damage and thus a more serious 
cognitive impairment. Most interestingly the effect size for mildly head injured subjects 
in Mutter et al, (1994) has a numerical similarity with control subjects in the meta-
analysis (d=0.07). This strong similarity between mild head injured and control 
subject’s SRT performance is the perhaps the best evidence that the mild head injured 
subjects demonstrate a substantial difference to more severely injured subjects in 
terms of their SRT performance and thus, irrespective of the TBI group’s homogeneity, 
should perhaps not be grouped together with the more severely head injured subjects. 
Subjects with pFC lesions demonstrate a negative within-subject interference 
effect that was not different to zero (Part 1; d=-0.18, i.e. their reaction times get faster 
after being switched to a random sequence) and thus they demonstrate absolutely no 
evidence of a within-subject interference effect. However pFC subjects are only 
moderately impaired relative to controls in Part 2 (d=0.64). It is difficult to understand 
how a group that does not display any within-subject interference effect can only be 
‘moderately’ impaired relative to a control group. It would be expected that control 
subjects would generate a strong interference effect and therefore be substantially 
different to pFC subjects who fail to demonstrate any form of interference effect. 
However, the calculations for the effect sizes for the control and pFC groups are not in 
question as we were able to obtain some of the original data from the study using pFC 
patients (Beldarrain et al, 1999) and to calculate effect sizes directly from those data.  
In contrast to both the TBI and pFC subjects cerebellar (Cb) subjects are 
completely impaired in the SRT. Like pFC subjects Cb subjects display no within-
subject interference effect (Part 1; d=-0.07) and thus no evidence of non-declarative 
sequence learning. Unlike pFC subjects however Cb subjects also display a more 
profound impairment relative to controls (Part 2; d=2.12). Not only is the within-subject 
interference effect for Cb subjects substantially weaker than those BGN patients who 
are traditionally regarded as impaired on the SRT but Cb subjects display a greater 
impairment relative to controls than even that of the severely impaired HD subjects 
(HD d=1.47). 
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Power and Effect Size 
No discussion of the meta-analytic results would be complete without some 
mention of statistical power. As noted in the discussions for both Parts 1 and 2 SRT 
studies suffer a serious lack of power, largely as a result of small sample sizes. This is 
a concern in its own right but even more so because many SRT studies rely on a 
failure to reject the null hypothesis to conclude there is no difference between groups, 
which is especially vulnerable to type-II errors in conditions of low power. One of the 
critical findings of this meta-analysis has been that many SRT studies, and especially 
those employing subjects with LSN, simply lack sufficient power to be able to draw the 
conclusions that they report. This is the main reason for the discrepancy in results 
between individual studies and the meta-analysis as regards the ability of LSN 
patients to perform the SRT. Because these studies had low power they were 
insensitive to even the medium-to-large differences between LSN and control groups 
and thus incorrectly concluded that LSN patients were not impaired in the SRT. This 
fundamental error has distorted the results of SRT studies, since the very first study. It 
is only with the findings of the meta-analysis that we finally begin to get a clear and 
accurate (and potentially more interesting) understanding of spared / impaired SRT 
performance in a range of different neurological disorders. 
 
As previously discussed the main cause of low power in SRT studies is low 
sample size. Another important benefit of the meta-analysis is providing valid 
estimates of effect sizes for different neuropathological populations which enables 
future researchers to tailor their research to fit the relevant effect size, and in particular 
ascertain an adequate sample size (see below) prior to beginning any research. 
 
Moderator Variables 
One of the surprises of the meta-analysis was the failure of severity of 
dementia to demonstrate a meaningful consequence for SRT performance. (See 
discussion of Parts 1 and 2). While it was expected that severity of dementia would be 
directly and inversely related to SRT performance the meta-analysis concluded there 
is no effect of dementia on SRT performance. There is currently no good explanation 
for this unexpected pattern of results except to repeat the point made in the discussion 
of Parts 1 and 2. Irrespective of the fact that these tests are part of a meta-analysis 
they still have relatively few subjects (the two dementing groups have ~50 subjects 
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each) and thus may still be somewhat insensitive to relatively small group differences. 
 
While some studies conclude that explicit sequence knowledge is 
advantageous for SRT performance other studies conclude it has little, if any, effect 
(Segar, 1997; Stadler & Neely, 1997; Jackson & Jackson, 1995; Mutter, Howard & 
Howard, 1994; Willingham & Korroshetz, 1993; Reber & Squire, 1884 & 1998). The 
consistent finding across both parts of the meta-analysis was that those patients with 
‘some’ explicit knowledge performed better and / or were less impaired relative to 
controls than those subjects with ‘no’ or ‘good’ explicit sequence knowledge. 
 
Although the moderator analyses of ‘Age’ and ‘On / Off Medication’ were 
statistically good predictors of SRT performance both suffered conceptual difficulties 
as detailed in the discussion of Part 2. Briefly, the ‘Age’ analysis is confounded by the 
presence of very high effect sizes due to aetiological condition rather than age in the 
younger cohort. Similarly the on / off medication analysis is confounded by systematic 
differences in group composition other than medication status. 
 
Recommendations for Future Research. 
In light of the power and meta-analytic results and the discussion presented 
above a number of recommendations can be made as to the design and direction of 
future SRT research. 
 
Future SRT Study Design Recommendations 
1) It is critical that a study have sufficient power to detect any differences 
between groups. Minimum sample sizes, to obtain 80% power with a two-tailed test 
and alpha set at 0.05, for the five primary aetiologies used in this meta-analysis are 
presented in Table 3.25 based on the mean effect size for each aetiology as 
calculated in the meta-analysis. 
 
Table 3.25. Subject numbers required for 80% power according to effect sizes 
calculated during the Meta-Analysis 
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 Part 12 Part 23 
Aetiology Mean 
effect 
size1 
N Required for 80% Power 
(Dependent-means t-test) 
Mean 
effect 
size1 
n Required for 80% 
Power (Independent 
means t-test)4 
Alzheimer’s Disease 0.57 27 0.6 45 
Mixed amnesics 1.01 10 0.77 28 
Korsakoff’s Syndrome 1.36 7 0.79 27 
     
Parkinson’s Disease 0.54 29 1.1 15 
Huntington’s Disease 0.39 54 1.47 9 
1 As calculated in the meta-analysis 
2 For studies examining the ability of neurological subjects to demonstrate an interference effect 
different from zero 
3 For studies comparing the interference effects of neurological and control subjects 
4 t-test of difference scores, n given is the number of neuropathological subjects required for 80% power 
and assumes equal n for the control group. 
 
2) Subject’s should ideally have no explicit sequence knowledge at all, or at 
least it should be keep to a bare minimum. Furthermore, it is preferable that if one 
group achieves a degree of explicit sequence knowledge that the other group do so to 
the same degree in order to better equate the influence of explicit sequence 
knowledge between groups. However, the mechanics of doing this raise a number of 
serious methodological issues (e.g. do subjects employ non-declaratively ‘acquired’ 
explicit sequence knowledge in the same way as knowledge deliberately provided by 
the experimenter?). Furthermore, some subjects (e.g. amnesics) may be incapable of 
retaining and using deliberately provided explicit sequence knowledge. Thus overall it 
is methodologically and theoretically preferable to ensure all subjects have no explicit 
sequence knowledge. However, just how this somewhat idealised goal might be 
accomplished, especially in neurologically intact control subjects, without introducing 
other methodological confounds (e.g. dual-task conditions for controls subjects only), 
is not clear. 
 
Suggested Directions For Future SRT Studies 
1) A study that would be of particular value at this time is a comparison 
between dementing and non-dementing PD subjects. The utility of such a study is two-
fold. It may help to explain the variation in the SRT performance of PD subjects (effect 
sizes for PD studies in the Part 1 of meta-analysis ranged from 0.23 to 1.42 and were 
widely distributed in that range, and in Part 2 ranged from 0.16 to 1.8, not counting the 
outlier, Stefanova et al, d=2.09). 
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2) The study that found a greater SRT impairment in more dementing AD 
subjects (Ferraro, Balota and Connor, 1993) suggests dementia may be a critical 
predictor of SRT performance at least in this disorder. Coupled with the possibility that 
the meta-analysis failed to find a difference between severity of dementia because it 
also lacked the power to detect any difference argues strongly for a study designed 
specifically to address the issue of severity of dementia irrespective of aetiology. In 
particular a study that deliberately examines differing severities of dementia within and 
across aetiological conditions. Obvious aetiological candidates for this include: AD, 
and dementing PD and HD patients. 
 
General Conclusions 
 
Overall the meta- and power-analyses have reinforced the notion that the SRT 
is a sensitive test of non-declarative memory. In particular the meta-analysis has 
shown that the SRT is sensitive to neuropathological condition, and in particular is 
capable of dissociating limbic system and basal ganglia dysfunction. Furthermore, the 
meta-analysis has substantially increased our level of understanding of the 
relationship between neuropathological condition and SRT performance, and in 
particular shown that the relationship is more subtle and complex than originally 
thought. Most importantly the meta-analysis has produced conclusive evidence in 
opposition to the commonly held assumption that subjects with LSN-dependent 
amnesia are not impaired on the SRT; in fact they are impaired, just not to the same 
degree as other neuropathological populations. Not only does this contradict the 
majority of the SRT literature but the lack of a clean dissociation between LSN and 
BGN SRT performance also challenges the commonly held view that these two 
substrates are responsible for completely different memory systems. A central tenant 
of the multiple memory systems theory is the dissociation between neural substrates 
responsible for different memory systems. Taken together the LSN SRT impairment 
and the lack of a clear distinction between LSN and BGN performance are therefore a 
serious theoretical and empirical challenge to the theory. 
 
The other major finding of this study is that the vast majority of SRT studies 
have inadequate power, rendering them insensitive to group differences. This is a 
   - 146 - 
   
  
 
serious problem when applied to typical research practices but is even worse in 
conditions of atypical experimental design (relying on a failure to reject the null 
hypothesis) which are so common in SRT studies with LSN-dependent amnesics. 
Thus extreme care must be taken when interpreting the results of most SRT studies, 
especially when they conclude there is no difference between groups, and future 
studies must be designed with due concern for statistical power. 
 
Both the lack of power in SRT studies and, in particular, the serious challenge 
to the multiple memory system that a LSN SRT impairment produces strengthens the 
case for animal lesion work. The primary advantage of animal studies over human is 
the certainty associated with both the site and extent of neural injury. It is readily 
apparent from the results and discussion above that the two main issues within the 
human literature are a result of the (understandable) difficulty with accurately 
determining the neurological condition of a subjects and / or the site and extent of the 
neural damage a subject suffers (especially in neurodegenerative disorders, see 
Reber, 1992), and the often serious difficulty in sourcing sufficient neurological pure 
subjects to ensure adequate power. The use of animal subjects in research can 
overcome these problems by allowing the use of accurate, specific and restricted brain 
lesions and by ensuring the availability of large numbers of subjects. 
 
These advantages of animal research were part of the reason we developed an 
animal analogue of the SRT, in order to better test the various neural substrates 
implicated by the SRT literature and this meta-analysis. The other primary reason was 
the lack of an analogical valid animal model of a human non-declarative memory task. 
The following chapter (Chapter 4) introduces the literature concerned with animal 
memory work and multiple memory systems in particular to illustrate the successes 
and limitations of prior attempts to demonstrate multiple memory systems in animals. 
Chapter 4 will focus on the poor fit between animal and human ‘non-declarative’ 
memory tasks and will demonstrate that an animal-SRT task is a practical and useful 
addition to the multiple memory systems literature. Modelling human non-declarative 
sequence learning in animals offers the opportunity to demonstrate a double-
dissociation of neural substrate (basal ganglia lesions and limbic system lesions) and 
memory task (allocentric spatial learning and the animal-SRT task) using animal 
memory tasks that are both valid and reliable models of their analogous human 
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memory tasks, which hitherto has not been possible. 
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Appendix to Chapter 3 
 
Table 3A.1. Coding of Moderator Variables by Study 
 Meta-Aetiology Individual Aetiology 
Severity of 
Dementia 
On 
Meds 
(Y/N) 
SRT 
Length 
SRT 
Style 
Expl
Knowl
Patient 
       
Beldarrain et al, 1999 3 7 (pFC) 1 No 4 & 101 1 1
Curran, 1997 1 2 (Mixed Amnesiacs) 1 No 12 1 1
Ferraro Balota & Connor, 1993 2 4 (PD) 1 Yes 10 1 Not Rep
Ferraro Balota & Connor, 1993 1 1 (AD) 2 No 10 1 Not Re
Ferraro Balota & Connor, 1993 1 1 (AD) 3 No 10 1 Not Re
Jackson et al 1995 2 4 (PD) 1 Yes 11 2 1
Knopman & Nissen,1987 1 1 (AD) 3 No 10 1 1
Knopman & Nissen, 1991 2 5 (HD) 2 Yes 10 1 1
Knopman, 1991 1 1 (AD) 2 No 10 1 1
Mutter et al, 1994 3 7 (Head Injury) 1 No 10 1 3
Mutter et al, 1994 3 7 (Head Injury) 1 No 10 1 3
Nissen & Bullemer, 1987 1 3 (KS) 1 No 10 1 1
Nissen, Willingham & Hartman, 1989 1 3 (KS) 1 No 10 1 Not Re
Pascal-Leone et al, 1993 2 4 (PD) 1 Yes 8, 10 & 121 1 2
Pascal-Leone et al, 1993 3 6 (Cerebellar Injury) 1 No 8, 10 & 121 1 1
Reber & Squire, 1994 1 2 (Mixed Amnesiacs) 1 No 10 1 1
Reber & Squire, 1998 1 2 (Mixed Amnesiacs) 1 No 12 1 1
Sommer et al, 1999 1 4 (PD) 1 Yes 10 1 2
Stefanova et al, 2000 2 4 (PD) 1 Yes 10 1 4
Stefanova et al, 2000 2 2 (ACoA amnesia) 1 No 10 1 2
Westwater et al, 1998 2 4 (PD) 1 Yes 10 1 Not Re
Willingham & Korroshetz, 1993 2 5 (HD) 3 Yes 12 1 1
       
1 Coded as a ‘missing’ value in the meta-analysis 
2 All unreported variables were coded as ‘missing’. 
Note: A ‘missing’ value means the mean ES associated with that study is not included in the moderator 
analysis for that variable (only). 
 
Legend for Coding Variables 
Aetiological meta-category: LS=1, BG=2, Other=3 
Individual Etiology: AD=1, Mixed Amnesiacs=2, KS=3, PD=4, HD=5, Cerebellar Lesion=6, pFC & Non-
specific (frontal) head injury =7 
Dementing (the neurological group): Yes/No 
Severity of Dementia (in the neurological group): 1=Non-dementing, 2=Very mildly dementing, 3= Mildly 
dementing or worse 
On Medication (the neurological group): Yes/No 
SRT Length: Actual length used as coding variable 
SRT style: 1= Knopman & Nissen style 4-button; 2= 4-choice box (Jackson et al, 1995) 
Amount of explicit knowledge: 1=none, 2= ‘some’, 3= ’good’. 
Age: Under, or equal to, 65 and over 65 
Logged RT: Yes/No 
Random Sequence Style: ’Unconstrained’ (random sequences were only constrained by disallowing 
immediate repetition and / or ensuring equal frequency of stimulus presentation of a training block ) & 
’Constrained’ (random sequences that only varied from repeating sequences in terms of the actual 
sequence information presented). 
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Table 3A.2. Detail of Methods Used For Generating Effect Sizes by Study 
Author and Neurologic 
Aetiology  Part 1 Analysis (Within subject) 
Part 2
 Data Source (Values given are Mean & (SD) of difference scores) 
Mean 
ES (g) Data Source 
Beldarrain et al, 19991 
 
 
pFC Injury 
Original data provided 
by author 
Long SRT; Ipsilateral hand = -54(96), N=22,  
ES = -0.56 
Contralateral hand = -45(130), N=22, 
 ES = -0.34  
Short SRT= -135(392), N=18, ES = 0.34 
-0.19 p-values in text & original data provided by author 
Curran, 1997 
Mixed Amnesics F-value in text F=4.21, Amnesics N=10 0.65 
Original data provided by 
author 
Ferraro et al 1993 
PD 
Assume significance 
(Difference = 51ms) p=0.05, PD N=17 0.71 Interaction F-value in text 
Ferraro et al 1993 
Very mild AD 
Assume significance 
(Difference = 62ms) p=0.05, Very Mild AD N=27 0.55 Interaction p-value in text 
Ferraro et al 1993 
Mild or worse AD 
Assume no effect 
(Difference = 15ms) p=0.5, Mild or worse  AD N=15 0.25 Interaction F-value in text 
Jackson et al 1995, 
Experiment 2 : PD 
Mean difference & 
SDdiff in text 
PD = 9.3(33.9), N=11 0.27 Difference scores t-value in text 
Knopman & Nissen,1987 
AD 
Mean difference & 
SDdiff in text 
AD = 110(162), N=28 0.68 Difference scores t-value in text 
Knopman & Nissen, 1991 
HD 
RTs in Table 2, SDdiff 
calculated HD = 62(112.19), N=13 0.55 Interaction F-value in text 
Knopman, 1991, 
Session 1, AD 
Unlogged mean 
difference score in 
text. SDdiff calculated. 
AD 80(83.63), N=11 0.96 Interaction F-value for Log RTs in text 
Mutter et al, 1994, Mild HI t-values in text Expt. 1, Mild HI, t=3.765, N=12, ES = 1.08 Expt. 2, GCS>13, t=3.075, N=12, ES = 0.89 0.91 
Table 3; Mean Differences 
and SDdiff  scores 
Mutter et al, 1994,  
Moderate HI t-value in text Experiment 2, GCS≤13, t=1.819, N=12 0.53 
Table 3; Mean Differences 
and SDdiff  scores 
Nissen & Bullemer, 1987, 
 
KS 
Meandiff  scores 
estimated from Fig. 8, 
SDdiff calculated from 
F-value for Block 
KS = 95(46.3), N=6 2.05 
Meandiff  scores estimated 
from Fig 8, SDdiff calculated 
from interaction F-vaule 
Nissen, Willingham & 
Hartman, 1989,  
Session 1, 
KS 
Meandiff  scores 
estimated from Fig. 1, 
SDdiff calculated from 
F-value for Block 
KS 85(67.03), N=7 1.27 
Meandiff  scores estimated 
from Fig 1, SDdiff calculated 
from Block F-values for 
individual groups 
Pascal-Leone et al, 1993 
 
PD 
Meandiff  scores 
estimated from Fig. 1 
& 3, SDdiff calculated 
from p-value for Block 
in experiment 1 
All ESs; SDdiff 70.87, N=20 
Expt. 1: PD = 110, ES = 1.56 
Expt. 2: SRT 8, PD = 167.5, ES = 2.36;  
SRT 10 PD = 110, ES = 1.54;  
SRT12 PD = 17.5, ES = 0.24 
1.42 
Meandiff  scores estimated 
from Fig. 1 & 3, Pooled-
SDdiff calculated from p-
values for Block in 
experiment 1 
Pascal-Leone et al, 1993 
 
Cerebellar 
Meandiff  scores 
estimated from Fig. 1 
& 3, SDdiff calculated 
from p-value for Block 
in experiment 1 
All SDdiff = 100.33, N=15 
Expt 1: Cerebellar = -15, ES = -0.15. 
Expt 2: SRT8, Cerebellar = 10, ES = 0.1;  
SRT10 Cerebellar = -15, ES = -0.15;  
SRT12 Cerebellar = -10, Es = -0.1 
-0.08 
Meandiff  scores estimated 
from Fig. 1 & 3, Pooled-
SDdiff calculated from p-
values for Block in 
experiment 1 
Reber & Squire, 1994 
 
Mixed Amnesics 
Assume significance Experiment 1: p=0.05, N=9 1.04 
Meandiff  scores estimated 
from Fig. 1. SDdiff 
calculated from interaction 
F-value  
Reber & Squire, 1998 
Mixed Amnesics 
Meandiff  score from 
Table. 1, SDdiff 
calculated. 
Session 1 Amnesics = 24.8(28.1), N=5 0.88 Meandiff  scores from Table. 1, SDdiffs calculated. 
Sommer et al, 1999 
PD 
Meandiff  & SDdiff 
values in text PD = 78.3(218.1), N=11 0.36 
Meandiff  & SDdiff values in 
text 
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Stefanova et al, 2000 
 
PD 
Meandiff  scores 
estimated from Fig. 1, 
SDdiff calculated from 
F-value for Block 
PD = 20(85.78), N=39 0.23 
Mean scores estimated 
from Fig. 1, SDdiff 
calculated from Interaction 
F-value 
Stefanova et al, 2000 
 
ACoA 
Meandiff  scores 
estimated from Fig. 1, 
SDdiff calculated from 
F-value for Block 
ACoA = 110(85.78), N=30 1.28 
Mean scores estimated 
from Fig. 1, SDdiff 
calculated from Interaction 
F-value 
Westwater et al, 1998 
PD t-value in text t=2.6, PD N=13 0.72 Interaction F-value in text 
Willingham & Korroshetz, 
1993. HD Assume no difference p=0.5, HD N=12 0.28 
Difference scores t-value in 
text 
1  The harmonic mean (37) was entered for the N of controls subjects in the meta-analysis 
2  The interaction F of the raw-RT data for session one were used as it is consistent with what is shown 
in the graph (the log-RT interaction F is not). 
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Table 3A.3. Power of Studies Included in the Meta-Analysis Given Idealised ESs : Within 
Neurological Group Effect (Two-Tailed) 
     ←                             Theoretical 
Significance                       → 
     ←            Clinical 
Significance            → 
Study: # 
Subjects 
Actual 
ES (d) 
Small 
(d=0.2) 
Medium 
(d=0.5) 
Large 
(d=0.8) 
Very 
Large 
(d=1.2) 
Beldarrain et al, 1999 
(pFC) 22 -0.19 15 61 95 100 
Curran, 1997 (Mixed 
amnesics) 10 0.65 9 29 62 92 
Ferraro Balota & 
Connor, 1993 (PD) 17 0.71 12 49 87 100 
Ferraro Balota & 
Connor, 1993 (Very 
mild AD) 27 
0.55 
17 71 98 100 
Ferraro Balota & 
Connor, 1993 (Mild 
AD) 15 
0.25 
11 44 82 99 
Jackson et al 1995 
(PD) 11 0.27 9 32 67 95 
Knopman & 
Nissen,1987 (AD) 28 0.68 18 72 98 100 
Knopman & Nissen, 
1991 (HD) 13 0.55 10 38 75 98 
Knopman, 1991 (AD) 11 0.96 8 26 56 88 
Mutter et al, 1994 (Mild 
traumatic head injury) 24 0.92 16 65 96 100 
Mutter et al, 1994 
(Moderate traumatic 
head injury) 12 
0.53 
10 35 71 97 
Nissen & Bullemer, 
1987 (KS) 6 2.05 7 17 36 66 
Nissen, Willingham & 
Hartman, 1989 (KS) 7 1.27 7 20 43 75 
Pascal-Leone et al, 
1993 (PD) 20 1.42 14 56 92 100 
Pascal-Leone et al, 
1993 (Cerebellar) 15 -0.08 11 44 82 99 
Reber & Squire, 1994 
(Mixed amnesics) 9 1.04 8 26 56 88 
Reber & Squire, 1998 
(Mixed amnesics) 5 0.88 6 14 28 53 
Sommer et al, 1999 
(PD) 11 0.36 9 32 67 95 
Stefanova et al, 2000 
(PD) 39 0.23 23 86 100 100 
Stefanova et al, 2000 
(ACoA) 30 1.28 19 75 99 100 
Westwater et al, 1998 
(PD) 13 0.72 10 38 75 98 
Willingham & 
Korroshetz, 1993 (HD) 12 0.28 10 35 71 97 
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Table 3A.4. Power of The Studies Included in the Meta-Analysis Given Idealised ESs : Between 
Neurological & Control Group Effect (Two-Tailed) 
      ←                        Theoretical 
Significance                       → 
 # of Subjects   ←          Clinical 
Significance         
→ 
Study: Neuro. Controls Actual 
ES (d) 
Small 
(d=0.2) 
Medium 
(d=0.5) 
Large 
(d=0.8) 
Very 
Large 
(d=1.2) 
Beldarrain et al, 
1999 (pFC) 22 52 0.65 12 49 87 99 
Curran, 1997 
(Mixed amnesics) 10 10 0.16 7 19 40 72 
Ferraro Balota & 
Connor, 1993 (PD) 17 26 0.73 10 35 71 96 
Ferraro Balota & 
Connor, 1993 (Very 
mild AD) 27 26 
0.22 
11 43 82 99 
Ferraro Balota & 
Connor, 1993 (Mild 
AD) 15 26 
1.22 
9 32 67 95 
Jackson et al 1995 
(PD) 11 10 1.7 7 19 41 74 
Knopman & 
Nissen,1987 (AD) 28 13 0.62 9 30 64 94 
Knopman & Nissen, 
1991 (HD) 13 12 1.32 8 22 48 82 
Knopman, 1991 
(AD) 11 16 0.58 7 21 45 79 
Mutter et al, 1994 
(Mild traumatic 
head injury) 24 11 
0.07 
8 27 57 89 
Mutter et al, 1994 
(Moderate traumatic 
head injury) 12 11 
1.4 
7 21 45 78 
Nissen & Bullemer, 
1987 (KS) 6 8 0.9 6 14 28 53 
Nissen, Willingham 
& Hartman, 1989 
(KS) 7 7 
0.8 
6 14 28 54 
Pascal-Leone et al, 
1993 (PD) 20 30 1.05 10 40 78 98 
Pascal-Leone et al, 
1993 (Cerebellar) 15 30 2.16 9 34 70 96 
Reber & Squire, 
1994 (Mixed 
amnesics) 9 12 
0.97 
7 19 41 73 
Reber & Squire, 
1998 (Mixed 
amnesics) 5 10 
0.68 
6 14 27 53 
Sommer et al, 1999 
(PD) 11 15 0.16 8 23 49 83 
Stefanova et al, 
2000 (PD) 39 31 2.09 13 54 91 100 
Stefanova et al, 
2000 (ACoA) 30 31 0.98 12 48 87 100 
Westwater et al, 
1998 (PD) 13 9 0.89 7 20 42 75 
Willingham & 
Korroshetz, 1993 
(HD) 12 12 
1.77 
8 22 47 80 
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Table 3A.5. Effect Sizes and 95% Confidence Intervals for All Results Figures in Part 1. 
Figure: Mean ES 95% CI 
3.1, All Effects Sizes Included in Part 1 
Ferraro Balota & Connor, 1993 (Very mild AD) 0.55 0.546 
Ferraro Balota & Connor, 1993 (Mild AD) 0.25 0.716 
Knopman & Nissen,1987 (AD) 0.68 0.537 
Knopman, 1991 (AD) 0.96 0.878 
Alzheimer's Disease Mean ES 0.57 0.31 
Curran, 1997 (Mixed amnesics) 0.65 0.898 
Reber & Squire, 1994 (Mixed amnesics) 1.04 0.986 
Reber & Squire, 1998 (Mixed amnesics) 0.88 1.248 
Stefanova et al, 2000 (ACoA) 1.28 0.558 
Mixed Amnesia Mean ES 1.01 0.4 
Nissen & Bullemer, 1987 (KS) 2.05 1.398 
Nissen, Willingham & Hartman, 1989 (KS) 1.27 1.151 
Korsakof's Syndrome Mean ES 1.36 0.86 
Limbic System Neuropathology Mean ES 0.78 0.24 
Ferraro Balota & Connor, 1993 (PD) 0.71 0.697 
Jackson et al 1995 (PD) 0.27 0.843 
Pascal-Leone et al, 1993 (PD) 1.42 0.702 
Sommer et al, 1999 (PD) 0.36 0.841 
Stefanova et al, 2000 (PD) 0.23 0.448 
Westwater et al, 1998 (PD) 0.72 0.793 
Parkinson's Disease Mean ES 0.54 0.27 
Knopman & Nissen, 1991 (HD) 0.55 0.785 
Willingham & Korroshetz, 1993 (HD) 0.28 0.8 
Huntington's Disease Mean ES 0.39 0.56 
Basal Ganglia Neuropathology Mean ES 0.51 0.24 
Mutter et al, 1994 (Mild traumatic brain injury) 0.92 0.83 
Mutter et al, 1994 (Moderate traumatic brain injury) 0.53 0.81 
Traumatic Brain Injury Mean ES 0.66 0.59 
Beldarrain et al, 1999 (pFC) -0.19 0.595 
Pascal-Leone et al, 1993 (Cerebellar) -0.08 0.719 
Other Neuropathology Mean ES 0.17 0.36 
Overall  Mean ES 0.56 0.16 
  
Figure 3.2, Severity of Dementia 
Non-Dementing Subjects 0.58 0.18 
Very Mildly Dementing Subjects 0.6 0.4 
Mildly Dementing Subjects 0.45 0.38 
Overall Mean ES 0.56 0.16 
   
Figure 3.3, Degree of Explicit Sequence Knowledge 
Subjects with No Explicit Sequence Knowledge 0.49 0.25 
Subjects with ‘some’ Sequence Knowledge 1.1 0.38 
Subjects with ‘good’ Sequence Knowledge 0.39 0.35 
Overall Mean ES 0.56 0.16 
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Table 3A.6. Effect Sizes and 95% Confidence Intervals for All Results Figures in Part 2. 
Figure: Mean ES 95% CI 
3.4, All Effects Sizes Included in Part 2 
Ferraro Balota & Connor, 1993 (Very mild AD) 0.22 0.543 
Ferraro Balota & Connor, 1993 (Mild AD) 1.26 0.693 
Knopman & Nissen,1987 (AD) 0.62 0.672 
Knopman, 1991 (AD) 0.58 0.784 
Alzheimer's Disease Mean ES 0.6 0.33 
Curran, 1997 (Mixed amnesics) 0.16 0.878 
Reber & Squire, 1994 (Mixed amnesics) 0.97 0.917 
Reber & Squire, 1998 (Mixed amnesics) 0.68 1.102 
Stefanova et al, 2000 (ACoA) 0.98 0.533 
Mixed Amnesia Mean ES 0.77 0.38 
Nissen & Bullemer, 1987 (KS) 0.9 1.101 
Nissen, Willingham & Hartman, 1989 (KS) 0.8 1.089 
Korsakof's Syndrome Mean ES 0.79 0.77 
Limbic System Neuropathology Mean ES 0.68 0.24 
Ferraro Balota & Connor, 1993 (PD) 0.73 0.631 
Jackson et al 1995 (PD) 1.7 1.003 
Pascal-Leone et al, 1993 (PD) 1.05 0.601 
Sommer et al, 1999 (PD) 0.16 0.782 
Stefanova et al, 2000 (PD) 2.09 0.581 
Westwater et al, 1998 (PD) 0.89 0.889 
Parkinson's Disease Mean ES 1.1 0.22 
Knopman & Nissen, 1991 (HD) 1.32 0.841 
Willingham & Korroshetz, 1993 (HD) 1.77 0.941 
Huntington's Disease Mean ES 1.47 0.62 
Basal Ganglia Neuropathology Mean ES 1.14 0.21 
Mutter et al, 1994 (Mild traumatic brain injury) 0.07 0.804 
Mutter et al, 1994 (Moderate traumatic brain injury) 1.4 0.898 
Traumatic Brain Injury Mean ES 0.66 0.4 
Beldarrain et al, 1999 (pFC) 0.65 0.444 
Pascal-Leone et al, 1993 (Cerebellar) 2.16 0.767 
Other Neuropathology Mean ES 1.43 0.28 
Overall  Mean ES 1.06 0.14 
   
Figure 3.5, Severity of Dementia 
Non-Dementing Subjects 1.15 0.16 
Very Mildly Dementing Subjects 0.55 0.39 
Mildly Dementing Subjects 1.1 0.43 
Overall Mean ES 0.94 0.16 
   
Figure 3.6, Degree of Explicit Sequence Knowledge : Neuropathological Subjects 
Neuropathological Subjects with No Explicit Sequence 
Knowledge 1.27 0.21 
Neuropathological Subjects with ‘some’ Sequence Knowledge 0.93 0.27 
Neuropathological Subjects with ‘good’ Sequence Knowledge 1.39 0.42 
Overall Mean ES 0.94 0.16 
 
Figure 3.7, Degree of Explicit Sequence Knowledge : Control Subjects 
Control Subjects with No Explicit Sequence Knowledge 1.05 0.54 
Control Subjects with 'Some' Explicit Sequence Knowledge 0.36 0.29 
Control Subjects with 'Good' Explicit Sequence Knowledge 0.92 0.26 
Overall Mean ES 0.94 0.16 
 
Figure 3.8, Age 
Subjects ≤ 65 years of age 1.2 0.15 
Subjects > 65 years of age 0.72 0.27 
Overall Mean ES 0.94 0.16 
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Figure 3.8, Medication Status 
Subjects on Medication During SRT Performance 1.19 0.22 
Subjects not on Medication During SRT performance 0.77 0.2 
Overall Mean ES 0.94 0.16 
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Chapter 4 
 
An Introduction to Multiple Memory 
Systems in Animals 
 
General Introduction 
 
The previous chapter presented a quantitative review of the human SRT 
literature and concluded that patients with limbic system dysfunction are impaired in 
the SRT. Not only does this directly contradict most SRT studies that use such 
patients but also the multiple memory systems theory itself. As a consequence there is 
a need for restricted lesion work in animal subjects to support and expand on the 
human SRT literature, especially as regards determining the neural substrates for 
non-declarative sequence learning. This chapter will show that while there are several 
valid animal analogues of human declarative memory, there is as yet no good animal 
analogue of human implicit memory and implicit sequence learning in particular. While 
the performance of animals across memory tasks is dissociable, which implies 
multiple memory systems, the tasks used to demonstrate non-declarative memory are 
not comparable / analogous to human non-declarative tasks and therefore the 
memory system(s) they rely on may not be the same as those used in human non-
declarative memory. 
 
This chapter begins by showing that there is good evidence for multiple-
memory systems in animals and that these systems appear analogous to the 
appropriate human memory systems. Next this chapter will present a discussion of 
memory tasks in animals that are presumed to be analogous to declarative and non-
declarative memory tasks in humans and establish that the animal non-declarative 
tasks in particular are poorly connected to the appropriate human tasks. Finally, it will 
be concluded that rats are capable of appreciating and responding to serially ordered 
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information. The ability of rats to respond to serially ordered information suggests that 
animal subjects could perform a SRT-type task.  
 
4.1 Evidence of Multiple-Memory in Animals 
 
In order to ascertain the likelihood of rats being able to perform a SRT task it is 
first necessary to demonstrate that animals can demonstrate multiple and dissociable 
forms of memory. If they can not, then rats are unlikely to be able to show a 
dissociation between SRT behaviour and allocentric spatial learning (the primary rat-
analogue of human declarative memory). It is not necessary at this point, however, to 
demonstrate that animals have memory systems analogous with human declarative 
and non-declarative memory, merely that they have independent and dissociable 
forms of memory.  
 
Multiple Memory in Rats 
 A large number of studies have demonstrated that rats posses multiple memory 
systems and there is wide agreement that what memory systems rats do enjoy are 
broadly similar to human memory systems (Packard and Teather, 1998; Cohen, 
Poldrak and Eichenbaum, 1997; Gluck, Ermita, Oliver and Myers, 1997; Squire, 1992; 
Horn, 1991; Kesner, 1990). 
  
The case for multiple memory systems in rats gains strong support from several 
studies which successfully demonstrate double-dissociations between memory type 
and lesion site. In an example of this kind of work Packard, Hirsh and White (1989) 
tested rats with either caudate nucleus or fimbria / fornix lesions on win-shift and win-
stay tasks. The win-shift task requires a subject to shift their response strategy to 
alternative locations based on the presence of the rewarding stimulus in the previous 
choice and is considered a test of working memory analogous to human declarative 
memory. In contrast the win-stay task simply requires a subject to learn an approach 
response to a particular stimulus and to repeat the response within a session, which is 
comparable to human habit / skill learning, and is considered a test of procedural 
memory. A clear double-dissociation was found as rats with hippocampal systems 
damage (fimbria / fornix lesions) were impaired on the win-shift task but not in the win-
stay task (they even out performed control rats in this task) whereas caudate lesioned 
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animals were not impaired in the win-shift task but were impaired in the win-stay task.  
 
Similarly Kesner, Farnsworth and DiMattia (1989) demonstrated a double-
dissociation between spatial localisation (egocentric and allocentric) and lesion site 
(medial prefrontal cortex and parietal cortex). Rats performed both an ‘adjacent arm 
task’ in a standard 8-arm radial maze as a test of egocentric spatial memory, and a 
117-hole cheese board task that tested allocentric spatial memory. They found that 
medial pre-frontal cortex lesions impaired the adjacent arm task but not the cheese 
board task, whereas parietal cortex lesions impaired cheese-board performance but 
not adjacent arm performance. 
 
A single-dissociation was demonstrated by Packard and White (1990) who 
found that caudate nucleus lesions impaired rats’ performance on a baited / unbaited 
8-arm radial maze. Although caudate lesioned rats learned to approach baited arms 
(the pattern of baited / unbaited arms was held constant across sessions) they were 
severely impaired in their ability to learn to avoid entering the unbaited set. 
Furthermore, examination of response patterns ruled out the possibility that rats (both 
lesioned and controls) were employing an egocentric response pattern. Thus caudate 
lesioned rats can be characterised as demonstrating a reference memory impairment 
but not a working memory impairment (Olton and Papas, 1979). However Packard 
and White go on to note that the working / reference memory distinction is ‘incomplete’ 
and instead suggest that the caudate lesion impairment is a consequence of a deficit 
in stimulus-response (S-R) associations. Specifically, they suggest that while rats with 
caudate lesions are capable of learning a general S-R association (i.e. radial-maze 
arms have food at the end of them) they are unable to discriminate between baited 
and unbaited arms because they can neither strengthen a S-R association (learned 
pre-lesion) between baited arms and food, nor weaken the association between 
unbaited arms and a lack of food. However, because the caudate lesioned animals 
had intact hippocampi they were still able to learn the relationship among stimuli, and 
in particular the stimulus properties of reinforcers learned before animals received a 
lesion remained intact. Furthermore, caudate lesioned rats do not repeat within trial 
errors because they do not have a general working memory impairment. This, 
therefore, is clear evidence that one form of memory relies of the caudate nucleus 
whereas another form does not. 
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In a demonstration of a double-dissociation between memory system and 
neural substrate in rats, Packard and White (1991) demonstrated a dissociation of 
task (win-shift and win-stay; per Packard and White, 1989) and dopamine (DA) 
agonist infusion site (hippocampus and caudate). Rats with DA agonists injected into 
the hippocampus showed improved retention of a win-shift task, but not a win-stay 
task, whereas rats with DA agonists injected into the caudate nucleus showed 
improved acquisition of a win-stay, but not a win-shift, task. As the win-shift task is 
considered a working (declarative) memory task, and the win-stay a reference 
(procedural) memory task, this good evidence of dissociable memory systems that 
rely on independent neural substrates in rats.  
 
In a compelling attempt to dissociate memory and neural lesion, McDonald and 
White (1993) tested three different lesion sites (fimbria/fornix, dorsal striatum, and 
lateral amygdala) on three different tasks (win-shift, win-stay, and conditioned cue 
preference (CCP, a simple stimulus (light) –reward (food) association); being tests of 
declarative, procedural and reward associative -memory respectively). They found a 
triple-dissociation between memory task and lesion site. Damage to the hippocampal 
system (fimbria / fornix lesions) impaired acquisition of the win-shift task but not of 
either the win-stay or CCP tasks; damage to the basal ganglia (dorsal striatum 
lesions) impaired acquisition of the win-stay task but not of either the win-shift or CCP 
tasks; and damage to the lateral amygdala impaired acquisition of the CCP alone. The 
win-stay deficit produced by the striatal lesions supports Packard and White (1990) 
above in that McDonald and White conclude that “the dorsal striatum is not necessary 
for acquisition of a [simple] stimulus-reward association”, but is required for acquisition 
of a relatively more complex stimulus-response association. These results were also 
replicated with neurotoxic lesions (cochicine and kanic acid for hippocampal lesions, 
and N-methyl-D-asparate lesions for both amygdala and caudate lesions) instead of 
the radio-frequency lesions used in the primary study. Replicating the study with 
neurotoxic lesions serves two functions: it provides further evidence of the validity and 
reliability of the primary finding, and it increases the specificity of the neural substrate 
under examination (from gross neuroanatomical region to more specific neural 
structures). These studies provide clear evidence of dissociable and independent 
memory systems in rats and substantially strengthens the case for multiple memory 
systems in animals.  
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In a series of more recent studies Packard and Teather (1997) provided new 
pharmacological evidence of dissociation of function between the hippocampus and 
dorsal striatum by using intra-cerebral injections of 2-Amino-5-Phosphonopentanoic 
acid (AP5; a glutamatergic NMDA antagonist). Rats performed a both a spatial and a 
cued task in the Morris water maze. The standard spatial water-maze task, in which 
rats learn to approach from different directions an escape platform that is always 
hidden (submerged) in the same quadrant on all trials, is known to be a hippocampal 
dependent (Morris, Garrud, Rawlins and O’Keefe, 1982) spatial working memory task. 
By contrast, the cued water-maze task, in which rats learn to approach a visible 
platform that is moved between quadrants after each trial, is known to be sensitive to 
caudate lesions (McDonald and White, 1994; Packard and McGaugh, 1992). As 
predicted rats with intrahippocampal injections of AP5 were impaired on the spatial, 
but not the cued task. Rats with intracaudate AP5 injections were impaired on the 
cued, but not the spatial, task. Thus these results are consistent with findings from the 
radial arm-maze (Packard et al, 1989; McDonald and White, 1993), and therefore 
provide support from another set of behavioural tasks that the hippocampus and 
dorsal-striatum are responsible for independent memory systems (see also McDonald 
and White, 1994).  
 
 A further specification of the neural architecture responsible for the different 
types of memory is found in Floresco, Seamans and Phillips (1997) who demonstrated 
an ability to briefly impair task performance via temporary inactivation of the relevant 
neural structure. Rats were injected with lidocaine in either the hippocampus, medial 
prefrontal cortex or nucleus accumbens in order to produce a transient inactivation of 
the structure. Subjects performed a delayed spatial win-shift radial-maze task and a 
non-delayed random foraging radial-maze task. Transient inactivation of the 
hippocampus disrupted performance on both tasks, whereas inactivation of the 
hippocampus on one side of the brain and the prefrontal cortex on the other side of 
the brain disrupted the delayed win-shift, but not the undelayed foraging task. In 
contrast inactivation of the hippocampus on one side of the brain and the nucleus 
accumbens on the other disrupted foraging behaviour but not delayed win-shift 
behaviour. Similar results have been found with the Morris water-maze task (Seamans 
and Phillips, 1994).  
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 In conclusion, there is good evidence that rats demonstrate multiple, 
dissociable and independent memory systems. In particular that the neural substrates 
of animal memory systems are similar to human memory substrates in that the 
extended-hippocampal system is strongly implicated in ‘declarative’ memory and the 
basal ganglia is implicated in ‘non-declarative’ memory, for both animals and humans. 
This would suggest that modelling human memory behaviour in animals is possible, 
valid and a useful method for testing various hypotheses that can not easily be 
examined in humans. 
 
Multiple Memory in Non-Human Primates 
 The demonstration of multiple memory systems in animals  would, however, be 
especially compelling if a dissociation could also be demonstrated in animals that are 
more closely related to humans. The following section will provide an account of the 
demonstration of multiple-memory systems in non-human primates which, much like 
the memory systems found in rodents, are analogous to human memory systems and 
thus further strengthen the case that animal memory work can provide valuable 
insights into human memory. Non-human primates demonstrate evidence of multiple 
memory systems in much the same way found in rats. For example, Bueger, Gross 
and Rocha-Miranda (1974) report that caudate putamen lesions impair retention of 
visual, but not auditory, discriminations or delayed alteration in monkeys. See also: 
Baxter and Murray, (2001); Murray, Gaffan, and Flint, (1996); Gaffan, (1994); Cohen 
and Eichenbaum, (1993); Squire, (1992); Gaffan and Harrison (1989); and Mishkin 
(1978) for similar findings. It is sufficient for the purposes of this section to discuss the 
detail of a single comprehensive demonstration that non-human primates have 
multiple memory systems reasonably analogous to those seen in humans. 
 
 As part of an attempt to present clear evidence of multiple memory systems in 
macaque monkeys Gaffan (1994) describes object recognition as the “paradigmatic 
example of declarative memory in monkeys” and proposes that it depends on the 
medial temporal lobe in monkeys in much the same way declarative memory in 
humans depends on analogous structures (but see Aggleton and Brown, 1999). 
Gaffan also notes that it should be possible to double-dissociate between fornix and 
perirhinal damage by virtue of the fact that fornix damage produces the least 
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behavioural impairment of any temporal lobe damage in object recognition tasks and 
perirhinal cortex damage in particular produces substantially greater object recognition 
impairments than fornix dysfunction. Gaffan suggests this is because axons of the 
fornix originate and / or terminate within the medial temporal memory systems 
whereas “nonfornical neocortical inputs and outputs of the medial temporal memory 
system are more functionally important than the fornix”. The experiments reported in 
the study unequivocally support his claims. Lesions to both the perirhinal cortex and 
the fornix substantially impair post-operative performance of a pre-operatively learnt 
delayed-matching-to-sample task (i.e. within-session recognition memory), but the 
perirhinal lesions produced a substantially greater impairment than fornix lesions. In 
contrast fornix lesions, but not perirhinal cortex lesions, impaired a spatial 
discrimination task which is considered analogous to human declarative memory 
tasks. Gaffan then went on to dissociate these structures from the amygdala by 
demonstrating that neither fornix or perirhinal lesions resulted in an impairment during 
the acquisition of systematic preferences (for novel foods) whereas amygdala 
dysfunction severely impaired acquisition. He also noted that difference in effect for 
the lesions is not simply a matter of differences in quantitative severity as the effects 
has been doubly-dissociated from each other. The clear conclusion therefore is that 
the fornix and perirhinal cortex belong to functionally distinct (albeit not strictly 
independent)  memory systems. Furthermore, lesions to the human perirhinal and 
adjacent cortex produce ‘semantic dementia’ (Hodges, 1993) analogous to the 
behavioural deficits in monkeys with perirhinal lesions. Thus monkeys not only have 
multiple memory systems, but these systems are functionally similar to that found in 
humans. 
 
 Not only does the evidence of multiple memory systems in non-human primates 
enjoy considerable conceptual and functional similarities with human multiple memory 
systems but there have also been two very recent studies examining the ability of 
monkeys to perform the SRT task. Procyk, Dominey, Amiez and Joseph (2000) 
demonstrated that monkeys can learn a SRT task. Two monkeys were trained to 
perform a SRT task that only differed from the human task by the use of a 9-choice 
response panel (a 3 x 3 square array) and a short, 4-trial, repeating sequence. One of 
the monkeys demonstrated both a learning effect during repeating sequence blocks 
and, more importantly, an interference effect when switched from a repeating to a 
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random sequence. The second monkey’s performance was more problematic. While 
its reaction times actually slowed over repeating-sequence sessions it nevertheless 
displayed some evidence of an interference effect as reactions slowed even more 
markedly when the it was switched to a random sequence. Interestingly the author 
substituted new repeating-sequences at regular intervals and both monkeys were able 
to learn each new sequence and respond accordingly. Humans fail to demonstrate 
any ability to transfer identical abstract structure between different sequences (which 
requires learning the underlying abstract structure of the sequence) in the SRT and 
the authors noted that monkeys were also incapable of abstract sequence learning 
and thus concluded that monkeys show the same kind of SRT learning as humans in 
an ‘implicit’ [learning] condition. 
 
 Another SRT study with monkeys (Nixon and Passingham, 2000) reports 
similar results as well as supporting the finding in the meta-analysis that cerebellar 
subjects are substantially impaired on the SRT. Monkeys with cerebellar lesions were 
substantially impaired on a (4-trial) SRT task. Although they demonstrated post-
surgical retention of a repeating sequence (learned pre-surgically) their reaction times 
were consistently slower post surgically in comparison to both control monkeys and 
their own pre-surgical reaction times. Furthermore, they displayed little ability to learn 
a new repeating sequence post-surgically whereas control monkeys quickly learned 
the new sequence. Note: because monkeys were not switched to a random sequence 
after a repeating sequence there was no opportunity for them to demonstrate an 
interference effect. However, monkey’s preoperative response times improved 
noticeably more when they were switched from random to a repeating sequence 
(characterised as an ‘assistance’ effect). Not only did cerebellar monkeys never learn 
the new sequence to the same degree they had learned the first sequence but they 
were perpetually slower while performing the new sequence in comparison to their 
(pre-operative) old sequence behaviour. Although the utility of this study is limited by 
the fact that the study uses a single dissociation approach and does not employ any 
interference effect (the primary measure of non-declarative sequence learning in 
humans), it is still evidence that monkeys can demonstrate a SRT-like learning-effect 
phenomena and that such performance is dependent on at least one brain structure 
(the cerebellum) that is also involved in human SRT performance. 
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 While both monkey-SRT studies provide some support that monkeys can 
perform a SRT-like task in a human-like manner, the Procyk et al. (2000) study in 
particular provides the best evidence of the ability of non-human primates to perform a 
SRT task (albeit evidence from only one animal). Ultimately however both studies offer 
evidence that the an animal SRT task would be a valid and useful device for 
examining the neural substrates of non-declarative sequence learning in humans. 
 
Interim Conclusions on Multiple-Memory Systems in Animals 
 
Although far from a complete discussion of the animal multiple-memory 
literature the studies cited above provide clear evidence that animals can demonstrate 
dissociations of memory task and neural substrate. The purpose of this chapter is not 
to engage in a protracted discussion of the mechanisms and characterisations of the 
different memory types, and the relevant neural structures in animal subjects, nor is it 
to attempt to decide which of the competing theories of multiple-memory systems 
(both animal and human) is the more valid based on the evidence provided. However, 
it does show that it would be feasible and useful to demonstrate that rats show some 
type of sequence learning ability. Part of the impetus for this thesis is that there is 
currently no memory task for animal subjects with good analogical validity with human 
non-declarative memory tasks, beyond the recent pilot work with monkeys. Therefore, 
we are forced to rely on indirect evidence, for example that rats are capable of 
demonstrating learning and memory of a type that is dissociable from another form of 
learning and memory which is analogous with human declarative memory. All the 
studies discussed in this chapter so far demonstrate than rats display evidence of a 
memory system, or systems, that is independent from another memory system which 
is analogous with human declarative memory. Furthermore, this first memory system 
is generally reliant on basal ganglia structures as opposed to the extended 
hippocampus or temporal memory system and thus mimics the basal ganglia / 
hippocampus dissociation found in humans (Chapters 1, 2 & 3). Therefore, there is 
good evidence not only that animals are capable of demonstrating multiple-memory 
systems but that they do so in a manner which is analogous to that of humans. Thus 
there is considerable justification for exploring the possibility that rats can demonstrate 
some form of ‘non-declarative’ memory, and sequence learning in particular. 
Moreover, the demonstration in the meta-analysis in Chapter 3 that amnesic subjects 
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show a degree of impairment in the SRT task is a serious theoretical and empirical 
challenge for the multiple-memory systems theory which needs addressing, and an 
animal-SRT would be an ideal way to explore the causes of this theoretically 
unexpected impairment. 
4.2 Animal Analogues of Human Memory Tasks 
 
 At this stage in the discussion little attempt has been made to marry animal 
systems directly to human systems, which is required if results of experimental work in 
animals is to be generalised to human subjects. As noted in Chapter 1 even though 
there is good conceptual grounds for positing strong similarities between animal and 
human memory systems (i.e. Reber’s principle of commonality, 1992) comparison 
between different species can be problematic (Sherry and Schacter, 1987). In order to 
make the extrapolation from animal to human behaviour as valid as possible it is 
necessary to demonstrate that the structures and processes upon which the 
comparison relies are as similar as possible in both species. While there are a number 
of widely accepted animal analogues of human declarative memory there are few valid 
animal analogues of human non-declarative memory. The following section will 
discuss a number of both commonly used animal memory tasks in order to 
demonstrate that while there are good analogues of human declarative memory tasks 
there are none of human non-declarative memory tasks.  
  
Allocentric Spatial Memory 
Allocentric spatial memory is regarded as the primary rat analogue of human 
declarative memory (Aggleton, Vann and Good, 2000; Aggleton and Brown, 1999; and 
Gaffan, 1998). Commonly used tasks of this type in animal research are designed to 
test an animal’s spatial memory and include such tasks as radial-maze performance 
(e.g. Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993; Colombo, Davis and Volpe, 1989; Dunnett, 1983; 
Floresco, Seamans and Phillips, 1997;  Kesner, Bolland and Dakis, 1993; Squire, 
1992; Squire and Zola-Morgan, 1988; Zola-Morgan et al, 1992), water-maze (spatial) 
learning (e.g. Gallagher and Holland, 1992; McDonald and White, 1994; Packard, 
Hirsh and White, 1989; and Packard and Teather, 1998), various discrimination tasks 
(e.g. Eichenbaum et al, 1986, 1988; Zola-Morgan and Squire, 1985), and delayed 
non-matching to sample (e.g. Aggleton, 1985; Gaffan, 1974; Otto and Eichenbaum, 
1992; Rafaelle and Olton, 1988; Rothblatt and Kromer, 1991) 
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For example, the radial arm maze has a long history of use within memory 
research and studies of this type typically report that rats with hippocampal systems 
damage show impairments on this task, in much the same way humans with limbic 
system damage are impaired on analogous spatial tests (Hopkins, Kesner and 
Goldstein, 1995). However, animal subjects are by no means completely impaired as 
they learn to run down maze arms to collect rewards and to search among maze arms 
for reward and therefore are capable of learning the constituent procedures necessary 
for the task performance. Furthermore, rather than a global behavioural impairment, or 
even a global memory impairment, rats with hippocampal system damage display a 
specific behavioural deficit that can be characterised as an inability to learn and / or 
express the variant / flexible requirements of the task, particularly in terms of spatial 
working memory (Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993). Unlike intact rats, hippocampally 
lesioned rats will continue to make spatial working memory errors within a session by 
entering previously baited arms that they have already visited within the session. 
Hence the operational requirement for working memory usually exacerbates their 
spatial memory deficit (Jarrard, 1995). 
 
Similar conclusions can be drawn from studies employing Morris’ (1981) spatial 
water-maze task. Rats with hippocampal lesions are impaired in contrast to sham-
lesion rats as they take longer to escape from the water on to a submerged, and thus 
unseen, platform at a fixed location. Once again, however, the impairment is not total 
as hippocampal rats reduce their escape latencies and also demonstrate learning 
when a single start location is employed (Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993). 
 
Delayed Non-Match to Sample 
Studies employing a delayed non-match-to-sample (DNMS) procedure require 
subjects to discriminate between two stimulus, one of which they experienced in an 
earlier sample phase, and are rewarded for attending to the novel stimuli during the 
test phase. A number of variations on this procedure are commonly used (e.g. ‘Y’-
mazes) but while some variations of the DMTS task are sensitive to hippocampal 
damage (i.e. those employing positional cues, Aggleton et. al. 1989; Gaffan, 1974, 
1977; Gaffan and Saunders, 1985; Otto and Eichenbaum, 1992; Zola-Morgan and 
Squire, 1985) others are not (i.e. those using object cues). What is of particular 
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interest is that subjects with compromised hippocampal systems show no impairment 
at short delays but as the delay (between sample and test phase) increases these rats 
are progressively more impaired 
 
This ability to learn and remember task procedures and the presence of a 
delay-dependent impairment is highly analogous with the performance of human 
amnesic subjects in recognition memory tests (Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993) and 
provides support for both generalising from animals to human, and for multiple 
memory systems in general. (But see Aggleton and Brown, 1999, who argue that 
recognition memory depends on familiarity judgements which are not dependent on 
episodic memory). 
 
Basal Ganglia Dependent Animal Memory Systems. 
Although not as widely accepted or as well detailed as the hippocampal 
studies, there is general agreement that basal-ganglia, and especially the caudate 
nucleus, are primarily responsible for procedural / reference forms of memory in 
animals (Packard and Teather, 1998; White, 1997; Kesner, Bolland and Dakis, 1993; 
Packard and White, 1991; Packard, Hirsh and White, 1989). In consequence, a 
number of studies have examined the performance of rats with caudate lesions in the 
radial-maze in an attempt to contrast these findings with those of hippocampal lesion 
subjects (see above). However, while although these forms of memory are dissociable 
in rats and although the dissociation mimics the hippocampal / basal ganglia 
distinction found in humans there is no ready analogue of reference memory tasks in 
humans. 
 
Furthermore, a strict interpretation of the working / reference memory 
dissociation predicts that while rats with hippocampal lesions will suffer (spatial) 
working memory but not reference memory impairments, and rats with basal ganglia 
dysfunction will show the opposite pattern of impairment / sparing. However, as 
discussed above rats do sometimes show severe reference memory deficits 
(McDonald and White, 1990; Packard and White, 1990). But in other tasks (e.g. the 
water maze) caudate lesions do not impair reference memory (McDonald and White, 
1994; Packard and Teather, 1998). Thus reference memory does not clearly 
dissociate caudate and hippocampal damage. Therefore, there is not only a need for a 
   - 168 - 
   
  
 
valid animal-analogue of a human non-declarative memory task but a need for one 
that can reliably dissociate caudate and hippocampal injury.  
 
The Analogical Validity of Animal Models of Human Memory tasks. 
There is good agreement as to the validity of animal allocentric spatial memory 
tasks as a model of human declarative memory but there is no similarly well accepted 
model of human non-declarative memory tasks in animals. It is not that animal 
subjects are incapable of displaying dissociable memory systems. The studies 
presented earlier show very clearly that animal memory systems are functionally and 
neuroanatomically very similar to human memory systems. However, what is lacking 
is a functional and conceptual analogue of a human non-declarative memory tasks in 
animals. Although several animal memory tasks have proven to be dissociable from 
animal analogues of human declarative memory tasks (i.e. allocentric spatial memory 
tasks), and thus serve to demonstrate dissociable and independent memory systems 
in animals, these animal memory tasks have no clear connection to human non-
declarative memory tasks other than being dissociable from tasks that are 
conceptually related to human declarative memory tasks. The SRT task appears to be 
a good candidate as an animal model of one human non-declarative memory task. 
Also, the evidence suggests that animals are likely to employ the same 
neuroanatomical structures to perform the SRT as those responsible for human SRT 
performance. However, the ability of rats to demonstrate sequence learning is not 
directly supported by the evidence discussed above. Rather it is supported by the 
general evidence in the literature which demonstrates rats are capable of responding 
appropriately to serially ordered information even if the serial order of the stimuli 
contains no sequence information.  
 
Serial Pattern learning in Rats 
 In order to be able to perform any SRT task animal (rat) subjects would need to 
be able to respond to serially ordered information. Fortunately there is considerable 
evidence that they can do so. 
 
The 5-Choice serial reaction time task has been used extensively with rats 
throughout the last decade as an animal analogue of the continuous attention 
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performance test in humans (Muir, Fischer and Björklund, 1999; Muir, Bussey, Everitt 
and Robbins, 1996; Sirviö et al, 1993; Carli and Samanin, 1992; Jäkälä et al, 
1992A&B; Muir, Robbins and Everitt, 1992;  Robbins et al, 1989; Cole & Robbins, 
1987 & 1989; Carli, Robbins, Evenden and Everitt, 1983; and Eysenck, 1982). 
Primarily used to dissociate neural structure and cognitive task (and often contrasted 
with spatial memory) it appears at first glance to be all but identical to the human-SRT. 
However, no 5-choice SRT task that is reported in the literature has ever used a 
repeating sequence of stimuli. Because it is employed solely as a test of visual 
attention the stimuli are always presented in a random fashion. Nevertheless, the fact 
that it requires rats to respond to serially ordered stimuli (albeit randomly ordered) 
indicates the possibility that they may be capable of learning a repeating sequence. 
 
Other studies (Burns and Dunkman, 2000; Compton, 2001 and 1991; Compton, 
Bishop and Dietrich, 1996; Fountain, 1990) have also shown that rats can learn serial 
ordered information including demonstrating anticipation of forthcoming elements of a 
3-element sequence. Compton, (2001) trained rats to acquire a three element series 
of 21, 7, or 0 sucrose pellets, and to associate a particular response cue (texture and 
brightness of the runway floor) with a particular element size. Rats ran faster (i.e. 
demonstrated anticipation) in response to cues associated with larger element sizes 
relative to cues associated with smaller element sizes. Compton compared the ability 
of neurologically intact control rats, hippocampal or caudate lesioned rats to learn the 
element size series (stimulus-stimulus associations) and response cue (stimulus-
response) associations. While anticipation developed more slowly in both groups of 
lesioned rats than in intact rats all three groups eventually demonstrated an ability to 
track the elements of the series. Reversal of the response (‘explicit’) cues disrupted 
hippocampal lesioned rats and, to a lesser degree, caudate lesioned rats, but did not 
disrupt control rat behaviour. Reversing the order in which the element sizes (number 
of pellets) were presented markedly disrupted anticipatory behaviour in caudate rats, 
but did not effect hippocampal or control rats.  
 
Thus rats appear to have the ability to perceive and retain serially ordered 
information and to act on it meaningfully. Therefore, it is likely rats would be capable of 
learning a repeating sequence in a SRT-like task and thus be capable of showing the 
desired interference effect when switched to a random sequence.  
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4.3 Conclusions 
 
 Animal subjects at least appear to have comparable memory systems with 
humans and therefore provide valid targets for memory research that can not be 
undertaken in humans, or can only be undertaken in humans with considerable 
difficulty and / or with frequent experimental confounds. The fact that animal subjects 
demonstrate dissociable memory systems, a memory system analogous to human 
declarative memory, and an ‘other’ memory system somewhat analogous to non-
declarative human memory behaviour strongly suggests that, should a valid animal-
analogue of the human SRT be developed, animal subjects are very likely to exhibit 
similar phenomena to humans in such a task. Not that animals can be expected to 
behave precisely the same as humans, but rather that within the constraints of the 
task and their abilities animal subjects should demonstrate behaviour that is the 
animal equivalent of human behaviour in such a task. 
 
 There is good evidence to suggest that rats can attend and respond to serial 
ordered information which is a necessary prerequisite for any attempt to model SRT 
behaviour in animals. Furthermore, based on the evidence that basal ganglia lesions 
typically impair procedural / reference memory tasks it seems likely that this brain area 
would also be involved in sequence learning / SRT behaviour in rats in much the same 
way this area is clearly involved in human sequence learning / SRT behaviour 
(Chapters 2 and 3). If a valid animal-SRT task could be developed it could be used to 
examine the neural and neurochemical substrates responsible for human non-
declarative sequence learning. It would also provide an opportunity to test the 
apparent SRT impairment demonstrated in limbic system amnesics in the meta-
analysis presented in Chapter 3 and furthermore to contrast limbic system and basal 
ganglia involvement in the SRT under rigorous experimental conditions, i.e. with better 
experimental controls, focused and restricted brain injury, and large sample sizes (to 
ensure adequate power). 
 
 As a consequence of the arguments presented in this chapter there is good 
reason to suspect that rats could perform an animal-analogue of the human SRT task. 
Therefore, the following chapter (Chapter 5) will present an initial attempt to adapt the 
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SRT task for use with rodent subjects in order to provide an opportunity to examine 
this form of memory in animals.  
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Chapter 5 
 
The Fan-Maze Serial Reaction Time 
Task 
 
General Introduction 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, there is currently no valid animal analogue of a 
human non-declarative memory task. Given the uncertain nature of the neural locus of 
non-declarative memory in humans and the considerable variation in how different 
neurological disorders effect non-declarative memory performance (see Chapter 3) 
there is a clear need for an animal analogue of a human non-declarative memory task. 
Previous studies have suggested that radial maze tasks employing unbaited arms 
(reference memory: Packard and White, 1990) or a win-stay procedure (Packard, 
Hirsh and White, 1989) are representative of non-declarative memory in animals. 
Unfortunately, it is not clear how those two tasks relate specifically to non-declarative 
memory tasks used with humans. Another example of a ‘non-declarative’ animal task 
that is assumed to be similar to human tasks is Wang et al’s, 1990. 24-hr concurrent 
discrimination task. In the context of  Wang’s task however Squire (1992) noted that 
this, and perhaps other, examples of ‘non-declarative’ memory in animals are 
problematic because while animals appear to be using processes akin to non-
declarative memory humans appear to rely more on episodic memory during such 
tasks. 
 
Chapter 2 explained that the SRT is a widely accepted behavioural task that, in 
its modified form (i.e. accounting for Shanks and St. John’s concerns), is a valid and 
sensitive test of human non-declarative memory. Chapter 4 provided supporting 
evidence that rats demonstrate the necessary pre-requisites for SRT performance. 
Specifically, they display dissociable multiple-memory systems which have 
considerable points of similarity with human memory systems, and are capable of 
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recognising and responding to serially ordered information. Therefore, it seems likely 
that rats will be able to perform a SRT-like task and that such a task will rely on brain 
structures in the rat that are functionally comparable to those structures that are 
responsible for SRT performance in humans. 
 
Deficits on the SRT task may be a reflection of an impairment in expressing 
serially ordered information, rather than a general impairment in learning new 
associations (Jackson et al, 1995). Two recent animal studies that examined the 
neural substrates of serially-ordered sequences add strong support for the suggestion 
that the basal ganglia are important in the execution of sequential behaviour. Kermadi, 
Jurguet, Arzi and Joseph (1993) found neuronal activity in the caudate that appeared 
to be consistent with the neural coding of serial order sequencing in primates. 
Aldridge, Berridge, Herman and Zimmer (1993) studied the role of the neostriatum in 
controlling serially-ordered sequences in rodent grooming behaviour and reported 
lesions of the neostriatum disrupted grooming sequences but not the individual 
behavioural elements.  
 
The literature presented in Chapter 4 suggests that animals with limbic system 
neuropathology would be unimpaired in a SRT task. The results of the meta-analysis 
in Chapter 3, however, contradicts that assertion. Contrary to expectations the meta-
analysis found that human subjects with limbic system neuropathology (LSN) were in 
fact impaired in the SRT. In particular, once collapsed into a group in order to assure 
adequate power LSN subjects demonstrate a significantly weaker interference effect 
than control subjects, which is evidence of an SRT impairment. This contradicts the 
conclusions of the individual LSN SRT studies and  threatens the multiple-memory 
systems theory which relies on the tenant of independent and dissociable memory 
systems. LSN should not impair SRT behaviour as the limbic system is responsible for 
declarative and not non-declarative memory. The fact that LSN subjects are impaired 
in a non-declarative memory task, albeit less so than subjects with damage to other 
neural systems, is thus a serious theoretical and empirical challenge to the multiple 
memory systems theory. Furthermore, this human LSN SRT impairment reinforces the 
need for an animal-SRT task to address this important issue as well as then more 
general one of which specific neural systems are involved in SRT learning. 
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As demonstrated in Chapters 1 & 2 it is possible to dissociate between different 
forms of memory in humans and thus the unexpected results of the meta-analysis are 
more likely due to the complex relationship between declarative and non-declarative 
memory as expressed in SRT performance (albeit dominated by non-declarative 
memory), rather than simply due to the inability of the SRT to dissociate the different 
types of memory. An animal-SRT could well provide an opportunity to ascertain what 
role limbic system structures play in a non-declarative task that should be independent 
of limbic system structures. Furthermore, it could well be possible to also to discover 
the role that brain structures responsible for cognitive functions secondary / auxiliary 
to memory function (e.g. attention) play in SRT task performance.  
 
Clearly a major problem with the human SRT literature is the uncertainty 
surrounding the precise location and extent of neural injury in subjects. Even with 
modern neuroimaging techniques there is still relative uncertainty as to the precise 
nature of a subject’s neural pathology and how it relates to SRT behaviour (see 
Chapter 2 ‘Neuroimaging and the SRT’). Therefore, the development of a rat SRT will 
be particularly useful for evaluating the consequences of restricted and precisely 
targeted brain injury and in doing so shed light on the neural correlates of human non-
declarative memory. It would expected that dorsal caudate lesions in rats would result 
in a SRT impairment (Jackson et al, 1995; Knopman & Nissen, 1991; Willingham, 
Nissen & Bullemer, 1989; Willingham & Koroshetz, 1990; and Ferraro, Balota & 
Connor, 1993) whereas hippocampal lesions would not (Nissen & Bullemer, 1989; and 
Nissen Willingham & Hartman, 1989). Conversely, hippocampal system lesions should 
impair performance of a spatial working memory test in animals but not performance 
on the SRT. 
 
 After consideration of many standard animal memory tasks (i.e. the radial-
maze, the water-maze, and various operant chamber designs) it was initially decided 
to adapt the radial-maze design to something that could be used in an SRT type 
procedure. Our original intent was to demonstrate a double dissociation between 
animal-analogues of human declarative and non-declarative memory tasks within the 
same apparatus so that non-specific (e.g. motivational and locomotor) factors would 
largely be equal. Thus, we required an apparatus and procedure that were flexible 
enough to allow for some form of SRT task and enable us to generate a radial maze-
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like working memory task, which is one of the most accepted animal-analogues of 
human declarative memory. We designed a novel apparatus called a ‘fan-maze’ which 
was essentially a 16-arm sunburst-maze collapsed horizontally such that all the arms 
were serially adjacent rather than spatially separated. It is interesting to note that the 
radial maze also had its origins in the sunburst maze (Harley, 1979). The reasoning 
was that a limited number of arms could be employed for the SRT-type task and the 
full set of arms employed in some form of spatial memory task. 
 
 This chapter describes the development of the ‘Fan-maze SRT and will report 
the initial study designed solely to demonstrate that rats are capable of SRT-type 
sequence learning from the perspective of demonstrating an interference effect when 
switched from a repeating to a random sequence.  
 
 These initial findings in particular are valuable as they provide a clear indication 
that rats can learn a basic SRT-like task and demonstrate a robust interference effect. 
Thus rats’ behaviour is conceptually and behaviourally similar to that shown by 
humans in the human SRT task.  
 
Methodology 
 
Subjects. 
 Eleven female 13 month old Wistar rats were individually housed in standard 
laboratory cages in a constant temperature controlled holding room (21˚C) with an 
reversed 12 hour light/dark cycle (lights off from 6am). All animals had water available 
ad libitum and were maintained at 80% of free feeding body weight during the course 
of the study. All studies were reviewed and approved by the Canterbury University 
Animal Ethics Committee. 
 
Apparatus  
 The ‘Fan-maze’ (see Fig. 5.1) was a novel device comprising an aluminium 
body (85cm from start-box to peripheral wall, 132cm wide at the periphery; 15cm wide 
at the leading edge) with 15 equispaced nose-pokes around the peripheral wall, each 
of which could be separately illuminated from behind. The fan-maze was located in a 
dimly lit room.  
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Fig 5.1. A Schematic of the 15-hole Fan-Maze 
 
 
 
Each nose-poke was a 5cm diameter circle cut into the distal wall of the maze 
and illuminated by a bright LED mounted behind an opaque Perspex shield / screen. 
Two infra-red light-detecting-relays (LDRs) were mounted immediately outside the 
nose-poke housing (but prior to the Perspex shield) to register head entry into the 
nose-poke. Each nose-poke was centrally located at the end of short arms which were 
separated by 25cm long, 15cm high, internal aluminium sleeves and covered by a 
clear Perspex lid (25cm long). Attached to the leading edge of the apparatus was a 
‘start-box’ (15cm high, 15cm wide, 20cm long) with a clear Perspex lid. The start-box 
was separated from the body of the maze by a curved Perspex door that was 
computer operated and motor-driven. A hole in the start-box wall distal to the maze 
allowed access to a remote controlled dipper for reinforcement delivery (0.05ml of 
condensed milk diluted 1:1 with water). Opaque Perspex was mounted under fifteen 
1cm wide by 55cm long strips cut in the aluminium floor of the maze and illuminated 
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from beneath by 5 serial, equispaced, 28v/40ma bulbs. Each strip light led directly to 
one of the nose-pokes and started 10cm from the start-box door and terminated 5cm 
before the appropriate nose-poke. Three infra-red light-detecting-relays (LDRs) were 
mounted at different heights in the walls of the start-box such that movement away 
from all three LDRs, after the dipper had returned to its resting (down) position, started 
the timer. The three LDRs were positioned in such a way as to make it all but 
impossible for a rat to not break at least one of them while attending to the dipper port. 
Distal nose-pokes were illuminated individually after a inter-trial interval of 10 seconds 
during which the Perspex door prevented the rat re-entering the maze but allowed it to 
view the maze. The onset of the nose-poke light, strip-lights and lowering of the 
Perspex door were simultaneous such that the rat could observe the lit nose-poke 
slightly before it could gain access to the maze. A response at the correct (illuminated) 
nose-poke at the perimeter of the maze turned the timer off and operated the dipper 
(which remained in position for 5 seconds after the rat broke the start-box LDRs when 
it re-entered the start-box after making a nose-poke).  
 
Behavioural Testing Procedure 
 Preliminary training consisted of having the central striplight and nose-poke 
(#8) lit and allowing the rat to freely explore the maze but only making reinforcement 
available after a response at this central nose-poke. After all rats had been shaped to 
shuttle between the dipper and the central nose-poke they were switched to a random 
sequence of nose-pokes that only ever included 4 positions (left-to-right, #’s 3, 6, 10 & 
13; these positions were used for all sequences, repeating and random, in all fan-
maze studies thereafter). Rats were run once per day for a single session of 96 
massed trials. For each trial a record was kept of the running time (the time taken 
between leaving the dipper area and making a correct nose-poke; latency data from 
the occasional error response was not included in the analysis).  
  
 For the rat SRT we modified the 4-choice random and repeating sequences 
used by Knopman & Nissen (1987). The repeating 10-trial sequence employed by 
Knopman and Nissen in the their SRT task was D-B-C-A-C-B-D-C-B-A, such that the 
four stimuli were presented unequally. So that the density of reinforcement associated 
with the different nose-poke locations would be equal we employed a 12-trial 
sequence: A-D-A-B-C-D-C-A-D-B-C-B (where A=nose-poke #3, B=#6, C=#10, & 
   - 178 - 
   
  
 
D=#13). In our random sequence condition the order in which the nose-pokes were 
presented had to satisfy several criteria: a nose-poke position never immediately 
repeated, and during the course of each 12 trials all four nose-poke positions were 
presented with equal frequency. All sessions, repeating and random, consisted of 96 
individual trails. Individual 12-trial random-sequences were combined per Fellows, 
1967, at the start of each session to make up a unique set of 96 random trials which 
was used for all rats during that particular session. Care was taken to ensure that 
neither the repeating sequence nor any significant (4-trial) portion of it was included in 
the random sequences. Due to the novel apparatus and procedure we thought it 
sufficient at this stage only to replicate the procedure used by most of the human 
literature and control for frequency of stimulus presentation within the random 
sequences, not for any other simple frequency information between repeating and 
random sequences (see Chapter 2). The intent was to demonstrate that rats could 
learn something while performing the SRT task in order to show that the task was a 
valid analogue of the human SRT. It was intended that the presence / absence of 
different simple frequency information in the repeating and random sequences would 
be manipulated later to demonstrate that the rats were capable of learning actual 
sequence information. For example, humans will learn actual sequence information 
when all other statistical frequency information is held constant between repeating and 
random sequences (see Reed and Johnson, 1994). 
 
 Random sequences (R) and repeating sequences (S) were imposed using 
three sets of random sequence sessions interspersed with two sets of repeating 
sequence sessions (RSRSR). The rats were first trained on random sequences (R1) 
and once all subjects had developed stable running times (nine sessions) they were 
then switched on the next day to repeating sequence sessions (six daily sessions; S1) 
before returning to the random sessions (two daily sessions; R2). Four days after the 
end of the R2 set of sessions subjects were returned to the maze for another six 
repeating sequences sessions (S2) before finally being switched immediately to a final 
set of five random sequence sessions (R3) 
  
Results  
 
The running time latency for each trial was log-transformed per Knopman and 
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Nissen (1987) to achieve homogeneity of variance in these scores and was used in all 
analyses. The other measures recorded during performance was an error measure of 
the percentage number of correct trials throughout a session. The primary measure of 
sequence-learning is the deterioration in behaviour (interference effect) when 
switching from a repeating-sequence to a random-sequence and difference scores 
were computed for each subject for each measure and averaged across the group. 
However, as the experimental design also included switches from a random-sequence 
to a repeating-sequence it is possible that subjects might demonstrate a behavioural 
advantage as a result of the switch. This advantage might be evident even when first 
switching to a novel repeating-sequence but is more likely when switching back to a 
previously encountered repeating-sequence. Thus we also analysed the data to test 
for any improvement in behaviour (labelled as an ‘assistance’ effect) when switching 
from a random-sequence to a repeating-sequence. 
 
General analysis of behaviour across a single set of sessions was undertaken 
via repeated-measures one-way MANOVAs (using the ANOVA/MANOVA module in 
Statistica, StatSoft Inc. Tulsa, USA) for each measure (Log-RT, percent correct, and 
light / orientation difference). Interference effect analyses compared the last two 
sessions (192 trials) of the repeating sequence to the first two sessions (192 trials) of 
the random sequence. Assistance effect analyses compared the last two sessions 
(192 trials) of the random sequence to the first two sessions (192 trials) of the 
repeating sequence  Thus both interference and assistance effect analyses were a: 
two (sequence condition) by two (session) MANOVA, with repeated measures on both 
factors.  
 
General Analysis of log reaction time  
Each block of sessions of any given type was analysed by separate repeated-
measures one-way MANOVAs to test for any effects (e.g. learning) within any of the 
five blocks of session types. As shown in Fig. 5.2 both the first random and the first 
repeating sequence sessions (R1 & S1) had significant reductions in reaction times 
over sessions (R1, F(8,80)=27.3, p<0.0001; and S1, F(5,50)=3.55, p<0.01). However, 
neither the second block of random sequences (R2) nor the second block of repeating 
sequences (S2) produced significant effects (F’s<1). The last block of sessions (R3) 
also produced evidence of a significant session effect (F(6,54)=3.88, p<0.0025) but 
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this was due to a significant increase in reaction time across sessions.  
Fig 5.2, Log-Reaction Time Scores Across Sessions (error bars ± 1 SEM). 
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Fig. 5.2 also shows that there is an overall effect of sequence type.  Although 
reaction times were generally stable at the end of the first block of sessions (‘R1’, 
random sequences only) there is an indication of a decrease in reaction times once 
subjects are switched to a block of repeating sequence sessions (‘S1’). Once switched 
back to random sequence sessions (R2) reaction times deteriorated back to the same 
level as at the end of the first random-sequence block, strongly suggesting that 
subjects had used some form of sequence knowledge to improve performance during 
the repeating-sequence sessions. Furthermore, when switched back to the repeating-
sequence sessions (S2) reaction times immediately improved to the same point as 
during the first repeating-sequence block. It is also clear that the last four sessions of 
the second repeating-sequence block (sessions 20-23) are both stable and 
substantially faster than any random-sequence blocks to that point. Although the 
mean reaction time then unexpectedly improved again immediately after switching 
back to the random-sequence sessions (session #24) the general trend for this third 
block of random-sequence sessions (R3) was for reaction times to be more consistent 
with those of the previous two random-sequence blocks (R1 & R2), i.e. slower than 
during repeating-sequence sessions. 
 
Interference and Assistance Analysis of log reaction time  
Individual switches from / to a repeating / random sequence were analysed via 
2 x 2 MANOVAs (sequence condition by session number) with repeating measures on 
R1 S1 R2 S2 R3 
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both factors. The interest here is the degree to which behaviour changes as a function 
of sequence condition and thus interference / assistance effects are displayed in terms 
of the difference in behaviour between one sequence condition and the other. 
 
The first sequence-switch analysis was for the switch from the initial set of 
random sessions (R1) to the first set of repeating sessions (S1; an ‘assistance’ effect). 
As shown by the difference score shown by the first bar in Fig. 5.3 (‘R1 to S1’) the 
switch to a repeating sequence provided an immediate advantage as reaction times 
were significantly faster during the two repeating sessions compared to the preceding 
two random sessions (F(1,10)=6.29, p<0.05, see Figs. 5.2 & 5.3).  
 
Fig 5.3, Assistance and interference effects for the log reaction time measure when 
switching to / from a block of random sequence sessions (error bars ± 1 SEM). 
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The next switch (S1 to R2) was a conventional interference effect. While there 
was no main effect or session or an interaction effect (F’s<1), the effect of this critical 
manipulation (S1 vs. R2) was clearly confirmed  (F(1,10)=22.67, p<0.0001; Fig. 5.3). 
Reaction times slowed significantly when subjects were switched from a repeating to a 
random sequence, which in the human SRT is considered clear evidence of sequence 
learning.  
 
The next switch (R2 to S2) was another ‘assistance’ effect. The effect of 
switching from two blocks of random sequence sessions (R2) to two blocks of 
repeating sequence sessions (S2; same sequence as S1) was also significant 
(F(1,10)=5.92, p<0.05) while session and interaction effects were again absent (F’s 
<1.0). Thus, as in the first random to repeating switch rats demonstrated an immediate 
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advantage when changing to a repeating sequence. 
 
 The final switch (S2 to R3) was a conventional interference effect but this 
switch did not produce any effects (main effect of sequence condition, F<1; main 
effect of session, F(1,10)=1.54, NS; interaction effect, F(1,10)=1.14, NS). Thus 
subjects did not repeat the interference effect that they had demonstrated when first 
switched from repeating to a random sequence. However, examination of Fig. 5.2 
clearly shows that, other than the first session, times for the third block of random 
sequence sessions (R3) were generally slower than that of the (immediately 
preceding) second block of repeating sequence sessions (S2). Examination of 
individual subject performance during the first random sequence session of R3 
(session #24) reveals no anomalies or atypical behaviour patterns and while the 
unusually fast reaction times (for a random sequence block) in this session explains 
the lack of an interference effect we cannot explain why subjects reacted so quickly to 
random stimuli during this session. 
 
General Analysis of the Percentage of Correct Trials per Session  
 
Fig 5.4, Percentage number of correct trials per session across all sessions (error 
bars ± 1 SEM). 
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With the exception of the first block of (random) sessions (R1) there is little 
evidence of any systematic variation between sequence type for this measure (see 
Fig. 5.4). A one-way repeated-measures MANOVA of the first block of random 
sequences (R1) was significant (F(8,80)=4.2, p<0.0005) indicating that subjects made 
fewer errors across sessions. However, separate one-way repeated-measures 
R1 S1 R2 S2 R3 
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MANOVAs for the first block of repeating sequence sessions (S1), the second block of 
random sequence sessions (R2), and the second block of repeating sequence 
sessions (S2) were not significant although the latter block of sessions approached 
significance (S1, F(5,50)=1.7, NS; R2, F(1,10)=1.13, NS; and S2, F(5,50)=2.13, 
p=0.078). Thus there was no systematic change in error rate across these three 
middle blocks of sessions. However, a one-way repeated-measures MANOVA of the 
last block of random sequence sessions (R3) was significant (F(6,54)=2.44, p<0.05) 
but in this case it is due to subjects making more errors during some sessions in this 
block.  
 
Interference and Assistance Analysis of the Percentage of Correct Trials per 
Session  
 
Fig 5.5, Assistance and interference effects for the percentage number of correct trials 
per session when switching to / from a block of random sequence sessions (error bars 
± 1 SEM). 
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 As in the previous assistance / interference effect analysis this analysis 
consisted of 2 x 2 (sequence condition by session) repeated-measures MANOVAs for 
each switch. Throughout all switches for this (error) measure all main effects of 
sequence condition and session were not significant (all F’s<1, see Fig. 5.4). Thus at 
no point did the subjects demonstrate either assistance or interference effects when 
switching from a random to a repeating or a repeating to a random block of sequences 
(respectively) for this measure. Although the interaction effect for the first (assistance 
effect) switch (R1 to S1, Fig. 5.5) was not significant (F(1,10)=2.13, NS) the interaction 
for the next (interference effect; S1 to R2) switch was significant (F(1,10)=9.09, 
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p<0.025). This effect is likely due to error rates improving during the last two repeating 
sequence sessions of S1 but worsening during the two random sequence sessions of 
R2 (see blocks 14 & 15 and 16  17 in Fig. 5.4). The interaction effect for the second 
assistance effect switch (R2 to S2) just failed to reach significance (F(1,10)=4.27, 
p=0.06) and the interaction for the final (interference effect) switch (S2 to R3) was not 
significant (F<1). 
 
General Discussion  
  
 Although not an unqualified success the study produced favourable evidence 
that rats can learn a 12-trial repeating sequence in a SRT-like task. The log reaction 
time data in particular strongly suggests that rats were capable of demonstrating SRT 
sequence learning similar to human SRT behaviour. Rats demonstrated a log reaction 
time interference effect when first switched from a repeating to a random sequence in 
exactly the same manner that humans do. Although the second repeating-to-random 
switch was not significant due to unusually fast reaction times in the first random 
sequence session (session #24; Fig. 5.2) it is clear that for the remainder of this block 
of random sequence sessions reaction times were substantially higher than during the 
preceding block of repeating sequence sessions. In general rats reacted faster during 
repeating sequence sessions than during random sequence sessions. Thus rats also 
demonstrated learning effects consistent with those found in humans. 
 
 The evidence from the other behavioural measure is less clear. Although the 
pattern of behaviour as measured by the percent-correct measure was consistent with 
the sequence switches (i.e. behaviour deteriorated when switched from a random 
sequence to a repeating sequence session, and improved when switched from a 
random to a repeating sequence session) none of the interference / assistance effects 
were significant. Nevertheless, some initial percent-correct learning effects were 
consistent with human SRT behaviour, but as indicated elsewhere (Chapter 2) such 
changes are far less convincing than interference effects. 
 
 The evidence of sequence learning from the reaction time measure must be 
tempered by the acknowledgement that statistical structure was not held constant 
between repeating and random sequences per the discussion on sequence structure 
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in Chapter 2. Specifically that frequency information (e.g. transition frequency), other 
than simple stimulus frequency, was not constrained across sequence types. Thus 
any evidence of sequence learning (i.e. interference, assistance or learning effects) 
may be due to the rats learning the simple frequency differences between the 
repeating and random sequences and not due to learning the repeating sequence 
(Jackson and Jackson, 1995; Reed and Johnson, 1994; Curran, 1997; and Stadler 
and Neely, 1997). Nonetheless, the fact that the rats demonstrated some form of 
sequence learning is sufficient at this point to conclude they learned something in a 
manner analogous to that of humans. 
 
 Although the primary aim of this study was to develop an animal-analogue of 
the human SRT task it will be apparent that the fan-maze SRT task has some 
conceptual and behavioural differences from the human SRT task.   
 
The sensorimotor demands of the animal and human SRT tasks are very 
different. Firstly, while humans makes simple key presses rats have to travel almost a 
full meter before making a response, and then travel back again to collect their 
reward. Secondly, because the strip-lights extended so close to the entrance point into 
the maze from the start-box, and these strip-lights were a perfect cue for nose-poke 
identification, rats might be simply adopting a ‘follow the light’ strategy. Thus rats may 
not have suffered as strong a behavioural disadvantage when responding to random 
sequences than they might otherwise have done had they not been able to employ 
this simply strategy. In fact under these conditions it is the sequential nature (or 
otherwise) of strip light presentation rather than nose poke presentation that provides 
the operant cues necessary for faster responding. The fact that the nose poke 
associated with the strip light was also lit might be irrelevant from the rat’s point of 
view, as it can instead rely on a far more immediate cue. Thus, the point at which the 
rat must decide how to respond may occur sooner after entering the maze than 
desired, which substantially minimises the behavioural differences associated with the 
different sequence types as measured within the maze. It may even be that the point 
at which a rat ‘responds’ is actually prior to entering the maze (i.e. having sighted the 
lit strip light while still inside the start-box, or very shortly after entering the maze) and 
therefore any real difference in behaviour occurs prior to any behavioural 
measurement taking place. In light of these concerns and the consequent decision to 
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completely redesign the animal-SRT task the development of a spatial memory task in 
the fan-maze was abandoned. 
 
  Furthermore, the open nature of the fan-maze and its spatial environment 
permit the use of spatial cue / strategies to aid in accurately predicting the next 
stimulus location. Given that human SRT is a non-declarative memory task, and that 
spatial learning is the primary animal-analogue of human declarative memory tasks, 
this confound substantially reduces the analogical validity of the fan-maze SRT task.  
 
However, these issues notwithstanding there was a strong suggestion that rats 
can learn repeating sequences and respond to changes in sequence information in a 
similar manner to that of humans in the SRT. In light of this conclusion, and the 
methodological and procedural issues discussed above, the following points and 
recommendations are made in respect of future attempts to develop an animal 
analogue of the human SRT. 
 
? As discussed in the introduction to this chapter the primary concern with 
current examples of procedural memory tasks in animals is the lack of contact 
these tasks make with human non-declarative memory tasks. Therefore, rat-
SRT procedures should conceptually and behaviourally resemble human SRT 
procedures as closely as possible. Firstly, animal subjects should perform the 
task within as few sessions as possible. Secondly, any switch from one 
sequence condition to another should take place within a session, and 
preferably towards the end of the session, as is done in human studies. Thirdly, 
all random sequences should be more closely constrained such that the only 
statistical and / or frequency information that is allowed to vary between the 
random and repeating sequences is the actual repeating sequence. Fourthly, 
the apparatus and procedure should encourage the rat to perform the task as 
quickly as possible with the minimal amount of gross motor behaviour. 
 
? The relatively large surface area of the fan-maze and the obvious  
environmental cues introduce an unavoidable spatial component into the task. 
Due to the fact that we were attempting to model a non-spatial memory task it 
is preferable therefore that rat-SRT performance is not dependent on / 
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confounded by spatial strategies, in the same way human SRT is a not 
dependent on spatial factors. Thus a more compact apparatus minimising 
extra-maze spatial cues during performance (which would also limit locomotion) 
is preferable. 
 
In light of the general finding in this chapter that rats display SRT-behaviour in a 
similar fashion to human SRT behaviour (irrespective of how they do so) and the 
points concerning the procedural and conceptual limitations of the rat-SRT task the 
next chapter (Chapter 6) will present the initial study of a second new animal SRT 
task. It is hoped that the nascent ability of rats to perform an animal-SRT analogue 
demonstrated in the studies above will be more readily observed in a study which 
substantially increases the points of similarity between the animal and human SRT. 
Demonstrating that rats can perform the SRT under more rigorous conditions would 
provide far stronger evidence that the rat-SRT is a valid animal-analogue of the 
human SRT.  
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Chapter 6 
 
The Intracranial Self-Stimulation 
Serial Reaction Time Task: A Control 
Group Study 
 
 
Introduction 
 
A Second Rat SRT TASK 
 
The fan-maze design / protocol was a reasonably successful initial design (see 
Chapter 5). However, the points of similarity between the rat SRT task and the human 
task were relatively limited and the fan-maze task was prone to procedural problems 
and technical difficulties. The primary measure of SRT performance, the interference 
effect, is a systematic measure of behavioural variation. Thus anything that acts to 
produce unwanted behavioural variation increases the risk of losing the effect of the 
sequence manipulation in behavioural ‘noise’, and the fan-maze appeared particularly 
prone to behavioural issues that increased such variation. The possibility that rats 
could employ spatially based strategies to perform the task also weakens the task’s 
validity as an animal-analogue of a human non-declarative memory task. Mechanical 
failures and the shuttling requirement also suggested the need for a batter task. 
 
In light of these concerns it was decided to abandon the fan-maze in favour of a 
more restricted environment which would allow us to employ a procedure that has 
several advantages. The new procedure is methodologically more similar to the 
human-SRT and is expected to highlight differences between repeating and random 
sequence behaviour. This chapter will begin with a discussion of the arguments for 
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these changes before reporting the results of a control study that was undertaken to 
test the new equipment, the new procedures, and discern the optimal parameters for 
generating an interference effect in rats. It will be clear from the results that the 
changes were successful. 
 
The purpose of developing the rat-SRT was to model human SRT behaviour in 
rats in order to test assumptions and theories about human non-declarative sequence 
learning. Although there was some evidence that rats performed the fan-maze SRT in 
a similar fashion to how humans perform the SRT there were obvious differences 
between the task requirements for the human SRT and the fan-maze SRT. Five main 
points of dissimilarity were identified between the human and fan-maze SRT. These 
were: the delivery of a food reward for every trial, a much lower number of trials per 
session, a far greater number of sessions overall, switching between sequence types 
occurred between sessions not within sessions, and there were a number of 
behavioural differences in terms of how the SRT task was performed in the fan-maze 
(i.e. locomotor responding in a maze as opposed to the brief motor requirements of 
simply pressing a button). Each of these points is discussed briefly below. 
 
While unavoidable the fact that animal subjects need to be rewarded reliably 
and regularly in order to continue behaving introduces a behavioural artefact into SRT 
performance that is not present in the human task. Of particular concern is the fact 
that while the human SRT is performed in a continuous fashion during which separate 
trials follow on quickly and smoothly, trials in the fan-maze SRT are performed in a 
more discrete fashion by virtue of the rat deliberately stopping to gain the reward and 
in doing so interrupting SRT performance. A number of alternatives were mooted such 
as increasing the number of trials per reward (into ‘chunks’) but while this might well 
improve within chunk behaviour it would still require the division of a session into 
relatively many chunks. We even thought it possible to increase the number of trials 
per reward to the total number of repeating-sequence trials (e.g. 12 trials) and in this 
manner ensure the subject quickly and accurately completed a full sequence before 
being rewarded. Unfortunately, this doesn’t defeat the chunking problem, it only 
reduces the number of chunks experienced by the animal. More problematically 
reward at the end of a sequence encourages recognition of the presence of a 
repeating sequence and even of the sequence itself, in direct contrast to the human 
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SRT and the desired aim of the protocol. We also considered employing a variable 
reinforcement schedule to encourage subjects to run quickly, but again this just 
redistributes the chunking and also does not eliminate the need to halt behaviour to 
gain the reward and may even interfere with sequence learning by forcing the animal 
to experience / organise stimuli in a variable fashion (see Frensch, Buchner and Lin 
1994; Jacoby et al, 1989; Stadler, 1995; and Stadler, 1993, in Chapter 2). It was 
apparent that as long as a subject was rewarded in a discrete and regular fashion it 
would be impossible to avoid reward delivery interfering with SRT behaviour.  
 
As a function of the food-reward system, and especially satiation effects, it was 
not possible for rats to perform anywhere near as many trials per session as human 
subjects do. Consequently rats performed both far fewer trials per sessions and far 
more sessions overall than human subjects. Obviously the main concern with this 
procedure is that the rats did not have the same opportunity to continuously learn the 
repeating sequence as humans do. The rats had experienced fewer trials within a 
session and their sessions were far further apart than in human studies (days as 
opposed to minutes). This problem is further compounded by the problem that rats 
continually experienced interrupted performance during exposure to the repeating-
sequence due to constantly stopping to obtain food reward.  
 
Another difference between the human and fan-maze SRT tasks is that 
switching between sequence types in the fan-maze was done between sessions in 
contrast to switching within a session in the human work. Given that the sequence 
switch is critical to demonstrating non-declarative sequence learning it is clearly 
desirable to maximise such an effect. Hence it is more desirable to switch sequence 
types during continuous responding rather than at the beginning of a new session. 
Switching between sessions denies an important point of similarity between the rat 
and human versions and switching from a repeating to a random sequence within a 
session could be expected to increase the ability of animal subjects in the SRT to 
demonstrate a strong interference effect.  
 
Rats in the fan-maze are required to run almost a full meter to register a 
response before having to run back again to receive their food reward whereas 
humans respond in the SRT task by simply pressing a button. This also decreases 
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behavioural similarities between the two tasks. The relatively long response time in the 
case of rats also substantially increases behavioural variability within the fan-maze 
task. Given that a stated aim of the fan-maze SRT was to model as closely as 
possible the human-SRT task the profound difference in the mechanics of the 
response behaviour is a concern.  
 
When considering the source of these problems in the fan-maze SRT it quickly 
became apparent there were three main causes: reward delivery characteristics, 
response mechanics and the opportunity to employ spatial strategies. The latter two of 
these causes were not only relatively easy to address but could be solved in concert. 
To minimise the requirement for locomotion and increase the procedural points of 
similarity between the animal and human tasks we developed a far smaller apparatus 
which, by virtue of its small size, could be placed in an environment with minimal 
spatial cues. Allowing subjects to respond simply and quickly with a minimum of motor 
behaviour reduced the influence of behavioural artefacts produced by the response 
mechanics in the fan-maze (e.g. fatigue from repetitive, medium-distance, 
locomotion). Eliminating any spatial cues greatly reduced the possibility of animals 
using (allocentric) spatial memory to perform the task and thus encouraged the use of 
behavioural strategies based on non-declarative memory.  
 
The new technique we used employed a task in which rats nose-poking one-of-
four holes directly in front of the rat (see Fig. 6.1 below). This new task reduced 
behavioural artefacts by minimising the amount of motor response required to make a 
response. A head turn and a relatively shallow nose-poke was all that was required. It 
thus more closely approximated the button-pressing response of the human-SRT in 
terms of the nature of the response, especially the ability to quickly move from one 
stimulus response position to another with minimal motor behaviour.  
 
The Intracranial Self Stimulation  
The other primary cause of problems in the fan-maze, the reward delivery 
system, was less easily overcome. While the food restricting procedure has a long and 
useful history in animal behaviour experiments any experimenter who has used this 
procedure will readily acknowledge it is not without difficulties and drawbacks. No 
matter how carefully their weight is monitored (subjects in the fan-maze SRT studies 
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were weighed daily) a degree of variability in body weight may occur, which is likely to 
affect behavioural motivation. When combined with the necessity of interrupting 
behaviour in order to deliver a reward (be it one per trial or whatever) the problem of 
varying motivation, both between and within sessions, introduces substantial 
opportunity for behavioural variation.  
 
It was this concern led us to consider employing intracranial self-stimulation 
(ICSS) as a reward delivery system because (among other reasons discussed below) 
it has an extremely quick onset and very short duration (e.g. 2msec and 500msec, 
respectively) and thus results in minimal behavioural  interruption during task 
performance. On examination it seemed possible that ICSS might be ideally suited for 
addressing the concerns identified with the fan-maze as it not only is it minimally 
disruptive but it is also extremely salient and can be designed to ensure a constant 
level of reinforcement within a subject. Furthermore, by virtue of setting the degree of 
simulation a rat receives to a fixed proportion of the current that produces maximal 
response rates it is also possible to ensure a constant level of reinforcement between 
subjects (see “Rate-Response Function” in the methods section below). Furthermore, 
ICSS is not subject to satiation (Gallistel, 1964; Gallistel et al, 1974; Waraczynski  et 
al, 1987)  
Olds and Milner (1954) first discovered that very mild electrical stimulation of 
certain brain areas was rewarding, so much so that if stimulation was made contingent 
on behaviour, e.g. bar pressing, a rat would respond rapidly and repeatedly for long 
periods of time (i.e. hours). Since then a considerable body of work has examined the 
neural and procedural characteristics of ICSS (see the “Parametric Analysis of Brain 
Stimulation Reward in the Rat” series of articles, Gallistel et. al. 1974, for a detailed 
review) such that it is now possible to detail a number of the characteristics of the 
protocol. 1) It is largely a function of electrical stimulation of one of the two main 
dopamine (DA) reward pathways, either the mesolimbic or nigrostriatal pathways 
(Fiorino, et. al 1993; Gallistel et. al, 1981; McCown et. al. 1986; Nicolaysen et. al 
1988; Phillips and Fibiger, 1978; Ranaldi and Beninger, 1994; Stephens and Herberg, 
1977). 2) The relationships between a variety of stimulation parameters (pulse-
frequency, current strength, train-duration, pulse style, etc.) can be empirically 
quantified. For example, Gallistel et. al (1981) showed that the ‘required’ strength 
(current value) of a stimulation train (a series of pulses) is a hyperbolic function of train 
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duration (see also Edmonds et. al. 1974; Edmonds and Gallistel, 1974; Gallistel, 1964, 
1974 and 1978; Leon and Gallistel, 1992; Stellar and Gallistel, 1975; Mazur et al, 
1987; and Waraczynski et. al. 1987). And 3) It has a number of idiosyncratic features. 
It does not suffer from satiation, and (given appropriate stimulation parameters) is 
extremely reinforcing and any behavioural task learnt via ICSS reward is however 
prone to rapid extinction. Any simple parametric manipulation can render a previously 
rewarding stimulation aversive and vice-versa.  
 
 A pilot study was first performed with a few animals to examine the feasibility of 
ICSS in the modified rat-SRT (the data not presented). Rats demonstrated reliable 
interference effects when switching from repeating to random sequences while 
receiving ICSS protocol in the new SRT apparatus. For these reasons it was decided 
to undertake a formal control study designed  to ascertain the optimal parameters for 
reliable SRT behaviour in rats. 
 
Experimental Design 
The purpose of the study presented in this chapter is to manipulate experimental 
conditions in order to determine the optimal parameters for generating an interference 
effect in rats. Given that the interference effect is the primary measure of SRT 
performance establishing the optimal parameters for generating interference effects in 
rats will therefore provide the optimal parameters for studying rat-SRT behaviour in 
general.  
 
It was hypothesised that spaced learning (i.e. experiencing the repeating sequence 
over separate sessions) might accentuate any interference effect. It was decided to 
compare the effect of performing the SRT over three sessions with that of performing 
it within a single session. Given that humans perform 500 trials in a typical SRT study 
it was decided to roughly double this figure for use with rats. The figure of 940 trials 
per session was settled for ease of use with different sequence lengths (see Chapter 
7). Consequentially individual triple condition sessions were 940 trials long. Hence the 
single session was 2820 trials long, and in this way all rats experienced the same 
number of total trials irrespective of number of sessions (i.e. three sessions x 940 
trials per session = 2820 trials in total). 
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 In order to demonstrate that any interference effect produced by switching from 
a repeating to a random sequence was due to the random sequence information 
interfering with prior representations of sequence information a strong experimental 
test would be to show that either random sequences alone and / or repeating 
sequences alone (i.e. without any switch) do not produce a similar effect. Thus three 
sequence conditions were used within each of the two number of sessions conditions: 
random-only, repeating-only, and repeating sequences with a switch to random 
sequences. Rats that only ever experienced random sequences should display a 
modest improvement in behaviour over sessions, due simply to a practice effect with 
the motor requirements of the task, but no interference effect. However, repeating-only 
rats should also fail to show any interference effect as they never actually switch to 
random sequences.  
 
 Thus the experimental design consisted of three factors: sequence type 
(random or repeating), number of sessions to complete the total of 2820 trials (one or 
three), and presence or absence of a switch from a repeating to random sequences. 
However, the design was incomplete in that not all possible combinations of these 
factors were used. In particular the triple-session condition used a modified ‘repeating 
only‘ condition. Rather than just receive repeating information across all three 
sessions, as a strict application of experimental conditions would demand, it was 
decided to switch this group to a random sequence at the end of their third, and last, 
session. Doing this provided a direct comparison with the single-session repeating 
plus switch-to-random condition, i.e. an examination of the effect of switching to 
random sequences once only at the end of the overall exposure to repeating 
sequences, irrespective of how many sessions the rat had experienced the repeating 
sequences over.  
 
However, unlike the repeating-to-random group in the single session condition 
the repeating-to-random group in the triple session condition was switched from 
repeating to random sequences at the end of all sessions. Thus it differs from all other 
groups in that it experienced multiple repeating to random sequence switches.  
 
Due to the use of a novel apparatus and untested reward delivery system in 
this experiment it was decided to employ a shorter, 4-trial, repeating sequence in 
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order to ensure sequence learning. A pilot study (not reported) using the SRT 
chamber, the ICSS reward system, and a 4-trial repeating sequence demonstrated 
that rats could learn that repeating sequence under these conditions. Hence it was 
decided to retain this sequence length in the current study in order to ensure rats 
would be capable of demonstrating the optimal parameters for sequence learning. A 
parametric analysis of rats’ abilities to learn longer sequence lengths is presented in 
the next chapter. 
 
 The purpose of this study was to maximise rat SRT performance in order to 
establish that the rat-SRT is a robust and sensitive test capable of demonstrating any 
impairment or sparing of SRT performance as a consequence of damage to different 
neural structures. For this reason the rats in the condition that generated the strongest 
interference effect, and the respective random-only control group, went on to 
constitute the control groups for animals with various lesions (see Chapter 7). 
Although the control and lesion studies are presented separately for purposes of 
clarity (this chapter and Chapter 7, respectively), they were actually undertaken in a 
partially overlapping fashion and conducted in exactly the same fashion. 
 
Method 
Rats.  
57 Norwegian hooded rats were used aged between 120 & 150 days at the 
time of electrode implantation for intracranial self-stimulation. Rats were housed 
individually with food & water available ad libitum and trained / tested during the dark 
portion of a reversed 12hr light / dark cycle. The change in rat strain from Chapter 5 
was brought about through colony changes imposed on the facility. 
 
Surgery: ICSS Electrode Implantation:  
Subjects were treated 20 minutes pre-operatively with 0.18mg/kg of atropine 
sulphate (concentration=0.13mg/ml, dose=0.18mg/kg; Phoenix Pharmaceutical 
Distributors, Auckland, New Zealand) before being anaesthetised with 100mg/kg of 
sodium pentobarbital (concentration=50mg/ml, dose=100mg/kg). Twisted wire ICSS 
bipolar electrodes (Plastics One Inc. model MS303/1) were cut to length (1.3cm) and 
had a small amount (~1mm) of insulation removed from the tip. The electrode tips 
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were separated by ~1mm before being implanted into the medial forebrain bundle at 
the level of the lateral hypothalamus. Flat skull stereotaxic coordinates adapted from 
the Paxinos and Watson (1986) atlas were: from Bregma, A/P –2.6mm, M/L ±1.8mm, 
and from dura, -8.6mm ventral. Electrodes were held in place by a dental acrylic head-
cap that was fastened to the skull with 4 small screws. All subjects received one 
electrode implanted into either the left or right hemisphere (balanced across rats). 
Subjects were left for seven days after surgery before familiarisation training began. 
 
Apparatus 
The novel ICSS-SRT chamber (Fig. 6.1) had an open-ended rectangular 
aluminium body, 20cm long by 15cm wide by 15cm high, with a Perspex lid and a 
brass-rod floor, underneath which was a shallow tray containing bedding material. The 
open end of the rectangle was fastened to a slightly wider (27cm) semi-circular 
aluminium wall which has a small ledge (5cm wide) mounted at an angle of 15º 
between the floor and the wall. The ledge holds four equispaced nose-pokes (3cm 
diameter, 7cm apart from centre to centre) and designed to be easily reached from a 
central position in the chamber. The aluminium wall was painted with a non-
conducting paint (Dulux Paint, Auckland, New Zealand; ‘HammerFinish Grey’) to 
prevent interference from the electronics associated with the nose-pokes. The 
Perspex lid included a channel and hole to allow the ICSS cable easy access to the 
chamber. The ICSS cable ran from a 2-channel commutator (Plastics One, model 
SL2C) fastened to an aluminium arm, that projected to a point 40cm directly above the 
centre of the chamber down to the subject. The ICSS-SRT chamber was placed within 
the SRT-training box (see below) to minimise spatial cues. The chamber was 
controlled by an IBM-PC running Med Associates (St. Albans, Vermont) WinMPC 
operant software connected to a MED-PC computer interface, which also operated the 
stimulator. 
 
The Stimulator: A Lafayette Instruments Co. (Lafayette, Indiana) model 82408 sine 
wave stimulator was used. The stimulator was capable of delivering from 0.01µa to 
10µa with a train duration between 0.1 and 11 seconds in either a bipolar or 
monopolar fashion at a fixed pulse frequency of 50Hz. Current strength variation can 
be achieved in three ranges (0.01µa to 0.1µa, 0.1µa to 1.0µa, 1.0µa to 10µa) by a 
variable-resistance relay that was calibrated to an accuracy of 1% of the range 
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maximum. For this reason any current variation was performed in steps of at least 5%. 
While actual stimulation strength varied according to individual subjects (see below) 
stimulation was always bipolar, and the train duration was always 0.5 seconds. Note: 
no subject used in the experiments reported in this thesis required stimulation above 
0.5µa. 
Fig 6.1, Photograph of the ICSS-SRT chamber inside the ICSS-Training box, all 
nose-pokes are lit for the purpose of the photo. 
 
 
ICSS-Training Box: Initial nose-poke training was conducted in a painted wooden 
box, 40cm wide by 50cm long and 30cm high, with two nose-pokes (3.5cm diameter) 
mounted in the floor in the centre of the box, 6.5cm apart (centre to centre; see Fig. 
6.2). The nose-pokes were identical to those used in the fan-maze and were also 
controlled by the MED-PC computer interface. The arm holding the commutator used 
to deliver ICSS current to the ICSS-SRT chamber was permanently attached to the 
side of this box and arced up to place the commutator directly over the centre. The 
box was placed in a corner of a dimly lit room where subjects could not see anything 
of the room except the ceiling which was featureless. The arm that held the 
commutator was also mounted with an infra-red camera (Henry’s Electronics, 
Paddington, London; model 208IR B/W board camera) which was connected to a 
video monitor in the adjacent control room that allowed real-time viewing of behaviour 
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(in this box and the ICSS-SRT chamber). 
 
Behavioural Procedures 
 Subjects were initially placed in the ICSS-training box and trained to nose-poke 
in return for ICSS reward per nose-poke. 
 
Fig 6.2 Photograph of 2-hole ICSS-training box. Both nose-pokes are lit. 
 
 
Familiarisation: During the first two sessions rats were free to explore the ICSS-
training box for 20 minutes, without the ICSS cable attached or any nose-poke lit / 
active. The second session was identical except the ICSS cable was attached but no 
current was supplied. 
 
Initial Nose-Poke Training: Initial training sessions in the ICSS-training box involved 
shaping the subjects to nose-poke at either of the nose-pokes (both were lit 
throughout the session). An initial current value was selected by stimulating (in 0.5sec. 
bursts) with very low current when the rat was adjacent to one of the nose-pokes and 
observing the subject as the current was gradually increased. Once a subject began to 
display any behavioural response the current was lowered back to the value 
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immediately prior to this and this value used for the rest of these initial training 
sessions to shape the nose-poke response. Training continued until the rats were able 
to quickly and reliably nose-poke either hole, which typically took between three and 
five sessions. Each session lasted for 20 minutes or 300 trials, whichever came first. 
 
Rate-Response Function: During the next two sessions rate-response functions 
were generated (see Fig. 6.3) during which current value was systematically altered 
and the number of responses per minute recorded for each current value. Both holes 
in the ICSS-training box were lit and a nose-poke in either produced stimulation. The 
current value used in initial training sessions was the starting point and was 
incremented / decremented by 0.005µa or 0.01µa as appropriate to the 0.0µa to 0.1µa 
and 0.1µa to 1.0µa current ranges (respectively) used in the initial nose-poke training.  
 
In the first of these sessions the current value was first gradually decreased 
until the subject stopped responding, and then gradually increased to beyond the 
initial starting (i.e. to increase nose-poke response rates) until the response-rate 
remained stable over five current steps, before being decreased gradually to the 
starting point again. In this way two response rates were generated at each current 
value, during the decreasing phases and during the increasing phase of the rate-
response function. The second session repeated this process but in the reverse order, 
the current was firstly gradually increased from the initial value but then decreased to 
the point the animal stopped responding and then increased again to the initial value. 
All response rates for a particular current value were averaged and a response-rate 
plotted (Fig. 6.3). The two-thirds maximal response value was calculated (the current 
value at which the subject would respond at two-thirds of its maximal response rate) 
and this value was used for that subject throughout the remainder of the study. Thus 
an important factor was that all subjects experienced an identical relative stimulation 
value (66%) and therefore we were able to equate the motivational value of the 
reinforcer between subjects, something that is practically impossible with food reward. 
 
Discrimination Training: In subsequent sessions only one of the two ICSS-training 
box holes were lit and only a nose-poke to the lit hole produced stimulation. 
Immediately after a successful nose-poke the light was turned off and an inter-trial 
interval (ITI) of 500msec. elapsed before the next hole was lit. Holes were lit in an 
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entirely random fashion so that the rat had no way of predicting where the light would 
appear next and had to learn to distinguish between lit and unlit holes. Each 
discrimination training session lasted for 20 minutes or 300 trials, whichever came 
first. Once subjects were able to discriminate quickly and accurately (typically between 
two and three sessions) they were moved onto the ICSS-SRT chamber familiarisation. 
 
Fig. 6.3 Example of a Rate Response Function (values averaged over trials) 
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ICSS-SRT Familiarisation: Like the previous familiarisation sessions in the ICSS-
training box familiarisation to the ICSS-SRT chamber involved two separate sessions. 
During the first session subjects were placed in an inactive ICSS-SRT chamber (which 
was inside the ICSS-training box) for 20 minutes without the ICSS cable being 
attached and left to explore. The second session was identical except the ICSS cable 
was attached but no current was passed through it. 
 
ICSS-SRT Training, Part 1: Initial training in the ICSS-SRT chamber involved all four 
holes remaining lit and a nose-poke to any hole resulted in stimulation. Each session 
lasted for 10 minutes or 200 trials, whichever came first, and rats typically only 
required one such session. 
 
ICSS-SRT Training, Part 2: Part 2 was identical to Part 1 (all holes were lit at the start 
of each session / cycle) except that as a hole was nose-poked it was extinguished and 
any further nose-poke to it did not result in stimulation. Once all four holes had been 
nose-poked (regardless of order) they were reset (relit) and the cycle began again. 
Sessions lasted for 20 minutes or 200 trials, whichever came first, and rats typically 
Two-thirds maximal 
response rate (26 
responses per minute) 
Current value that 
induces two-thirds 
maximal response rate 
(100µa) 
Maximal response rate (39 
response per minute) 
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became proficient at this within two or three sessions. 
 
SRT Training: Rats were exposed to 100-quasi random trials and had to complete the 
session within 10 minutes in order to advance onto the SRT proper. A unique 100-trial 
quasi-random sequence was generated per the rules detailed below and was used for 
each subject during this session only. After successfully completing this phase 
subjects were returned to their home cage and did not perform the SRT proper until 
the next day. 
 
SRT Testing.  
All rats underwent a total of 2820 trials in the ICSS-SRT chamber over one or 
three sessions. Rats in single-session groups completed the 2820 trials within one 
continuous session, whereas those rats in the triple-session condition completed 2820 
trials over three sessions on adjacent days, performing 940 continuous trials per 
session.  
 
Rats were further divided into three groups within each session-length 
condition. The purpose was to compare rats that experienced: only random 
sequences with those that only repeating sequences and with those that experience 
repeating sequences with a random sequence switch towards the end of the session. 
In addition the triple-session ‘repeating-only’ group (see above) received repeating 
sequences only during sessions one and two but received random sequences at the 
end of the third session. 
 
Single-Session Conditions.  
 
Group 1: Random-to-Random (no switch). These rats only ever experienced 
random sequence information throughout the 2820-trial session.  
 
Group2: Repeating-to-Repeating only (no switch). These rats only ever 
experienced the repeating sequence throughout the 2820-trial session.  
 
Group 3: Repeating-to-Random (switch). These rats received 2580 repeating 
sequence trials before being switched (uncued) to 240 random trials. 
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Triple-Session Conditions.  
 
Group 4: Random-to-Random (no switch). These rats only ever experienced 
random sequences for 940 trials per session during each of the three sessions. 
 
Group 5: Repeating-to-Repeating (plus a switch to random in the last session). 
This group experienced 940 trials of the repeating sequences in their first two 
sessions but in the third session received 860 repeating-sequence trials before being 
switched (uncued) to 80 trials of the random sequence.  
 
Group 6: Repeating-to-Random (switch). This group always experienced 860 trails 
of the repeating sequence before being switched (uncued) to 80 trials of the random 
sequence at the end of each of the three sessions.  
 
Group Numbers 
 Group numbers are presented in Table 6.1 below. Each group initially had eight 
rats but two groups (Groups 1 and 3) went on to be included in the lesion study 
(presented in Chapter 7) and had animals added to bring their group size up to 12 per 
group. These additional animals are included in this study as their SRT procedure was 
identical to that of other rats in their respective groups. 
 
Table 6.1, Final Group Sizes  
 
Single-Session 
Conditions 
Triple-Session 
Conditions 
 
Group Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
Number of Rats 13 8 12 8 8 8 57 
 
Repeating and Random Sequences 
It was hoped that this short sequence would promote sequence learning in 
what was still a very novel and largely untested design. If rats could demonstrate a 
reliable ability to learn this short sequence under these conditions it would then be 
possible to examine their ability to learn longer sequences. Therefore, the repeating 
sequence was a novel 4-trial sequence; 3-1-4-2. 
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An important methodological feature was that random sequences were 
generated per Johnson and Reed (1994) to ensure that all simple frequency 
information was identical between random and repeating sequences. Thus such 
simple frequency information as transition probability and ‘reversals’ (see ‘The Effect 
of Sequence Structure on SRT Performance’ in Chapter 2) did not differ between the 
random and repeating sequences, ensuring the only difference between sequence 
types was the presence or absence of the repeating sequence. Four-trial sets of 
random sequences were combined per Fellows (1967) to create a unique 480-trial 
block of random sequences and the block examined to ensure it contained no three or 
four trial sequences identical to those found in the repeating sequence. This 480-trial 
block of random trials was used for all subjects throughout this part of the study after 
all sequence to random transitions. In order to minimise any possible learning of these 
random trials the starting position within the block was randomly varied for each 
subject (that experienced a switch to random sequences) for each session. 
 
Behavioural Measures  
Behaviour was measured by (log transformed) reaction times and error rates. 
Reaction times were quantified as from the onset of the stimulus (light) to the correct 
hole being nose-poked (error trials were not discarded). An error was any nose-poke 
to an unlit hole. 
 
Note: Due to a programming error reaction time data stopped recording during 
the SRT session for a few animals (two in Group 2 and one in Group 3). However 
error data recorded normally for these animals and their experience in the task was 
identical to other animals in their group (i.e. stimulus presentation was not effected). 
Thus while these rats are not included in the reaction time analysis they are included 
in the error-rate analysis and hence the degrees-of-freedom values are not identical 
between the analyses of the two measures. The fault was corrected and all data 
generated prior to this was checked to ensure reaction times had been recorded 
properly throughout the entire session. 
 
Histology  
Rats were sacrificed with an overdose of sodium pentobarbitone before being 
perfused with 4% formalin and their brains were removed and fixed in 4% formalin. 
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Brains were transferred to a long-term-solution (4% sucrose) before being sliced on a 
freezing microtome at 50μm and stained with cresyl-violet to locate ICSS-electrode 
tips. 
 
Results 
 In order to allow comparison between the various session length and sequence 
type conditions, sessions were divided to produce 36 blocks of trials. In the single-day 
condition (2820 trials) this involved averaging 20 trials for the first block of trials and 80 
trials for all subsequent blocks. In the three-day condition the first block of trials for 
each session was averaged over 60 trials and all subsequent blocks (for that session) 
were averaged over 80 trials. This meant that random sequence interference blocks 
were always averaged over 80 trials regardless of session condition and were thus 
directly comparable between conditions.  
 
Histology 
 Placement of electrode tips is indicated in Fig. 6A.1 in the appendix to this 
chapter. All tips were within the medial forebrain bundle and placements were 
relatively consistent between groups. 
 
Stimulation Values 
 A one-way ANOVA comparing the stimulation value used for each rat during 
SRT sessions across groups was not significant (F<1), see Fig 6.4. 
 
Fig. 6.4, Average Stimulation Values (µa) per Group Used in SRT Sessions (Error 
bars ± 1 SEM). 
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Log-Reaction Time Measure 
 
General Analysis  
Analysis was performed on an equal number of trials prior to the point when 
any interference effect would be introduced (if appropriate to that group). Thus the first 
33 ‘non-interference’ blocks (60 trials in the first block, 80 trials per block thereafter) of 
the total 36-blocks for the single-session conditions were analysed. The triple session 
conditions each generated one block of 60 trials and 11 blocks of 80 trials per session 
for a total of 12 blocks per session. The 12th and last block of each session contained 
‘interference data’ as it was at the start of this block that a switch from repeating to 
random sequences took place (if appropriate to condition). Hence the 12th block from 
each session was removed and analysed separately and the remaining blocks were 
collapsed together over sessions to form a continuous set of 33 blocks. See Fig. 6.5. 
 
Fig 6.5, Average Log-Reaction Time per Trial across Non-Interference Blocks (Error 
bars ± 1 SEM). ‘Thirds’ refer to the portion of single sessions only. Session numbers 
are relevant to the triple session conditions only. Session 3 only includes three blocks 
because the fourth block is the interference effect block (if appropriate to group 
condition) which is reported separately. 
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Due to the unequal number of conditions within variables (group type, number of days 
1st 3rd or Session 1 2nd 3rd or Session 2 Last 3rd or Session 3 
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to complete, and sequence type) it was impossible to compare group and either 
number of days or sequence-type within the same analysis. For example, while there 
was a single-session, random-only, no-switch-to-random condition (i.e. Group 1) there 
was no single-session, random-only, switch-to-random condition. Such a condition is 
nonsensical in terms of the experimental design as to have such a condition would 
require switching from the random sequence to, either, a ‘different’ random sequence 
(which is impossible anyway given that the random sequence was deliberately made 
identical to the repeating sequence in all ways except for the actual repeating 
sequence and it is therefore impossible to have a ‘different’ random sequence) or a 
repeating sequence. Thus learning effects (across the 33 blocks) were analysed in 
three separate MANOVAs testing individual variable (number of sessions, sequence 
type and presence / absence of interference switch) by block effects, with repeated 
measures on blocks. 
 
Group Analysis: The initial analysis of reaction time data compared the behaviour of 
the six groups, irrespective of number of sessions and sequence-type conditions, 
across blocks and was thus a 6 (group) x 33 (block) MANOVA with repeated measure 
for blocks. This analysis produced a non significant group effect (F(5,49)=1.32, NS) 
but a significant block effect (F(32,1568)=20.8, p<0.00001) and a significant group x 
block interaction (F(160,1568)=1.32, p<0. 01). Thus while groups were not different 
prior to any sequence switch all rats improved (responded faster) over blocks 
irrespective of number of sessions and sequence type. The interaction effect most 
likely stems from the that triple session groups tend to be slower than single session 
groups and groups 4 and 6 diverge from other groups over sessions (Fig 6.5). 
 
Number of Sessions Analysis: Effectively a breakdown of the previous group 
analysis this analysis simplifies the single and triple session comparison and analyses 
reaction times irrespective of group and sequence-type, across blocks. It was thus a 2 
x 33 MANOVA with repeating measures on the last variable. This analysis produced a 
significant main effect of number of days (F(1,53)=4.9, p<0.05) due to the single 
session rats responded faster than the triple session rats (single-session overall 
mean(SD) = 0.19(0.004), triple-session overall mean(SD) = 0.27(0.007), see Fig 6.6). 
Both the block effect and interaction effect for this analysis were significant (block, 
F(32,1696)=23.27, p<0.00001; interaction, F(32,1696)=3.77, p<0.00001). Overall rats 
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responded faster across blocks irrespective of individual group and sequence type but 
this improvement was more consistent in the single session animals. The interaction 
effect is more clearly refects the relatively slower reaction times for the triple-session 
condition as trials progress and especially the increase in reaction times in this group 
at the start of second session (blocks 13-15 in Fig. 6.6). 
 
 
Fig. 6.6, Data aggregated according to Number of Sessions (Error bars ± 1 SEM). ). 
‘Thirds’ refer to the portion of single sessions only. Session numbers are relevant to 
the triple session conditions only. 
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Interference Effect Analysis 
To maintain consistency with human SRT procedures the interference effect 
analysis compared difference scores between groups. Difference scores were 
generated from subtracting the average of the 80 trials immediately prior to the 
sequence switch (if any) from the average of the 80 trials immediately after the 
sequence switch. A one-way ANOVA was performed for each behavioural measure. 
Dependent measures t-tests were also calculated individually for each group to see if 
their post-interference behaviour was significantly different to their pre-interference 
behaviour. For both the ANOVA and t-test analyses interference effects for triple-
session groups (Groups 4, 5 & 6)  were only calculated on data from the third and last 
session. 
 
Group Analysis: The first analysis compared reaction time interference effects for the 
six different groups (see Fig 6.7). The group difference was significant (F(5,49)=3.65), 
1st 3rd or Session 2nd 3rd or Session Last 3rd or Session 3 
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p<0.01) and thus the six groups differed in terms of the strength of their interference 
effects. Post hoc analysis (Newman-Keuls tests) revealed that Group 3 (single-
session switch to random) had a significantly stronger interference effect than Groups 
4 and 6 (p’s <0.05), and differences approached significance when compared to 
Groups 1, 2 and 5 (p’s=0.08, 0.07 & 0.07, respectively). No other group differences 
were significant or approached significance. 
 
 
Fig 6.7, Change in Average Log Reaction Time per Trial after switching to a 
Random Sequence (if appropriate; Error bars ± 1 SEM). 
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Individual dependent-measures t-tests were carried out for each group to test if 
their behaviour altered significantly after the point where a sequence switch would 
take place. The differences between pre- and post-switch blocks was only significant 
for Group 3 (t(11)=3.12, p<0.01; all other groups p’s >0.16). 
 
Error Measure 
 
General Analysis 
Single Session Triple Session 
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As for the reaction time measure practice effects (across 33 blocks) were 
calculated for error rates for the three variables (group type, number of days to 
complete, and sequence type) in separate variable by block MANOVAs with repeated 
measures on blocks.  
 
Group Analysis: The first variable analysis compared the behaviour of the six groups, 
irrespective of number of sessions and sequence-type condition, across blocks and 
was thus a 6 x 33 MANOVA with repeating measures on the last variable. This 
analysis produced a non significant group effect (F(5,51)=1.43, NS; see Fig. 6.8) but a 
significant block effect (F(32,1632)=73.86, p<0.00001) and a significant group x block 
interaction (F(160,1632)=1.6, p<0. 00001). Thus while groups were not different prior 
to any sequence switch all rats improved (made fewer errors) over blocks irrespective 
of sequence or number of sessions conditions. The interaction is difficult to interpret 
as the error data shows no clear pattern except for the variability between groups in 
the first third / session. In particular Group 5’s reaction times are faster than other 
groups even in the first few blocks, and Group 3’s reaction times are initially slower 
than Group 1’s but are faster after block 9. Either of these two effects could produce 
an interaction effect. 
 
Fig 6.8, Average Number of Errors per Trial across Non-Interference Blocks (Error 
bars ± 1 SEM). ‘Thirds’ refer to the portion of single sessions only. Session numbers 
are relevant to the triple session conditions only. Session 3 only includes three blocks 
because the fourth block is the interference effect block which is reported separately. 
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Number of Sessions Analysis: The second variable analysis compared behaviour 
2nd 3rd or Session 2 Last 3rd or Session 3 1st 3rd or Session 1 
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between single and triple session conditions, irrespective of group and sequence-type, 
across blocks. It was thus a 2 x 33 MANOVA with repeating measures on the last 
variable. This analysis nearly produced a significant main effect of number of days 
(F(1,55)=2.93, p=0.09) due to the single session rats making slightly more errors on 
average than the triple session rats, see Fig 6.9). While the block effect for this 
analysis were significant (F(32,1760)=72.54, p<0.00001) the interaction effect was not 
(F(32,1760)=1.26, NS). Thus, overall, rats made fewer errors over blocks irrespective 
of group or sequence type.  
 
Interference Effect Analysis 
 Just as for the reaction time analyses the analysis of the interference effects for 
error rate were carried out via a (one-way) ANOVA to compare between groups  
Difference scores were again generated from subtracting the average of the 80 trials 
immediately prior to the sequence switch (if any) from the average of the 80 trials 
immediately after the sequence switch. A one-way ANOVA was performed for each 
behavioural measure. Dependent measures t-tests were also calculated individually 
for each group to see if their post-interference behaviour was significantly different to 
their pre-interference behaviour. For both the ANOVA and t-test analyses interference 
effects for triple-session groups (Groups 4, 5 & 6)  were only calculated on data from 
the third and last session. 
 
Fig. 6.9, Error Rate Data Aggregated According To Number-Of-Sessions (Error 
Bars ± 1 SEM). 
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Group Analysis: The first analysis compared interference effects for the different 
groups. The analysis was significant (F(5,51)=8.1), p<0.0001; see Fig. 6.10) and thus 
the six groups differed between themselves in terms of the strength of their 
interference effects. Post hoc analysis (Newman-Keuls tests) revealed that Group 3 
had a significantly stronger interference effect than all other groups (all p’s<0.005). No 
other group differences were significant. 
 
Individual dependent-measures t-tests were carried out for each group to test if 
their behaviour altered significantly after the point where a sequence switch would 
take place. The differences between pre- and post-switch blocks was only significant 
for Group 3 (t(116.0, p<0.00001 and Group 6 (t(7)=2.48, p<0.05); all other groups p’s 
>0.16). 
 
Fig 6.10, Change in Average Number of Errors When Switched to a Random 
Sequence (if appropriate: Error bars ± 1 SEM). 
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General Discussion 
 
The first conclusion from the data presented above is that rats can learn an 
embedded repeating sequence in the novel apparatus when rewarded with ICSS. 
Thus the experimental protocol is valid and useful. These findings show that that the 
optimal conditions for demonstrating an interference effect in rats is a single session 
with a switch to random sequences at the end of the session, i.e. Group 3’s 
conditions. Group 3 is the only group to demonstrate a significant change in behaviour 
when switched from repeating to random sequences (i.e. Group 3 shows a clear 
interference effect on both measures). 
 
The presence of a strong interference effect in the single-session condition in 
the repeating-to-random group (Group 3) in contrast to the absence of any such effect 
in both the random-only and repeating-only single-session groups (Groups 1 and 2 
respectively) strongly suggests that rats learn the repeating sequence and apply that 
knowledge to enhance performance. This pattern of results directly supports the 
conclusion that it is the switch from repeating to random sequences that causes the 
deterioration in behaviour at this point seen in Group 3 and not other factors (e.g. 
fatigue).  
 
There is also a clear advantage of performing the SRT in a single-session. 
Those rats that experienced the repeating sequence over three days (Groups 5 and 6) 
displayed no interference effects when switch from a repeating to a random sequence. 
Furthermore, the negative interference effects for both reaction time and error rates 
demonstrated by Group 5 (Figs. 6.7 and 6.10) clearly shows that the practice of 
allowing rats to experience two repeating-only sessions before switching them to 
random sequences at the end of the third repeating session was not effective. If 
anything these rats’ behaviour improved at this point rather than deteriorated as would 
be expected if they had learnt the repeating sequence. Group 6 rats, which 
experienced a switch from repeating to random sequences at the end of each of the 
three sessions, demonstrated a modest interference effect when switched to random 
sequences on the error rate measure (Figs. 6.10). Group 6 rats demonstrated if 
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anything a negative interference effect for the reaction time measure (i.e. rats reacted 
faster after being switched to random sequences, see Fig. 6.7).  
 
 Hence this study has fulfilled its purpose by clearly demonstrated the optimal 
conditions for generating such behaviour in rats. Single-session repeated-sequence 
performance produces a far stronger interference effect than triple-session repeated-
sequence performance. For this reason these conditions were used in the SRT-lesion 
study reported in the next chapter. Thus Group 1 (single-session random-only 
sequences) was used in the SRT-lesion study as the initial control for the presence of 
a repeating sequence. 
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Appendix to Chapter 6. 
 
Fig. 6A.1, Schematics of representative ICSS electrode tip placements in the rat 
brain. All brain images are 2.6mm posterior to Bregma. Brain sections are adapted 
from Paxinos and Watson (1986). 
 
 
 
 
Group 1 Group 2 
Group 4 
Group 5 
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Chapter 7 
 
The Intracranial Self-Stimulation 
Serial Reaction Time Task: A Lesion 
Group Study 
 
General Introduction 
 
 The first aim of the animal empirical work presented in this thesis was to 
demonstrate that the rat-SRT is a valid and reliable animal-analogue of the human 
SRT task. This aim has been achieved with the ICSS-derived findings in Chapter 7, 
that rats perform the SRT task in manner broadly similar to human subjects and in 
particular show a strong interference effect when switching from a repeating to 
random sequence when tested in a single session. The second aim of the animal 
empirical work was to determine the neural substrates responsible for rat-SRT and 
hence address the anomalies that arose from the meta-analysis of the human SRT 
data. Therefore the first experiment presented in this chapter will contrast control rats 
with rats with caudate or hippocampal lesions in order to determined whether basal 
ganglia or limbic system dysfunction impairs SRT behaviour in rats. If caudate lesions, 
but not hippocampal lesions, impair a rat’s ability to perform the SRT relative to control 
(neurologically intact) rats this would provide convincing evidence that the rat-SRT is a 
valid and reliable animal-analogue of the human SRT. 
 
 It can be expected that caudate lesions will impair rat-SRT behaviour based on 
the studies presented in Chapter 4 that conclude caudate lesions impair reference / 
procedural memory tasks in rats (e.g. Packard and White, 1989 and 1990; Kesner, 
Bolland and Dakis, 1993), and, if the rat-SRT is a valid analogue of the human SRT, 
then caudate lesions should disrupt the rat-SRT (Knopman and Nissen, 1991; 
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Willingham and Korroshetz, 1993; Ferraro, Balota and Connor, 1993). Based on the 
same evidence it can also be expected that hippocampal rats should not show a SRT 
impairment. However, the meta-analysis found that subjects with amnesia due to 
limbic system dysfunction do show a SRT impairment suggesting that hippocampal 
rats may also be impaired in the SRT. Thus the inclusion of a hippocampal lesion 
group in experiment one will address this issue, which of course reinforces the 
particular utility of the rat-SRT. 
 
 One of the primary reasons for contrasting procedural / reference memory 
tasks with spatial working memory tasks in animals is that procedural / reference 
memory tasks are impaired by basal ganglia dysfunction (Cohen and Eichenbaum, 
1993). These tasks are assumed to be analogous to human non-declarative memory 
tasks by virtue of sharing a similar neuroanatomy. As concluded in Chapter 4 however 
these procedural / reference tasks, while dissociable for allocentric spatial memory 
tasks, bear very little relationship to human non-declarative memory tasks apart from 
being dependent on similar neural substrates. They are therefore of limited utility for 
modelling human non-declarative memory functions in animals.  
 
The previous chapter demonstrated that rats are capable of learning a relatively 
short (4-trial) repeating sequence in the SRT chamber while being rewarded with 
ICSS during a single session. Given the success of that study it became possible to 
examine the ability of rats to learn longer sequences. Furthermore, based on the 
relative success of the 12-trial fan-maze (Chapter 5) it is reasonable to expect that rats 
in the ICSS-SRT task will be able to learn longer (than 4-trial) repeating sequences. 
For this reasons this experiment will include a parametric test of the ability of rats to 
learn 4, 8, and 12-trial repeating sequences (with a separate session for each 
sequence length). It is also reasonable to suggest that learning a longer repeating 
sequence requires more effort on the part of the non-declarative system. Thus a 
longer sequence may result in an impairment in lesioned and / or intact rats that is not 
evident at shorter sequences lengths, in much the same way longer delays in the 
radial-maze produce greater working memory impairments in hippocampally lesioned 
rats. 
 
 The first experiment attempted to demonstrate a dissociation between the 
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effect of neural lesion (caudate nucleus and hippocampus) on SRT performance. If it 
was successful it will provide strong evidence of the independence of declarative and 
non-declarative memory in animals. In particular it would be the first demonstration of 
a neuroanatomical dissociation for non-declarative memory using a memory task that 
is a valid animal-analogue of its human counterpart. 
  
As noted in Chapters 1 and 2 demonstrations of single dissociations, while 
useful, are less empirically compelling than double-dissociations. Therefore, in 
experiment 2 the ability of rats to perform the rat-SRT was contrasted with their ability 
to perform an allocentric spatial working memory task. In order to take advantage of 
the ICSS protocol employed with these rats a well accepted spatial memory task, the 
16-hole hole board, was adapted for use with ICSS reward. Precisely the opposite 
pattern of results to that in the rat-SRT was expected in the hole board. caudate 
lesions should not impair spatial working memory whereas hippocampal lesioned rats 
should suffer an impairment. 
 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Subjects.  
58 Norwegian hooded rats aged between 120 & 150 days at the time of 
electrode implantation for intracranial self-stimulation were used. Subjects were 
housed individually with food & water available ad libitum and trained / tested during 
the dark portion of a reversed 12hr light / dark cycle (lights on from 6pm).  
 
Lesions and ICSS Implant Surgery.  
Subjects were prepared with a presurgical injection of atropine sulphate 
(Phoenix Pharmaceutical Distributors, Auckland, New Zealand) injected IP 
(concentration=0.13mg/ml, dose=0.18mg/kg) 20 minutes before being anaesthetised 
with sodium pentobarbital injected IP (concentration=50mg/ml, dose=100mg/kg). 
Immediately prior to ICSS electrode implant subjects received bilateral radiofrequency 
lesions of either the dorsal caudate or the dorsal hippocampus. Stereotaxic 
coordinates were taken from the Paxinos and Watson (1986) atlas with the skull flat. 
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The coordinates used for the bilateral caudate lesion were: from Bregma A/P +0.3mm, 
L ±3.2mm, and from dura –4.5mm ventral. Bilateral hippocampal lesions were made at 
two locations, an anterior and a posterior site. Stereotaxic coordinates for the anterior 
site were: from Bregma A/P –3.0mm, L ±2.0mm, and from dura –3.3mm ventral. 
Posterior site coordinates were: from Bregma A/P –3.7mm, L ±2.0mm, and from dura 
–3.4mm ventral. The lesions were created with a Radionics radiofrequency generator 
and a 0.7mm diameter electrode with a 2mm uninsulated tip (Radionics Inc. 
Burlington, Mass. USA; model RFG-4). For the caudate lesion the bilateral sites 
underwent 60 seconds of current with the electrode held at 60°C. The anterior 
hippocampal lesions were created with 60secs. of current with the electrode tip held at 
56°C and the posterior hippocampal lesions with 60 secs. of current with the electrode 
tip held at 57°C. During the same surgery rats received bilateral implants of a twisted 
wire electrode (MS305/1, Plastics One, Roanoke, VA) into the medial forebrain bundle 
(mfb) at the level of the lateral hypothalamus. Stereotaxic coordinates and surgical 
procedures (for ICSS electrode implantation) were identical to those used in Chapter 
6.  
 
Intracranial Self-Stimulation (ICSS).  
ICSS parameters, procedures and conditions were identical to those used in 
the previous chapter (Chapter 6) except that the best of the two electrodes implanted 
in each animal was determined (typically the electrode that required the least current 
of the two to produce reliable responding) during early training and only used 
thereafter throughout the experiment. Note: the additional controls (five additional rats 
were added to both groups 1 & 3) were also given double electrode implants but were 
not different to their single electrode counterparts. 
 
Table 7.1, Summary of Surgery Details 
Surgery Type 
Flat-Skull Coordinates; 
from Bregma 
From 
Dura 
Lesion 
Parameters 
 A / P L D / V  
ICSS Electrode Implantation (all rats) -2.6 ±1.8 -8.6 NA 
Caudate Lesions +0.3 ±3.2 -4.5 60ºC, 60sec 
Hippocampal Lesions: Anterior site -3.0 -3.3 56ºC, 60 sec 
                                       Posterior site -3.7 ±2.0 -3.4 57ºC, 60 sec 
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Group Numbers 
 Final group numbers are presented in Table 7.2 below. Two additional caudate 
subjects were removed due to having small and / or unilateral lesions. Three 
additional hippocampal animals were removed for the same reason. Because of the 
small number of Group 1 rats in the SRT12 condition their data are not included in any 
analysis of this condition, although their data are provided in figures for comparative 
purposes. 
 
Table 7.2, Group Sizes for Experiment 1 
Group Type / Test 
Type 
Random-Only 
Controls : Group 1 
Repeating and 
Random Controls: 
Group 3 
Caudate 
Lesions 
Hippocampal 
Lesions Total 
Initial (post surgical) 
Numbers 
13 13 14 18 58 
Number of Rats in the 
SRT4 
13 13 12 15 53 
Number of Rats in the 
SRT8 
12 11 12 15 50 
Number of Rats in the 
SRT12 
4a 11 13 b 15 43 
a Eight Group 1 rats were unfortunately euthanased before they could perform the  SRT12 
b The apparent ‘appearance’ of a caudate rat in the ST12 is due to the data from a (different) rat in 
each of the SRT4 and SRT8 conditions being lost. Although the experience of these rats in the 
session was identical to that of their group-mates a computer failure corrupted the data files after 
they were recorded but before they could be analysed. 
 
Apparatus.  
 The SRT equipment was identical to those used in Chapter 6. 
 
Serial Reaction Time Task.  
Task performance was broken up into three parts. Part 1, a 4-trial repeating 
sequence, Part 2, an 8-trial repeating sequence, and Part 3, a 12-trial repeating 
sequence. 
 
Part 1 employed the same 4-trial repeating sequence as used in Chapter 6 (3-
1-4-2). Part 2 employed a novel 8-trial (2-4-2-1-4-3-1-3). Part 3 employed a novel 12-
trial repeating sequence (4-1-3-2-4-3-2-4-1-2-1-3). All random sequences were 
generated to ensure only actual sequence information varied between the random and 
repeating sequences. The 480-trial block of random sequences used in Chapter 6 
(appropriate to the 4-trial repeating sequence) was used again in this study in Part 1, 
and two new sets of 480-trials of random sequences appropriate to the 8- and 12-trial 
condition were generated and used in Parts 2 and 3 respectively. All random 
sequence blocks were used in an identical manner to that of Chapter 6. 
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Procedure 
Lesion rats initially completed ICSS and SRT training as in Chapter 6. After 
SRT training all rats went on to perform Part 1 of the SRT task (4-trial repeating 
sequence). 48-hours after this they completed Part 2 (8-trial repeating sequence) and 
then completed Part 3 (12-trial repeating sequence) 48 hours later. Five days after 
completing Part 3 all subjects (i.e. both control and lesion animals) started training in 
experiment 2. 
 
SRT Training.  
 All basic training procedures were identical to those used in Chapter 6. 
 
SRT Testing.  
All subjects underwent a total of 2820 trials in the ICSS-SRT chamber over a 
single session irrespective of sequence length (4, 8, or 12). The repeating sequence 
used in each session was appropriate to the sequence-length condition. Groups 1 & 3 
(i.e. unlesioned rats) from the previous study (see Chapter 6) were used as control 
subject data for the lesioned rats. Group 1 only ever experienced 2820 random trials 
whereas Group 3 experienced 2560 repeating sequence trials before switching to 240 
random sequence trials. Both lesions groups experienced the same experimental 
conditions as Group 3: 2560 repeating sequence trials before switching to 240 random 
sequence trials in a single session.  
 
Behavioural Measures.  
The main measure of human-SRT behaviour task is reaction time. As in 
Chapter 6, this was measured from the onset of the hole being illuminated until it is 
successfully nose-poked. All reaction-time data were log-transformed per Knopman & 
Nissen, 1987. For the rat-SRT, the number of errors (nose-poking an unlit hole) is also 
an important measure. 
 
Histology.  
Subjects were sacrificed with an overdose of sodium pentobarbitone before 
being perfused with 4% formalin and their brains were removed and fixed in 4% 
formalin. Brains were transferred to a long-term-solution (4% formalin  and sucrose) 
before being sliced on a freezing microtome at 50μm and stained with cresyl-violet to 
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locate ICSS electrode tips and to determine lesion extent. 
 
Results 
 
Histology 
 Placements of ICSS electrode tips and position and extent of lesions are 
presented in Figs. 7A.1 ands 7A.2, respectively in the appendix to this chapter.  
Analysis  
 
     The analysis for each part (sequence-length) was conducted separately by 
measure (reaction times and error rates) and by condition (training and interference 
effect). Training effects are analysed via group by block MANOVAs with repeated 
measures on blocks. Interference effects between groups were analysed via one-way 
ANOVAs (using difference scores). The change in behaviour over the switch point is 
also analysed independently for each group via pre- post-switch dependent means t-
tests. 
 
Part 1: The SRT4  
Reaction Time Analysis: Training Data for SRT4 
 The main effect of group in MANOVA comparing groups across pre-
interference blocks (see Fig. 7.1) was not significant (F(3,48)=1.69, NS) and neither 
was the interaction effect (F(96, 1546)=1.2, NS). However, the main effect of block 
was significant (F(32,1536)=34.17, p<0.00001), due to the fact that all rats reacted 
faster over blocks. 
 
Fig. 7.1, SRT4; Average Log Reaction Time per Trail Across Blocks (Error bars ± 
1 SEM).   
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Reaction Time Analysis: Interference Effect for SRT4 
 The ANOVA of this interference effect between groups was significant 
(F(3,48)=4.4, p<0.01; see Fig. 7.2). Post-hoc testing revealed that Group 1 (random-
only controls) had a significantly weaker interference effect than the other three 
groups (Newman-Keuls: p’s<0.05), but the other three groups were not different to 
each other. Furthermore, sequence control rats (Group 3), caudate lesions (CN), and 
hippocampal lesions (Hip) all had significant pre / post interference effects (Group 3, 
t(11)=3.7; CN, t(11)=3.2; Hip, t(14)=4.6, all p's<0.01) whereas the interference effect 
for random control rats (Group 1) was not significant (t(12)=0.6, p=0.58). Thus all 
groups that experienced repeating sequences demonstrated the capacity for 
generating a robust interference effect (i.e. reaction times slowed after being switched 
from a repeating to a random sequence). However, the group that only experienced 
random sequences failed to demonstrate any interference effect as expected.  
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Fig. 7.2, SRT4; Change in Average Reaction Time When Switched to a Random 
Sequence (Error bars ± 1 SEM).  
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Error Rate Analysis: Training Data for SRT4 
 The main effect of group in the error rate MANOVA comparing groups across 
pre-interference blocks (see Fig. 7.3) was not significant (F<1). However, both the 
main effect of block and the interaction effect were significant (block, 
F(32,1536)=75.09, p<0.00001; interaction, F(96, 1536)=1.82, p<0.00001). Thus all 
rats made fewer errors over blocks. Examination of figure 7.3 suggests that the 
interaction effect probably arose from Group 3 initially making more errors than the 
other groups but them improving by the end of block 18 to the point where it made 
slightly fewer errors than all other groups over the second half of testing. In contrast 
the hippocampal rats made fewer errors across the initial sessions. Importantly there 
are no group differences at the end of training. 
 
Fig. 7.3, SRT4; Average Error Rate per Trial Across Blocks (Error bars ± 1 SEM).   
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Error Rate Analysis: Interference Effect for SRT4 
The ANOVA between groups was significant (F(3,48)=3.25, p<0.05; see Fig. 
7.4). Post-hoc testing revealed that the random control group (Group 1) had a 
significantly weaker interference effect (a much smaller difference score) than the 
other three groups (Newman-Keuls: p’s<0.05), but the other three groups were not 
different to each other. Furthermore, the sequence control group (Group 3), caudate 
lesions (CN), and hippocampal lesions (Hip) all had significant pre / post interference 
effects (Group 3 t(11)=6.0; CN t(11)=2.8; Hip t(14)=4.1, all p's<0.025) but once again 
Group 1’s interference effect was not significant (t(12)=0.2, p=0.84). Thus all groups 
that experienced repeating sequences demonstrated the capacity for generating a 
robust interference effect (i.e. their error rate increased markedly when switched from 
a repeating to a random sequence). However, the group that only experienced 
random sequences failed to demonstrate any interference effect for the this measure. 
 
Summary of Part 1: The 4-Trial SRT  
Rats showed evidence of learning an embedded repeating sequence. Rats that only 
experienced random sequence did not display an interference effect. This pattern of 
interference effects is identical to human SRT performance. However, at a 4-trial 
sequence, neither caudate nor dorsal hippocampal lesions impaired interference 
effects. 
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Fig. 7.4, SRT4; Change in Average error Rate When Switched to a Random 
Sequence (Error bars ± 1 SEM).   
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Part 2: The SRT8 
 
Reaction Time Analysis: Training Data for SRT8 
 The main effect of group in MANOVA comparing groups across pre-
interference blocks (see Fig. 7.5) was almost significant (F(3,48)=2.36, p=0.08). This 
was due to the caudate lesion group reacting more slowly across blocks. However, 
both the main effect of block and the interaction effects were significant (block (F(32, 
1440)=43.78, p<0.00001; interaction F(96, 1440)=1.4, p<0.01). Thus rats as a whole 
react faster over blocks. The interaction effect was most likely due to caudate lesions 
rats initially reacting as quickly as the other rats but their reaction times did not 
improve to the same degree as other rats across blocks. The reaction time of the 
caudate group did, however, reach about the same speed as they had shown towards 
the end of the SRT-4 session. The reaction times for the other three groups was faster 
than they had shown in the SRT4 task. 
 
Reaction Time Analysis: Interference Effect for SRT8 
The ANOVA for this measure between groups was significant (F(3,46)=5.32, 
p<0.005; see Fig. 7.6). In this instance, however, Post-hoc testing revealed that the 
caudate lesions (repeating-to-random conditions) had a significantly weaker 
interference effect than the other three groups (Newman-Keuls: p’s<0.05), but the 
other three groups (Group 1, Group 3 and hippocampal lesions) were not different to 
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each other. Group 1, Group 3 and the hippocampal lesion group each had significant 
pre / post differences (G1 t(11)=4.2, p<0.01; G3 t(10)=5.5, p<0.001; Hip. t(14)=4.3, 
p<0.001) whereas the caudate lesion group did not (CN t(11)=1.4, p=0.3). Thus 
although the caudate lesion rats enjoyed the same experimental conditions as Group 
3 and the hippocampal lesion rats the caudate rats were unable to learn the 8-trial 
repeating sequence as demonstrated by their failure to generate an interference 
effect. 
 
Fig. 7.5, SRT8; Average Log Reaction Time per Trial Across Blocks (Error bars ± 
1 SEM).   
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Fig. 7.6, SRT8; Change in Average Reaction Time When Switched to a Random 
Sequence (Error bars ± 1 SEM). 
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It is important to note that the apparent interference effect demonstrated by the 
random controls (Group 1) was an anomaly, due to the consistently high variation 
between blocks in this group. As Group 1 only ever experienced random sequences 
there is therefore nothing for these rats to learn and therefore no sequence learning to 
disrupt. To explain this anomaly Fig. 7.7 presents the last 14 blocks (including the, 
final, 3 random sequence blocks) of the session for all groups. As can be seen the 
behaviour of the three repeating sequence groups (repeating controls, caudate and 
hippocampal lesion groups) is quite stable prior to the switch point (between block 33 
and 34). The repeating controls (Group 3), the caudate lesion group and the 
hippocampal lesion group show relatively little between block variation prior to the 
sequence switch, whereas Group 1 displays considerable between block variation 
prior to the switch point. 
 
Fig. 7.7, Average Log Reaction Times for the Last 14 Blocks of the Session. 
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Secondly, those groups that do demonstrate a reliable interference effect 
(Group 3 and the hippocampal lesion group) not only demonstrate a marked 
deterioration in performance after being switched to random sequences but their 
performance remains poor over the next few blocks relative to their pre-interference 
performance. In contrast performance for Group 1 deteriorates markedly at the switch 
point but them promptly returns to its pre-interference level in the next block (Block 
#35). Hence it was merely coincidental that Group 1’s reaction times deteriorated at 
this point (blocks 33 versus 34 were used to generate the data shown in Fig 7.6). 
  
Sequence 
Switch Point 
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Error Rate Analysis: Training Data for SRT8 
 The main effect of group in MANOVA comparing groups across pre-
interference blocks (see Fig. 7.8) was not significant (F(3,46)=1.54, NS) and neither 
was the interaction effect (F(96, 1472)=1.09, NS). However, the main effect of block 
was significant (block (F(32, 1472)=38.85, p<0.00001). Thus rats as a whole made 
fewer errors over blocks. 
 
Fig. 7.8, SRT8; Average Error Rate per Trial Across Blocks (Error bars ± 1 SEM).   
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1-3 4-6 7-9 10-12 13-15 16-18 19-21 22-24 25-27 28-30 31-33
Block Number
A
ve
ra
ge
 E
rr
or
 R
at
e 
pe
r T
ra
l
Group 1: Random-Random (no switch)
Group 3: Repeating-to-Random
Caudate Lesions: Repeating-to-Random
Hippocampal Lesions: Repeating-to-Random
 
 
Error Rate Analysis: Interference Effect for SRT8 
The ANOVA for this measure between groups was significant (F(3,46)=12.0, 
p<0.00001; see Fig. 7.9). Post-hoc tests revealed that the caudate lesion group had a 
significantly weaker interference effect than both the repeating controls (Group 3) and 
the hippocampal lesion group (both p’s <0.01) but was not different to the random 
controls (Group 1). Similarly Group 1 had a significantly weaker interference effect 
than either Group 3 or the hippocampal lesion group (both p’s <0.01). Furthermore, 
Group 3 and the hippocampal lesion group (Hip) both had significant pre / post 
interference effects (Group 3, t(11)=3.56; Hip, t(14)=5.3, both p's<0.01) whereas both 
Group 1 and the caudate lesion group did not demonstrate significant interference 
effects across the point where Group 3, the caudate lesion group and the hippocampal 
lesion group were switched to random sequences (Group 1, t(12)=0.5; caudate lesion 
group, t(11)=0.09). Thus caudate lesions impaired SRT behaviour as measured by 
error rate. 
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Summary of Part 2: The 8-trial SRT 
Rats with caudate lesions are markedly impaired (i.e. show no interference 
effect) relative to both control and hippocampal lesion rats. This indicates that 
performance of the rat-SRT relies on the basal ganglia in a similar fashion to the way 
in which the human SRT relies on the basal ganglia. Furthermore, intact and 
hippocampal rats who experienced the repeating sequence can perform the SRT at 
this sequence length. Thus the caudate lesion impairment is not due to an 'excessive' 
sequence length. 
 
Fig. 7.9, SRT8; Change in Average Error rate When Switched to a Random 
Sequence (Error bars ± 1 SEM).   
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Part 3: The 12-Trial SRT 
Note, although the aggregate data for Group 1 is included in all figures in this 
section Group 1 is not included in any of the analyses in this section due to its small 
sample size (N=4). 
 
Reaction Time Analysis: Training Data for SRT12 
 The main effect of group in MANOVA comparing groups across pre-
interference blocks (see Fig. 7.10) was significant (F(2,36)=3.36, p<0.05). Post hoc 
analysis revealed that the reaction times of the caudate group was slower overall in 
comparison to Group 3 (Newman Keuls; p<0.05), while the random controls and the 
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hippocampal lesion group showed non-significant intermediate reaction times. While 
the main effect of block was significant (F(20, 720)=11.29, P<0.00001) the interaction 
effect was not (F<1). Thus rats as a whole reacted faster over blocks. Reactions times 
for each group were generally consistent with those seen in the SRT8 task. 
 
Fig. 7.10, SRT12; Average Log Reaction Time per Trial Across Blocks (Error bars 
± 1 SEM).   
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Reaction Time Analysis: Interference Effect for SRT12 
The ANOVA for the difference scores between groups was not significant 
(F(2,36)=1.42, NS), see Fig. 7.11. Thus interference effects did not differ across 
groups as a whole. The pre / post t-tests performed separately for each group were 
not significant (Group 3 t(10)=0.36; caudate lesion group t(1)=0.94) except for the 
hippocampal lesion group which did demonstrate a significant change in behaviour 
when switched to the random sequence (t(14)=2.76, p<0.025). 
 
Error Rate Analysis: Training Data for SRT12 
 The main effect of group in MANOVA comparing groups across pre-
interference blocks (see Fig. 7.12) was not significant (F(2,36)=1.85, NS). However, 
both the main effect of block and the interaction effect were significant (block 
(F(20,720)=17.96, p<0.00001; interaction (F(40,720)=1.53, p<0.025). Thus rats as a 
whole made fewer errors over blocks. The interaction effect is likely due to the fact 
that caudate lesioned rats show a greater change across blocks than other groups 
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and hippocampal lesioned rats show a more marked initial reduction in error rate than 
the two control groups. 
 
Fig. 7.11, SRT12; Change in Average Reaction Time When Switched to a Random 
Sequence (Error bars ± 1 SEM).   
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Fig. 7.12, SRT12; Average Error Rate per Trial Across Blocks (Error bars ± 1 
SEM).   
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Error Rate Analysis: Interference Effect for SRT12 
The ANOVA for the difference scores between groups was not significant (F<1, 
see Fig. 7.13).  Thus overall groups did not differ in terms of the strength of their 
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interference effects. While the pre / post tests for Group 3 and the caudate lesion 
group were not significant (Group 3, t(10)=1.04, NS; caudate lesion group, t(12)=1.15, 
NS) the hippocampal lesion group did demonstrate a significant change in pre / post 
interference behaviour (t(14)=3.13, p<0.01). Thus just as for the reaction time 
measure the hippocampal lesion groups showed a modest ability to learn this very 
long (12-trial) repeating sequence, unlike the neurologically repeating-sequence 
control group (Group 3). 
 
Fig. 7.13, SRT12; Change in Average Error rate When Switched to a Random 
Sequence (if appropriate: Error bars ± 1 SEM).   
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Summary of Part 3: The 12-trial SRT 
Neurologically intact control rats who experienced the 12-trial repeating-
sequence displayed no evidence they could learn it although being capable of learning 
shorter sequences. However, hippocampal rats displayed some evidence of sequence 
learning at this sequence-length. Thus a hippocampal lesion in some way facilitates 
SRT performance. 
 
General Discussion of Experiment One 
 
 The first point to make from the findings presented above is that all rats that 
   - 233 - 
   
  
 
experienced a repeating sequence demonstrated some ability to learn a repeating 
sequence (albeit a short, 4-trial sequence, in the case of the caudate lesion rats). This 
provides further evidence that rats, irrespective of neurologic status, can perform the 
SRT task under these conditions. Because caudate lesioned rats were not impaired in 
this task the impairment they demonstrated at longer sequence-lengths was indicative 
of impaired sequence learning and not simply an inability to perform the underlying 
requirements of the task. In contrast both the neurologically intact, and hippocampally 
lesioned, rats who experienced the same sequences were capable of learning the 
longer sequence. This, therefore, is unequivocal evidence that rats rely on the basal 
ganglia to perform the SRT.  
 
 As predicted hippocampal lesions did not impair SRT behaviour. In fact there is 
a strong suggestion in Part 3 (SRT12) that hippocampal lesions may actually facilitate 
behaviour. The hippocampal rats were the only group do show any evidence of 
sequence learning at this, longer, sequence length. Furthermore, the hippocampal 
interference effect in the SRT12 task was consistent across both behavioural 
measures (reaction times and error rates) which provides a degree of convergent 
validity for the finding. It is especially interesting to note that the neurologically intact 
repeating control rats (Group 3) showed no evidence of learning the 12-trial sequence.  
 
 An important point to make about the hippocampal SRT facilitation is that it 
while it is consistent with the multiple-memory systems theory it directly contradicts the 
results of the meta-analysis as regards the ability of limbic system amnesics to 
perform the SRT. Although this matter with be discussed in some detail in the 
following chapter it is worthwhile to briefly address the main points here. In contrast to 
the constituent studies aggregated into the Limbic System Neuropathology (LSN) 
group the meta-analysis itself concluded that limbic system amnesics were impaired 
relative to controls in the SRT. In particular that limbic system amnesics had a weaker 
interference effect than neurologically intact controls. The inclusion of a hippocampal 
lesion group in the present study directly addresses this issue. If limbic system 
neuropathology that (mildly) impairs SRT behaviour then the hippocampal lesion rats 
should be similarly (mildly) impaired in this experiment. The finding that the 
hippocampal lesion group not only were not impaired but even demonstrated a mild 
facilitation effect strongly suggests that it is not limbic system dysfunction ‘per se’ that 
   - 234 - 
   
  
 
produces the apparent SRT deficit in LSN subjects seen in the meta-analysis. A 
possible alternative is that the frontal pathology often evident in limbic system 
syndromes may be responsible for their apparent SRT impairment. This is consistent 
with the finding in the meta-analysis that subjects with pre-Frontal cortex injury (pFC) 
and moderately severe traumatic brain injury (TBI; which can be assumed to be 
primarily frontal) were impaired in the SRT (Pascual-Leone et al, 1993; Mutter, 
Howard and Howard, 1994) to a similar degree as LSN subjects (Part 2; pFC d=0.64, 
moderately severe TBI d=0.67, and LSN d=0.68). 
 
 The use of the finding that hippocampal lesion subjects are not impaired in the 
rat-SRT to address the apparent SRT impairment of LSN subjects reported in the 
meta-analysis is a clear and obvious example of the utility of the rat-SRT task. Rhe 
point that it is precisely this sort of work that can be carried out in animal subjects 
provides a perfect example of just how useful the rat-SRT will be, and has already 
been, for addressing theoretically and empirically important issues in memory 
research. 
 
Experiment 2 : The ICSS 16-Hole Board Task 
 
In an initial attempt to develop a spatial working memory protocol to contrast 
with the rat-SRT the 16-hole hole board task was adapted for use with ICSS. First 
developed by Oades and Isaacson (1978) the hole board task requires a rat to locate 
a fixed set of four food rewards hidden amongst an open field containing 16 holes. 
The particular advantage of this task is that two forms of spatial memory can be 
measured simultaneously: working and reference memory. As the four target holes 
are fixed (invariant) across trials for individual rats the discrimination between target 
and non-target holes is considered be the domain of reference memory. In contrast 
within trial information i.e. whether or not a target has already been visited in that 
particular trial, is the domain of working memory.  
 
Van der Staay, van Nies, and Raajimakers (1990) used a 16-hole hole board to 
examine the effects of age in a ‘spatial… discrimination task’ and concluded not only 
that age was inversely related to both working and reference memory performance but 
that the two forms of memory measure ‘represent distinct aspects of spatial memory’. 
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A similar result of age was found by Raajimakers, Blockland and van der Staay (1993) 
who tested young and old rats in a 16-hole hole board task, a water maze, and a 
modified conefield task. Van der Staay (1999) also used a 16-hole hole board to 
examine any differences in spatial working memory behaviour between albino WAG 
rats and pigmented Brown Norway rats and that working memory performance was 
generally poorer in Brown Norway rats than WAG rats, but the reverse was true of 
reference memory performance. He concluded as a result that the two forms of 
memory measure are independent of each other. 
 
In relation to hippocampal injury and hole board performance Oades (1981a) 
reported that only rats with hippocampal or ventral tegmental area lesions were 
impaired in the hole board. In particular both lesion types severely impaired both 
working and reference memory. Similarly Oades (1981b) reported that, unsurprisingly, 
treatment with haloperidol did not effect either the (marked) working or reference 
memory impairments rats produced by hippocampal lesions. However, haloperidol 
treatment did reduce the number of working memory errors (but not reference memory 
errors) in rats with neocortical lesions. 
 
Thus the hole board task appears to be a sensitive measure of allocentric 
spatial learning in rats, which (allocentric spatial learning) is considered the primary 
animal-analogue of human declarative memory (Aggleton, Vann and Good, 2000; 
Aggleton and Brown, 1999; and Gaffan, 1998). Therefore lesions of the hippocampus 
should impair hole board performance (i.e. rats with hippocampal lesions should make 
more working and / or reference memory errors), but caudate lesions should not 
impair hole board behaviour (but see Packard and White, 1990). 
 
Method 
 
Subjects 
A total of 36 rats who had completed all parts of experiment one were then 
included in experiment two. Control animals in the holeboard sessions are a mixture of 
Group 1 (four animals) and Group 3 animals (nine animals) from experiment 1, 
selected on the basis of still being available when holeboard training started. Two 
subjects in the caudate group failed to learn the holeboard task and are not included in 
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that part of the study. Two other caudate subjects died during holeboard training and 
are not included for that reason 
 
Table 7.3. Group Sizes for Experiment 2 
Group Type / Test 
Type 
Random-Only 
Controls : Group 1 
Repeating and 
Random Controls: 
Group 3 
Caudate 
Lesions 
Hippocampal 
Lesions 
Total 
Number of Rats in the 
Holeboard Sessions. 
13 8 15 36 
Apparatus 
 The holeboard was a novel apparatus, consisting of a 1.2m diameter grey 
Perspex circular platform elevated 75cm off the ground with 16 nose-pokes (capable 
of being independently illuminated) mounted into the body of the board (see Fig. 7.14). 
The nose-pokes were arranged in two concentric rings (inner and outer) of eight nose-
pokes each and placed at the cardinal and demi-cardinal compass positions (i.e. 
North, North-East, East etc.). The nose-pokes were identical to those used in the SRT 
equipment except for being slightly larger at 4cm diameter. The holeboard was 
surrounded by a low clear Perspex wall (10cm high) which was continuous around the 
periphery of the holeboard. The same model commutator as used for the SRT 
equipment was mounted directly above the centre of the holeboard and supplied the 
ICSS current to the animal. The commutator fitting also held the same model infra-red 
camera as used in the SRT equipment which allowed real-time viewing of the animals 
during holeboard training / testing.  
 
Fig. 7.14. The 16-hole holeboard with behaving rat. Note: the brighter nose-
pokes are still illuminated whereas the dimmer nose-pokes are unlit having been 
extinguished after a successful nose-poke. 
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The holeboard was placed in a small (2m wide by 3.2m long) room painted 
white. The room contained a number of obvious spatial cues including: different sized 
pictures on all of the walls, a curtain door at one end, a table at the other end of the 
room where cages were kept during behaviour, cables which exited from half way up 
the wall and ran down the wall and under the holeboard, and a low intensity light 
which was placed on the floor (i.e. below the level of the holeboard) next to the table 
(see Fig. 7.15). Care was taken to ensure the spatial environment was consistent 
across sessions. Nose-pokes and ICSS was controlled by the same Med-Associated 
computer interface as controlled the SRT equipment. 
 
Fig. 7.15. A schematic of the arrangement of the holeboard room (not to scale). 
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Holeboard Training 
 All sessions were performed across consecutive days.  
 
Familiarisation. As rats had already learned to nose-poke in the ICSS-SRT task there 
was no need to train them to nose-poke in the hole board. Thus familiarisation 
consisted of one session during which the body of the holeboard was completely 
covered by a wooden cover. Animals were left to acclimatise to the room for 20 
minutes without the ICSS cable attached. The second familiarisation session was 
similar except the holeboard was now uncovered and the ICSS cable attached (but no 
current passed through it). Rats were left to explore the holeboard and the (unlit) 
nose-pokes for 20 minutes. 
Initial training. The first phase of initial training consisted of all 16 nose-pokes being 
lit and an animal being rewarded with ICSS for any response in any nose-poke. 
However, after five nose-pokes to any one hole the light for that hole was extinguished 
and no further stimulation was received for any further nose-poke. After all 16 holes 
had been nose-poked (for a total of 80 responses) all nose-pokes were relit and the 
cycle began again, for a maximum of 160 nose-pokes or for 20 minutes, whichever 
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came first. Animals continued in this procedure until they learnt to nose-poke all 16 
holes and learnt to actively explore the holeboard for any they may have missed. 
 
 After the first phase of initial training (which typically lasted two or three 
sessions) animals were changed to a training condition in which only a single nose-
poke to each hole was rewarded. After a successful nose-poke that hole was unlit and 
no further reward was given. Unlit nose-pokes were relit once a nose-poke had been 
made to all 16 holes. Animals typically learnt to move around the holeboard 
responding quickly, and only once, to each hole within two to three sessions. 
 
Holeboard Task Training. Thereafter animals experienced one session where nose-
poking only 12 of the 16 holes gave ICSS reward (always the same 12 holes for each 
animal). Furthermore those holes that had been successfully nose-poked remained 
illuminated and any subsequent response to such holes did not produce ICSS reward. 
Animals were required to nose-poke all 12 target holes at which point all 16 holes 
were unlit and a 10-second ITI started. After the ITI expired the 16 holes were relit and 
the cycle began again. Animals had to complete 10 sets of trials to complete the 
session. Immediately thereafter (i.e. within the same session) animals completed 
another session of 10 sets of trials which was identical except that only eight holes 
now gave ICSS reward (always the same eight). Immediately thereafter (i.e. within the 
same session again) animals progressed to the first actual testing session (see 
below).  
 
Holeboard Testing 
 The first testing session was identical to the immediately preceding training 
sessions except that only four holes (of the 16) now gave ICSS reward. There were 
six sets of four holes and each animal was assigned one set which was used 
throughout holeboard testing for that animal. Each set of four holes was 
counterbalanced for side (two holes on the left and two on the right), for quadrant (one 
hole from each of the four quadrants), and for ring (two inner ring and two outer ring 
holes). Note: A quadrant consisted of four holes, e.g. holes one, two, three and four 
made up the “North-East’ quadrant. 
 
 As in the final training sessions all 16 holes were lit and the first response to a 
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target hole within a trial resulted in ICSS reward. However, the light for any hole was 
not extinguished after a successful response and any subsequent responses to it 
within the trial was recorded as a working memory error. Responses to non-target 
holes (which were always the same 12 holes for that animal for each session) were 
not rewarded (the hole remained illuminated) and were counted as reference memory 
errors. 
 
 After all four target holes had been nose-poked (one trial) all holes were unlit 
and a 10 second ITI started. After the ITI expired all 16 holes were lit again and the 
process started again. The initial testing session consisted of 10 trials. The next seven 
sessions all consisted of 20 trials per session.  
 
 During testing sessions animals had to perform within two criteria. Firstly, that 
had to locate and nose-poke all four target holes within five minutes. Secondly, they 
could not make more than 24 error responses (being twice the number of non-target 
holes). If either of these criteria were exceeded all non-target holes and all target 
holes that had already been nose-poked within that trial were unlit leaving only those 
non-nose-poked target holes. Once non-target and already nose-poked holes were 
unlit (i.e. after making more than 24 errors or taking longer than 5 minutes) within a 
trial no animal ever failed to go on and nose-poke the remaining lit holes within the 
time available to it. 
 
Procedures  
Five days after completing Part 3 of experiment one all subjects (i.e. both 
control and lesion animals) began training in the 16-hole holeboard. After holeboard 
training subjects performed one 10-trial test session in the holeboard and then seven 
20-trial test sessions (all sessions performed on separate, and consecutive, days) for 
a total of 150 trials. 
 
Behavioural Measures 
Four measures of behaviour were recorded / generated from hole board 
behaviour in much the same way as in normal hole board studies (van der Staay, van 
Nies, and Raajimakers, 1990; Raajimakers, Blockland, and van der Staay, 1993; van 
der Staay, 1999) and are defined as follows: 
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Working Memory Errors: Returning to nose-poke a target hole already nose-
poked in that trial. 
Reference Memory Errors: Nose-poking a non-target hole 
Total Number of Errors: The combination of both working and reference 
memory errors. 
Trial Time: Time taken to complete the trial, from all holes being lit (starting the 
trial) until the fourth target hole was nose-poked (ending the trial). 
 
Results 
 
 Analyses of hole board data were MANOVAs performed between groups and 
across block with repeated measures on blocks for each measure. Data from each 
block of five trials was collapsed (averaged) to form a single data point which 
produced 30 blocks of data over the total 150 trails. The first session generated two 
blocks of data (being only 10 trials long) whereas all subsequent sessions generated 
four blocks of data (each being 20 trials long). 
 
 Note, for ease of presentation the data in figures has been further aggregated 
from that data used in the analysis to one data point per session. 
 
Working Memory Errors Analysis 
 The main group effect of the MANOVA between groups was not significant 
(F(2,30)=2.0, NS) nor was the interaction effect (F(58,870)=1.12, NS) Thus there was 
no difference between groups for this measure even though the caudate lesion 
animals appear to make more errors on average (see Fig. 7.16). There was however a 
significant effect of block (F(28,870)=7.16, p<0.00001) indicating that overall animals 
made fewer errors across blocks. 
 
Fig. 7.16, Average Number of Working Memory Errors Across blocks (Error 
bars ± 1 SEM) 
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Reference Memory Errors Analysis 
 Although the main effect of group was once again not significant (F<1) both the 
main effect of block and the interaction effects were block, F(29,870)=112.12, 
p<0.00001; interaction, F(58,870)=1.6, p<0.005). once again rats made fewer errors 
over sessions irrespective of group. The interaction effect is more difficult to ascribe 
but may be due to the hippocampal lesion rats improving slightly more slowly than 
other rats in sessions two and three. See Fig. 7.17 
 
Fig. 7.17, Average Number of Reference Memory Errors Across blocks (Error 
bars ± 1 SEM) 
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Total Number of Errors Analysis 
 Neither the main effect of group nor the interaction effect were significant for 
this analysis (both F’s <1). However, the main effect of block was significant 
(F(29,870)=77.41, p<0.00001), rats made fewer errors over sessions. See Fig. 7.18 
 
Fig. 7.18, The Mean Total Number of Errors Made per Session (Error bars ± 1 
SEM) 
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Average Trial Time Analysiss 
 The main effect of group was significant (F(2,30)=5.09, p<0.025; see Fig. 7.19). 
Post hoc analysis revealed that the caudate lesion group took significantly longer on 
average to complete a trail than either of the other two groups (Newman Keuls, both 
p’s<0.025). Similarly the main effect of block was also significant (F(29,870)=14.72, 
p<0.00001) as was the interaction effect (F(58,870)=1.82, p<0.001. Overall rats 
completed a 4-hole trial faster across sessions. The interaction effect is due to the fact 
that the caudate lesion animals were much slower than the other animals during the 
first four blocks, but on average completed a trial in a very similar time to the other 
animals in later blocks. 
 
Summary of The Hole Board Analysis 
 
 In contrast to expectations the hippocampal lesioned animals were not impaired 
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in the holeboard task. In fact the only impairment evident in the task was that of 
caudate lesioned animals which, in the first four blocks, took longer (on average) to 
complete a 4-hole trial than either the neurologically intact controls or the hippocampal 
lesion animals. 
 
Fig. 7.19, Average Time Taken to Complete a (4-hole) Trial (Error bars ± 1 SEM) 
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 This lack of any behavioural impairment due to a hippocampus lesion is 
unexpected as the hole board task is presumed to be a spatial memory task, and thus 
should reveal an impairment in rats with limbic system dysfunction. Other spatial 
memory tasks (e.g. the radial-maze and the water-maze) are impaired by hippocampal 
lesions (Squire, 1992; Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993; Kesner, Bolland and Dakis, 
1993; Devan, Goad and Petri, 1996; Floresco, Seamans and Phillips, 1997; Aggleton 
and Brown, 1999) and several authors have concluded that the hole board is also a 
sensitive test of animal spatial memory (van der Staay, van Nies, and Raajimakers, 
1990; Raajimakers, Blockland, and van der Staay, 1993; van der Staay, 1999). 
 
 However, closer examination of the procedures used in normal (i.e. food 
rewarded) hole board studies reveal several conceptually important differences 
between those protocols and the protocols used in the current study. The usual 
practice in hole board tasks is to place the animal in a new starting position within the 
maze on every session, if not every trial. This is identical to the procedure used in the 
water maze task to prevent the use of stereotyped response strategies. If hippocampal 
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lesioned rats are placed in the same starting position every time in water maze task 
they soon learn to locate the hidden platform and do not display a behavioural deficit 
(McDonald and White, 1994; Devan, Goad and Petri, 1996; Setlow and McGaugh, 
1999). However, if instead the rat is placed in a new starting position then its attempts 
to use a stereotyped response are not effective and it displays a behavioural deficit. 
Unfortunately our hole board procedure did not do this. Not only were the rats not 
removed from the maze between trials but the starting position at the beginning of 
each session was always the same. On closer examination of the data it was 
discovered that all rats regardless of neurologic status adopted a stereotypical pattern 
of behaviour. After initially orienting themselves in the hole board they nose-poked 
their closest target hole and then ran around the maze in a circular pattern nose-
poking target holes as they went. Furthermore, because rats were always placed in 
the same starting position there was little requirement for spatial cues once they had 
learned the position of the closest target hole and could simply employ a stereotyped 
pattern of behaviour straight away  
 
Why the usual procedures were not employed in the ICSS version of the hole 
board is largely due to the success of using ICSS in SRT task. Using ICSS in the SRT 
enabled the use of far more trials of (essentially) non-interrupted behaviour than 
normal. Because the success of the initial ICSS-SRT study was so recent at the time 
when the hole board task was being designed it was decided to apply these 
advantages to the hole board task as well. Thus rats would be allowed to behave 
continuously and perform far more trials per sessions than normal. This however was 
a serious error. By obviating the need for a rat to constantly employ spatial cues to 
reorientate itself in the maze (as removing it between trials and replacing it in a 
different start position for each trial would do) the task requirements were 
fundamentally altered, such that deficits in spatial memory would no longer produce 
impairments in the task. Instead, if anything, the task could be performed via more 
procedural / non-declarative functions (once the target holes were learnt) and this may 
explain why the caudate lesion rats were initially slower to complete trials.  
 
It is also quite common in hole board tasks for the hole board to wiped down 
between trials in order to destroy odour trails between target holes as rats can simply 
follow their odour trail on subsequent trials. Once again because of the use of ICSS 
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and a relatively short ITI this was not done. Thus it was possible for rats to follow their 
own odour trail on subsequence trials after first successfully locating their particular 
target holes. 
In summary the failure to remove rats from the hole board between trials, the 
failure to use different starting positions within the maze at the start of each session / 
trial, and the failure to prevent rats following odour trails substantially reduces the 
spatial memory components of the task. Rats are instead able to rely on stereotyped 
behaviour which is not impaired by hippocampal lesions, and for this reason 
hippocampal rats were not impaired in the hole board. Therefore, the present version 
of the  ICSS hole board task is invalidated as a test of allocentric spatial memory and 
can offer no useful evidence for contrasting with SRT task performance and thus can 
not be used to demonstrate a double-dissociation between memory task and neural 
substrate.  
 
However, while the hole board task in the form used in this experiment is invalid 
it has at least demonstrated that it is possible to use ICSS reward with the task. Thus, 
an obvious avenue for future research will be to repeat the hole board portion of the 
study while employing appropriate methodological procedures. Under these conditions 
it is expected that hippocampal lesions will produce a spatial memory deficits in the 
hole board. 
 
General Conclusions of the Chapter 
 
The first aim of the animal empirical work presented in this thesis was to 
demonstrate that the rat-SRT is a valid and reliable analogue of the human SRT. This 
aim was largely realised in the control study Chapter 6. However, the current study 
also provides some evidence of this type. The finding that rats with neurological 
lesions can perform the rat-SRT provides further evidence that the rat-SRT is a valid 
animal-analogue of the human SRT. Furthermore, the fact that rats with caudate 
lesions could perform the task at the short trial length is a particularly compelling 
example of the SRT’s validity in light of the caudate rat’s impairment at the longer 
sequence length. It is not difficulties with attending to or responding to stimuli that 
produces the SRT impairment displayed by caudate lesion animals, but rather an 
inability to learn a (longer) repeating sequence.  
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The second aim of the animal empirical work presented in this thesis was to 
demonstrate that the rat-SRT task was reliant on the same neural substrates as the 
human SRT which was addressed by experiment 1. Although not impaired in the short 
sequence conditions (Part 1; SRT4)  caudate lesion rats were impaired on the 8-trial 
repeating sequence (Part 2) in contrast to neurologically intact and hippocampal lesion 
rats. This is clear evidence that rats rely on the basal ganglia to perform the SRT in 
the same way humans do. Not only did caudate lesion animals have markedly weaker 
interference effects than the control and hippocampal lesion rats that experienced the 
repeating sequence but there was also some suggestion that caudate rats reacted 
more slowly overall than these other rats (see reaction time learning effect in Part 2). 
In conclusion basal ganglia dysfunction produces a clear and reliable impairment in 
the SRT that is not related to an inability to perform the underlying requirements of the 
task.  
 
In summary this chapter presented strong neuroanatomical evidence for the 
analogical validity of the rat-SRT task as a model of a human non-declarative memory 
task. In combination with the strong theoretical and behavioural evidence from 
Chapters 2 & 4 and Chapters 5, 6 & 7 (respectively) this means that there are now 
multiple grounds for claiming that the rat-SRT is a reliable, valid and useful animal-
analogue of the human SRT task. 
 
As a consequence of having achieved both of the primary aims of the thesis the 
following chapter (8) will present the general discussion and conclusions of the thesis. 
Chapter 8 will also discuss the consequences of the results of the analytic studies 
presented in this thesis (both human and animal) in relation to the primary theories 
and issues presented in the thesis. In particular it will be shown how the findings of 
both the meta-analysis and the rat-SRT studies apply to the general multiple-memory 
systems theory, the declarative  / non-declarative memory dissociation, and the 
validity and utility of the SRT task as a test of non-declarative memory. Limitations of 
the thesis and suggestions for future research will also be discussed.  
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Chapter 8 
 
General Discussion and 
Conclusions 
 
General Contributions 
 
 The primary aim of this thesis was to examine the contributions of the SRT task 
to the multiple memory systems theory and to develop an animal model of the human 
SRT task.. In the first instance a qualitative review of the human SRT literature 
(Chapter 2) was presented in which the validity of the SRT task as a test of non-
declarative memory was discussed. Although a number of limitations of the task and 
issues of conceptualisation were raised the ultimate conclusion of the chapter was that 
the SRT task, when used appropriately, is a sensitive measure of non-declarative 
memory. Hence the SRT is a useful candidate for demonstrating a dissociation 
between declarative and non-declarative memory and consequentially providing 
evidence for the multiple memory systems theory.  
 
Both humans and animals have declarative and non-declarative memory 
systems. The human evidence presented in Chapters 1, 2 and 3 is generally difficult to 
reconcile with the idea of a unitary memory system. It is possible to demonstrate a 
double-dissociation of memory task and neural substrate in animals which are 
considered to be strong evidence of multiple memory systems (in both animals and 
humans). Nevertheless, because the ‘other’ animal memory tasks that are typically 
dissociated from spatial learning tasks are not valid analogues of human non-
declarative tasks it is difficult to meaningfully relate this dissociation to humans. In 
summary the work presented in this chapter will discuss the specific contributions 
made, and revisit briefly some of the main issues addressed in the thesis, and suggest 
some directions for future research.  
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 In contrast to the contributions of the human SRT to the multiple memory 
systems theory the animal experimental contributions to non-declarative memory 
functions are more problematic. The thesis provided a succinct summary of the animal 
memory literature and found that animals show good evidence of multiple systems. It 
was also concluded that, irrespective of the demonstration of dissociable memory 
systems in animals, problems of validity and the lack of explicit animal analogues of a 
human non-declarative memory task made it difficult to draw firm conclusions about 
human non-declarative memory from animal non-declarative memory tasks. Prior to 
completion of this thesis only two pilot animal SRT studies appeared using monkeys 
(but see DeCoteau and Kesner, 2000, for a recent radial maze rat “SRT” task based 
on the animal learning a sequence of places). This thesis has provided two new 
examples of rat SRT tasks, the fan-maze and ICSS task. It has been shown both that 
animals can perform a SRT task, and that rats with caudate lesions show an 
impairment on the ICSS-SRT task, the same neural substrate appears to be especially 
important for humans when they experience the SRT. It was also shown that damage 
to the brain area known to be responsible for the animal analogue of human 
declarative memory, the hippocampus, did not disrupt the animal SRT task. Instead, 
hippocampal lesions even facilitated SRT performance. Thus the rat-SRT is a valid 
animal-analogue of the human SRT and provides new evidence of multiple memory 
systems in rats which is conceptually close to the evidence that generated the 
hypothesis of: human multiple memory systems. 
 
Theoretical Contributions of the Thesis 
 
 This thesis has reported results consistent with the multiple memory systems 
theory. Rats show evidence of non-declarative sequence learning which, in 
conjunction with the animal memory research presented in Chapter 4, strongly 
suggest that rats have at least two memory systems. Furthermore, rat-SRT 
performance demonstrates a dissociation between injury to different neural structures 
which provides further evidence of the independence of these memory systems, which 
in turn provides additional support for the general multiple memory systems theory. 
  
 The empirical evidence presented in this thesis provides further support for 
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Reber’s principle of commonality, that evolutionarily earlier forms and functions will be 
displayed across species. By providing good evidence that rats perform the SRT in 
much the same way as humans, and that rats rely on the same neural substrate for 
SRT performance as humans, the thesis provides empirical support for the theory that 
humans and animals have similar (multiple) memory systems. In consequence 
therefore the empirical evidence presented in the thesis also supports Reber’s axiom 
that consciousness “is a late arrival on the evolutionary scene”, and hence must be 
largely independent of the phylogenetically older non-declarative  
 
Not-Declarative Memory vs. Non-declarative Memory 
As some authors (Rovee-Collier, Hayne and Colombo 2001) have noted non-
declarative memory is often (implicitly) defined as those memories that are not 
declarative i.e. definition by dissociation rather than association. This characterisation 
neatly encapsulates a point that was made in Chapter 4. All too often the declarative 
memory system in animals is dissociated from ‘another’ memory system which is not-
declarative rather than non-declarative. Although there is good evidence to suggest 
that animal declarative memory is dissociable and independent from a memory 
system that is not-declarative, there is currently little evidence that the declarative 
memory in animals is dissociable from non-declarative memory in particular. Largely 
because the ‘not-declarative’ memory tasks that are used in animals do not make 
good conceptual or behavioural contact with human non-declarative memory tasks. 
Thus the rat-SRT provides an ideal opportunity to demonstrate a dissociation between 
declarative and non-declarative memory in animals, which is far more generalisable to 
human memory than the current declarative / not-declarative dissociation. 
 
Contributions of the Meta Analysis 
  
A surprising but important finding in the thesis was that a meta-analysis of the 
human SRT data showed that subjects with limbic system amnesia suffer a mild SRT 
impairment. As discussed in Chapter 3 this contradicts both the multiple memory 
systems theory and the conclusions of virtually all the amnesic studies included in the 
meta analysis. If this finding is an accurate reflection of the behaviour of limbic 
systems amnesics, and is a consequence of the same dysfunction that produces the 
amnesia, then this poses a serious challenge for the independence of memory 
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systems. There seems little doubt that this finding is valid. All but two of the ten 
studies that made up the limbic system neuropathological group contained indications 
that the amnesic subjects were not as unimpaired relative to controls as the studies 
had concluded. As shown by the power-analysis, this disparity between the studies’ 
conclusions and the meta-analysis’ conclusions is largely due to the low power 
enjoyed by these studies and consequent insensitivity to group differences. Combining 
these studies in a meta-analysis enabled us to perform a more sensitive test of group 
differences than that of the individual studies which meant that the meta-analysis 
provided a far more accurate and reliable estimate of group differences than any of 
the individual studies. Using such an approach under conditions of low power greatly 
increases the risk of making a type-II error, in this case failing to reject the null 
hypothesis of no difference between groups. One of these SRT studies employed 
mildly dementing AD patients (Ferraro, Balota and Connor, 1993) and reported that 
these subjects were indeed impaired relative to controls. The fact that these subjects 
were mildly dementing confounds the interpretation of their SRT deficit. However, the 
test of homogeneity for the limbic system neuropathology (LSN) group was not 
significant for either the group as a whole or for its constituent aetiologies. The effect 
sizes for the three aetiologies collapsed into the general LSN group were very similar 
between groups (AD d=0.6, MA d=0.77, and KS d=0.79) and very similar to the LSN 
group as a whole (LSN d=0.68). In particular it is useful to note that studies with ‘pure’ 
amnesics (Reber and Squire, 1994 & 1998) suggest the same degree of impairment 
that is suggested by studies with other limbic system disorders. While the LSN SRT 
literature is confounded by the wide variety and extent on neural pathology in these 
groups, and the presence of other forms of cognitive dysfunction in some of the 
aetiologies (e.g. dementia in AD) we can be confident that the three constituent LSN 
groups are very consistent between themselves and demonstrate a very similar 
degree of impairment. Thus we can conclude that the conclusion that there is a SRT 
impairment in LSN subjects is reliable. Given that the LSN groups all suffer a very 
similar degree of SRT impairment it is tempting to conclude also that there may be 
something common to these three aetiologies that produces their SRT impairment.  
 
 Not only are LSN subjects impaired in the SRT but so to are subjects 
with neither limbic system or basal ganglia dysfunction. The ‘ON’ group in the meta-
analysis were markedly impaired in the SRT task, even more so than BGN subjects in 
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places. The widespread nature of the brain damage in the ON aetiologies suggests a 
number of different regions are important for SRT behaviour. However most of the 
individual aetiologies that make up the ON group produce frontal brain damage (with 
the obvious exception of the subjects with cerebellar lesions), and this may produce 
the SRT impairment in such subjects. This also suggests that the impairment seen in 
LSN subjects may be a consequence of the non-specific frontal neuropathology 
common in such disorders. The LSN SRT impairment in particular provides a strong 
rationale for exploring the LSN SRT impairment in animal subjects as animal studies 
using focused brain lesions should be capable of determining why LSN subjects suffer 
a SRT impairment. The thesis supported this point by presenting empirical data that 
suggests that the SRT impairment in LSN subjects is not a consequence of limbic 
system pathology. The fact that rats with hippocampal lesions were not impaired in the 
SRT and even demonstrated a mild facilitation of SRT performance suggests that it is 
not limbic system dysfunction ‘per se’ that produces the SRT impairment in LSN 
subjects (the hippocampus being a major component of the limbic system). As noted 
in the discussion of Chapter 3 many of the aetiologies that produce amnesia also 
produce other forms of ‘non-specific’ neuropathology (AD in particular). Hence it may 
be that this additional, non-limbic, neuropathology is what produces the mild SRT 
impairment in LSN subjects. This possibility is strengthened by the fact that many of 
the aetiologies included in the LSN group are known to produce some disruption to the 
frontal area of the brain (see Aggleton and Brown, 1999).  
 
 The meta-analysis also concluded that subjects with basal ganglia damage are 
substantially impaired in the SRT. This corresponds with the multiple memory systems 
literature as a whole and the SRT literature in particular. The finding that basal ganglia 
patients are more impaired in the SRT provides evidence of a (partial) dissociation 
between different the limbic system and the basal ganglia in SRT performance.  
 
Behavioural Contributions of the Current Research  
 
The double (and triple) dissociations between memory task and neural 
substrate discussed in Chapter 4 provided clear evidence that animals have multiple 
memory systems. Furthermore, such dissociations are superficially similar to the 
human memory dissociations discussed in Chapters 1 & 2. Based on the similarity in 
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human and animal memory work therefore, and in particular the similarities in their 
memory behaviour, there are strong a priori grounds for expecting animals to use an 
animal analogue of human non-declarative sequence learning when they (the animals) 
perform a SRT task. Moreover, the studies discussed in Chapter 4 provide similarly 
strong grounds for expecting that the animal non-declarative memory system used to 
perform the rat-SRT would be dependent on the basal ganglia.  
 
As established in Chapter 4, however, prior to the development of the current 
rat-SRT there was no good animal analogue of a human non-declarative memory 
task. Although many studies had demonstrated reliable dissociations between 
allocentric spatial learning and reference / procedural memory tasks these latter tasks 
have poor conceptual and behavioural connections with human non-declarative 
memory tasks. As discussed in Chapter 1 brain / behaviour relations in animals are 
often different (in varying degrees) to human brain / behaviour relations (Schacter and 
Tulving, 1994) and as a result it would seem theoretically and behaviourally useful to 
ensure that the tasks used to test and compare memory systems in animals and 
humans are as similar as possible. Thus there was a need for a reliable animal 
analogue of a human non-declarative memory task in order to help validate the 
generalisation of the results of memory studies from animals to humans (and vice 
versa).  
 
 The rat-SRT extended the exploratory SRT work recently reported with non-
human primates (Nixon and Passingham, 2000; Procyk et al, 2000). Critically rats that 
experienced a repeating sequence demonstrate an interference effect when switched 
from the repeating- to a random-sequence. This was first demonstrated in the fan-
maze (Chapter 5) in which rats demonstrated behaviour consistent with the presence 
of absence of a sequence switch. Specifically, rats demonstrated an interference 
effect when switched from repeating to random sequence and, just as importantly, 
demonstrated no interference effect at the same point in the fan-maze session when 
the repeating sequence was not switched to random. Thus the interference effect 
across days / sessions was not an anticipatory response.  
 
 Examination of the contribution of the rat-SRT to multiple memory systems was 
somewhat more difficult than of the contribution of the human SRT, given that at the 
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start of this project there was no rat-SRT. However, this thesis has now demonstrated 
three critical strands of evidence necessary to validate the rat-SRT as an animal 
analogue of the human task: conceptual / theoretical (Chapters 2 & 4), behavioural 
(Chapters 5, 6 & 7) and neuroanatomical (Chapter 8).  
 In contrast to using food to reward behaviour, and in contrast to the limitations of the 
fan-maze, the ICSS-SRT task has a number of advantages. Rats rewarded with ICSS 
experience far less behavioural interruption during performance and can thus respond rapidly 
and continually. The ICSS-SRT procedure is substantially more similar to the human SRT and 
has far fewer spatial cues than the fan-maze. Under the right experimental conditions the rats in 
the ICSS-SRT task demonstrated robust and reliable sequence earning behaviour deteriorated 
markedly when switched from a repeating to a random sequence. Those rats that only ever saw 
random sequences demonstrated no evidence of an interference effect which means that any 
interference effect demonstrated as a consequence of a switch from repeating to random 
sequence was not a general behavioural artefact (e.g. due to fatigue). 
 
 The SRT control study (Chapter 6) clearly demonstrated that spaced learning is 
not an effective technique for sequence learning in the SRT. This contrasts with many 
memory tasks in rats that report a clear advantage of spaced learning (e.g. DeCoteau 
and Kesner, 2000. Why learning a repeating sequence over several long sessions 
should not produce any sequence learning (Groups 5 & 6 in Chapter 6) is uncertain. 
Irrespective of the fact that learning is broken down into three sessions each session 
still contains far more trials (940) than is usual in rodent behavioural tasks. 
Nevertheless, spaced learning was not a viable technique in the ICSS-SRT task. 
Instead the clearest indication of sequence learning came from a single session of 
massed repeating-sequence trials. 
 
 A useful metric for the validity of a behaviour is the convergence between 
different measures of the same phenomenon. Thus it is important to note that reaction 
time and error-rate measures produced the same pattern of findings. In fact there is 
some evidence that, irrespective of the much higher error-rates in rats than in humans, 
error-rates made be a slightly more sensitive measure of sequence learning in rats 
(compare Figs. 6.7 & 6.10, and Figs. 7.6 & 7.9 in particular). 
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Intra Cranial Self Stimulation 
 Although ICSS had been used as a behavioural reward in the past (e.g. Stellar 
and Gallistel, 1975) it had only been used either to contrast ICSS reward with food 
reward systems and / or to examine the parametric functions of the ICSS 
phenomenon itself. The novel use of ICSS as a behavioural reward for complex 
behaviour clearly indicates its utility and advantages as a reward delivery system for 
such behaviours. Not only is ICSS minimally disruptive during behaviour but it also 
promotes fast and continual responding. The other great advantage of ICSS is that it 
is non-satiating which enabled the use of many more trials within a session than would 
be possible with food reward. The non-disruptive and non-satiating features of ICSS in 
particular made it ideal for use with the SRT task which requires rapid and continuous 
responding over a large number of trials. Although rats can learn a SRT when 
motivated by food reward (the fan-maze) the limitations of the food reward system (i.e. 
behaviourally disruptive, variably motivation, and satiation) introduce serious 
conceptual and empirical confounds into a SRT task in particular. 
 
Neurobiological Contributions of the Current Research 
 
 The fan-maze and SRT control study tasks used different sequence lengths, 12 
and 4-trial, respectively. The use of the short sequence length raises the issues of 
whether or not rats were able to acquire declarative knowledge of the sequence, as 
humans most certainly would. If rats do develop declarative sequence knowledge then 
their behaviour may not be indicative of non-declarative sequence learning, defeating 
the point of the model. However, there are two strands of evidence that suggest rats 
did not acquire declarative sequence knowledge. Firstly neither of the groups in the 
SRT-control study (Chapter 5) that experienced repeating sequences over multiple 
sessions (Groups 5 and 6) demonstrated any sequence learning. If rats can 
declaratively acquire the short repeating sequence it seems reasonable to suggest 
that they should be able to do within even one session, let alone across three, given 
that declarative memory acquires information very quickly (e.g. even after a single 
exposure). Thus the fact Groups 5 & 6 demonstrated no sequence learning at the end 
of session three (Group 6, switched to random at the end of each of the three 
sessions, also displayed no interference effect in any session) suggests they did not 
acquire declarative knowledge of the repeating sequence. Secondly, and critically, 
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caudate lesioned rats demonstrated a SRT impairment at both a moderate (8-trial) 
and long (12-trial) sequence length but not at a short (4-trial) length (but note that 
even neurologically intact repeating-sequence control rats could not learn the 12-trial 
repeating sequence). As the caudate is the neural correlate of non-declarative, but not 
declarative, memory caudate rats should not have suffered any SRT impairment if 
they learnt the sequence declaratively. Furthermore, as the hippocampus is the neural 
correlate of declarative memory SRT performance that relies on declarative memory 
should be impaired by a hippocampal lesion. Instead the hippocampal lesion actually 
facilitated SRT performance. Given this pattern of results there is every reason to 
conclude that rats learned the repeating sequence non-declaratively. 
 
The hippocampal facilitation effect is not a complete surprise given that the 
hippocampus is typically thought of as responsible for declarative memory. Although 
most theorists adopt the position that each memory systems is solely responsible for 
the memory tasks associated with it, it is undoubtedly the case that, except in extreme 
instances, memory tasks are not process pure. The obvious speculation therefore as 
to why hippocampal lesions facilitated SRT performance is that an intact declarative 
memory system actually interferes with SRT behaviour. The suggestion is that the 
declarative memory system interferes with non-declarative memory when the 
organism attempts to use declarative memory to solve the problems posed by the task 
but the information required is only available to the non-declarative memory system. 
Thus the declarative memory system constantly chases spurious relationships 
between stimuli which interferes, to a fairly limited extent, with the non-declarative 
memory system. As a result an impaired declarative system (i.e. as a consequence of 
a hippocampal lesion) may interfere to a far lesser extent than an intact system would, 
thus facilitating non-declarative memory performance. Previous theoretical 
formulations (e.g. Eichenbaum, 1999) have also suggested that any learning situation 
will use a combination of declarative and non-declarative memory and that instances 
of facilitated performance after hippocampal lesions may reflect a shift in this balance. 
 
As noted in the discussion to the previous chapter the dissociation of the effect 
of caudate lesions and hippocampal lesions on rat-SRT behaviour is verification that 
the rat SRT relies on at least one neural substrate for SRT performance in common 
with humans. Hence this is good neuroanatomical evidence that the rat-SRT is a valid 
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animal-analogue of the human SRT and, furthermore, that rodent non-declarative 
memory is dissociable from rodent declarative memory. 
 
Unresolved issues and Future Research 
Sequence Length 
There is a disparity between the parametric analysis of the effect of sequence 
length on SRT performance in the rat-SRT task and studies in the human SRT 
literature. While neurologically intact rats can learn both a 4- and an 8-trial sequence 
they are incapable of learning a 12-trial sequence (but note that hippocampal lesion 
rats demonstrate some evidence of sequence learning at this trial length). In contrast 
Stadler (1992) and Stadler and Neely (1997) concluded that human SRT performance 
is independent of sequence length. Stadler (ibid) found that, if anything, SRT 
performance actually improved at the longer (16-trial) sequence lengths. However, two 
points must be kept in mind when comparing these results to those of the rat-SRT. 
Firstly, it is not so much that the SRT performance of neurologically intact rats show a 
length dependent deterioration in SRT behaviour, but more that they demonstrate very 
similar interference effects in both the 4- and 8-trial tasks and then no interference 
effect at all in the 12-trial task. It may be therefore that there is simply an all-or-nothing 
effect with non-declarative sequence learning and Stadler et al, simply did not use 
long enough sequence lengths to observe this in humans. Note: it I also possible than 
the subjects simply learnt fragments of the repeating sequence and thus treated the 
task as if it were a shorter repeating sequence and thus generated an interference 
effect.. Given that humans are, by definition, cognitively superior to rats the notion that 
rats and humans perform the SRT in similar ways but that rats can not learn 
sequences as long as those humans can learn seems reasonable. Secondly, there is 
contrasting evidence of a sequence length effect in humans. Pascual-Leone et al 
(1993) demonstrated progressively weaker interference effects in humans over 8, 10, 
and 12-trial sequence lengths. Furthermore, this progressive weakening in 
interference effect is seen in both control and PD subjects, although it was more 
marked in the PD subjects. 
 
Thus there is some disagreement as to the role sequence length plays in SRT 
performance. Unfortunately it appears that the utility of the rat-SRT task to address 
this issue is exhausted as it is difficult to use a sequence length between 8 and 12 
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trials in the 4-hole apparatus without introducing frequency of stimulus presentation 
confounds (i.e. as with the 10-trial repeating sequence in humans). It may however be 
possible to test a 10-trial repeating sequence in rats if a 5-hole apparatus was 
employed, or even a 9-trial sequence with a 3-hole apparatus, although altering the 
number of stimulus positions may introduce problems of its own. 
 
The Lack of a Double-Dissociation in the Current Research 
The most serious unresolved issue of this thesis is the failure to demonstrate a 
double-dissociation between memory task and neural substrate. There is every reason 
to expect that if the hole board had been run correctly it would have provided evidence 
of a spatial working memory impairment in hippocampal lesion rats but not in caudate 
lesion rats, and thus a double dissociation between memory task and site of neural 
injury. While the absence of double-dissociation does not threaten the empirical and 
theoretical contributions of the thesis these contributions would have been even more 
compelling had the double-dissociation been demonstrated. A repetition of the hole 
board study in light of the lesions learned in this thesis is an obvious, and useful, 
possibility for future research. 
 
Pharmacological Studies  
 Packard and White, (1991) and White, Packard and Seamans (1993) 
demonstrated that dopamine plays a critical role in memory in both the hippocampus 
and caudate. The administration of dopamine (ant)agonists into the caudate and 
hippocampus during SRT performance would help establish the role of dopamine in 
the SRT and thus non-declarative memory. This would be useful given that human 
basal ganglia dysfunction often results from dopamine degeneration (i.e. Parkinson’s 
disease). It may even be worthwhile to target dopamine receptor subtypes (e.g. DA1 
and DA2) to see if different population of dopamine receptors play different roles in 
non-declarative memory. A similar technique for increasing the specificity of the neural 
substrate under scrutiny would to infuse a local anaesthetic (e.g. lidocaine) into the 
caudate during SRT behaviour and observe the effect. It would of course be especially 
useful to demonstrate that temporary inactivation of the caudate (either in its entirety 
or restricted sub-receptor populations) disrupted SRT performance but that once the 
inactivation wore off normal performance was reinstated. 
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Pre-Frontal Cortex Lesions 
 Given the finding in the meta-analysis that pFC lesions (and other aetiologies 
that may affect the frontal region of the brain, e.g. AD and close head injury) seriously 
disrupt human SRT performance, and that (unconscious) attention is an important 
component of non-declarative memory it would be useful to examine the effect of pFC 
lesions in the rat-SRT. Such research could help to tease out the role of attention and 
also (non-specific) frontal neuropathology in human non-declarative memory. 
 
Limbic System / Hippocampal Lesions 
 While hippocampal rats demonstrated some facilitation of SRT performance the 
lesions were relatively small and largely restricted to the CA1 and dentate gyrus (see 
Fig. 7A.2). Thus an examination of larger hippocampal lesions and / or lesions to other 
limbic system structures might help to discover why amnesics are impaired in the 
SRT. It may be, for example, that the small lesions used in Chapter 7 were 
insufficiently disruptive to produce any impairment. If rats with larger hippocampal 
lesions and / or other limbic system lesions were still unimpaired in the SRT this would 
provide strong empirical support for the hypothesis discussed in Chapter 3 and above. 
That the amnesic SRT impairment seen in the meta-analysis is not due to limbic 
system dysfunction but rather to non-specific neuropathology of the type common in 
the various amnesic aetiologies. Oh the other hand, if rats with larger hippocampal 
lesions or other limbic system lesions were impaired in the SRT this would suggest 
that the hippocampal lesion used in this thesis were too small. If such rats were 
impaired in the SRT it would also suggest that the amnesic SRT impairment 
demonstrated in the meta-analysis was due to limbic system dysfunction, with 
appropriately serious consequences for the multiple memory systems theory. 
 
Future Research in the Human SRT  
 An unexpected finding in the meta-analysis was the lack of relationship between SRT 
performance and dementia. By definition dementia produces cognitive dysfunction, and more 
severe dementia produces commensurately greater degrees of cognitive impairment which may 
eventually include non-declarative memory. Alzheimer’s disease results in progressively 
worsening dementia as a direct consequence of progressive brain damage. However, brain 
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damage in AD is not limited to the limbic system (except in the very early stages), but includes 
damage to the widespread cortical association areas and, ultimately, subcortical areas including 
the basal ganglia. Thus it is reasonable to assume that dementia will produce a SRT 
impairment related to the severity of the dementia. Empirical evidence for this is provided by 
Ferraro, Balota and Connor (1993) who found that very mildly dementing AD subjects were 
not impaired in the SRT but mildly dementing subjects were. Although, the meta-analysis 
found that there was no relationship between severity of dementia and SRT performance there 
is some evidence that this conclusion may be incorrect. Firstly, even after combining studies in 
the meta-analysis there are still relatively few subjects in each of the groups and thus the 
moderator analysis of severity of dementia may be insufficiently sensitive to any group 
differences by virtue of low power. Secondly, when the two dementia groups were analysed 
separately from the non-dementing subjects there was a marginally non-significant difference 
between groups, and the lack of significance may again be due to low power. Thus there is 
some suggestion that severity of dementia may be related to SRT impairment. Finally it must 
be remembered that only very-mildly and mildly dementing subjects were included in the 
analysis and it seems likely that more severely dementing subjects would produce a very clear 
SRT impairment. 
 
Due to the uncertainty surrounding the relationship between dementia and the SRT a 
study of limbic system it would be useful to examine the effect of relatively pure limbic 
system pathology. The problem is of course, as discussed in the meta-analysis, it can 
be difficult to obtain sufficiently large sample sizes of ‘pure amnesics’, and thus 
assuring adequate power. A possible population to examine instead might be those 
subjects with ‘age associated memory impairments’. This diagnosis is a very reliable 
predictor of AD (~80% of people diagnosed with it go on to develop AD) but is 
characterised as a pre-dementing phase to the disorder (Bartes-Faz et al, 2001). 
Hence, subjects with this diagnosis have relatively pure limbic system pathology. it 
may be that even though these subjects suffer amnesia they would not be impaired in 
the SRT as they suffer amnesia in the absence of dementia (by virtue of their pre-AD 
diagnosis). If this is the case it may be more appropriate to compare these subjects 
with controls in the SRT rather than diagnosed AD patients (even the very-mildly 
dementing AD patients in Ferraro, Balota and Connor, 1993). If subjects with an age 
associated memory impairment diagnosis were not impaired in the SRT relative to 
controls this would suggest that it is the addition / non-specific neuropathology 
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associated with the more severe amnesia that produce the mild SRT deficits in LSN 
subjects seen in the meta-analysis. If, on the other hand, these subjects are impaired 
in the SRT this would suggest that the SRT does rely on the limbic system to some 
extent. However, given that the very-mildly dementing AD patients in Ferraro, Balota 
and Connor, (1993) were not impaired relative to controls, and given that the 
hippocampal lesioned rats in Chapter 7 showed a mild facilitation of SRT 
performance, it seems unlikely that subjects with an age associated memory 
impairments diagnosis would not be impaired in the SRT. 
 
Conclusions 
 In conclusion the thesis has demonstrated that human subjects with limbic 
system amnesia are impaired in the SRT in contradiction to the various studies in the 
literature. The failure of SRT studies with amnesic patients to report any difference 
between amnesic and control groups is due to SRT studies generally having poor 
power. However, the animal evidence presented by this thesis also demonstrated that 
this SRT impairment in amnesic subjects is most likely not a consequence of limbic 
system dysfunction, and suggested that it may instead be due to the additional 
(frontal) neuropathology common in such disorders. 
 
The thesis has also presented empirical evidence that rats posses a non-
declarative system that is behaviourally and neuroanatomically analogous to human 
non-declarative memory, at least as measured by the SRT task. Thus rats are likely to 
posses multiple memory systems related to those found in humans. 
 
While the failure to demonstrate a double-dissociation of memory system and 
brain structure is regrettable it does not detract from the ultimate conclusion that the 
ICSS-SRT task is a valid analogue of the human SRT task. Hence the rat-SRT is likely 
to be useful for: examining the neurology of non-declarative memory, the pattern of 
spared / impaired non-declarative memory in different neuropathologies, and the 
multiple memory systems theory as a whole. 
   - 262 - 
   
  
 
References 
Aggleton J P. One-trial object recognition by rats. Quarterly-Journal-of-Experimental-
Psychology:-Comparative-and-Physiological-Psychology. 1985 Nov; Vol 37B(4): 279-
294. 
 
Aggleton J P, Blindt H S., and Rawlins J N. Effects of amygdaloid and 
amygdaloidippocampal lesions on object recognition and spatial working memory in 
rats. Behavioral-Neuroscience. 1989 Oct; Vol 103(5): 962-974, 1151. 
 
Aggleton J. P., and Brown M. W. Episodic memory, amnesia, and the hippocampal-
anterior thalamic axis. Behavioral Brain Sciences. 22(3), (1999), 425-444. 
 
Aggleton J. P., Vann S. D., and Good M. Identifying cortical inputs to the rat 
hippocampus that subserve allocentric spatial processes: a simple problem with a 
complex answer. Hippocampus. 10(4), (2000), 466-74. 
 
Aldridge J W., Berridge K C., Herman M, and Zimmer L. Neuronal coding of serial 
order: Syntax of grooming in the neostriatum. Psychological-Science. 1993 Nov; Vol 
4(6): 391-395. 
 
Attneave F. Applications of information theory to psychology: A summary of basic 
concepts, methods, and results. NY, Henry Holt. (1959). vii, 120 pp. 
 
Bartres-Faz D, Junque C, Lopez-Alomar A, Valveny N, Moral, P, Casamayor R, Salido 
A, Bel C., and Clemente I C. Neuropsychological and genetic differences between 
age-associated memory impairment and mild cognitive impairment entities. Journal-of-
the-American-Geriatrics-Society. 2001 Jul; Vol 49(7): 985-990. 
 
Baxter M. G., and Murray E. A. Impairments in visual discrimination learning and 
recognition memory produced by neurotoxic lesions of rhinal cortex in rhesus 
monkeys. European Journal of Neuroscience. 3(6), (2001), 1228-1238. 
 
Beldarrain M. G., Grafman J., Pascual-Leone A., and Garcia-Monco J. C. Procedural 
learning is impaired in patients with prefrontal lesions. Neurology. 1, (1999), 1853-
1859. 
 
Berry. Peer Review of; Shanks D. R., and St. John M. F. Characteristics of dissociable 
human learning systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 17, (1994), 367-447. 
 
Braak H, Braak E. Development of Alzheimer-related neurofibrillary changes in the 
neocortex inversely recapitulates cortical myelogenesis. Acta Neuropathologia.92(2), 
(1996), 197-201. 
 
Braak H, Braak E, Yilmazer D, de Vos RA, Jansen EN, Bohl J. 
Pattern of brain destruction in Parkinson's and Alzheimer's diseases. 
Journal of Neural Transmission. 103(4), (1996), 455-90.  
 
Bueger A, A., Gross C. G., and Rocha-Miranda C . E. Effects of ventral putamen 
lesions on discrimination learning by monkeys. Journal of Comparative and 
   - 263 - 
   
  
 
Physiological Psychology. 86(3) (1974), 440-446. 
 
Burns R. A., and Dunkman J. A. Jr. Ordinal position learning and remote anticipation. 
Journal of general Psychology. 127(2), (2000), 229-238. 
 
Carli M., Robbins T. W., Evenden J. L., and Everitt B. J. Effects of lesions to 
ascending noradrenergic neurones on performance of a 5-choice serial reaction time 
task in rats: implication for theories of dorsal noradrenergic bundle function based on 
selective attention and arousal. Behavioural Brain Research. 9, (1983), 361-380. 
 
Carli M., and Samanin R. Serotonin2 receptor agonists and seretonergic anorectic 
drugs affect rats’ performance differently in a five-choice serial reaction time task.  
Psychpharmacology. 106, (1992), 228-234. 
 
Catania A C. The natural and artificial selection of verbal behavior. In; Hayes, Steven 
C. (Ed); Hayes, Linda J. (Ed); et-al. (1994). Behavior analysis of language and 
cognition. (pp. 31-49). Reno, NV, US: Context Press; Reno, NV, US 
 
Cleeremans A. Awareness and Abstraction are Graded Dimensions. Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences. 17, (1994), 402. 
 
Cohen J. The statistical power of abnormal-social psychological research: A review.  
Journal-of-Abnormal-and-Social-Psychology. 1962; 65(3): 145-153. 
 
Cohen N. J., Ivry R., and Keele S. W Attention and Structure in Sequence Learning. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning Memory and Cognition. (1990). 1617-
30. 
Cohen, NJ & H Eichenbaum. Memory, Amnesia, and the Hippocampal System. (1993) 
MIT Press. 
Cohen NJ, Poldrack RA, Eichenbaum H. Memory for items and memory for relations 
in the procedural/declarative memory framework. Memory. 5(1-2), (1997), 131-178. 
 
Cole B. J., and Robbins T. W. Amphetamine impairs the discriminative performance of 
rats with dorsal noradrenergic bundle lesions on a 5-choice serial reaction time task: 
New evidence for central dopaminergic-noradrenergic interactions. 
Psychopharmacology. 91, (1987), 458-466. 
 
Cole B. J., and Robbins T. W. Effects of 6-hydroxydopamine lesions of the nucleus 
accumbens septi on performance of a 5-choice serial reaction time task in rats: 
implications for theories of selective attention and arousal. Behavioural Brain 
Research. 33, (1989), 165-179. 
 
Colombo PJ, Davis HP, Volpe BT. Allocentric spatial and tactile memory impairments 
in rats with dorsal caudate lesions are affected by preoperative behavioral training. 
Behavioural Neuroscience. 103(6), (1989), 1242-50. 
 
Compton D. M. Serial learning: a review of the behavioral and physiological research 
with the rat. Neuroscience Biobehavioural Revie. 15(3), (1991), 163-174. 
 
Compton D. M., Bishop J. T., and Dietrich K. L. Serial pattern learning in senescent 
   - 264 - 
   
  
 
rats: a comparison of acquisition performance with young and hippocampal-lesioned 
rats. Journal of General Psychology. 132(2), (1996), 137-149. 
 
Compton D. M. Are memories for stimulus-stimulus associations or stimulus-response 
associations responsible for serial-pattern learning in rats? Physiology and Behavior. 
72, (2001), 643-652. 
 
Curran T. On the neural mechanisms of implicit memory. Psyche. 2(1), (1995). 
 
Curran T. Higher-order associative learning in amnesia: Evidence from the serial 
reaction time task. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience. 9(4), (1997), 522-533. 
 
Curran T., and Keele S. W. Attentional and nonattentional forms of sequence learning. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition. 19(1) (1993), 
189-202. 
 
DeCoteau W. E., and Kesner R. P. A double dissociation between the rat 
hippocampus and medial caudoputamen in processing two forms of knowledge. 
Behavioral-Neuroscience. 114(6), (2000), 1096-1108. 
 
Devan B D, Goad E H., and Petri H L. Dissociation of hippocampal and striatal 
contributions to spatial navigation in the water maze. Neurobiology-of-Learning-and-
Memory. 1996 Nov; Vol 66(3): 305-323. 
 
Dominey P. F., Ventre-Dominey J., Broussolle E., and Jeanerod M. Analogical transfer 
is effective in a serial reaction time task in Parkinson’s disease: Evidence for a 
dissociable form of sequence learning. Neuropsychologia. 35(1), (1997), 1-9. 
 
Doyon J, Laforce R Jr, Bouchard G, Gaudreau D, Roy J, Poirier M, Bedard PJ, Bedard 
F, Bouchard JP. Role of the striatum, cerebellum and frontal lobes in the 
automatization of a repeated visuomotor sequence of movements. Neuropsychologia. 
36(7), (1998), 625-41 
 
Edmonds D E., and Gallistel C. R.  Parametric analysis of brain stimulation reward in 
the rat: III. Effect of performance variables on the reward summation function. Journal-
of-Comparative-and-Physiological-Psychology. 87(5), (1974), 876-883. 
 
Edmonds D E., Stellar J. R., and Gallistel C. R. Parametric analysis of brain 
stimulation reward in the rat: II. Temporal summation in the reward system. Journal-of-
Comparative-and-Physiological-Psychology. 87(5), (1974), 860-869. 
 
Eichenbaum H., Otto T., and Cohen N. J. Two functional components of the 
hippocampal memory system. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 17, (1994), 449-518. 
 
Fellows  B. J. Chance stimulus sequences for discrimination tasks. Psychological 
Bulletin. 67(2), (1967), 87-92. 
 
Ferraro F. R., Balota D. D., and Connor L. T. Implicit memory and the formation of 
new associations in nondementing Parkinson’s Disease individuals and individuals 
with senile dementia of the Alzheimer type: A serial reaction time (SRT) investigation. 
Brain and Cognition. 21, (1993), 163-180. 
 
   - 265 - 
   
  
 
Fiorino F. F., Coury A., Fibiger H. C., and  Phillips A. G. Electrical stimulation of 
reward sites in the ventral tegmental area increases dopamine transmission in the 
nucleus accumbens of the rat. Behavioural-Brain-Research. 55(2), (1993), Spec 
Issue: 131-141. 
 
Floresco S. B., Seamans J. K., and Phillips A. G. Selective roles for hippocampal, 
prefrontal cortex, and ventral striatal circuits in radial-arm maze tasks with or without 
delay. The Journal of Neuroscience. 17(5), (1997), 1880-1890. 
 
Fountain S. B. Rule abstraction, item memory, and chunking in rat serial-pattern 
tracking. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavioral Processes.16(1), 96-
105. 
 
Frensch P. A., Buchner A., and Lin J. Implicit learning of unique and amibiguous serial 
transitions in the presence and absence of a distractor task. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition. 20(3), (1994), 567-584. 
 
 
Gaffan D. Recognition impaired and association intact in the memory of monkeys after 
transection of the fornix. Journal-of-Comparative-and-Physiological-Psychology. 1974 
Jun; Vol 86(6): 1100-1109. 
 
Gaffan, D. Dissociated effects of perirhinal cortex ablation lesion, fornix transection 
and amygdalectomy: evidence for multiple memory systems in the primate temporal 
lobe. Experimental Brain Research. 99 (1994), 411-422 
 
Gaffan, D. Associative and perceptual learning and the concept of memory systems. 
Cognitive Brain Research, 5 (1996), 69-80 
 
Gaffan D, and Harrison S. A comparison of the effects of fornix transection and sulcus 
principalis ablation upon spatial learning by monkeys. Behavioural-Brain-Research. 
1989 Jan; Vol 31(3): 207-220. 
 
Gaffan D, and Saunders R C. Running recognition of configural stimuli by fornix-
transected monkeys. Quarterly-Journal-of-Experimental-Psychology:-Comparative-
and-Physiological-Psychology. 1985 Feb; Vol 37B(1): 61-71. 
 
Gallagher M., and Holland P C. Understanding the function of the central nucleus: Is 
simple conditioning enough? In; Aggleton, John P. (Ed). (1992). The amygdala: 
Neurobiological aspects of emotion, memory, and mental dysfunction. (pp. 307-321). 
New York, NY, US: 
 
Gallistel C. R. Electrical self-stimulation and its theoretical implications. Psychological-
Bulletin. 61(1), (1964) 23-34. 
 
Gallistel C. R., Stellar J. R., and Bubis E. Parametric analysis of brain stimulation 
reward in the rat: I. The transient process and the memory-containing process. 
Journal-of-Comparative-and-Physiological-Psychology. 87(5), (1974), 848-859. 
 
Gallistel C. R., Shizgal P., and Yeomans J. S. A portrait of the substrate for self-
stimulation. Psychological-Review. 88(3), (1981), 228-273 
 
   - 266 - 
   
  
 
Gershberg F. B., and Shimamura A. P. Serial position effects in implicit and explicit 
tests of memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and 
Cognition. 20(6), (1994), 1370-1378. 
 
Gershberg F. B., and Shimamura A. P. The neuropsychology of human learning and 
memory. Martinez J. L. Jr and Kesner R. P. (Eds) Neurobiology of Learning and 
Memory. Academic Press, San Diego, USA. (1998). 
 
Gluck M. A., Ermita B. R. Oliver L. M., and Myers C. E. Extending models of 
hippocampal function in animal conditioning to human amnesia. Memory. 5(1/2), 
(1997), 179-212. 
 
Gould S. J. Exaptation: A crucial tool for an evolutionary psychology. Journal of Social 
Issues. 47(3), (1991), 43-65. 
 
Graf P., and Masson M. E. J. Implicit memory: New directions in cognition, 
development, and neuropsychology. Hillsdale, NJ, US: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 
Inc. (1993). viii, 369 pp. 
 
Graf P, and Schacter D L. Implicit and explicit memory for new associations in normal 
and amnesic subjects. Journal-of-Experimental-Psychology:-Learning,-Memory,-and-
Cognition. 1985 Jul; Vol 11(3): 501-518. 
 
Grafman J., Holyoak J. K., Boller F. (Eds.) Structure and Functions of the Human 
Prefrontal Cortex. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences Volume 769, (1995). 
 
Grafton S. T., Hazeltine E., and Ivry R. Functional mapping of sequence learning in 
normal humans. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience. 7(4) (1995), 497-510. 
 
Grafton S. T., Hazeltine E., and Ivry R. Abstract and effector-specific representations 
of motor sequences identified with PET. The Journal of Neuroscience. 18(22), (1998), 
9420-9428. 
 
Hanley J R, Davies A D M, Downes J J, and Mayes A R. Impaired recall of verbal 
material following rupture and repair of an anterior communicating artery aneurysm. 
Cognitive-Neuropsychology. 1994 Oct; Vol 11(5): 543-578. 
 
Harley C W. Arm choices in a sunburst maze: Effects of hippocampectomy in the rat. 
Physiology-and-Behavior. 1979 Aug; Vol 23(2): 283-290. 
 
Hazeltine E., Grafton S. T., and Ivry R. Attention and stimulus characteristics 
determine the locus of motor-sequence encoding a PET study. Brain. 120, (1997), 
123-140. 
 
Hedges, L. V, and Olkin, I . Nonparametric estimators of effect size in meta-analysis. 
Psychological-Bulletin. 96(3), (1984 ) 573-580. 
 
Hoffmann J, and Koch I. Stimulus-response compatibility and sequential learning in 
the serial reaction time task. Psychological-Research/Psychologische-Forschung. 
1997 Jun; Vol 60(1-2): 87-97. 
 
Holyoak and Gattiss. Peer Review of; Shanks D. R., and St. John M. F. 
   - 267 - 
   
  
 
Characteristics of dissociable human learning systems. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences. 17, (1994), 367-447. 
 
Hopkins RO., Kesner R. P., and Goldstein M. Memory for novel and familiar spatial 
and linguistic temporal distance information in hypoxic subjects. Journal of the 
International Neuropsychological Society. 1(5), (1995), 454-68. 
 
Horn G. Learning, memory and the brain. Indian Journal of Physiological 
Pharmacology. 35(1), (1991), 3-9. 
 
Howard D V, and Howard J H. Age differences in learning serial patterns: Direct 
versus indirect measures. Psychology-and-Aging. 1989 Sep; Vol 4(3): 357-364. 
 
Howard D. V., and Howard Jr. J. H. Adult age differences in the rate of learning serial 
patterns: Evidence from direct and indirect tests. Psychology and Aging. 7(2), (1992), 
232-241. 
 
Jäkälä P., Sirviö J., Riekkinen J. R., Haapalinna A., and Riekkinen P. Effects of 
atipazemole, and α2-adrenoceptor antagonist, on the performance of rats in a five-
choice serial reaction time task. Pharmacology, Biochemistry and Behavior. 42, 
(1992A), 903-907. 
 
Jäkälä P., Sirviö J., Jolkkonen J., Riekkinen Jr. P., Ascady L., and Riekkinen P. The 
effects of p-chlorophenylalanine-induced serotonin synthesis inhibition and muscarinic 
blockade on the performance of rats in a 5-choice serial reaction time task. 
Behavioural Brain Research. 51, (1992B), 29-40. 
 
Jackson G. M, and Jackson S. R. Do measures of explicit learning actually measure 
what is being learnt in the serial reaction time task? A critique of current methods. 
Psyche. 2(1), (1995). 
 
Jackson G. M., Jackson S. R., Harrison J., Henderson L., and Kennard C. Serial 
reaction time learning and Parkinson’s disease: Evidence for a procedural learning 
deficit. Neuropsychologia. 33(5), (1995), 577-593. 
 
Jacoby L L, Kelley C M., and Dywan J. Memory attributions. Roediger, Henry L. III 
(Ed); Craik, Fergus I. M. (Ed). (1989). Varieties of memory and consciousness: 
Essays in honour of Endel Tulving. (pp. 391-422). Hillsdale, NJ, US: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, Inc; Hillsdale, NJ, US 
 
Jacoby L. L, Ste-Marie D., and Toth J. P. Redefining automaticity: Unconscious 
influences, awareness, and control. In: Baddeley, A. D., and Weiskrantz, L. (Eds). 
Attention: Selection, awareness, and control: A tribute to Donald Broadbent. New 
York, NY, US: Clarendon Press/Oxford University Press. (1993) 
 
Jarrard L. E. What does the hippocampus really do? Behavioural-Brain-Research. 
71(1-2), (1995) 1-10. 
 
Jeminez et al Peer Review of; Shanks D. R., and St. John M. F. Characteristics of 
dissociable human learning systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 17, (1994), 367-
447. 
 
   - 268 - 
   
  
 
Kesner R. P., Bolland B. L., and Dakis M. Memory for spatial locations, motor 
responses, and objects: triple dissociation among hippocampus, caudate nucleus, and 
extrastriate visual cortex. Experimental Brain Research. 93, (1993), 462-470. 
 
Kesner R. P. Learning and memory in rats with an emphasis on the role of 
hippocampal formation. In Kesner, Raymond P.(Ed); Olton, David S.(Ed); et al. 
Neurobiology of Comparative Cognition. Hillsdale, NJ, USA: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, Inc (1990), 179-204 
 
Kesner R. P., Farnsworth G., and DiMattia B V. Double dissociation of egocentric and 
allocentric space following medial prefrontal and parietal cortex lesions in the rat. 
Behavioral-Neuroscience. 1989 Oct; Vol 103(5): 956-961. 
 
Kinsbourne, M. Brain mechanisms and memory. Human Neurobiology. 6, (1987), 81-
92. 
 
Knopman D. Long-term retention of implicitly acquired learning in patients with 
Alzheimer's disease. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology. 13(6), 
(1991A), 881-894. 
 
Knopman D. Unaware learning versus preserved learning in pharmacologic amnesia: 
Similarities and differences. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory 
and Cognition. 17(5), (1991B), 1017-1029. 
 
Knopman D., and Nissen M. J. Implicit learning in patients with probable Alzheimer's 
disease. Neurology. 37(5), (1987), 784-788. 
 
Knopman D., and Nissen M. J. Procedural learning is impaired in Huntington’s 
disease: Evidence from the serial reaction time task. Neuropsychologia. 29(3), (1991), 
245-254. 
 
Layforce R Jr, Doyon J. Distinct contribution of the striatum and cerebellum to motor 
learning. Brain Cognition. 45(2), (2001), 189-211 
 
Leon M., and Gallistel C. R. The function relating the subjective magnitude of brain 
stimulation reward to stimulation strength varies with site of stimulation. Behavioural-
Brain-Research. 52(2), (1992), 183-193. 
 
Lindsay and Goryska. Peer Review of; Shanks D. R., and St. John M. F. 
Characteristics of dissociable human learning systems. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences. 17, (1994), 367-447. 
 
Mayes A. R. Memory and amnesia. Behavioural Brain Research. 66, (1995), 29-6. 
 
Mayes A W. Neuropsychology of memory and amnesia. In; Ron, Maria A. (Ed); David, 
Anthony S. (Ed). (1998). Disorders of brain and mind. (pp. 125-146). New York, NY, 
US: Cambridge University Press; New York, NY, US 
 
McCown T. J., Napier T. C, and Breese G. R. Effects of chronic electrode implantation 
on dopaminergic neurons in vivo. Pharmacology,-Biochemistry-and-Behavior. 25(1), 
(1986) 63-69. 
 
   - 269 - 
   
  
 
McDonald R. J., and White N. M.A triple dissociation of memory systems: 
Hippocampus, amygdala, and dorsal striatum. Behavioral Neuroscience. 107(1), 
(1993), 3-22. 
 
McDonald R. J., and White N. M. Parallel information processing in the water maze: 
Evidence for independent memory systems involving dorsal striatum and 
hippocampus. Behavioral and Neural Biology. 61, (1994), 560-570. 
 
Mazur J. E., Stellar J. R., and Waraczynski M. Self-control choice with electrical 
stimulation of the brain as a reinforcer. Behavioural-Processes. 15(2-3),  (1987), 143-
153. 
 
Milner T, Corkin S, and Teuber HL. Further analysis of the hippocampal amnesic 
syndrome: 14-year follow-up study of H. M.  Neuropsychologia. 1968; 6(3): 215-234. 
 
Mishkin M. Memory in monkeys severely impaired by combined but not by separate 
removal of amygdala and hippocampus. Nature. 1978 May; Vol 273(5660): 297-298. 
 
Morikle Peer Review of; Shanks D. R., and St. John M. F. Characteristics of 
dissociable human learning systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 17, (1994), 367-
447. 
 
Morris R. G., Garrud P., Rawlins J, N., and O'Keefe J. Place navigation impaired in 
rats with hippocampal lesions. Nature. 297(5868), (1982) 681-3.  
 
Muir J. L., Bussey T. J., Everitt B. J., and Robbins T. W. Dissociable effects of AMPA-
induced lesions of the vertical limb diagonal band of Broca on performance of the 5-
choice serial reaction time task and on acquisition of a conditional visual 
discrimination. Behavioural Brain Research. 82, (1996), 31-44. 
 
Muir J. L, Robbins T. W., and Everitt B. J. Disruptive effects of muscimol infused into 
the basal forebrain on conditioned discrimination and visual attention: differential 
interactions with cholinergic mechanisms. Psychopharmacology. 107, (1992), 541-
550. 
 
Muir J. L., Fischer W., and Björklund A. Decline in visual attention and spatial memory 
in aged rats. Neurobiology of Aging. 20, (1999), 605-615. 
 
Murray E. A., Gaffan E. A., and Flint R. W. Jr. Anterior rhinal cortex and amygdala: 
dissociation of their contributions to memory and food preference in rhesus monkeys. 
Behavioural Neuroscience. 110(1), (1996), 30-42. 
 
Mutter S. A., Howard Jr. J. H., and Howard D. V. Serial pattern learning after head 
injury. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology. 16(2), (1994), 271-288. 
 
Nissen M. J., and Bullemer P. Attentional requirements of learning: Evidence from 
Performance Measures.  Cognitive Psychology. 19, (1987), 1-32. 
 
Nissen M J., Knopman D. S., and Schacter D. L. Neurochemical dissociations of 
memory systems. Neurology. 37, (1987), 789-794. 
 
Nissen M. J., Willingham D., and Hartman M. Explicit and implicit remembering: When 
   - 270 - 
   
  
 
is learning preserved in amnesia. Neuropsychologia. 27(3), (1989), 341-352. 
 
Nixon P. D., and Passingham R. E. The cerebellum and cognition: cerebellar lesions 
impair sequence learning but not conditional visuomotor learning in monkeys. 
Neuropsychologia. 38, (2000), 1054-1072. 
 
Oades R. D., and Isaacson R. L The development of food search behaviour by rats: 
The effects of hippocampal damage and haloperidol. Behavioral Biology. 24. (1978). 
327-337. 
 
Oades R. D. Type of memory or attention? Impairments after lesions of the 
hippocampus and limbic ventral tegmentum Brain Research Bulletin 7(2). (1981A), 
221-6. 
 
Oades R. D. Impairments of search behaviour in rats after haloperidol treatment, 
hippocampal or neocortical damage suggest a mesocorticolimbic role in cognition. 
Biological Psyhcology. 12(1) (1981B), 77-85. 
 
Olds J., and Milner P. Positive reinforcement produced by electrical stimulation of 
septal area and other regions of rat brain. Journal-of-Comparative-and-Physiological-
Psychology. 47, (1954) 419-427. 
 
Olton D S., and Papas B C. Spatial memory and hippocampal function. 
Neuropsychologia. 1979; Vol 17(6): 669-682. 
 
Otto T., and Eichenbaum H. Complementary roles of the orbital prefrontal cortex and 
the perirhinal-entorhinal cortices in an odor-guided delayed-nonmatching-to-sample 
task. Behavioral-Neuroscience. 1992 Oct; Vol 106(5): 762-775. 
 
Overskied. Peer Review of; Shanks D. R., and St. John M. F. Characteristics of 
dissociable human learning systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 17, (1994), 367-
447. 
 
Packard M. G., Cahill L., and McGaugh J. L. Amygdala modulation of hippocampal-
dependent and caudate nucleus-dependent memory processes. Procedures of the 
National Academy of Science USA. 91(18), (1994), 8477-8488. 
 
Packard M. G., Hirsch R., and White N. M. Differential effects of fornix and caudate 
nucleus lesions on two radial maze tasks: Evidence for multiple memory systems. The 
Journal of Neuroscience. 9(5), (1989), 1465-1472. 
 
Packard M G., and McGaugh J L. Double dissociation of fornix and caudate nucleus 
lesions on acquisition of two water maze tasks: Further evidence for multiple memory 
systems. Behavioral-Neuroscience. 1992 Jun; Vol 106(3): 439-446. 
 
Packard M. G., and Teather L. A. Double dissociation of hippocampal and dorsal-
striatal memory systems by posttraining intracerebral injections of 2-amino-5-
phosphonopentanoic acid. Behavioral Neuroscience. 111(3), (1997), 543-551. 
 
Packard M. G., and Teather L. A. Amygdala modulation of multiple memory systems: 
Hippocampus and caudate-putamen. Neurobiology of Learning and Memory. 69, 
(1998), 163-203. 
   - 271 - 
   
  
 
 
Packard M. G., and White N. M. Lesions of the caudate nucleus selectively impair 
‘reference memory’ acquisition in the radial maze. Behavioral and Neural Biology. 53, 
(1990), 39-50. 
 
Packard M. G., and White N. M. Dissociation of hippocampus and caudate nucleus 
memory systems by posttraining intracerebral injection of dopamine agonists. 
Behavioral Neuroscience. 105(2), (1991), 295-306. 
 
Pascual-Leone A., Grafman J., Clark B. A., Stewart M., Massaquoi S., Lou J-S., and 
Hallett M. Procedural learning in Parkinson’s Disease and Cerebellar Degeneration. 
Annals of Neurology. 34, (1993), 594-602. 
 
Pascual-Leone A., Grafman J., and Hallett M. Modulation of cortical motor output 
maps during development of implicit and explicit knowledge. Science. 263, (1994), 
1287-1289. 
 
Pascual-Leone A., Wasserman E. M., Grafman J., and Hallett M. The role of the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in implicit procedural learning. Experimental Brain 
Research. 107, (1996), 479-485. 
 
Pascual-Leone A., Tarazona F., Keenan, J., Tormos J. M., Hamilton R., and Catala M. 
D. Transcranial magnetic stimulation and neuroplasticity.  Neuropsychologia. 37, 
(1999), 207-217. 
 
Paxinos G., and Watson C. The rat brain in stereotaxic coordinates. San Diego CA: 
Academic Press. (1986). 
 
Perruchet P., and Amorim M-A. Conscious knowledge and changes in performance in 
sequence learning: Evidence against dissociation. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition. 18(4), (1992), 785-800. 
 
Phillips A. G., and Fibiger H. C. The role of dopamine in maintaining intracranial self-
stimulation in the ventral tegmentum, nucleus accumbens, and medial prefrontal 
cortex. Canadian-Journal-of-Psychology. 32(2), (1978) 58-66. 
 
Proyck E., Dominey P. F., Amiez C., and Joseph JP. The effects of sequence 
structure and reward schedule on serial reaction time learning in the monkey. 
Cognitive Brain Research. 9, (2000), 239-248 
 
Raaijmakers W., Blockland A., and van der Staay F. J. Spatial discrimination learning 
in rats as an animal model of cognitive ageing. Behavioural processes. 30, (1993), 
165-174. 
 
Raffaele K C., and Olton D S. Hippocampal and amygdaloid involvement in working 
memory for nonspatial stimuli. Behavioral-Neuroscience. 1988 Jun; Vol 102(3): 349-
355. 
 
Rah S. K., Reber A. S., and Hsaio A. T. Another wrinkle in the dual-task SRT 
experiment: it’s probably not a dual task. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review. 7(2), 
(2000), 309-313. 
 
   - 272 - 
   
  
 
Ranaldi R., and Beninger R. J. The effects of systemic and intracerebral injections of 
D-sub-1 and D-sub-2 agonists on brain stimulation reward. Brain-Research. 651(1-2), 
(1994), 283-292. 
 
Rauch S. L., Savage C. R., Brown H. D., Curran T., Alpert N. M., Kendrick A., 
Fischman A. J., and Kosslyn S. M. A PET investigation of implicit and explicit 
sequence learning. Human Brain mapping. 3, (1995). 271-286. 
 
Reading P. J., Dunnett S. B., and Robbins T. W. Dissociable roles of the ventral , 
medial and lateral striatum on the acquisition and performance of a complex visual 
stimulus-response habit. Behavioural Brain Research. 45, (1991), 147-161. 
 
Reber A S. On the primacy of the implicit: Comment on Perruchet and Pacteau. 
Journal-of-Experimental-Psychology:-General. 1990 Sep; Vol 119(3): 340-342. 
 
Reber A. S. Theoretical focus: The cognitive unconscious: An evolutionary 
perspective. Consciousness and Cognition. 1, (1992), 93-133. 
 
Reber P. J., and Squire L. R. Parallel brain systems for learning with and without 
awareness. Learning and memory. 1, (1994), 217-229. 
 
Reber P. J., and Squire L. R. Encapsulation of implicit and explicit memory in 
sequence learning. Journal of Cognitive neuroscience. 10(2), (1998), 248-263. 
 
Reber and Winter. Peer Review of; Shanks D. R., and St. John M. F. Characteristics 
of dissociable human learning systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 17, (1994), 
367-447. 
 
Reed J,. and Johnson P. Assessing implicit learning with indirect tests: Determining 
what is learned about sequence structure. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory and Cognition. 20(3), (1994), 585-594 
 
Rescora R. A. Pavlovian conditioning: It’s not what you think it is. American 
Psychologist. 43, (1998), 151-160. 
 
Rescora R. A., and Wagner A. R. (1972). A theory of Pavlovian conditioning: 
Variations in the effectiveness of reinforcement and nonreinforcement. In A. H. Black 
and W. F. Prokasy (Eds.). Classical conditioning. II. Current research and theory. New 
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 64-99. 
 
Robbins T. W., Everitt B. J., Marston H. M., Wilkinson J., Jones G. H., and Page K. J. 
Comparative effects of ibotenic acid- and quisqualic acid-induced lesions of the 
substantia innominata on attentional function in the rat: further implications for the role 
of cholinergic neurons of the nucleus basalis in cognitive processes. Behavioural Brain 
Research. 35, (1989), 221-240. 
 
Rossi J S. Statistical power of psychological research: What have we gained in 20 
years? Journal-of-Consulting-and-Clinical-Psychology. 1990 Oct; Vol 58(5): 646-656. 
 
Rothblat L A., and Kromer L F. Object recognition memory in the rat: The role of the 
hippocampus. Behavioural-Brain-Research. 1991 Jan; Vol 42(1): 25-32. 
 
   - 273 - 
   
  
 
Rovee-Collier C., Hayne H., and Colombo M. The development of implicit and explicit 
memory. Advances in Consciousness Research. John Benjamins Publishing 
Company, Amsterdam / Philadelphia. (2001). 
 
Rozin P. The evolution of intelligence and access to the cognitive unconscious. 
Progress in Psychobiology and Physiological psychology. 6, (1976), 245-280. 
 
Ruotsalainen S., Sirviö J., Jäkälä P., Puumala T., MacDonald E., and Riekkinen Sr P. 
Different effects of three 5-HT receptor agonists on the performance of rats in 
attentional and working memory tasks. European Neuropsychopharmacology, 7 
(1997), 99-108 
 
Salmon D. P., and Butters N. Neurobiology of skill and habit learning. Current Opinion 
in Neurobiology. 5(2), (1995),184-90 
Schacter D. L. Implicit memory: History and current status. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition. 13(3), (1987), 501-518. 
 
Schacter D. L., Bowers J., and Booker J. Intention, awareness, and implicit memory: 
The retrieval intentionality criterion. In: Lewandowsky, S., Dunn, J. C., (Eds.), Implicit 
memory: Theoretical issues. (1989). Hillsdale, NJ, US: Lawrence  
 
Schacter D, and Tulving E (Eds) Memory systems 1994. 
Cambridge, MA, US: The MIT Press. (1994). viii, 407 pp. 
 
Schank J. C., and Wimsatt W. C. (1987). Generative entrenchment and evolution.  In 
A. Fine and P. Machamer (Eds.), PSA 1986: Proceedings of the meetings of the 
Philosophy of Science Association. East lansing., MI: Philosphy of Science 
Association. 33-60. 
 
Scoville W B, and Milner B. Loss of recent memory after bilateral hippocampal lesions.  
Journal-of-Neurology,-Neurosurgery-and-Psychiatry. 1957; 20: 11-21. 
 
Seamans J K., and Phillips A G. Selective memory impairments produced by transient 
lidocaine-induced lesions of the nucleus accumbens in rats. Behavioral-Neuroscience. 
1994 Jun; Vol 108(3): 456-468. 
 
Segar C. A. Two forms of sequential implicit learning. Consciousness and Cognition. 
6, (1997), 108-131. 
 
Sedlmeier P, and Gigerenzer G. Do studies of statistical power have an effect on the 
power of studies? Psychological-Bulletin. 1989 Mar; Vol 105(2): 309-316. 
 
Setlow B., and McGaugh J. L. Involvement of the posteroventral caudate-putamen in 
memory consolidation in the Morris water maze. Neurobiology of Learning and 
Memory. 71(2), (1999), 240-247. 
 
Shanks D. R Human Instrument learning: A Critical Review of Data and Theory. British 
Journal of Psychology. 84 (1993), 319-354. 
 
Shanks D. R., Green R. E. A,., and Kolodny j. A Critical Examination of the Evidence 
for Nonconscious (Implicit) Learning. IN: Attention and Performance XV: Conscious 
and Nonconscious Imformation processing. Umilta C., and Moscovitch M. (Eds). MIT 
   - 274 - 
   
  
 
Press (1994). 
 
Shapiro M L., and Olton D. S. Hippocampal function and interference. Schacter, 
Daniel L. (Ed); Tulving, Endel (Ed). (1994). Memory systems 1994. (pp. 87-117). 
Cambridge, MA, US 
 
Shanks D. R., and St. John M. F. Characteristics of dissociable human learning 
systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 17, (1994), 367-447. 
 
Sherry D. F., and Schacter D. L. The evolution of multiple memory systems. 
Psychological Review. 94(4), (1987), 439-454. 
 
Sirviö J., Jäkälä P., Mazurkiewicz M., Haapalinna A., Riekkinen P, and Riekkinen P. J. 
Dose- and parameter-dependent effects of atipamezole, an α2-antagonist, on the 
performance of rats in a five-choice serial reaction time task. Pharmacology, 
Biochemistry and Behavior. 45, (1993), 123-129. 
 
Squire L. R. Memory and the hippocampus: A synthesis from findings with rats, 
monkeys, and humans. Psychological Review. 99(2), (1992), 195-231. 
 
Sommer M., Grafman J., Clark K., and Hallett. Learning in Parkinson’s disease: 
eyeblink conditioning, declarative learning and procedural learning. Journal of 
Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry. 67(1), (1999), 27-34. 
 
Stadler M. A. On learning complex procedural knowledge. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition. 15(6), (1989), 1061-1069. 
 
Stadler M. A. Statistical structure and implicit serial learning. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition. 18(2), (1992), 318-327. 
 
Stadler M A. Implicit serial learning: Questions inspired by Hebb (1961). Memory-and-
Cognition. 1993 Nov; Vol 21(6): 819-827. 
 
Stadler M. A. Role of attention in implicit learning. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition. 21(3) (1995), 674-685. 
 
Stadler and Frensch. Peer Review of; Shanks D. R., and St. John M. F. 
Characteristics of dissociable human learning systems. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences. 17, (1994), 367-447. 
 
Stadler M. A., and Neely C. B Effects of sequence length and structure on implicit 
serial learning. Psychological Research. 60, (1997), 14-23. 
 
Stefanova E. D., Kostic  V. S., Ziropadja L., Markovic M., and Ocic G. G. Visuomotor 
skill learning on serial reaction time task in patients with early Parkinson’s disease. 
Movement Disorders. 15(6), (2000), 1095-1103. 
 
Stellar J. R., and Gallistel C. R. Runway performance of rats for brain-stimulation or 
food reward: Effects of hunger and priming. Journal-of-Comparative-and-
Physiological-Psychology. 89(6), (1975 ), 590-599. 
 
Stephens D. N., and Herberg L. J. Effects on hypothalamic self-stimulation of drugs 
   - 275 - 
   
  
 
influencing dopaminergic neurotransmission injected into nucleus accumbens and 
corpus striatum of rats. Psychopharmacology. 54(1), (1977),81-85. 
 
Terrace H S, and McGonigle B. Memory and representation of serial order by children, 
monkeys, and pigeons. Current-Directions-in-Psychological-Science. 1994 Dec; Vol 
3(6): 180-189. 
 
Tulving E, and Schacter D L. Priming and human memory systems. Science. 1990 
Jan; Vol 247(4940): 301-306. 
 
van der Staay F. J. Spatial working memory and reference memory of brown 
Norwegian and WAG rats in a holeboard discrimination task. Neurobiology of Learning 
and Memory. 71, (1999), 113-125. 
 
van der Staay F. J., van Nies J., and Raaijmakers W. The effects of aging in rats on 
working and reference memory performance in a spatial holeboard discrimination task. 
Behavioral and Neural Biology. 53, (1990), 356-370. 
 
Voytko M. L., Olton D. D., Richardson R. T., Gorman L. K., Tobin J. R., and Price D. L. 
Basal forebrain lesions in monkeys disrupt attention but not learning and memory. The 
Journal of Neuroscience. 14(1), (1994), 167-186. 
 
Wang,-Qiang, Mao,-Li-min, and Han,-Ji-sheng. The role of periaqueductal gray in 
mediation of analgesia produced by different frequencies of electroacupuncture 
stimulation in rats.International-Journal-of-Neuroscience. 1990 Aug; Vol 53(2-4): 167-
172. 
 
Waraczynski M. A., Stellar J. R., and Gallistel C. R. Reward saturation in medial 
forebrain bundle self-stimulation. Physiology-and-Behavior. (6), (1987), 585-593. 
 
Warrington E K, and Weiskrantz L. A study of learning and retention in amnesic 
patients. Neuropsychologia. 1968; 6(3): 283-291. 
 
Wesikrantz L. Neuroanatomy of memory and Amnesia: A Case for Multiple Memory 
Systems. Human Neurobiology. 6, (1987), 93-105. 
 
Westwater H., McDowall J, Siegert R., Mossman S., and Abernathy D. Implicit 
learning in Parkinson’s disease: Evidence from a verbal version of the serial reaction 
time task. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology. 20(3), (1998), 413-
418. 
 
White N. M. Mnemonic functions of the basal ganglia. Current Opinions in 
Neurobiology. 7(2), (1997), 164-169. 
 
White N. M., and McDonald R. J. Acquisition of a spatial conditioned place preference 
is impaired by amygdala lesions and improved by fornix lesions. Behavioural Brain 
Research. 55(2), (1993), 269-281. 
 
White N. M., Packard M. G., and Seamans J. Memory enhancement by post-training 
peripheral administration of low doses of dopamine agonists: possible autoreceptor 
effect. Behavioral and Neural Biology. 59(3), (1993), 230-241. 
 
   - 276 - 
   
  
 
Willingham. Peer Review of; Shanks D. R., and St. John M. F. Characteristics of 
dissociable human learning systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 17, (1994), 367-
447. 
 
Willingham D. B., Nissen, M. J., and Bullemer P. On the development of procedural 
knowledge. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition. 
15(6), (1989), 1047-1060. 
 
Willingham D. B., and Koroshetz W. J. Evidence for dissociable motor skills in 
Huntington’s disease patients. Psychobiology. 21(3), (1993), 173-182. 
 
Wimsatt W. C. (1986). Developmental constraints, generative entrenchment, scientific 
change, and the analytic-synthetic distinction: A developmental model of scientific 
evolution. In W. Bechtel (Ed.), Intigrating scientific disciplines. Dordrecht: Martinus-
Nijhoff. 185-208. 
 
Wickelgren I. The cerebellum: the brain's engine of agility. Science 281, (1998), 1588-
1590. 
 
Zola-Morgan S., and Squire L R. Medial temporal lesions in monkeys impair memory 
on a variety of tasks sensitive to human amnesia. Behavioral-Neuroscience. 1985 
Feb; Vol 99(1): 22-34. 
 
Zola-Morgan S., Squire L. R., and Mishkin M. The neuroanatomy of amnesia: 
Amygdala-hippocampus versus temporal stem. Science. 218 (1982), 1337-1339. 
 
 
 
